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San Antonio Independent School District y. Rodriguez DISCO ' ~ 
~.-'I 
::~u::::3::tional Bank of Dallas y. Rodriguez ~ ~ ~~. 
Appeal from the USDC for WD Texas (3-Judge Court)(Goldberg, USCJ, 
Spears & Roberts)(PC) 
This is the Texas school property tax equal protection 
----------------case. 
Appellees brought this action on behalf of Mexica .. 
American children and their parents who reside in the 
Edgewood Independent School District near San Antoniog 
and on behalf of all other children throughout Texas 
who live in school districts with low property valuations. -Appellees contended that the method of state financing of 
public schools deprived their class of the equal protection 




State support to public elementary and secondary schools 
in Texas is funnelled through the Available School Fund, 
which allocated approximately $296 million in 1970-71 on 
a per capita basis, and the Minimum Foundation Pro$ram, 
which allocated more than $1 billion in 1970-71 in the form 
of grants for the costs of salaries, school maintenance, 
and transportation. Eighty per cent of the Minimum 
Foundation Program is financed fnn general s~te revenues 
with the remainder apportioned to local school districts. 
Local school districts are empowered to lev~y and collect 
ad valorem property taxes to provide their share of he 
Minimum Foundation Program (20%), to satisfy bonded 
indebtedness for capital expenditures, and to finance all 
expenditures above the state minimum. It is this ad valorem 
taxation system that the USDC found unacceptable under the 
command of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Because of the large part that local ad valorem taxes 
play in financing public education in Texas, the USDC con-
cluded that this ad valorem taxation system made the guality -of education received in the public schools a function o 
t~local property tax base. For example, the USDC noted 
that a survey of 110 school districts throughout Texas demon• 
stnated that while the 10 districts with a market value 
of taxable property per pupil above $100,000 enjoyed an 
.. 
equalized tax rate per $100 of only 31¢, the poorest 4 
("'· -
districts, with less than $10,000 in taxable property per 
pupil, were burdened with a rate of 70¢. Despite the 
fact that the poor districts taxed themselves at a rate 
more than double the rich districts, the low rate of the 
rich districts yielded $585.00 per pupil, While the high 
-3-
rate of the poor districts yielded only $60.00 per pupil. 
Moreover, since certain state financial support programs 
operated on a matching funds basis, the USDC found that the 
taxation system tended to subsidize the rich at the expense 
of the poor, rather than the other way around. For poor 
school districts in Texas, the USDC correctly observed that 
the taxation and financing system was a "tax more, spend 
less system." 
Observing that the statutory and constitutional 
frarnwork in Texas for providing public education drew 
distinctions between groups of citizens depending on the 
wealth of the district in which they live (which in turn 
is a reflection of their own economic status), the USDC 
concluded that Texas would have to demonstrate a compelling 
state interest furthered by the classifications in order --to withstand constitutional attack. The demanding standard 
of e~al protection review was thou~ necessary because 
a fundamental interest, education, was involved, and 
because the distinctions were based on a suspect classifi .. 
catio~ wealth. The USDC concluded that far from showing --that compelling state interests justified the classifica-
tions, Texas had not even been able to show a reasonable 
basis for the classifications. The Supreme Court of 
California has reached a similar conclusion, Serrano y. Priest, 
5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971), as has the USDC for Minnesota, 
Van Dusartz y. Hatfield, F.Supp. (Minn. 1971). 
The USDC stayed its mandate for two years and retained 
jurisdiction, in order to give Texas an opportunity through 
its legislature to devise a new financing scheme consistent 
with the command fo the Equal Protection Clause. 
In addition, the USDC provided that its order in no way 
-4-
affected the validity and sources of payment of the debt 
obligations of school districts currently outstanding, nor 
would it affect the validity of obligations and sources of 
revenue adopted to secure them within the two-year stay 
period, 
The guts of the decision is that appellees' class was 
denied the equal protection of the laws because "the system 
of financing public education in Texas discriminates on 
the basis of wealth by permitting citizens of affluent 
districts to provide a higher quality education for their 
children, while paying lower taxes." 
In No. 71-1332 appellants are the school district and 
the State of Texas. Because of the importance of this 
issue, I would NOTE PROBABLE JURISDICIION. In the 
alternative, AFFIRM. 
In No. 71-1339 appellants are a group of iKas banks 
who underwrite and own school bonds, as well as the Securities 
Industry Assn. They seek to appeal from an order denying 
them leave to intervene as a matter of right, They sought 
to intervene after the USDC rendered its decision in the 
Tieir 
case, which had been going on for three years. ~ con-
cern is for the integrity of the debt obligatiomof the .. 
school districts, and the sources of revenue adopted to 
service those obligations. The USDC provided protection 
for these interests to the maximum extent possible. I 
would AFFIRM in this appeal. They sought to intervene far 
too late in the date, and the USDC correctly noted that 
their interests had been fully protected by the State of 
Texas. 
.... -
In No. 71-1332 the AG's of several dozen states have 
filed an amicus brief in support of jurisdiction, and the 
-5-
Governors of 5 states (Minnesota, Maine, South Dakota, 
Wisconsin, and Michigan) have filed an amicus brief in 
support of the motion to affirm. Leave to file these 
briefs should be granted. 
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TO: . J. 
F M: 
rvie ilkinaon, III 
• Pow 11, Jr. 
o. 71-1332 
!strict v. 
T st 3 , 1972 
Sc ool 
slavi hly th C lifornia cas of errano v. Pri t, icb 
in turn adopte at literally t " ctiviat chol rsbip" 
th ory of rofeasor oon and Su ar 1 th ir boo , Private 
Wealth and Pu lie • ucation, pr dica ita opinio o t e 
propo ition: 
•• h quality of public d c tion y not a 
nction of wealth oth r t n the ltb of the 
at t a ole. ' 
But th Court in both of thea c s s, gal following the 
'activi t ac ol r " , considere the lth of chool districts -
rather than the e lth of p ople - c trollin • Court 
held t Fourtee t ndment required sc ool districts of 
uequal wealth ' or s qualizin ction by t e state o t at 
the w alth availabl for education in acb cbool district 1 
approximate! t • 
2. 
Curiously, however, the Supreme Court cases relied 
upon involved "wealth classifications" that operated against 
individuals (!.~. imprisonment of indigents for failure to 
pay fines, providing criminal defendants with counsel and 
transcripts, outlawing poll taxes), whereas in Serrano and 
and RodriS'!ez the wealth classification was of "school districts". 
Professor Goldstein, University of Pennsylvania, 
in an article recently published in 120 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 
504 (1972) questions the validity of the nequal wealth of 
school districts" analysis. Indeed, a hurried reading of 
Goldstein's article is rather convincing that the school 
district wealth foundation for these opinions is logically -
and perhaps legally - insupportable. 
My own experienee in public education in Virginia -
if my recollection is correct - tends to corroborate Prof. 
Goldstein's critical view. The taxable wealth of a school 
district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the citizens 
who reside in it. A classic example is Sussex County, Virginia, 
in which Vepco has recently constructed an atomic power plant 
costing - as I recall - several hundred million dollars. 
This has resulted in the taxable wealth of that previously 
. '· ' J<-· •• 
3. 
poor county "going through the roof' , without affecting ... 
except in a few arginal cases of persona employed • the 
actual wealth of resident of the County. A similar situation 
resulted in J s City County when Anheuser-Busch built its 
plan t ere. 
My guess is that, in ter of ealth, the City of 
Richmond is on of Virginia's wealthiest school districts -
largely bee~ of indus trial nd co ercial dev lo nt 
within the City. Yet, the wealth per individual or fa ily 
y be r 1 ttv ly lo in view of the large black population. 
The educational problem in Virginia resulting from 
real estate taxes b in tb principal source of school revenue 
at the local level is i the rural cou tie - not in th 
urban centers inba ited by the blacka nd the poor wbices. 
In Giles County, for ex mple, there is littl or no high v lue 
. 
real estate or indu trial development. The county is poor 
and the people are poor, ut they are ot "ghetto" resident 
and there are very few blacks. 
I writing this morandum to you in tbe hope that 
you will go by the State epartment of · ucation and asse le 
such statistical data a y be av ilable and rel vant to 
' ' 
these questions. If you discuss this with me , perhaps 
I can indicate sources which may save you some time. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr. Larry A. BaDIP'l'ld 





Kr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III DATE: August 30, 1972 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-1332 San Antonio School 
District v. Rodriguez 
The Court in the above case (following almost 
slavishly the California case of Serrano v. Priest, which 
in turn adopted almost literally the ''activist scholarship" 
theory ofJrofessors Coons and Sugarman in their book, Private 
Wealth and Public Education, predicated its opinion on the 
proposition: 
uThe quality of public education may not be a 
function of wealth other than the wealth of the 
state as a whole. n 
But the Court in both of these cases, again following the 
"activist scholars '' , considered the wealth of school districts -
rather than the wealth of people - as controlling. The Court 
held the Fourteenth Amendment required school districts of 
11equal wealth'' or some equalizing action by the state so that 
the wealth available for education in each school district is 
approximately the same. 
2. 
Curiously, however, the Supreme Court cases relied 
upon involved "wealth classifications" that operated against 
individuals <!·B· imprisonment of indigents for failure to 
pay fines, providing criminal defendants with counsel and 
transcripts, outlawing poll taxes), whereas in Serrano and 
and Rodri&uez the wealth classification was of • school districts11 • 
Professor Goldstein, University of Pennsylvania, 
in an article recently published in 120 Univ. of Pa. L. Rev. 
504 (1972) questions the validity of the "equal wealth of 
school districts 11 analysis. Indeed, a hurried reading of 
Goldstein's article is rather convincing that the school 
district wealth foundation for these opinions is logically -
and perhaps legally - insupportable. 
My own experienee in public education in Virginia -
if my recollection is correct - tends to corroborate Prof. 
Goldstein's critical view. The taxable wealth of a school 
district does not necessarily reflect the wealth of the citizens 
who reside in it. A classic example is Sussex County, Virginia, 
in which Vepco bas recentlt constructed an atomic power plant 
coating - as I recall - several hundred million dollars. 
This has resulted in the taxable wealth of that previously 
3. 
poor county "going through the roofu. without affecting -
except in a few marginal cases of persons employed - the 
actual wealth of residents of the County. A similar situation 
resulted in James City County when Anheuser-Busch built its 
plant there. 
My guess is that, in terms of wealth, the City of 
Richmond is one of Virginia's wealthiest school districts -
largely becaa•• of industriQaL and commercial development 
within the City. Yet, the wealth per individual or family 
may be relatively low in view of the large black population. 
The educational problem in Virginia resulting from 
real estate taxes being the principal source of school revenue 
at the local level is in the L~ral counties - not in the 
urban centers inhabited by the blacks and the poor whites. 
In Giles County, for example, there is little or no high value 
real estate or industrial development. The county is poor 
and the people are poor, but they are not '"6hetto•• residents 
and there are very few blacks. 
I am writing this memorandum to you in the hope that 
you will go by the State Department of Education and assemble 
such statistical data as may be available and relevant to 
these questions. If you discuss this with me, perhaps 
I can indicate sources whicb may save you some time. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
lfp/sa 





Mr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: August 31, 1972 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-1322 San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez 
This case reminds me, as Brandeis urged, of the 
importance of the economic and sociological facts in cases 
of great social and constitutional significance. 
The Coons and Sugarman thesis (that the quality of 
education varies directly with the money spent on it) has been 
assumed by many to be true but proved by no one. BeGGre I 
accept it (in view of my own 20 years experience in public 
education and my skepticism as to facile new theories), I 
would like to see more documentation than I've found so far 
in the briefs or the shallow opinions in Serrano or Rodriguez. 
There is, of course, a relationship between reeources 
devoted to education and its quality. But it is equally true 
that money alone can't buy educational quality. 
Charlie Wright's brief for Texas challenges the 
Coons and Sugarman assumption, as it does the view that the 
Constitution requires "equal" wealth devoted to education in 
2. 
each school district. Professor Goldstein's analysis also 
questions the assumption. 
I wonder, however, whether there may not be studies 
by educators-~.~., at the great university schools of educa-
tion (Harvard and Texas), for example) - that would be relevant. 
The Coleman report is cited, but I believe this is 
now acknowledged to have various flaws. The re,prt of the 
President's Commission on School Finance (1972) may be a 
helpful source. 
These random thoughts lead me to inquire whether 
we can obtain any research assistance in this area from the 
Court Library or the Library of Congress? If this may be 
possible, will you try to frame the research questions. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
' !,.,_ ---'~-- ---~-----------~'- ________________ __......,,~ 
, 
•. 
September 7, 1972 
No. 71-1332 Rodriguez v. San Antonio 
I should read the case comment by Timothy H. Gailey -
an applicant for a clerkship - in the March 1972 issue of the 





Mr. .J. Harvie Wilkinson, m 
lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: September 27, 1972 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez No. 71-1332 
As you did not have an opportunity to obtain the Virginia information 
which we discussed, I suggest that you call the state Treasurer, your 
friend Walter Craigie, Jr., and ask him to send you a copy of the state 
Report -a public document -which contains in various statistical tables 
information as to the assessed valuation of real property in each county 
and city, and the real property tax rate in each of these subflivisions. 
In Virginia, as you lmow, the State Constitution requires property 
to be assessed at fair market value. But the practice prevails of 
"discounting" the assessed value by a specified percentage, and applying 
the tax rate to the discounted value. Thus, in Hanover County (where my 
family's farm was located), my recollection is that the assessed value 
was discounted 60-70 . before applying whatever rate the Board of 
Supervisors determined for a particular year. In view of this syiltem 
1n VirglnJa comparisons cannot be made fairly without being adjusted-
which I believe 1s done in one of the offtelal reports. 
I believe the same report (containing statistical data an taxation 
in Virginia) will show the assessed value (and possibly the adjusted 
2. 
"real value") of real estate per capita in each city and county. 
I m1derstand, of course, that Virginia statistics are net nece•sarUy 
relevant to the san Antonio case. I would like to haft a copy of the 
Virginia report primarily for my own information and to satiafy my 
curiosity. 
In speaking to Walter, I would not mention any spec1flc case: 
simply say that you would like to have a cq>y of the latest report which 
contains th ls data. 
I.. F. P., Jr. 
cc: Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
BENCH MEMO 
No. 71-1332 OT 1972 
San Antonio Independent School Dist v. Rodriguez 
Appeal from USDC WD Texas (Goldberg, Spears, Roberts~~PC) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In your memorandum to me dated September 21, 1972, 
reviewing the cases assigned to me for the first sitting 
period, you indicated that this case was of the highest 
priority. You also stated that, based upon your reading 
of the principal briefs and selected amicus briefs, it was 
your preliminary view that the USDC WD Texas was wrong. 
Finallyg you suggested that I might divert from the usual 
bench memo format and undertake to draft my memo in a manner 
that might serve as a "rough outline" of an opinion, which 
might preserve valuable time later. 
Pursuant to your suggestions, I have reviewed the briefs 
-., 
with the goal in mind of preparing an outline of the 
critical issues in the case. (I have also undertaken to 
examine a number of the critical"~in terms of importance 
to 1 
not conclusion-~secondary authorities as well as canvas~ 
A 
the major precedents.) Having only ski~d the surface in 
~ 
terms of the volume of resources touching on the problems 
raised in this case, I have arrived at a number of thresh-
hold conclusions. First, the case is clearly the most 
important one I have participated in since you came on the 
Court (indeed, it is possibly the most important case in 
recent years). 
i ~S 
Second, there ... a seemingly endless 
number of paths that one might pursue to the resolution 
of this controversy. There simply are no constants• the -factual premises are as disputable as the legal conclusions. 
I, thereforep find it impractical (and possibly impossible) 
to draft an outline opinion at this stage. Thirdp despite 
this disappointing response to your request, I do find 
that ~ny intelligent and thorough opinion would grapple 
~ith several issues, and it may prove most helpful if I 
attempt to designate those matters and endeavor to collate 
the contentions and basic source material on each. 
One final caveat. It is not my anticipation that this 
will be the last memo I write in this case. Rather, it is 
my estimation and hope that we will do much exchanging of 
views before this case comes to rest. I look forward to 
participation in this case with more enthusiasm than I 
can recall possessing heretofore for other cases. This 




This suit was filed in the USDC WD Texas in 1968 by 
the parents of school children residing in Edgewood Ind. 
School Dist against the State Bd of Educ, the Att Gen of 
the State, and the Bexar Gty (San Antonio) Bd of Trustees. 
A three-judge ct was properly convened in light of the 
nature of the attack on the state laws governing the financing 
of education as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The major factual findings relate to the manner in which 
the State system operates and the manner in which it affects 
both the plaintiff school district and other districts 
throughout the state. 
Texas, much like 49 other States, funds (i) elementary 
and secondary schools from two primar sources• state-
2.. 
funded foundation grants an local property tax contri-
butions that are collected and expended locally. The 
State "Foundation School Program" is itself funded from 
two sources. Eighty percent of the Fund comes from state 
revenues, while 20% comes from local district contributions. 
The State Fund goes to pay for teacher salaries, building 
maintenance, and transportation. Some confusion in com-
puting the amount of the state aid is caused by the use 
in the several briefs of statistics from two different 
school years. The DC found that state aid contributed 
$210.00 to Edgewood and $237 to Alamo Heights, the most .--- ._ 
wealthy district in the Cty (these fgures are per pupil, 
per year). The Serrano amici, apparently relying on figures 
for the same year (1967~68), arrived at $222 for Edgewood 
and $225 for Alamo Heights. (CC & S at 16) Appelleeso rely-
.. ,...4 ...... 
ing on statistics from 1970-71, found that state aid accounted 
for $350 in Edgewood and $393 in Alamo Heights (the locality's 
required share, or Local Fund Assignment, uped the former 
to $356 and the latter to $491). If these figures are 
accurate despite the fact that they were not mentioned by 
the DC, they would seem to indicate a not insubstantial 
increase in state participation over the last three years. 
The second major source of school finance--local 
property taxes--has not changed much over the same period. 
The DC found that in 1967-68 Edgewood had a market value of 
real property per student of $5,429 and was able to raise 
$21 per pupil. Alamo Heights possessed a market value per 
pupil of over $45,000 and provided $307 per pupil in taxes. 
~i 
The astonishing trgurep however, was the tax rate. Edge-
wood taxed itself at a rate of $1.05 per $100 of property 
value while Alamo Heights taxed itself at only $.85 per 
$100 valuation. These two districts demonstrate the 
prototypical result often found by comparing the districts 
with the least property wealth against the one with the 
most--the poor districts tax themselves at a higher rate 
but yield substantially less in terms of educational 
expenditures per pupil. (More recent figures provided by 
appellees ~sh~ that at the same rates Edgewood nO\'l provides 
$37 per pupil while Alamo Heights provides $412.) 
In addition to the comparison of plaintiff's district 
to others in San Antonio, the DC relied on a study om 
110 of Texas' 1200 school districts showing that in the -
wealthiest districts (over $100,000 taxable property per 
pupil) expenditures of $585 could be derived from a tax 
--5~-
rate of 31¢. In the poorest districts (under $10,000 per 
pupil of taxable property} a 70¢ rate yielded only $60.00 
per pupil. In the bulk of intermediate school districts 
the correlations weee not so exagerated. 
(The state and local figures outlined above can be 
bewildering. The parties are not presenting the Ct with 
identical data, instead they pull statistics from affidavits 
f4iled which ~over, with varying degrees of completeness, 
several years of this litigation. Moreover, there is no 
reason to expect that the Edgewood-Alamo Heights statis-
tics reflect disparities throughout the state. The 
broader 110 district sample is challengable both because 
of the size of the sample and the lack of significant 
correlation except at the extremes. The parties, however, 
should concede that this case will not be won or lost on the 
basis of the particular statistics in this case. In 
approaching such a massive problem the Ct cannot be so 
myopic as to disregard the .:ealities of sc~ financi~ 
on a nationwide basis. That is, it will necessarily pin 
its decision on generalities about school financing through 
property taxation at the district level. And, of course, 
those generalities must be verified. I will return shortly 
to the question of what generalities must be sustained in 
order for plaintiffs to succeed.) 
Based on these factual findings, the DC held that the 
Texas system of school financing discriminated on the basis 
of district wealth. It found that this case was appropriate 
for treatment under the "compelling state interest" umbrella 
of the Ct's Equal Protection decisions. It justified this 
--6--
categorization on the dual 
a fundamental interest and 
1 · · h o d · · cone us~ons t at e ucat~on ~s 
tha~eal~h"based classifications 
are suspect. Based on this foundation, the DC accepted 
the principle of "fiscal neutrality" ..... the quality of public -----------.... 
education may not be a function of wealth, other than the 
wealth of the State as a whole. Not only was it able to 
find a compelling state interest for the state's program, 
it found that the state had failed "even to establish a 
reasonable basis for these classifications." Finally, it 
emphasized that plaintiffs had not advocated, and the ct 
I• ,~ · 
had not approved, a rule that educational expenditures 
---=-
~ust be~al. Any rational scheme of financing ... -apart 
from wealth ... based classifications ...... would pass muster. This 
choice was for the State to make and not for the federal 
ct. The DC, thereforep stayed its hand for two years to 
.. ,, .. , + .. lo le. 
allow the state to devise anj · g· ,, plan. 
III. THESIS 
The focus of this case from start to finish must be 
on the inquiry whether quality education may depend on the 
wealth of political subdivisions within any given state. 
Even before that question may be asked we must come to 
grips with several of the factual premises of that thesis. 
But, and this seems to be of paramount importance, the Ct 
must avoid the temptation to mislabel the case. It is not 
a case designedp necessarily, to provide some remedy for 
the educational ills of .._ racial minorities or of the 
poor. Certainly some "poor" children and some minority-group -children will profit but so will many who cannot claim either 
~~ 7--
status and whose only injury derives from his place of 
residence within a property"poor school district. It is 
not surprising that these factors keep springing up. Plain" 
tiffs made a showing of correlation between individual 
po~erty and relative educational deprivation, as well as a 
showing that minorities were clustered in property-poor 
districts. In fact, while it did not rely on the findings, 
the DC did note that in the San Antonio area the poor and 
the minorities were lumped in property-poor districts. 
Despite those findings, those who crusade for uplifting the 
educational status of the poor and the Black or the Mexican-
American may be disappointed. The other "mislabel" that 
seems to crop up is that this is somehow an equalization of 
expenditure case (see C.A. Wright's Reply brief at 12). Every-
one who has written about this case has emphasized that 
equalization of expenditures is not the theme. Goldstein, 
in his article in the u. Pa. L. Rev. 9 makes this point 
several times (pp 512, 513, 518). As I have already pointed 
out, the DC was careful to note this fact. 
IV. FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THESIS 
(1) Relationship between money spent on education and 
its quality. 
You have indicated in your memos on this case a special 
concern about this aspect of the thesis. Certainly if we 
could conclude that there is no correlation between money 
and educational quality this case would be over. If money 
doesn't buy education then the deprivation of money doesn't 
deny the opportunity to enjoy education and 9 ergo, the equal 
.... a ..... 
protection clause has not been violated by the state. As 
you have pointed out, however, "there is a correlation, 
of course, between resources devoted to education and 
its quality." (Memo of 8/31/72) Texas also acknowledges 
that "there is some minimum sum of dollars beneath which a 
sound education cannot be had." (C.A. Wright brief at 18) 
The President's Comm'n on School Finance comes to largely 
the same conclusion: 
---:2 
"The truth is that educational research is only be-
ginning to come to grips with the complexity of the 
total teaching process •••• But, reason would seem to 
indicate that there must be fruitful ways to spend 
more money to improve schools •••• We recongnize that 
money builds schools, keeps them running, pays the 
teachers, and in crucial if not clearly defined ways, is 
essential if children are to learn." (P. xi) 
This unwillingness to be more assertive about the 
relationship between money and quality is largely a con-
sequence of recent studies finding no or little correlation 
between increased expenditures and educational conse-
quences. Most notable are the Coleman Report and the more --
recent Jencks Report accounts published in the press. The 
ry 
former has been criticized for its method and for its 
adopted measure of quality (esse~tially ..-k scores on 
tests designed to measure ~~degree of improvement in 
particular subject areas). 
The contentions of the parties derived from these 
uncertain studies should be briefly set out. The State 
of Texas asserts that at some defined minimum of per pupil 
expenditures the State is providing every child with a 
-.-9---
"basic" of "fundamental" education. This is certainly true • 
./ 
: _~ There is undoubtedly some level of state expenditure at 
~·~- ~w~ich the parties would agree that an adequate minimum 
t! ~.\X ~ educational package has been offered and that any local 
~ expenditure above that figure would be simply icing on the 
~ ·.~ ~ Texas characterizes its expenditure system in 




guarantee an adequate education to every child. • • • 
Beyond the state program, each district is left free to 
spend more money as its resources and its desires indicate." 
(C.A. Wright reply at 17) (see also p. 4 of opening brief) 
How do we determine whether $200 is adequate, or whether 
$350 is adequate? Who is to bear the burden? A number of 
answers to those questions have been oYfered in the briefs 
and in the underlying literature. 
One approach is to ask whether the State can be said to 
have genuinely determined that it's share of the financial 
burden provides a fundamnetal education when every school 
district that has the resources taxes itself to add on to 
the state grant. When the state grant fails to provide for 
art courses, a school newspaper, vocational training, a 
sports program, libraries (or any of a myriad of other 
things) but somehow every school district decides that it 
must have them--sometimes at the expense of the things the 
state grant labels as minimum (teacher salaries, maintenance)--
J ,Hd,.,...£ 
is it rational to the property tax-based side of 
the funding? The State itself, reasonimg along the same 
line, encourages local districts to spend more on teachers 
and those schools that do are rewarded with higher state 
--10--
grants. Texas will not be able honestly to claim that it 
has not heretofore acted on the presumption that money and 
the quality of education are related. 
On a national level it is almost universally true that 
public education is a function of mutual effort between 
state funding and local property taxes. Goldstein notes 
that 52% of all state spending on schools comes from 
local contributions (p. 507). Although we do not have a 
percentage breakdown cited in ~the briefs a look at the 
spending figures indieates that close to half of the money 
in any but the poor districts comes from local taxation. 
In such a system the schools that must rely on the state .. "'. 
aid aloneAli~ely to be inferior institutions in a large 
number of demonstrable ways. Teacher salaries will be 
~~, ~~~ ~ · alcowt~vr:t~elassses will be larger, fewer extracurricular 
~. ~- ~ ~ ~ will be found, libraries will be smaller, etc. 
It '\" 
~ _ ~ .· .. ~ In sum, as measured by the inputs, it will be clear that 
rrfl-':! , rv' , , .., ., 
these schools are inferior. When the output computations 
~~ ~ are so ambiguous it may make good sense to rely on the ---objective indicia. This was the approach taken in the (l ~J 
~ ~ several pre-Brown v. Bd of Educ cases under the separate but 
~ equal doctrine. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 u.s. 629 (1950) is 
vv "\'"! 
· ~ probably the best example of comparisons between objective 




The President's Comm'n relies, in part, on the demon-
strated fact that when parents have a choice between schools, 
other things being held constant, they will send their kids 
.. -11--
to the school that spends more. It is an assumption that 
educators have almost universally taken as a given and 
so lo"'t -.c 
..... the rejection of that principle provides nothing 
but uncertainty, it is likely that educators will continue 
i-t-. 
to rely on ...... .a-. .. This is one area where your own 
experience as an educational planner may be of service to 
the Court. Are gross disparities between per pupil ~--), 
""'A&e· ~vr---­
expenditures fairly indicative of disparities in the ~· ~. 
quality of education received? c::r4t 'f ~ 
~d ~?~·$~ 
The question is made somewhat easier here because in~~ 
every state the discrepencies are still significant and 
Texas is no exception. 
Appellees also argue that insofar as the future of 
conducted on 
educational research and experimentation will be/the 
i + ,~ fi'J'\ 
proving ground of state-supported schools Afair to 
deprive property-poor districts of the opportunity to parti• 
cipate in that process. These are the essential touch-
points in the debate over the wealth-quality relationship• 
I will save my conclusions for later. 
(b) Is market value of property in a district an adeqQate 
.... :1,"':7" .. ' 
measure of4weal£h? e 
To the extent that this inquiry is relevant to the case, 
it is a source of much controversy. It is my judgment that 
this case will not rise or fallv however, on the basis of 
this factual dispute. Nevertheless, it has been pushed into 
con 
the case by the parties and ilsumes considerable space in 
the principal briefs• it, therefore, deserves treatment here. 
..... 12--
The question posed focuses on the relationship between 
"individual wealth" and "district wealth." The latter is __ __, ___ _____ - . 
measured in terms of the assess Able real property (measured 
at fair market value) per pupil. That is, all the 
• 
assess l ble property is added up (residential» commercial, 
and industrial) and divided by the number of students or 
"task units" within the district. The category of individual 
wealth is reflected in as many as three relevant measure-
~
ments. One might look to the median family income (what 
the income of the family in the dead center of a continuum of 
incomes makes), or at the mean family income (the average 
income). Or, in an effort to relate district wealth to 
real poverty, one might focus on the number of families 
within any district living below the "poverty level." 
The DC relied on statistics regarding median family 
incomes and found a positive correlation 9 i.e.P the more -taxable real groperty in a district the richer the families. 
4 
{ 
T~s , relying on the Goldstein article 0 challenges those 
findings. Goldstein notes that the statistics relied upon 
.... ,..,.,. 
do not cover all school districts but only a selct portion. 
And 0 even within that sample, the correlation exists only at 
one 
the extremes. Texas also directs the Ct to il6 law review 
articlel (Kansas L Rev) and a California study tending to 
reject the thesis that any correlation exists. 
A very recent study performed by the Yale L. Rev. (which 
has been circulated to counsel and the Ct although still in 
page proofs) is the most complete analysis yet available. 
The Yale study undertook to examine every school district in 
the State of Connecticut (save two). They compared statis-
--lJ .... 
tically ... district property wealth with (1} the median ~ 
fV · 
family income, (2) mean family income, and (3) the number 
of "poverty-level" families within each district. Its -
findings were that district wealth correlated well with 
~th median and mean family incomy but that there was 
-
no discernible correlation between poverty families and 
district wealth. On the latter pointp it was shown that in 
Connecticut the really poor tend to be spread throughout 
the state's school districts. Some, of course, were resi- 1~~ 
dents of property-poor districts but others were residents 
of districts with very high assessible property. 
Yale, Goldstein, and the authors of Private Wealth and 
Public Education explain this lack of correlation in the 
0. 
same m• nner. The crucial factor in many districts is the 
existence of commercial or industrial property which is 
generally more valuable than residential property and 
often taxed at a higher rate. This finding comports with 
..., ..... 
your example of the Virginia school district in which a ,. 
major power plant was constructed. It also explains why 
oil .. rich West Texas has some of the sturdiest property 
tax bases and some of the poorest people. 
The architects of this thesis that has been adopted by 
the Texas ct and by cts in at least three other states have 
recognized from the very outset that "fiscal equality" or -
"fiscal neutrality" was not a principle geared to uplifting ............_ ____ _ 
the poor individual. Their thesis has focused instead on - -those who are "education poor." It has looked to those 
'-ll.lii&AIIIIU~G o-&- ' " • J e , .. #:. lot~ 'It J., '"~I 
schools thaSoffer Ln erLor e ucatLonal programs and 
has concluded that those children have been deprived of 
v..l 
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education on the basis of a wealth category created by 
the state. They find that individual famil wealth is 
largely irrelavant if it cannot buy education. The state 
~ ___,-
has said what "coin" or indicia of wealth will be utilized 
to acquire education and those that have relatively 
fewer of that "coin" must suffer irrespective what 
other assets they may possess. One gropes for analogies 
to make the point that seems to have been lost on the 
principal parties. Maybe the point becomes clearer if 
we look to the days in our country's history predating 
the existence of a common currency. If the State of 
Virginia had required that a child's education be paid for 
in cloth goods or other merchandise, those parents who 
had only grain and produce would have been disadvantaged 
and we might consider them "poor" in terms of their ability 
to purchase education. Of course, insofar as they were 
able to convert from one currency to another-"insofar as 
they could exchange grain for cloth goods--their poverty 
would be diminished. But, where convertibility is pro-
hibited as a practical matter, the "cloth poor" remain 
"education poor." This is pretty close to the situation 
with public education today. If a famil wishes to purchase 
~ a better education from the State of Texas they do it 
~ . -/( largely throu h their property tax payment, an~ 
At the risk of belaboring an obvious point, one more 
non-hypothetical may be of value. The statistics reprinted 
in the Serrano-amicus briefs show that out of 1200 districts 
in the State of Texas the Ysleta School Dlstrict was 6th 
--15--
from the ..._ bottom in terms of per pupil expenditures for 
education. Its combined state and local contributions 
netted an expenditure rate of $296 per pupil. The Ysleta 
district is the one in which my family's home is situated. 
When I was in public school the District could not yet afford 
a high school and I was fortunate enough to be sent back 
Ysleta 
into the wealthier El Paso School District (with the/District 
paying the tuition to the City). Two of my brothers and 
1-1.~ Yc/cf«.; 
one sister went through ~ school system, however, and 
,. ,._;,'X 
their educational offerling was always t · 3 .? deficient 
(in my parents eyes) in comparison with the education offered 
in the El Paso Schools. But, the options open to my parents 
were few indeed. They would gladly have devoted more of their 
personal income to education but did not have enough to send 
~>the kids to private schools. They could, and did~ vote in 
UJ ~ ~ favor of every school bond issue. They also promoted 
increasing the :d valorem tax rate. This was the extent of 
W""" ,.. • o/-o ~r to effect the quality of public education that 
:·_A;~ their children received In practical terms it mattered 
~~- . ---- I 




a greater share of their income for education. Or, neither 
did it matter that they were not "poor" in terms of the 
median income in the State. 
Momentarily, I will return to this problem of wealth 
and the purchase of education in considering the constitut-
ional arguments. One final "factual assumption" should be 
mentioned first. 
--16--
(c) Is a property-tax based ysstem for financing public 
education discriminatory on a minority or racial basis? 
As I have stated earlier, this issue seems entirely 
spurious and is a product, primarily, of the case's .. 
advocates1 in the press and the law reviews excessive 
zeal for the result. It has been billed by some proponents 
as a means for eradicating racial disccimination i1fhe pro" 
vision of education. Indeed, the DC did find that minority 
'r--~~----·~---------~ 
groups were concentrated in property-poor districts. Again, 
however, the ratio holds true only in the extremely rich or 
extremely poor districts. The property-poverty of a school 
district• depends too significantly on the drawing of lines 
~ ~----------~~--'---------~ 
and on the existence of high-yield property to be susceptible 
to the conclusion that all or any significant percentage 
of the poor districts are glutted with minorities. Certain-
ly, Mexican~Americans in Edgewood will profit from the DC 
decision but their gain is incidental or even coincidental 
to the benefits accruing to all the children in property-
poor districts where the tax effort has been high and the 
educational yield low. I will not waste further time on 
this "herring." 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
The Constitutional argument is styled in the language 
of recent precedents of this Ct recognizing a differentia-
tion between levels of justification necessary to support a 
state's classifications in terms of the suspect nature 
of the classification and/or the fundamentality of the 
interests affected. That approach to the 14th Amendment 
--17---
is generally referred to as the "compelling state interest" 
analysis byl its proponents, and as to "new equal protection" 
by its critics. Essentially it differentiates between two 
types of cases. Most cases involve differences in treatment 
under state law that are entirely permissible so long as 
they are supported by some "rational" or "reasonable" 
basis. Cases of economic regulation have long resided 
in that area. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483 (1955). More recently, welfare ca~es (Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 u.s. 471 (1970)) and housing (Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972»have been placed in the same 
category. Cases involving more "fundamental" interests, 
however, have called for a highe~ more demandin& showing 
of legitimate state interest. In that category the Ct has 
found (1) the right to vote (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. -
330 (1972), (2) the right to a fair criminal process 
(,J) 
(Griffin v. Illinois, 351 u.s. 12 (1956), andAthe right to 
interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 u.s. 618 (1969)). 
In this category as well are cases involving classifi-
cations touching upon First Amendment rights (Police Dept -
of City of Chicago v. Mosley, June, 1972). 
The higher or more demanding showing is also required 
in another group of cases which involve classifications 
11 , ._ 
on the basis of some particularly suspect category of 
persons. Foremost in this arena, of course, are classifi-
cations based on race. A~enage has also been found in 
...._., " 
this "suspect" category (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
Wealth has heretofore been recognized as the 
\
365 (1971)). 
third member of the suspect category group(Harper v. Virginia, 
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383 u.s. 663 (1966), Bullock v. Carter, 405 u.s. 134 (1972)). 
Historically, a finding that either the state law 
tC ~\ 
impinges upon a fundamental interest Q£ draws into question an 
\t ~ 
invideous or suspect classification, was sufficient to 
support a requirement that the state must meet the higher 
justification of "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state 
interest." For instaflce, in race cases the state • s cate-
gorization is always subjected to careful scrutiny no 
matter what the interest affected is. Likewise, when the 
right to interstate travel or the right to vote is impinged 
upon it makes no difference that the state discrimination 
was not drawn along any "suspect" line. In sum the -
I 
two doctrines--fundamental interest and suspect category--
operated largely independently to invoke closer scrutiny. 
Appellees concede that this has never been the case with 
respect to wealth-based classifications. A quick review 
of the major wealth cases confirms that conclusion. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 u.s. 12 (1956), which involved 
the right of an indigent to a transcript for use on appeal, 
involved both a wealth.,.based classification and a "fundan'ffotal" 
interest in a fair criminal process. Douglas v. California, 
~
372 U.S. 353 (1963),concerning the right to court-appointed 
counsel on appeal, also inplicated the right to a fair 
criminal process in conjunction with a wealth barrier. 
Harper v. Virginia Bd of Elections, 383 u.s. 663 (1966), 
the case that struck down the Virginia poll tax, was c&:ght 
up in the right to vote as well as a wealth-premised dis-
crimination. Most recently, Bullock v. Carter, 405 u.s. 
134 (1972)--the Texas primary filing fee case--also found 
., 
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a union of wealth discrimination and a fundamental interest 
in the right to vote for the candidate of one's choice. 
It is with these precedents in mind that plaintiffs 
attacked the Texas system of financing public schools. 
They,and the Seranno-amici, have been content to argue 
that the state need show a compelling interest for its scheme 
~n~ if the Court agrees that (1) the present system dis--criminates on the basis of wealth, and (2) that it impli-
cates a fundamental right to education. If either were 
found lacking the State would only have to measure up to 
the lesser "rational basis,. standard. You, of course, 
need not accept this entire approach to the equal protection 
clause, But, before turning to a consideration of alter-
natives, I will explore the case as presented. 
(a) Classification on the basis of wealth 
In my discussion of the factual assumpt~ons underlying 
the constitutional argument, I endeavored to demonstrate 
that there is not a great deal of difficulty encountered 
in finding that the Texas educational system is wealth-
based, It may or may not discriminate against the "poor." 
However, ~ c:early does discriminate against the propert¥-
PJ~• i.e., because of a system established by the state, 
definable classes of its citizens ... find that they are ,, " 
without the resources to provide an a:Pequate education to 
their children, In some districts the discrimination 
results only in relative deprivation--the taxpayers must 
try harder to arrive at the same level of educational offer-~ 
ing of other property-endowed districts. In other districts, 
speaking in practical realities, the ·citizens are effect-
ively barred from attaining the same level of educational 
offereing as other districts because only an unattainably 
high rate of self"taxation would net the same funds as 
are available in more wealthy districts. 
\ \ 
" There are, however, two barriers in the wealth portion -
of the equal protection formula which any opinion would 
have to deal with. 
First, as the State of Texas emphasizes, all of the -
former wealth cases have focused on the wealth of individ-
~v . uals. Now, for the first time, the Ct is focusing on a 
~ ~classification based on the wealth of a collection of 
~ ~~ individuals, the wealth of a political su~;vision.True, 
~~ -~ this ~s a distinction but in the words of Socratic method, 
~~ ' ,f 
~ ::i:::e:::st:0:e~1::::i:::i::i::~:~t3:)d:::e;e:::~ i:~A. 
sufficient substance to the distinction to warrant any 
devotion of time. 
Second, the wealth classification has not received 
what I could call unwavering protection from the Court. 
One might argue that the wealth classification is not 
a..,. J.. 
itself suspect Ill that each of the wealth cases may be 
explained in terms of the fundamental interest impli-
cated. This argument derives from the point I made pre--viously that wealth has not attained an independent status. 
While the nonindepenaence is surely true, it is not accurate 
to argue that the "wealth classification" cases do not 
emphasize the wealth aspect of the case. There is ample 
language to substantiate the plaintiffs' claim for a 
preferred treatment. One recent precedent, however, poses 
--21--
more serious problems for any smooth rationale for 
a wealth classification. 
In a 5-3 decision, during Justice Black's last Term on 
the Court he authored James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
James challenged, on equal protection grounds, the Calif 
Const provision requiring that no local housing projects 
could be constructed in any county in the State without the 
.q,J.,, +urn 
prior approval of the local electorate in a referendum ...a . 
The lower ct had found the provision unconstitutional 
largely on the basis of Humter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 384 (1969). 
charter provision 
In Hunter the Ct invalidated an Akron, Ohio 61dij4i61 
that required that all ordinances dealing with real estate 
as it related to Problems of race must be approved by a 
majority vote in a City election. The Ct found that this 
provision discriminated on the basis of race--racial 
housing ordinances could become law only with the approval of 
a majority of the voters while other housing matters did 
not require such procedure. Since race has long been a sus-
pect classification, the Ct applied the "rigid scrutiny" 
formula and found the Akron charter lacking in sufficient 
basis. Justice Black found Hunter distinguishable because 
James was not a race case and he was unwilling to "extend" 
Hunter. He did not say that wealth was not a suspect cate-
gory. Instead he emphasized that referendums "demonstrate -- .. 
devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, ~ 
prejudice." He found that, at the most, the Calif Const 
provision migqt be found to "disadvantage" "diverse and 
shifting groups" but that this alone was not enough. 
While Black did not focus on any wealth classification, 
\ 
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the dissenters (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun) did. Their 
opinion emphasized that "classifications on the basis of 
poverty" are "suspect" and "demand exacting judicial 
scrutiny." 
,., 1 fJ J, -1- J, c 1-otn,l f fJ 
Read broadly, as Texas reads it, James signal the 
death of the wealth classification's suspect nature. Such 
a devastating conclusion is probably unwarranted since Justice 
Black did not dispose of the case explicitly on that ground. 
The case may be viewed as relying instead on the peculiar 
1 f th f · · +o 1· · 1 d va ue o e ree re~n g~venAth~po ~t~ca process an ~o 
community decisionmaking as an experience in democracy. 
Any very broad holding accorded James is undercut by the 
Court's subsequent unanimous decision in Bullock v. 
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), in which the CJ relied, in 
part, on the wealth-based discrimination against voters 
and candidates who lacked the funds to place a candidate 
on the primary ballot. Bullock itself is a somewhat 
enigmatic decision, however, since it rests on both the 
right to vote and the wealth discrimination. But, at the 
least, Bullock is a "strict scrutiny" case which relies, in 
part, on the wealth classification and undercuts the notion 
that James killed the category. It is my judgment that 
whatever result is reached in the instant case James 
will not be the determinative precedent. 
(b) Fundamentality of Education 
A great deal of space has been devoted in the briefs to 
the question whether education is fundamental, in the 
sense that other interests 0 such as fair criminal process, 
.. 
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voting, interstate travel, and speech-related interests, 
have been found to be. The argument is made really on 
several fronts. First, plaintiffs cite the long string of 
Supreme Court cases in which the Ct has recognized the special 
role of public education in this country. Brown v. Bd of 
Education, 347 u.s. 493 (1954) is the first and most often 
cited source a 
Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. Compulsory 
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society. 
It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today 
it is the principal instrument in awakening the child 
to cultural values ••• In these days, it is doubtful 
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of education. 
Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken 
to provide it, is a right which must be made available 
to all on eEJ:ual terms." 
Similar, although not quite as powerfully said, is language 
from a number of other cases. Interstate RR Co. v. Mass-
achusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907) (Justice Holmes); Myer v. 
Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); McCollum v. Bd of Education, 333 U.S. 
203 (1948) (Justice Frankfurter); Abington School Dist v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See also each of the more 
recent cases we cited in Healy v. James for the importance of 
freedom of speech in the marketplace of American schools. 
On top of that precedential foundation plaintiffs 
- - -------
stack the following assertions. Education is the necessary 
minimum if a citizen is to participate fairly in the free 
'~ --
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enterprise system. Without it he is hobbled at the gate. -Education is necessary to give meaning to the rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The right to speak, 
~ ~------
the right to petition the government, and the concomitant 
right to receive information are largely meaningless for 
the uneducated. By the same token, if voting is necessary 
for participation in the foundational political process, 
education is essential if that right is to have any real 
substantive worth. 
On the other side, Texas does not contend that education 
is unimportant. Instead, it argues that it is not "funda .. 
mental" in terms of the interests protected under the 14th 
To establish this proposition the State looks to 
I 
Amendment. 
recent cases which have dealt with other important human 
r .... 
interests. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 the Ct 
~ " """ -refused to classify public welfare assistance as a funda-
mental interest entitled to protection under the higher 
scrutiny standard. Rather, ~ lumped welfare in the cateaory 
of "economic and social" interests. The fact that welfare 
"involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," was not itself sufficient to justify apply-
ing a higher constitutional standard. That view was under-
lined last Term in Jefferson v. Hackney when the Ct cited 
Dandridge favorably and stated that welfare legislation would 
pass muster so long as the "judgments are rational and not 
invideous." The same tact was taken in Lindsey v. Normet, 
405 u.s. 56 (1972) with respect to housing. The Ct rejected -
an effort to persuade the Ct that the "need for decent shelter" 
.. -25--
was a fundamental interest calling for "a more stringent 
standard that mere rationality." While stating that it 
would not "denigrate the importance of decent, safe and 
sanitary housing," the Ct concluded that t:he "Const does 
not provide judicial remedies for every social, and economic 
wrong." From these cases Texas reasons that if subsistence 
and housing are not fundamental, education cannot be. 
Of course, appellees argue to the contrary. They note .... ~ .... 
that the Court's interest in education · longer 
history thal the more recent concerns for welfare and ( 
housing. Also, education affects more people more directly.~ 
Most importantly, appellees and amici differentiate those 
cases on the ground that the fundamental right to an 
acceptable education is rooted in the "Document" itself 
~--------------------------
because it is inherent in the full exercise of First 
Amendment rights and the right to participate in the 
political process. 
In the case law analysis one other case is found to be 
significant by the State of Texas. They cite Gordon v. 
Lance, 4U3 U.S. 1 (1971) involving a West Virginia requirement 
that all local bond issues or increases in tax rates be 
approved by a 60% majority in a local referendum. In this 
case there was a School Bd bond issue that failed to 
get the requisite 60% in a referendum (it received 51.55% 
support). In a short opinion the CJ held that the statute 
was neutral, supported by rational state interests, and was 
not violative of the equal protection clause. Texas argues 
that since this was a case involving education, if there is 
a funda~tal interest in that area, the Ct would have said so. 
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Briefly, I find this argument unpersausive. The Ct billed 
the case as a voting rights case, not as a threat to any 
tt> 
fundamental interests in education or any other municipal 
A 
services. The statute did not interfere in any signifi-
cant way with education as opposed to other local interests. 
And, the attack was not based on a claim of deprivation of 
any right to education. 
Another argument, h "- considerably more merit, is a1.ng • -made by the State. The State contends that it will not be 
enough for the Ct to conclude that there is a fundamental 
right to education. Instead we will have to determine what 
about education makes it "fundamental" and then determine 
whether the disparities between districts
1
occasioned by the 
reliance on local property taxation are so substantial as to 
' constitute a denial of that fundamental interest. This 
1'~~ ~'argument is the legal face placed on the State 0 s argument 
~' ·_j~ C. «.l C'.S 
~- ._ challenging the~ factual assumptions, i.e. that the State's 
~ share of aid to education provides whatever is fundamental ,, 
~~ ~t an education. I agree with appellants that there 
,, must be some difference in constitutional terms between 
~ '~t!;~ absolu~iv~ion of _ a fund:;tal r;t an;-;: 
( ~) relative deprivation of that right. Certainly, if the re-
/.k · ~ lative deprivation was a mere several dollars per student per 
~~,...,~ 
• 
be hard pressed to find a violation of equal 
large measure, the resolution depends on the 
_..~ same factors considered in my discussion of the State's 
~ factual argument (see ~~ .• ~11~. 
~ ~ .~ as large as they appea~ 1.n th1.s case, the issue of relative 
~ deprivation becomes less troublesome. Alsop where the proof 
. • L _A I ' '' ..,. 
~ ~ rtJ• ....... e.hN~ :--
Where the discrepancies are 
• > • 
I 
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is that every district that can afford it spends more 
per pupil on education than do the property-poor districts, 
a strong case may be made that the actions of the citizens 
themselves establish .. what they find to be a fundamental 
educational opportunity. 
Much time will--and ought, to be;-devoted to this question. 
One thing that should be kept in mind is the need for the Ct 
to stay away from beling placed in the position of designating 
some figure as constituting a "minimum" education. That is 
a matter for each state to conclude for itself--not for this 
Ct. The Constitution does not provide for a fundamental 
education. It only provides that if a state offers a ..... ... 
fundamental education to some it must not offer less than than 
to others simply because of their lack of wealth. You have 
already placed your finger on one of the reasons why the 
Ct must not lose sight of the limitations of the Equal Pro-
tection clause. In your memo to Jay of 9/28/72 you suggest 
that the San Antonio theory, "carried to its ultimate extreme" 
would "require nationalization of all public schools." This 
is only a real possibility if the Ct forgets that its focus 
is on the state and the state's provison of education. Only -
if the Ct were to declare some fundamental hum right to 
education would differences between states become consti--------- ____________ ....... 
tutionally relevant. It is only after the state has under-
~taken to prov~de a service--here education--that the Ct 
~
requires that it offer it to all on an equal basis. And, 
it is for the State to define the "education" it is offering. 
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Texas would have the Ct accept the notion that it has deter-
mined what "education" is and has handed it out throughout 
the state in terms of the State-funded grant. The local 
taxing which adds on to that amount, Texas says, is merely to 
satisfy local needs or desires above and beyond what the 
State has found to be an adequate education. Appellees 
attempted to put the lie to that argument in the DC by 
proving that the local property tax portion of educational 
financing was an integral part of the State's program for 
providing its children with an education. That dispute will 
be a legitimate issue before the Ct. The definition of 
"quality education" or "fundamental education" as a concept 
in the abstract will not be an issue. 
(c) Compelling State Interest 
If appellees get this far--if they convince the Ct of 
the fundamentality of education and the invideousness of 
wealth classifications--they will have no trouble estab-
...... 
lishing that there is no 'Jompelling state interest to 
substantiate the State formula for school finance. The 
only conceivable justification is local control and the -
short answer to that justification is ~hat it simply 
does not provide local control in any real sense at the level 
1 7tll~~~t4c., tJI C.l't'tl~lf.U#-1,..,.,11'1 ·At.uf'f,hle.) 
of the poorer districts, and nyratternat1ve's' i 
Dol-t. .. v .. ,, ... ,, .,...,,,+- Jl 
3 
, • § · · 
1 nl•••• · 7 if · 4S could 
preserve local control. Texas does not argue seriously to 
the contrary. 
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(d) Rational Basis 
le 
Mention should be made of the possihl f applicability 
of the lesser standard of scrutiny--the rational or 
reasonable basis test. The DC found that there was no 
..., ..... -
adequate state basiss 
"Not only are defendants unable to demonstrate 
compelling state interests for their classifications 
based on wealth, they fail even to establish a reason" 
able basis for these classifications." 
Appellees, of course, rely on that finding and conclude that 
even if the Ct fails to demand stricter scrutiny they should 
still prevail. The Seranno"amici do not take that approach. 
In their book they concede that the odds against success are 
overwhelming under a rational basis test. Texas takes even 
a stronger position, stating that it would be "doctrinaire 
in the extreme" to strike down as lacking a rational founda-
tion a system that has been in existence for over 50 years. 
Quite apart from the legal analysis of whether the Texas 
system is rational, there are strong policy reasons for 
avoiding resting the case on the rational basis test. In 
short, as will become clearer when I review th~remedies 
available, a rational basis test would interfere with the 
State's choices of alternative systems. At any rate, it is 
my judgment that if appellees cannot invoke some higqer -standard of scrutiny their case is doomed. 
(e) An intermediate standard. 
l 
So far I have dealt with the language of equal protection 
as,if there were but two standarqs. I have treated the 
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case as if constitutional adjudication were a process of 
mathematical deduction. Those who have given the equal 
protection analysis careful consideration have recognized 
that, in fact, the process does not operate this way. 
Justice Marshall in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) 
stated it well: 
"the constitutional question may sound like a mathe-
matical formula. But legal 'tests• do not have the 
precision of mathematical formulas. The key words 
emphasize a matter of degree: that a very heavy burden 
of justification is on the State, and that the statute 
will he closely scrutinized in light of its asserted 
purposes." 
It is only in an effort to give consistency and predict-
ability to constitutional adjudication under the equal pro-
tection clause that the Ct has developed this ·series of 
/ 
labels and classifications. There is a great deal to be said - -------------. 
for avoiding both the appearance and the fact of ad hoc 
~ ~~-----------------------
lawmaking, but labels should not obscure what lies beneath. 
 . .,..__ 
Your opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. reflects 
a basic sensitivity to the problem. There you stated, 
"Though the latitude given state economic and social 
regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory 
classifications approach sensitive and funda~tal 
personal rights, the Court exercises a stricter 
scrutiny. " 
That language seems to contemplate a sort of sliding scale 
or balance in which the relative importance of the right 
affected and the relative"suspectness"of the state's 
classification is weighed against the legitimacy of the 
State's interests. In part, I believe that this is the manner 
''-...• l, 
,. 
, n .,luc.4 --31--
It 
you will--and should--approach this case. If you accept the 
precedents which conclude that wealth is a suspect classifi-
cation, and at the same time agree with my analysis that a 
wealth-based discrimiaation is not alone enough to warrant 
closer scrutiny, then the degree to which we will 
+-4t. 
burden ~ state with a duty to justify its property tax s~stem 
will depend on the relative funda~tality of education 
in our society and under our Constitution. On this question 
your own experiences, and your own view of what is and what 
is not essential to our form of government, will dictate 
whare you place education on any sliding scales of values. 
The higher you place education, the stiffer the burden 
-""----------
on Texas to justify its system. Having reached that 
decision, should you conclude that education is of suffi-
cient importance to merit imposing a significant burden of 
explanation on the state, you will probably find the state 
system inadequate. Then, in drafting an opinion, the focus 
~
wi; l shift to ~riting in a manner,.. wil~rovide__!_~e_:ibility 4 ., 
for the States to choose other alternatives and offer them 
a fair prediction of what alternatives will be successful. 
In so doigg you or whoever authors the opinion might well 
return to the classical language of equal protection to 
provide the necessary precedential basis and solidarity of 
analysis. This is, I think,how the game will be won or 
lost. Assuming for purposes of completeness that the case 
were affirmed 0 I will briefly canvass the remedial alternatives, 
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VI. REMEDIES 
The USDC did not instruct Texas as to what it was to 
do to correct its school financing system. It merely 
struck down the existing scheme and told Texas why it was 
unacceptable. This is as it should be. It is not for the 
federal court to fashion the remedy. The exact same approach 
has been taken by the other courts that have recently struck 
down property-tax based financing systems. 
Professor Wright makes a convincing argumentp however~ -
that before this Court affirms the USDC it must determine 
~-----------~--------------------
whether Texas does indeed have options available that are 
~---------------------------~---------------------
both constitutionally acceptable and politically feasible • 
. ~ 
I agree and will, therefore, outline the two main categories 
of alternative financing systems that have been suggested. 
(a) State "subvention" 
1 S~bven!!o~ is the w~d to mean full sta~e 
assumption of financing. The State would collect all the 
revenues for education in the state and then disburse those 
resources as it sees fit. The revenues could come from 
any of the usual revenue sources open to the state (in• 
come tax, sales tax, etc.). Indeedg the state could main" 
ta~n the property tax as ~sourc~ducatiOJl reye~es. 
Once the revenues were collected the State would then be 
free to dole out the funds to the state's local school 
districts in any manner that it found proper. The only 
limitation on the state is that it may not distribute --...__-----GI. •J tJ-IC. +s 
funds on the basis of the wealth of local school I D. 
{ 
Those who have attempted to undercut the Coonp Clunep 
A 
'·. 
.. ,..J ...... 
Sugarman thesis have argued that the State would be placed 
in a "strait jacket" with respect to expenditures. They _,...--. 
argue that the State would have to allocate its revenues 
among the districts on an equal per pupil expenditure 
basis. As I have stated earlier, this is simply not the 
case if the Ct strikes down the existing system under a 
strict scrutiny standard. The factors which render the 
present system invalid are (1) the importance of education, 
and (2) the distribution of that commodity among the districts 
on an impermissible wealth basis. So long as the state 
does not divide up the money on the basis of the wealth (either 
district or family) of 'the recipients P any other bas is 
would be approved. This is obviously so because the State 
would only have to measure up to a standard of rationality. 
Andp in an area of the state's expertise and in an area 
~ 
in which there are many unsettled empirical questions ' ~ ~ - ~~ ..... .. 
about the relation between expenditures and education, -----------------
federal courts would be hardpressed to find a state's judgw 
• ~ ............. _ _____........ ::> 
ments irrational or unreasonable, The best example of this 
flexibility may be seen if we consider whether the state 
would be free to 
in which it will 
designate several "experimental" districts 
p 
send at considerably higher rates in order 
" to test the relationship between increased money and educa-
tion. Certainly, such a program would be rational in a 
nonlegal sense. And, so long as the State does not select 
the districts on the basis of the property wealth of the 
districts, a federal ct would be compelled to approve it. 
Opponents of subvention argue that this alternative 
places the schools in a stultifying atmosphere of far~away 
--34 .... 
O..ureacratic control. But there is no reason to find that 
? 
the localities need to be deprived of the power to control 
the manner in which money is expended. If the State wished __ ......,._ ___ ___, 
~· 
to maintain local control it could surely do so. 
~ ----------~~--------------------------
The 
President 0 s Comm'n on School Finance recommends state 
funding as the best approach to the resolution of present 
inequities created by state reliance on "local district 
financing for the bulk of educational revenues." (P. xii). 
The Comm'n also recommends that local districts be permitted 
~ to increase the amount spent in its schools above the 
state foundation by as much as 10%. (P. xiii) 
As a practical matter the latter suggestion by the 
Comm'n is an imperative. Those districts that value 
education higher than the state values it should be per-
Local add-ons will I 
pass muster under the rational basis standard so long as the 
bulk of funding is not dependent on local wealth, i.e. once 
mitted to contribute more to education. 
courts can conclude that the state is providing a fundamental 
educational package to every child in the state,local 
increments will not be providing a fundamental interest 
and the program will, again, only have to survive rational 
basis scrutiny. This result strikes one appropriate balance 
between what I regard as the two major competing interests 
in education. Our country has always valued highly the 
notion that everyone gets an equal educational opportunity. 
~
At the same timeAparents and school districts have always 
valued highly the goal of the best education available for 
~ 
their children. Any system which cannot provide the former 
A 
without sacrificing the latter is destined to meet public 
.... 35 ..... 
opposition •• The problem with the existing system is that 
'1--h- f J,, .,~ 
it provides the localities a ' h money an opportunitydto 
provide quality education without granting a similar 
opportunity to less welathy districts. State subventionp 
coupled with flexibility for local add~onffi, meets both 
interests. 
(b) "District Power Equalizing" 
Power equilization is the product of the thinking of 
Coon\ elune & Sugarman ( Private Wealth, pp. 201 .. 42). A 
II 
great deal of attention has been focused on this alternative 
as possit{lt y the best alternative. Professor Wright 
questions its constitutionality and urges that if the Ct 
is to strike down the existing system it has an obligation 
to indicate, in advance, whether power equilization would 
satisfy equal protection standards. Otherwise , Professor 
Wrigh~ says that the State that tries power equilization will 
" be buying a law suit. I agree that soul d jurisprudence would 
dictate some, possibly indirect, guarantee that this alter .. 
native would be acceptable. 
Power equilization operates essentially as follows. 
The key factor in determining how much money would go to 
any district would be the ~ at which that district decides 
to tax itself. Dollars per pupil would be a function of 
a locality 0 s decision as to how highly it values education 
as reflected in the percentage of its taxes it is willing to 
commit to education vis a vis other districts. For example, 
in San Antonio Edgewood School District would be rewarded 
for taxing itself at a higher rate per $100 of valuation 
... 
than does Alamo Heights. The State could devise a scale of 
guaranteed payments to the districts at any given level 













The local school district would determine the rate at which 
it wished to tax its residents. Suppose Edgewood chose to 
tax itself at the lowest rate (1%). At that rate lets 
assume that,because of the lack of significant property 
ue, the district 
vall iillitltiilllfiil collected only $50 per pupil. The 
State then would subsidize the district in the amount of 
~ • .,.vs 
$350 (guaranteed amtJf amt collected). If Edgewood decided 
to try harder, i.e., raise its rate, it would be entitled 
to a greater level of support from the state. Now, suppose 
that Alamo Heights also chose to tax its property at 
the 1 % rate. At that rate, because of the relative wealth 
of the district, it brings in $500 per pupil. Since it is 
entitled to only $400 at that rate, it would give $100 to the 
state to be redistributed to other districts. (I have posited 
a proportional scheme but a state might select any level of 
support. For instance, it might have an incentive program 
that would offer relatively higher "offering" at each incre-
mental rise in effort.· For example, the local decision to 
jump from 1% to 2% could be rewarded by granting more than 
twice as much per pupil. Instead of $800 it might be $900). 
J 
In such a system the local school districts could main-
tain complete control of local matters. Indeed the local 
I 
.. -37--
control would be more meaningful under power equalizing than 
it is at present. The localities on the low end of the 
property scale could, for the first time, make a relative~ 
~.,. e c, +), e'/ 
ly choice about how highly ~ valuet education. 
All the other aspects of local control--hiring, programming, , cJ~ 
administistering--would remain where they are. 
In any specific application, of course, the power 
equalization formula would be more complicated. The state 
could take into consideration the other municipal services 
that urban residents must pay for, expenses which make it 
relatively more difficult to support education in a center 
city than in a suburb (this is known as accounting for 
"municipal overburden"). The State might choose to impose 
equalization on personal family income rather than on property 
taxes. It might also choose to consider only residential 
property in the formula and pool all property taxes received -
from commercial and industrial property. Furthermore, it 
might take into consideration higher cost factors in some 
schools, such as added transportation costs, or higher 
salary scales imposed by a strong urban Teachers' Union. 
It might also account for special remedial courses or courses 
for the blind or retarded. These differences could be easily 
worked into the formula by having"weighted task unitse" For 
instance, the state might conclude that if the cost of 
education was twice as great in the city it would count 
each student twice (l urban student = 2 task units). The 
"per pupil" quota could then'te figure~d on that basis. 
The constitutional argument mounted against power 
equalization is that it makes the child 0 s right to an education 
depend on the willingness of his parents to support educa-
tion and might lead to di~ities nearly as great as exist 
today. Professor Wright says he can not see how such 
"discrimiaation" differe from a wealth-based classification. 
The answer seems simple under classical equal protection 
analysis. Since power equalization does not contemplate 
discrimination on the basis of wealth, the ct need only 
apply a rational basis test. And, the State's interest 
in the full local control of education is certainly a rational 
scheme. 
On the practical side attackers of power equalization 
say it is unworkable in a real world, This is said to be 
~ '---" ----------~ 
so for one of two reasons. If the rate-offering ratio 
is set high (for instance the state chooses •a rate that 
will allow rich districts to continue to spend as much on 
education at the same tax rate) the cost of the program 
will be monumental to the state. There will be little 
redistribution of property-tax money between districtsg 
rather every district would be provided a way to raise 
itself up to the level of the top school district. In 
an age when there are a number of interests of great im-
portance competing for state dollars (water, energy, welfare, 
housing, highways) the school financing system will take 
money out of the control of the state--it will over~emphasize 
education. On the other hand, if the rate-offering ratiop is 
set lower the quality of the best schools will be lowered. 
1,' 
This is so, hypothetically, because parents in the rich 
districts will be unwilling to subsidize education in other 
districts and will lower their rate to avoid having the 
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state take property tax doll,ars away from them. And, 
when the rich schools spend less they will become increasing-
ly unattractive to parents who have the option to send their 
kids to private school. They may P therefore, give up on 
public education. What we will be left with is statewide 
mediocrity. 
The proponents of power equalization disagree. They 
conclude that a proper level can be found that will preserve 
the quality of the schools that presently spend more while 
providing poorer districts the chance to decide whether they 
wish to devote an equal amount of effort to education. 
Again, your personal experience may give you a good 
basis for estimating whether any such formula can work. 
My layman's judgment is that it can work. It is worth 
noting, too, that the arguments against power equaliza-
tion say something about the relative quality of education 
in Texas's schools. If spending less in the wealthy 
schools means that they will become mediocre, how is it 
that spending more in the poor schools will not improve 
the quality of education? I wonder whether the State 
can genuinely argue, as it does. both sides of the money-
quality question. 
The purpose of this section was merely to point out 
that under the "strict scrutiny" formula (or something akin 
~ to it) constitutional alternatives would certainly be 
available, none of which would require equal expenditure 
in every scho~l. With this behind usp I will turn to the 
important question regarding the practical consequences 
...... 4Q ...... 
in terms of what this case could mean as a precedent and 
how it will affect the furture role of the federal courts. 
VII PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The Court will undoubtedly be concerned about what this 
case portenAs for the future at least in terms of the other 
kinds of law suits it will present to the federal courts. 
There may be a dual concern for minimizing the "flood of 
litigation" and for avoiding a "slippery slope," Those 
concerns will cause the Justices to focus in their deliber-
ations on two potential problem areas' (1) other state or .. -
municipal service cases, and (2) other public education 
finance cases, -
(a) Municipal service cases 
The argument may be raised that if the Ct strikes down 
for 
local property"based provisions61 school finance it will 
also be compelled to strike down other municipal services 
which are financed in the same manner. Texas, for example, 
has local financing of hospitalsp water resources, etc. 
----~--~ -------------
Also every city provides a range of municipal services 
such as fire, police, low-income housing and local welfare 
programs, While an argument might be made that these 
should all be provided to all on an equal basis, the 
ground that it is fundamental in a way that other services 
~ ~ ~--------------------------------
are not. Dandridge and Lindsey v. Normet already provide the 







Also, in the cases of programs/funded through property 
ta~es, the claims for equal provision of municipal services 
will, in large measure, be demands for equal expenditures. 
This was certainly the case in the appeal 116~ decided by 
the CAS in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw (an en bane opinion 
holding that a municipality could not discriminate against 
blacks in providing munici~al services). The Ct, if it were 
school 
to affirm the instant/case, would carefully hold that this is 
~ ' · -
not an "equal expenditure case." Furthermore, in the 
,...--... ...._ 
ordinary case, there will not be a wealth-based discrimi-
nation, and in the absence of such discrimination the state 
would have to measure up to the lesser rational basis 
standard. Therefore, while it would be unwise to predict 
that cases will not come up making these claims, it is 
predictable that the Ct will have the jurisprudential tools 
available to make intelligent distinctions. 
(b) Public Education Cases 
Once the property tax basis of public education is 
wiped away, in the event that this case is affirmed, we 
can anticipate that other cases will follow in which children 
from schools that do not receive as great expenditures 
will complain of denial of a quality education. I do not 
tfuink that there is any way to foreclose those cases being 
filed. However, I am equally sure that the Ct will be un-
wi~ling to allow itself t in the role of national 
manager of the schools. Most of the conceivable cases will 
present little difficulty because the classification drawn by 
the state will not be a wealth or race classification. Ando 
--42- .. 
in that event, the state's actions will have only the rational 
or reasonable basis standard to meet. For instance, if the 
state decided to put new science equipment in only a few of 
the schools, children in the lab-less schools would not have 
a persuasive case in the absence of some proof that the 
state acted to further some invideous preference. Other-
wise a mere showing of reasonableness (an experiment with 
new training materials, etc) would suffice. 
None of this is to say that tough cases will not 
arise, for they surely will. I only refer to these areas 
to indicate that the theory pressed in the instant case 
may be accepted and a narrow opinion written that could 
leave education where it belongs. The fear of the unfore-
seeable will not, in my opinion, be the telling factor in this 
case, 
VIII CONCLUSION 
Whew! Having gone through what I consider to be all of 
the major arguments, both factual and legal, that will 
arise in this case, I find myself still undecided. Despite 
the basic simplicity of the constitutional argument, and 
despite the apparent unfairness of the present system, I 
cannot yet be sure that every consideration has been 
accurately disposed of, Therefore, other than to say that 
my inclinations cause me to lean toward affirmance, I 
will make no recommendation on the merits. Short of a 
merits recommendation, however, I would like to suggest 
that we treat this case somewhat differently usual. 
.li' ..-... 
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I would suggest the followings 
(1) So far I have only brought together the arguments 
and authorities in a tumbling and disorganized fashion. On 
any single issue in the case a great deal more in the way 
of ~Lt and scholarship remains ahead. There will un-
doubtedly be a number of problems that you find particularly 
crucial. We should focus on those issues in much more de .. 
tail than this memo affords. Further research and discussion 
seem inevitable. Either before the case is heard or before 
conference we should discuss the more troublesome issues 
with a view to getting closer to the core of the case. 
(2) If you can find the time in the next month or so, 
you might like to read the book, Private Wealth and Public 
Education by Professors Cune, Clune, and Sugarman. You have 
referred to them as the "activist scholars." That they 
are, but theirs is a brand of scholarship of the very 
highest caliber. I find myself quite envious of their 
sustained hard work and thoroughness. They began back in 
1968 by bringing a case in the USDC ND Illinois attacking 
the Illinois financing scheme. Their theory then was quite 
different than it is today. They focused on expenditures and 
argued that money should be distributed in accprd with the 
particular student's needs. Not surprisingly, they were 
shot down. The DC found the case nonjusticiable and this 
Ct aff'd by order. They then changed course and found the 
thesis they now pursue. That thesis became the major work 
in the area. Thereafter they wrote a lQng list of law review 
articles dealing with various facets of the case. At the 




California. They have also filed amicus briefs in virtually 
every case litigating this theory throughout the country. 
Their approach throughout has been quite unlike the ACLU 
or NEA or any number of other organizations that devote 
inadequate time to research and to preparing their case 
in the clearest fashion. A reading of their book demon-
strates that their thesis is not hare-brained,nor is it 
shallow. You will undoubtedly dispute many of their con-
clusions but it would still be helpful to see the case 
presented in its best light. 
(3) I would also urge that we treat this case differently 
within our office. I have personally profited from dis-
cussing the issues with Bill and Jay. We ought to encourage 
them to familiarize themselves with the issues in the case 
so that their judgments may embellish our own. I can assure 
this is not a suggestion that you allow us to "gang up" on 
you. Each of us, at this point 0 has a distinct and different 
attitude about the case. The case is undoubtedly going to be 
kicking around here the better part of the year and each of 
us may add to the total product. 
LAH 
Memo to: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. October 26, 1972 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez 
I had occasion today, in another connection, to read Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, holding (63) that a one-year residency re-
quirement for eligibility for welfare payments is unconstitutional as 
an impermissible burden on the right to travel. 
What attracted my attention is the brief concurring opinion by 
Justice Stewart (pps. 642-44), in which he emphasizes that the' com-
pelling interest" test is to be applied because a constitutional right 
itself is involved. 
I suggest that you incorporate an appropriate quotation from 
Justice Stewart's opinion in your draft of Rodriguez. This wi 11 sup-
port our view that the "compelling interest" test has not heretofore 
been applied except with respect to rights protected by the Constitution 
itself. 
L. F. P., Jr. 







'lldr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: October 9, 1972 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez 
As I continue reviewing some of the briefs, questions and issues 
come into focus that prompt me to call them to your attention. I hope 
you won't mind my "fiood" of memos - some of which are dictated to 
sort out my own thoughts, even more than to invite your assistance. 
The subject of this memorandum is what for me is the gut issue 
in this case: What is the principled constitutional answer to the question 
whether there is a "fundamental interest" in education which requires 
the application of the "compelling state interest" test? 
I have touched on this in the long memorandum dictated on 
Saturday (and not yet typed), but I will now try to focus on it more 
sharply. 
Archie Cox has written that determinations of the "relative 
importance of the subject" in equal protecting cases calls for a "largely 
subjective judgment". Cox, Foreward: Constitutional Adjudication 
and the Promotion of Human Rights 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 95 (1966). 
If this is all there is to it, there is no basis for principled adjudication. 
I personally would be inclined, subjectively, to place a higher value 
2. 
on education than on welfare and housing. Yet, one may doubt that the 
millions of Americans on welfare, and the other millions who are 
dependent on government subsidy for housing, would agree. Indeed, 
if I were making a purely social judgment I might very well agree that 
the welfare probi!em is more severe than the secondary education 
problem. The truth is that we have been making enormous progress in 
the United States in public education (Charlie Wright's brief states that 
in the decade ending in 1970, expenditures for public education increased 
153% while enrollment increased only 30%- Brief, p. 9), whereas no 
discernible progress has been made in solving the welfare problem 
which - if it continues to escalate - could indeed destroy our entire 
society. 
I am also tempted to observe thftt'; now that I live in Washington, 
) 
D. C. , and am afraid to walk its streets at night, that public safety 
seems terribly fundamental 
But returning to the law (as distinguished from the prejudices 
which add up to our subjective judgments), I invite your attention to 
the decision of Judge Harvey, cited in the Wright brief, pp. 28, 29. 
_, . 
He makes the point that the interests "heretofore labeled fundamental 
are few and are rooted in some provision of the Constitution. " This ....._ .......... .. ,.. - ___ ......_. ~ ~ . 
is certainly true with respect to fairness of criminal trials, all First 
Amendment rights, and to racial classifications which violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
3. 
It can be argued that First Amendment rights, including the 
right to vote, cannot be exercised effectively without education. I 
pause to state parenthetically that the courts have held to the contrary, 
in effect, in outlawing literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting. But 
I suppose one could argue - by stretching the logic somewhat - that 
unless our society provides adequately for the housing, welfare, health, 
aafety, transportation, etc. of our citizens, they are less likely to 
be able effectively to exercise First Amendment rights. 
The question as to which I want us to do some further thinking 
is, therefore, whether there is justification in constitutional doctrine 
for identifying as "fundamental" any right which is not directly rooted 
in the Constitution itself. 




Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: October 9, 1972 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
I have been particularly impressed by the brief amteua filed 
m behalf of 30 states 1n support of appellants, and apparently written 
in the Attorney General's offtee of Maryland (perhaps by Henry Lord, 
an exeeptlonally able lawyer). 
This amieus brief - as is appropriate m behalf of the states 
coneemed - is devoted primarily to the eonsdquenees of a constitutional 
deelsion sustaining ROdriguez and Serrano. As eontrasted with Prof. 
Wright's brief em behalf of Texas (which addresses, as it shonld, the 
fundamental eonstltutional issues), the Maryland amieus brief eonfronts 
head on the social and phUosophieal issues, as well as the praetieal 
effeet upm the states and espee1ally upcm the urbanized areas. 
This amicus brief relies heavtly on seeondary authorities -
quoting extensively from various studies, books, artteles and Senate 
testimcm.y. 
I have not had the time -and will not -to investigate independently 
these seeoodary authorities. If they have been presented fairly by the 
Maryland brtef, they pretty well destroy the alleged benefits of requiring 
2. 
the states to equalize school expenditures on a statewide basis. 
The brief ta partteularly devastating 1n the secMDn entitled 
"AdYerse Effects em Interests of Urban Areas and Racial 1\Alnortttes ", 
p. 83 et seq. 
I must cc:mfess tbat the brief appeals to me because tt supports 
and cc:mfirms tentatift judgments based em my own experience with 
Virginia education. 
The principal purpose of this memorandum ts to suggest, tf you 
have not done so, that you: 
brief 
1. Read the Maryland" carefully. 
2. Select several of the seemdary authorities relied oo therein, 
and read them to determine whether they have been ~ presented -
on the points involved- by the Maryland brief. 
Among the authorities cited, the following may merit examtnatloo: 
Prof. Joel s. Berke (whose affidavit was reUed upon by 
the District Court below)*. Prof. Berke has prepared two 
mooographs, publtshed stnee hta affidavit. Apparently these 
have been publlsbed by the Select Committee m Equal Educational 
Opportunity, U.s. Senate ''nle Financial Aspects of Equality of 
Educational Opportunity and Inequities in School Finance." 
*Incidentally Prof. Goldstein pretty well demolishes the table set forth 
1n the Berke affidavitl See Maryland Brief, 83-84. 
3 • 
. January 1972 (Cited Maryland brief, 85). 
Berke and Callahan, Serrano v. Priest : Milestcme or 
MUlstooe, 21 Jour. Pub. Law 23 (1972). 
study by u.S. Office of Educatioo, Finances of Large City 
School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (D. HEW Pub. No. 
OE72-29 1972). Cited Maryland Brief,. 90. 
William L. Taylor, former staff director of Civil Rights 
Commission, Mondale Committee Hearings, p. 10472. (Cited 
Maryland Brief 91. 
New York Times editorial Jan. 29, 1972. 
Prof. Charles S. Benson, a supporter of Rodriguez, but 
who testified at the Mondale hearings as to the possible adverse 
effects. Mondale hearings, p. 7689 (Maryland Brief 97). 
* * • • * 
Power Equalizing 
The Maryland brief argues -convincingly, I think, tbat'power 
equalizing" is impractical if not uncoostitutional Pp. 28-35. 
ImplleatiCils of National Control of Schools 
I remain uneonvinced (a.lthough you haven't worked on me directly, 
Jet) that the ultimate effect of the Rodriguez rule will not be national 
all 
cootrol of education. I would abhor such cootrol fo( the obvious reasoos, 
4. 
some of which are stated in the Maryland brief - pp. 36-40. I have in 
mind the lrreslstable impulse of politicians to manipulate public 
education for their own power and ideology - !· 1- Hitler, Mussollnt 
and all Communist dictators. 
To a far lesser extent, full state cmtrol - inevitable lf there 18 
full state funding - could have unattractive ooosequences. See 
Maryland Brief, 37-48. 
* ••• * 
I realize, of course, that the Maryland Brief ta advocacy, and 
not a balanced presentation. Please help me judge it fairly. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Larry A. Hammond DATE: October 9, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
I have been particularly impressed by the brief amicus filed 
oo behalf of 30 states 1n support of appellants, and apparently written 
in the Attorney General's office of Maryland (perhaps by Henry Lord, 
an exceptionally able lawyer). 
This amicus brief - as is appropriate on behalf of the states 
concerned - is devoted primarily to the consdquences of a constitutional 
decision sustaining Rodriguez and Serrano. As contrasted with Prof. 
Wright's brief on behalf of Texas (which addresses, as it should, the 
fundamental constitutional issues), the Maryland amicus brief confronts 
/A'-~~ 
~ the social and philosophical issues, as well as the practical 
/\. 
effect upon the states and especially upon the urbanized areas. 
This amicus brief relies heavily on secondary authorities -
quoting extensively from various studies, books, articles and Senate 
testimony. 
I have not had the time - and will not - to investigate independently 
these seccmdary authorities. If they have been presented fairly by the 
Maryland brief, they pretty well destroy the alleged benefits of requiring 
... 
2. 
the states to equalize school expenditures on a statewide basis. 
The brief is particularly devastating in the sedlinn entitled 
"Adverse Effects on Interests of Urban Areas and Racial Minorities", 
p. 83 et seq. 
I must confess that the brief appeals to me because it supports 
and confirms tentative judgments based on my own experience with 
Virginia education. 
The principal purpose of this memorandum is to suggest, if you 
have net done so, that you: 
brief 
1. Read the Marylan<;t' carefully. 
2. Select several of the secondary authorities relied on therein, 
and read them to determine whether they have been fairly presented -
on the points involved -by the Maryland brief. 
Among the authorities cited, the following may merit examination: 
Prof. Joel S. Berke (whose affidavit was relied upon by 
the District Court below)*. Prof. Berke has prepared two 
monographs, published since his affidavit. Apparently these 
have been published by the Select Committee on Equal Educational 
Opportunity, U.S. Senate "The Financial Aspects of Equality of 
Educational Opportunity and Inequities in School Finance." 
*Incidentally Prof. Goldstein pretty well demolishes the table set forth 
in the Berke affidavitl See Maryland Brief, 83-84. 
3. 
January 1972 (Cited Maryland brief, 85). 
Berke and Callahan, Serrano v. Priest : Milestme or 
MUlstme, 21 Jour. Pub. Law 23 (1972). 
Study by U. S. Office of Education, FJnances of Large Ctty 
School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (D. HEW Pub. No. 
OE72-29 1972). Cited Maryland Brte4 90. 
WiWam L. Taylor, former staff direetor of CivU Rights 
Commisstoo, Mondale Committee Hearings, p. 10472. (Cited 
Maryland Brief 91. 
New York Times editorial Jan. 29, 1972. 
Prof. Charles s. Benson, a supporter of Rodriguez, but 
who testified at the Mondale hearings as to the possible adverse 
effects. Mondale hearings, p. 7669 ('Maryland Brief 97) • 
• • • • • 
Power Equalizing 
The Maryland brief argues- eoovineingly, I think, tbat'power 
equalizing" is lmpraettealif net unemstituttonal. Pp. 28-35. 
Implieatlcns of National Control of Schools 
I remain uneonvineed (although you haven't worked on me dtreetly, 
,et) that the ultimate effect of the Rodriguez rule wUl net be national 
all 
emtrol of edueattoo. I would abhor such eootrol fo-( the obvious reasoos, 
4. 
some of which are stated in the Maryland brief- pp. 36-40. I have in 
~
m.1nd the irresistable impulse of politicians to manipulate public 
/'\ 
education for their own power and ideology - !_. ~· Hitler, Mussolini 
and all Communist dictators. 
To a far lesser extent, full state cmtrol - inevitable if there is 
full state funding- could have unattractive consequences. See 
Maryland Brief, 37-48. 
* * * * * 
1 realize, of course, that the Maryland Brief is advocacy, and 
not a balanced presentation. Please help me judge it fairly. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
·-
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Larry A Hammond DATE: October 9, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
I have been particularly impressed by the ·brief amicus filed 
on behalf of 30 states 1n support of appellants, and apparently written 
in the Attorney General's office of Maryland (perhaps by Henry Lord, 
an exceptionally able lawyer). 
This amicus brief .. as is appropriate on behalf of the states 
concerned - is devoted primarily to the consdquences of a constitutional 
decision sustaining Rodriguez and Serrano. As contrasted with Prof. 
Wrigbt•s brief on behalf of Texas (which addresses, as it should, the 
fundamental constitutional issues), the Maryland amicus brief confronts 
~ . J.a.v dk-1~ 
HW ... iiR the social and philosophical issues, as well as the practical 
1\ 
effect upon the states and especially upon the urbanized areas. 
This amicus brief relies heavily on secondary authorities -
quoting extensively from various studies, books, articles and Senate 
testimony. 
I have not had the time - and will not - to investigate independently 
these secondary authorities. If they have been presented fairly by the 
Maryland brief, they pretty well destroy the alleged benefits of requiring 
2. 
the states to equalize school expenditures on a statewide basis. 
The brief is particularly devastating in the sedDDn entitled 
"Adverse Effects an Interests of Urban Areas and Racial Minorities"t 
p. 83 et seq. 
I must c oofess that the brief appeals to me because it supports 
and coofirms tentative judgments based oo my own experience with 
Virginia education. 
The principal purpose of this memorandum is to suggest, if you 
have n<:t done so, that you: 
brief 
1. Read the ryland/carefully. 
2. Select several of the seecndary authorities relied m therein, 
and read them to determine whether they have been fairly presented -
on the points involved -by the Maryland brief. 
Among the authorities cited, the following may merit examination: 
Prof. Joel S. Berke (whose affidavit was relied upon by 
the District Court below)*. Prof. Berke has prepared two 
monographs, published since his affidavit. Apparently these 
have been published by the Select Committee on Equal Educational 
Opportunity, U.S. Senate ''The Financial Aspects of Equality of 
Educational Opportunity and Inequities in Sehool Finance. " 
*Incidentally Prof. Goldstein pretty well demolishes the table set forth 
1n the Berke affidavttl See Maryland Brief, 83-84. 
3. 
January 1972 (Cited Maryland brief, 85). 
Berke and Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or 
Millstone, 21 Jour. Pub. Law 23 (1972). 
Study by U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City 
School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (D. HEW Pub. No. 
OE72-29 1972). Cited Maryland Brief,. 90. 
William L. Taylor, former staff director of Civil Rights 
Commission, Mondale Committee Hearings, p. 10472. (Cited 
Maryland Brief 91. 
New York Times editorial Jan. 29, 1972. 
Prof. Charles S. Benson, a supporter of Rodriguez, but 
who testified at the Mondale hearings as to the possible adverse 
effects. Mondale hearings, p. 7669 (Maryland Brief 97). 
* * * * * 
Power Equalizing 
The Maryland brief argues - convincingly, I think, that'power 
equaliz1ngu is impractical if not unconstitutional. Pp. 28-35. 
Implicaticns of National Control of Schools 
I remain unconvinced (although you haven't worked on me directly, 
,et) that the ultimate effect of the Rodriguez rule will nc:t be national 
all 
cootrol of education. I would abhor such control foithe obvious reasons, 
·' . 
4. 
some of which are stated in the Ntaryland brief - pp. 36-40. I have in 
~
mind the irresistable impulse of politicians to manipulate public 
1\ 
education for their own power and ideology - !: !· Hitler, Mussolini 
and all Communist dictators. 
To a far lesser extent, full state cootrol - inevitable if there is 
full state funding - could have unattractive oonsequences. See 
Maryland Brief, 37-48. 
***** 
I realize, of course, that the Maryland Brief is advocacy, and 
not a balanced presentation. Please help me judge it fairly. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
' ' 
MEMORANDUM TO: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
October 12, 1972 
Your bench memo of 10/2/ 72 has absorbed my interest and 
thought for most of the day (Saturday, Oct. 7). May I say at the 
outset - without reservation - that your memo is thoughtful and 
penetrating in its analysis, well organized and exceptionally well 
expressed. However we finally come out in this vastly important 
case, your thinking will have made a significant contribution to my 
thinking and ultimate judgment. 
Mter reading the briefs with some care, my initial tentative 
reaction - as you know - was that the factual assumptions and legal 
conclusions of the district court were probably erroneous . Your 
memorandum has assisted me in a more thoughtful reexamination. 
This case is more troublesome for me than it otherwise would 
be because of my long association with public education. Next to 
the law, education was my primary intellectual interest for many years. 
As a member of the Richmond School Board for ll years, as its Chair-
man for 9, and as a member of the State Board of Education for 8 
years, including serving as its President, I lived fairly intimately 
-2-
with the immense problems, frustrations and occasional successes 
of public education. 
I am in agreement that the traditional system of funding and 
control (practiced in varying ways in 49 states, and for a century 
or more in some states) is not designed to produce - and does not 
produce - identical expenditures among the school districts of a 
state or, indeed, within certain districts. I have advocated for years 
a larger participation by the state in financial public education, and 
the trend - certainly in Virginia - has been in this direction.* 
The difficulty with school financing in Virginia (unrelated to 
race) was twofold: (i) the property wealth of districts does vary; 
and (ii) the willingness of the people to tax themselves for public 
schools may vary even more widely. I will cite only one example which 
you can visualize. The City of Richmond consistently over the years 
has provided more money per pupil for education than any of the 
counties in the metropolitan Richmond area. You saw the high quality 
residential developments, adjacent to the City, in both Chesterfield 
and Henrico Counties. Yet, neither of these counties has ever provided 
* I invite your attention to the new Virginia Constitution which tts-a 
unique education article (Article VIII), placing an affirmative duty on 
the state to provide "a statewide system of free public elementary and 
secondary schools open to all children of school age (which) shall ensure 
that an educational program of high quality is established and maintained." 
-3-
a per pupil expenditure for schools as high as that in the City of 
Richmond. Until fairly recently (when other factors have contributed 
to a marked deterioration in Richmond City schools), the general 
quality of Richmond public school education was recognized as the 
best in the state, second only to Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria. 
Yet , in terms of per capita wealth, Chesterfield and Henrico 
Counties are far richer than the City of Richmond if commercial and 
industrial property is excluded. But a tax rate on the latter type of 
properties must also be paid by individuals, and Richmond traditionally 
has simply been willing - due to strong civic leadership - to tax itself 
at a higher rate than in the adjoining counties. 
On the other hand, as contrasted with a few bright spots (e.g. 
Richmond and Northern Virginia) many Virginia counties - especially 
in the ...western part of the state (in which the black population is 
negligible) placed a low premium on public education; the leadership 
was weak; school boards were politically controlled; and the boards 
of supervisors were often large property owners not enthusiastic about 
taxing themselves. The result, in many of these counties, was a 
mediocre effort for public education. 
For these reasons, I pressed for years for a larger participation 
by the state, and the trend has been that way. But the principal burden 
-4-
still falls on the local communities, and the per pupil expenditures 
vary from a low of $523 per pupil in Henry County (in the far south-
west) to $1,318 in Arlington (operating funding from all sources).* 
The answer to the problem is not as simple as having the state 
take over all funding of public education. Your memorandum per-
ceptively identifies many of the problems. The tax structure of a 
state, involving the interrelationship of federal, state and local 
taxes of all kinds, is a complex mix which cannot be restructured 
without creating immense problems - political, economic and legal. 
Moreover, the genius of our federal system - certainly until recently -
has rested not merely upon the relationship and balance between 
state and federal governments. Local government has played a 
fundamental role in making our system work, in preventing the bigness 
even of state government from overwhelming the citizen, in keeping 
control of local municipal services - including education - largely in 
the hands of the localities where the politicians are far more responsive 
to the needs of the communities and the will of the people than at any 
other level. 
The local school board is, I believe, a unique American institu-
tion. It has played a vital role in the development of our public school 
* As of fiscal 1971 
-5-
system, and especially in helping to generate the community support 
necessary to finance it. Critics and cynics attack public education 
in the United States; they point to the obvious defects (which I make 
no pretense of defending), but they often overlook the merits of a 
system which has sustained a quality of democracy not found (I believe) 
in any other major country. Few other countries assure 12 years of 
free public education for every child who will take :it. Almost no other 
country has an educational system with the egalitarian character of ours, 
which deliberately attempts to minimize social and economic inequali-
ties, and which affords mobility opportunity for any individual who 
has the ability and determination to move upward in the s.ocial and 
economic strata of our society. 
Reasonable views may differ, but in my judgment the local school 
board - with the interest of the parents immediately involved - has been 
the most dynamic force behind the overall effectiveness of our public 
school system. A local school board does far more than deal with 
money. Within broad policies established by the State Board of Educa-
tion, the local board has significant autonomy - with respect to curriculum, 
textbooks, extracurricular programs, supplemental programs, experi-
ments in various educational techniques, employment and in-service 
training of teachers, promotions, school building locations, types of 
school buildings, etc . , etc . 
-6-
Whenever I feel myself becoming enthusiastic for full state 
funding, I check my impulse by recalling that whoever exclusively 
controls the purse strings, in the end will control all programs and 
policy. Such a total denigrating of local boards would not be in the 
best interest of education or our country. 
The state thus does have a strong interest - the people of the 
state have such an interest - in maintaining a high level of Jgc a J. -
interest and responsibility for public education. Whether this reaches 
the "compelling" level is debatable. But to say, as the district court 
did, that it does not meet the test of "rationality," is to cast con-
siderable doubt upon the rationality of the district court judges. 
This is especially true when they characterize as irrational a system 
approved and in effect in 49 states, some of which have had the essense 
of this system for a century. 
Thus, as you can see, I approach the San Antonio case with 
mixed emotions when I think only as a citizen and a former public 
school educator. 
As a lawyer and a judge, I have to apply constitutional principles 
in the resolution of this case. Yet, they must not be applied in a 
vacuum or in a way which may weaken or destroy substantial values 
in the existing system. Nor would it make any sense to apply con-
stitutional principles - unless they are unavoidably applicable - in a 
-7-
manner which is totally impractical from the political viewpoint. 
Against these more or less random thoughts as a backdrop, 
I now come to some more specific comments and questions raised 
by your thoughtful memorandum: 
1. Applicable standard of state interest. I agree with your 
view that if only a "rational" state interest nee<Bto be found, the 
Texas system must be sustained. For the reasons above stated, 
I think it clear that a rational argument can be made for preserving 
a vital and influential role for the local school district. 
Thus , a critical threshold question is whether the state must 
meet the "compelling interest" standard. You point out, correctly 
I think, that appellees - to sustain this position - must convince the Court 
that the state action either (i) impinges upon a fundamental interest or ...... 
(ii) draws into question an "invidious or suspect classification" (e.g. 
race, right to vote, right to travel). 
The "state action" here is the tax structure which, in accord 
with long tradition, leaves real estate as a tax source for the locality, 
with most other categories of taxation (income, sales, state licenses, 
etc.) reserved to the state itself. Property taxes provide the basic 
revenue for all of the local services: police and fire protection, streets 
and other public utilities (water, sewerage, lighting, etc.), public 
health, welfare, recreation, libraries and education. Some of these 
services (e.g . police and fire) are funded almost exclusively by the 
-8-
locality from the real estate tax. Other services - welfare, health 
and education - are jointly funded by states and localities, with the 
localities providing the predominant resources. 
2. Wealth alone not "suspect." Your analysis (p. 19) is that 
the Texas system "does discriminate against the property poor',' and 
thus is a system under which "wealth becomes a function of education."* 
You point out, however, that wealth alone has not yet been held to be 
a "suspect" classification. (In Harper and Bullock v. Carter other 
suspect subjects were involved; and in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 
137 (1971), Justice Black avoided saying that wealth was a suspect 
category when he had a good opportunity to do so.) I do not think 
there is any basis in law - or in policy under a free competitive system -
for concluding that wealth alone is "suspect." 
3. Is education a fundamental interest? The question remains 
as to the fundamentality of education. As you put it, is education a 
fundamental interest in the same sense that the Court has found cer-
tain other interests to be fundamental, namely, fair criminal process, 
voting rights, interstate travel, the right to seek public office, and 
speech related interests '1 
There is language in the school cases (Brown and its progeny) 
that could be quoted to support an affirmative answer. In addition, as 
* Please enlighten me as to the usage of the word "function." 
-9-
you point out in a felicitously phrased sentence: 
"On top of that precedential foundation, plain-
tiffs stack the following assertions." 
These "assertions" include the obvious and sound arguments 
as to the importance of public education in our democratic system 
(pp. 23' 24). 
If a layman stopped me on the street and inquired whether I 
thought education is fundamental to our democracy, there could be 
only one answer. But if the same layman asked whether public housing 
and welfare are fundamental where indigents are concerned, I would 
unhesitatingly give the same answer. Similarly, many would give 
the same answer if the question related to police protection, fire 
protection, to the communications network of roads, and to other 
services of government which are essential to the social and economic 
functioning of our system. 
The answers to each of the foregoing questions must be affirma-
tive if "fundamental" is used in the sense that the state or community 
could hardly get along without them. 
It is possible, of course, that the legal concept of what is "funda-
mental" may differ from the lay concept. Appellees argue, for example, 
that education is different because it is rooted in the Constitution itself, 
being inherent to the full exercise of First Amendment rights. One 
-10-
remembers, however, that it was not until after the Civ· 
that public schools came to be recognized as a state interest of 
any significance, fundamental or otherwise. Its roots simply do 
not go back to the Bill of Rights. 
There may well be degrees of fundamentality and certainly 
reasonable minds will differ in applying a standard so inherently 
subjective. Starting with my own preconceived notions as to the 
importance of public education, it would be fairly easy for me to 
conclude that it is a fundamental interest. I am not sure that such 
a judgment would be based on legal and constitutional analysis rather 
than social and philosophical concepts. 
I would appreciate your further thinking as to a principled 
basis, rooted in our past decisions, for concluding whether educa-
tion is a fundamental interest. We do have the repetitive dicta in 
the school segregation cases. Apart from these, what are the best 
available precedents on the affirmative side? On the negative side, 
I believe you have cited the precedents relied upon principally by 
Prof. Wright (Dandridge v. Williams, Jefferson v. Hackney, Lindsey 
v. Normet, and possibly Gordon v. Lance ). 
Before passing to another point, I raise a further question 
prompted by your memorandum. You state, correctly, that the 
Constitution does not require that a state provide public education; 
-ll-
rather, only that it must not discriminate if it undertakes to do so. 
(pp. 27 , 28.) If one concedes this, is it consistent to argue that 
education is a fundamental interest '1 The areas of fundamental 
interests, heretofore identified as such by the Court, have involved 
fair criminal process , voting, travel, the electoral process (one man, 
one vote) and the like. Each of these that comes to mind (as I dictate 
this) involves not merely a major state interest but an individual 
right accorded by the Constitution. Can we say, therefore, that 
there may be a fundamental interest - in the sense that the state 
must have a compelling interest in applying classifications to it -
in the absence of an enforceable, fundamental personal right? 
--~ 
4. Is there a realistic intermediate standard? Mter 
discussing whether the standard must be the "compelling interest 
test" or the "rational basis test," you suggest the possibility of an 
intermediate standard. This interests me as I am not entirely con-
tent with either of the standards mentioned. 
Yet the rationale of your intermediate or "sliding scale" 
standard is difficult to verbalize or visualize as being a solution. 
I agree that any soundly written opinion must avoid the appearance 
and the facts of ad hoc law making and that "labels should not obscure 
what lies beneath." There is no doubt a "gray area" between the 
two conventional standards. But would it not be as difficult to identify 
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and define a position within this gray area as it has been for various 
members of the Court in the past to define - and distinguish rationally -
the two standards now customarily invoked? 
You state that the higher one places education, the stiffer 
the burden on Texas to justify itself. This leaves the judgment in 
the realm of subjectivity, and it does not necessarily lead to a legal 
conclusion - at least as I presently view it. 
I could speak with conviction of the importance of more adequate 
state funding for education (as I have for years), but this would not 
necessarily lead me to conclude that a tax system, practiced in 
virtually all of the states for many decades, is unconstitutional. My 
concern comes into sharper focus when I think of possible alternatives, 
which you address under the caption of "remedies." 
5. What alternative plans could the Court soundly endorse in 
principle? Your memorandum suggests two, the first of which is 
sometimes called "state subvention." This is defined usually to mean 
full state assumption of financing. 
I can conceive, without difficulty, of the state taking over full 
responsibility for funding public education, and financing it from any 
or all available sources of revenue - including the heretofore local 
property tax. If the state did this (and assuming it were politically 
feasible), the local school board - and its vital role - would go down 
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the drain fairly soon. Some may not share this view, but I am 
satisfied from my own experience that the realities of political 
life and power are ultimately and conclusively tied to the source 
of funding. Moreover, this would raise all sorts of direct and in-
direct problems, some of which you have mentioned. It would cer-
tainly weaken the authority and importance of local government, 
which is already suffering from malnutrition and from lost control 
of tax resources. But I am not as concerned with this at the moment 
as I am with possible educational consequences. 
Once the state assumes full funding responsibilities, it is 
inevitable that per pupil expenditures will have to be essentially 
the same throughout the state. Certain variations would be allowed -
for differences in cost of living, to accommodate limited special 
education programs and the like. But I do not believe substantial 
discrepancies in per pupil expenditures would be tol~e~-:d...t~~~~ 
or would pass judicial scrutiny. Certainly anthing less than equality 
would provoke a flood of litigation. 
In 1971 the cost per pupil in Fairfax County was $890 as con-
trasted with $1,318 in neighboring Arlington County. If there were 
state funding, neither the politicians nor the courts would allow this 
discrepancy to continue - although the quality of schools in both 
counties ranks high in the state. Would Arlington be downgraded in 
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order to afford approximately the same level per pupil in Fairfax? 
And what about Chesterfield County, in an urbanized area with perhaps 
as much '\\ealth as Fairfax and yet a per pupil expenditure of only $647? 
Would it be averaged with Arlington? H so - and these examples can 
be multiplied by the variations throughout most any state - is it an 
answer to the citizens of Arlington to say that, after the state has 
taken away all or most of their real estate tax base, somehow they 
can add the "icing on the cake" which the state has taken away from 
them? 
H the State of Virginia had to level its per pupil expenditure to 
anything approaching the Arlington level, I hesitate to guess what the 
increased tax burden would be on a statewide basis. The median 
per pupil cost for all counties and cities in Virginia in 1971 was $649, 
and the average was $724. It is simply politically and economically 
impossible to increase expenditures on a statewide basis to the standards 
of Fairfax or Richmond, much less Arlington. Thus, in Virginia and 
no doubt in Texas, statewide funding almost irevitably would result 
in "leveling down" the education afforded in the localities which have 
had the good fortune both of high incomes and deep interest in schools 
for their children. 
You suggest something intermediate, and less drastic than full 
state funding. But who is to say what constitutes an adequate level of 
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expenditure for education on an equalized basis across the state? 
Texas claims that its present plan provides funding adequate to meet 
even the compelling state interest test. A three-judge court differs. 
I would like to find a reasoned and principled position that 
avoided destroying the usefulness of local control of the schools, 
and which also minimizes the wide gaps which now exist as a result 
of primary reliance on local funding. But I have not yet identified 
an intermediate position that is based on objective standards, as 
distinguished from subjective judgment as to what is "adequate." 
The "power equalization plan," which I confess I do not fully 
understand, does not appear to be a feasible alternative. It would 
involve a major restructuring of state tax systems with consequences 
difficult to foresee or predict - both legal, political and economic. I 
would hesitate to plunge into the unknown to that extent, at least 
without a firmer grasp of the probable consequences. 
6. We are a court - not a legislature. I presently incline to 
the view that if the Court were to hold the Texas plan unconstitutional, 
the only feasible alternative - that would stand judicial scrutiny -
would be full state funding. I am deeply reluctant for the judiciary 
to plunge 49 states into this sort of a crisis. I remind myself, as you 
have often reminded me in other connections, that we are not a super-
legislature, that judicial restraint is a cardinal virtue when approaching 
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an issue of constitutionality; and this seems especially true in view 
of the venerable age of the present system. There is a considerable 
public pressure for increased state responsibility of education, as 
we have witnessed in Virginia. One wonders whether this complex 
problem of how best to finance public education should not be left 
to the democratic process. 
* * * * * * * 
Note: I have not addressed many points - such as the validity 
of some of the factual assumptions - chiefly because I have run out 
of time. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
LFP, Jr. :pls 
10/28/72--LAH 
To• Mr. Justice Powell 
Froms LAH 
Re1 Attached memo on the Rodriguez outline 
Attached is my suggested outline for the Opinion for the 
Ct in Rodriguez. As written it has several benefits. We 
can touch upon the several secondary sources in the 
educational area without pl~ng untoward reliance upon 
them. We can avoid the impulse to overwrite the opinion 
by focusing our guns primarily on the argument for imposing 
a higher level of scrutiny on the State's financing scheme, 
defeat it, and then dispose of the subsidiary contention 
that the state system falls no matter what level of scrutiny 
is utilized. The meat of the opinion would turn on the 
discussion and interpretation of Supreme Ct cases. 
Of course, when the dissenters respond we may have to 
supplement our opinion with dislcussions indicating the 
contestability of every sociological premise that might 
underly the contrary result. 
Written in this fashion I think I can flesh out a 
rough draft in a week. Prior to writing I would need only 
to explore the Texas financing system a little more thor-
oughly by reviewing the record and the Texas statutes. 
I would also need to reread and organize the equal protection 
case law. As to the bulk of secondary material, it is cited 
and cross-examined in the mnultiple briefs. Since we are 
relying on such materials for little more than to demamstrate 
the compexity and division of opinion as to the underlying 
factual assumptions, we need only to assure ourselves that we 
""" ····· 
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(1) are citing authorities accurately, and (2) that we are 
citing the best sources for any given proposition. As 
the Fall progresses I will then endeavor to find the time 
to read over some of the more pertinent social science 
material wi~ more care. 
LAH 
10/28/72--LAH 
Toa Mr Justice Powell 
Froma LAH 
Rea Outline for Op Ct in Rodriquez 
• ~~ INTRODUCTION--A !-paragraph statement emphasizing that the 
~ ~~~ . Ct is here reviewing a decision whose impact, in the State from 
~~~~~~which the case comes, would be staggering. For better or 
~~ for worse it would revolutionize public education in Texas. 
Its principle would have equal applicability in almost evry 
~ ~· State in the Union. It also raises grave questions about 
~~~tate provision of other public services. Of equal import-
~~~ance is the significance of the questions it poses for the 
~~~ future role of thefederal judiciary in implementing the 
'-~~~ command of the 14th Amendment. This Ct 0 s judgment is rendered 
~~~ with the fullest awareness of the le~ty of the task. 7 
~~~ I. FACTS. This section would cover three pointss (a) r ~f· the procedural history of the case (parties, ruling of DC, etc) I 
P\ ~- (b) explanation pf how challenged Texas system of school 
finance operates; and (c) explanation of how that system 
. .  
effects expenditures in the San Antonio school districts. 
In this section we will candidly address the existing 
statistical disparities but will also emphasize the extent 
to which Texas has increased state participation in recent yrs 
and the extent to which state funds assure some of the 
basics of public education (books, teachers salaties, 
buildings, administrators). In footnote we would also 
point out the similarities between the Texas system and 






II. THESIS OF DC OPINION & OF RESPS. We would set out 
in brief the 14th A analysis adopted by the DC--suspect class-
ification: discrimination regarding a fundamental rt; corn-
pelling state interest scrutiny. Texas system does not 
measure up, indeed is not even rational. In this same 
section I propose to expose two of the major flaws with 
the thesis• (a) no convincing proof that money= education; 
and (b) this wealth classification, i.e., school district 
property wealth, is quite unlike the wealth classifications 
heretofore dealt with by the Ct. Here we need do no more, 
I believe, than point out these problems and indicate that 
the DC did not face them. 
III. FUNDAMENTALITY OF EDUCATION. Even assuming for 
the purposes of decision here that money = education and 
that district wealth creates a suspect classification, 
the case must nonetheless fall unless education is an -~~ ~ ~ f+Y' interest of sufficient magnitude to require strict judicial 
~~~crutiny, We will then analyse the cases emphasizing several 
1 ~ ._,L ~~points 1 (a) social importance is not synonymous with funda-
~~ ~ mentality: (b) some clear nexus with a constitutionallly 
~~~ ~cognized interest is prerequisite (Dandridge & Shapiro); 
~~::~~-~c) the Ct has already held welfare and housing not to be 
1..1· •• r 
~~ fundamental. And, at some pt in either this or the preceding 
~.:A~~ section we will cite cases emphasizing that the labels are 




not ends in themselves but are merely aids for the Ct's 
balancing of the invideousness of the discrimination and 
its impact against the state's justifications (Dunn v. 




IV. RATIONALITY. This is the second half of the heart 
of this case. Having exploded the strict scrutiny require-
ment, we must show why the Texas scheme is rational. It is 
premised on the notion of local control of education. There 
are a number of indicia of rationality which might be brought 
to beara (a) local property tax-based public education is 
used in at least 49 states; (b) while its historical sources 
run deep, educational finance has been a topic of recent 
concern in Texas and elsewhere but has been maintained; 
(c) a system need not work perfectly to be rational--the 
mere fact that some districts struggle does not render 
the concept of local control invalid. Even Edgewood retains 
significant local control even though it cannot practically 
speaking raise comparable funds. And, the mere fact that 
it is arguable that local control may be achieved in other 
ways is not sufficient reason to throw out a system based 
on rational considerations. Also, increasing state partici-
pation to make sure that some minimum provision is guaranteed 
proves the state's dedication to finding a proper mix of 
local control and state•secured minimum educational standards. 
V. DISCLAIMER. We should adrees some of the arguments 
in favor of the contrary result. We should make clear that 
the DC formula would not have been a universally great 
benefit to the poor, to the minorities, or the cities. 
We can cite several of the empirical st4udl~4ies that show 
the lack of correlation between expenditure and the supposed 
beneficiaries. While we should have a section here at the 
outset I anticipate that it will grow in response to whatever 
"parage of horrible" consequences the dissent relies upon •• 
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VI. CONCLUSION. The problems of educating children 
are complex. The disagreements between experts and 
legislators is profound. Alternative programs abound. 
The trend at the legislative level in recent years has 
been greater concern, higher expenditures, and more 
innovation. Disstaisfaction with the pace or the product 
of legislative response is insufficient cause for 
judicial intervention in an area in which it lacks 
expertise and tools. Experimentation and diversity--
both at the state and district level--should be encouraged 
and applauded rather than being terminated by judicial 
judgment. The "nine old friends of the children" can do 
little more for the educational opportunity afforded them 
than to reject the chance to interject the federal cts in 
the controversy over the course of public education. 
. . 
MEMORANDUM TO: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
October 12, 1972 
Your bench memo of 10/2/72 has absorbed my interest and 
thought for most of the day (saturday, Oct. 7). May I say at the 
outset - without reservation - that your memo is thoughtful and 
penetrating ln its analysis, well organized and exceptionally well 
expressed. However, we finally come out in this vastly important 
case, your thinking will have made a ~ignificant contribution to my 
thinking and ultimate judgment. 
After reading the briefs with some care, my initial tentative 
reaction- as you know- was that the factual assumptions and legal 
conclusions of the district court were probably erroneous. Your 
memorandum has assisted me in a more thoughtful reexamination. 
This case is more troublesome for me than it otherwise would 
be because of my long association with public education. Next to 
the law, education was my primary intellectual interest for many years. 
As a member of the Richmond School Board for 11 years, as Its Chair-
man for 9, and as a member of the state Board of Education for 8 
years, including serving as its President, I lived fairly intimately 
-2-
with the immense problems, frustrations and occasional successes 
of public education. 
I am tn agreement that the traditioual system of funding and 
control (praetieed in varying ways in 49 states, and for a century 
or more in some states) is oot designed to produce - and does not 
produce- identical expenditures amoDg the school districts of a 
etate or, indeed, within certain districts. I have advocated for years 
a larger participation by the state in financial public education, and 
the trend - certainly in Virginia - has been in this direction.* 
1he difficulty with school financing in Virginia (unrelated to 
race) was twofold: (i) the property wealth of districts does vary; 
and (li) the willingness of the people to tax themselves for public 
schools may vary even more widely. I will cite only one example which 
you can visualize. The City of Richmond consistently over the years 
has provided more money per pupil for education than any of the 
counties in the metropolitan Richmond area. You saw the high quality 
residential developments, adjacent to the City, in both Chesterfield 
and Henrico Counties. Yet, neither of these counties has ever provided 
~ *I Invite your attention to the new Virginia Constitution which as a 
unique education article (Article VIU), placing an affirmative duty on 
the state to provide "a statewide system of free public elementary and 
secondary schools open to all children of school age (which) shall ensure 
that an educational program of high quality is established and maintained." 
' ' 
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a per pupil expenditure for schools as high as that in the City of 
Richmond. Until fairly recently (wben other factors have contributed 
to a marked deterioration tn Richmond City schools), the general 
quality of Richmond public school education was recognized as the 
best in the state, second only to Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria. 
Yet . in terms of per capita wealth, Chesterfield and Henrico 
Counties are far richer than the City of Richmond if commercial and 
industrial property is excluded. But a tax rate on the latter type of 
properties must also be paid by individuals, and Richmond traditionally 
haF- simply been willing - due to Ptrong civic leadership - to tax Itself 
at a higher rate than in the adjoining counties. 
On the other hand, as contrasted with a few bright spots (e.g. 
Richmond and Northern Virginia) many Virginia counties - especially 
in the western part of the state (in which the black population is 
negligible) placed a low premium on public education; the leadership 
wa.f!! weak; F-chool boards were politically controlled; and the boards 
of supervisors were often large property owners not enthusiastic about 
taxing themselves. The result, in many of these counties, was a 
mediocre effort for public education. 
For these reasons, I pressed for years for a larger participation 
by the state, and the trend bas been that way. Dut the prinelpal burden 
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still falls on the local communities, and the per pupil expenditures 
vary from a low of $523 per pupll in Henry County (in the far south-
west) to $1,318 in Arlington (operating funding from all sources). • 
The answer to the problem i8 not as simple as having the state 
take over all funding of public education. Your memorandum per-
ceptively identifies many of the problems. The tax structure of a 
state. involving the interrelationship of federal, state and local 
taxes of all kinds, is a complex mix which cannot be restructured 
without creating immense problems -political, economic and legal. 
Moreover, the genius of our federal system - certainly until recently -
has rested not merely upon the relationship and ba.la.raee between 
state and federal governments. Local government bas played a 
fundamental role in making our system work, in preventing the bigness 
even of state government from overwhelming the citizen, in keepiDg 
control of local municipal services - including education - largely ln 
the hands of the localities where the politicians are far more responsive 
to the needs of the communities and the will of the people than at any 
other level. 
The local school board 18, I beUeve, a unique American institu-
tion. It has played a vital role in the development of our publle school 
• As of fiseat 1971 
... 
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system, and especially in helping to generate the community support 
necessary to finance it. Critics and cynics attack public education 
in the United States; they point to the obvious defects (which I make 
no pretense of defending), but they often overlook the merits of a 
system which has sustained a quality of democracy not found (I believe) 
in any other major country. Few other countries assure 12 years of 
free public education for every child who will take I. Almost no other 
country has an educational system with the egalitarian character of ours, 
which deliberately attempts to minimize social and economic inequali-
ties, and which affords mobility opportunity for any individual who 
has the ability and determination to move upward in the social and 
economic strata of our society. 
Reasonable views may differ, but in my judgment the local school 
board - with the interest of the parents immediately involved - has been 
the most dynamic force behind the overall effectiveness of our public 
school system. A local school board does far more than deal with 
money. Within broad policies established by the State Board of Educa-
tion, the local board has significant autonomy - with respect to curriculum, 
textbook.s, extracurricular programs, supplemental programs, experi-
ments in various educational techniques, employment and in-service 
training of teachers, promotions, school building locations, types of 
school buildings, etc • , etc • 
.. 
. ... ' 
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Whenever I feel myself beeomh~ enthusiastic for full state 
funding, I cheek my lmp.llse by recalling that whoever exclusively 
controls the purse strings, tn the end will control all programs and 
policy. Such a total denigrating of local boards would not be in the 
best interest of education or our country. 
The sta.te thus does have a strong interest - the people of the 
state have such an interest - in maintaining a htgh level of local 
interest and responslbitity for publle education. ·whether this reaches 
the ··compelling" level is rlebatable. "ut to say , as the district court 
did, that it rloes not meet the test of "rationality, ·· is to east con-
siderable doubt upon the :tQtionallty of the district court judges. 
This ts especially true when they characterize a r irrational a system 
approved and in effect tn 9 states, some of which have had the eesense 
or this system for a century. 
"Ihus, a you can ee , I approach the San ntonio case with 
mixe emotion when I thin c on y as a citizen an a ormer public 
F;Chool e ucator. 
As a lawyer and a judge, I have to apply constitutional pri~lples 
In the resolution of this case. Yet, they must not be applied in a 
vacuum or in a way which may weaken or destroy substantial values 
in the ext sting system. Nor wou d tt make any sense to apply con-
stitutional prtDCiples - unless they are unavol~ably applicable - in a 
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manner which is totally impractical from the political viewpoint. 
Against these more or less random thoughts as a backdrop, 
I DOW come to some more specific comments and questions raised 
by your thoughtful memorandum: 
1. Applicable standard of state interest. t agree with your 
view that if only a "rational" state interest need; to be found . the 
Texas system must be sustained. For the reasons above stated. 
I think it clear that a rational argument can be made for preserving 
a vital and influential ro le for the local school district. 
Thus, a critical threshold question is whether the state must 
meet the ··compelling interest'' standard. You point out , correctly 
I think, that appellees - to sustain this position- must convince the Court 
that the state action either (i) impinges upon a fundamental interest or 
(U) draws Into question an '"invidious or 8Uspect classification" (e.g. 
race, right to vote, right to travel). 
The ''state action'' here is the tax structure which, in accord 
with long tradition, leaves real estate as a tax source for the ocality, 
with most other categories ot taxation (income, sales , state licenses, 
etc.) reserved to the state itself. Property taxes provide the basic 
reve111e for all of the local services: police and fire protection, streets 
and other poblie utilities (water, sewerage, Ughting, etc.), public 
health, welfare, recreation, libraries and education. Some of these 
services (e.g. police and fire) are funded almost exclusively by the 
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locality from the real estte tax. Other services - welfare, health 
and education - are jointly funded by states and localities, with the 
localities providing the predominant resources. 
2. Wealth alone not "suspect." Your analysis (p. 19) is that 
the Texas system "does discriminate against the property poor',' and 
thus is a Eystem under which "wealth becomes a function of education."* 
You point out, however, that wealth alone has not yet been held to be 
a "suspect" classification. (In Harper and Bullock v. Carter other 
suspect subjects were involved; and in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.s. 
137 (1971), ,Justice Black avoided saying that wealth was a suspect 
category when he had a good opportunity to do ·,so.) I do not think 
there is any basis in law - or in policy under a free competitive system-
ror concluding that wealth alone ts "suspect." 
3. Is education a fundamental interest-? The question remains 
as to the fundamentality of education. As you put it, is education a 
fundamental interest in the same sense that the Court has found cer-
tain other interests to be fundamental, namely, •air c rimtnal process, 
voting rights, interstate travel, the right to seek public office. and 
speech related interests "J 
There is language in the school eases (Drown and its progeny) 
that could be quoted to support an affirmative answer. In addition, as 
* Please enlighten me as to the usage of the word "function." 




you point out in a felicitously phrased sentence: 
"On top of that precedential foundation, plain-
tiffs stack the followiDg assertions. " 
These "assertions" ine lude the obvious and sound arguments 
as to the importance of public education in our democratic system 
{pp. 23, 24). 
If a layman stopped me on the street and inquired whether I 
thought education is fundamental to our democracy, there could be 
only one amrwer. ut if the same layman asked whether public housing 
and welfare are fundamental where indigents are concerned, I would 
uDhesitatingly give the same answer. Similarly, many would give 
the same IJ18wer if the question related to police protection, fire 
protection, to the communications network of roads, and to other 
services of government which are essential to the social and ecommic 
fUDCtioning of our system. 
'Ibe answers to each of the foregoing questions must be affirma-
tlve if ·•fundamental" is used in the sense that the state or community 
could hardly get along without them. 
It is possible, of course, that the legal concept of what is .. funda-
mental" may differ from the lay concept. Appellees argue, for example, 
that education is different because it is rooted in the Constitution Itself, 
beiug iDherent to the full exercise of First Amendment rights. ODe 
' ~ " ' 
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remembers, however, that it was not until after the Civil War 
that public schools came to be recognized as a state interest of 
any significance, fundamental or otherwise. Its roots simply do 
not go back to the Bill of Rights. 
There may well be degrees of fundamentality and certainly 
reasonable minds will differ in applying a standard so inherently 
subjective. Starting with my own preconceived notions as to the 
importance of public education, it would be fairly easy for me to 
conclude that it is a fundamental interest. I am not sure that such 
a judgment would be based on legal and constitutional analysis rather 
than social and philosophical concepts. 
I would appreciate your further thinking as to a principled 
basis, rooted in our past decisions, for concluding whether educa-
tion is a fundamental interest. \Ve do have the repetitive dicta in 
the school segregation cases. Apart from these, what are the best 
available precedents on the affirmative side? On the negative side, 
I believe you have cited the precedents relied upon principally by 
Prof. ·wright (Dandridge v. Williams, Jefferson v. Hackney, Lindsey 
v. Normet, and possibly Gordon v. Lance ) • 
Before passing to another point, I raise a further question 
prompted by your memorandum. You state, correctly, that the 
Constitution does not require that a state provide public education: 
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rather, only that it must not discriminate if it undertakes to do so. 
(pp. 27, 28.) If one coocedes this, is it consistent to argue that 
education is a fundamental interest 'J The areas of fundamental 
interests, heretofore identified as such by the Court, have involved 
fair crimina.l process, votlDg, travel, the electoral process (one man, 
ooe vote) and the like. Each of these that comes to mind (as I dictate 
this) involves not merely a major state interest but an individual 
right accorded by the Constitution. Can we say, therefore, that 
there may be a fundamental interest - in the sense that the state 
must have a compelling interest in applying classifications to it -
in the absence of an enforceable, fundamental personal right? 
4 • Is there a realistic intermediate standard? After 
discussing whether the standard must be the "compelling interest 
test" or the "ratloDal basis test, " you suggest the possibility of an 
intermediate standard. 'this interests me as I am not entirely con-
tent with either of the standards mentioned. 
Yet the rationale of your intermediate or ''sliding scale" 
standard is difficult to verbalize or visualize as being a solution. 
I agree that any soundly written opinion must avoid the appeanmce 
and the facts of ad hoc law makiug and that "labels should not obscure 
what lies beneath." There is no doabt a ''gray area" between the 
two coaventioDal standards. But would it not be as difficult to identify 
.. " .... 
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and define a position within this gray area as it has been for various 
members of the Court in the past to define - and distinguish rationally -
the two standards now customarily invoked? 
You state that the higher one places education, the stiffer 
the burden on Texas to justify itself. This leaves the judgment in 
the realm of subjectivity, and it does not necessarily lead to a legal 
conclusion- at least as I presently view it. 
I could speak with conviction of the importance of more adequate 
state funding for education (as I have for years), but this would not 
necessarily lead me to conclude that a tax system, practiced in 
virtually all of the states for many decades, is unconstitutional. My 
concern comes into sharper focus when r think of possible alternatives, 
which you address under the caption of "remedies." 
5. ·what alternative plans could the Court soundly endorse in 
principle? Your memorandum suggests two, the first of which is 
sometimes called "state subvention.,. This is defined usually to mean 
full state assumption ot financing. 
I can conceive, without difficulty, of the state taking over full 
responsibility for funding public education, and financing it from any 
or all available sources of revenue - including the heretofore local 
property tax. If the state did this (and assuming it were politically 
feasible), the local school board - and its vital role - would go down 
~· 
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the drain fairly soon. Some may not share this view, but I am 
satisfied from my own experience that the realities of political 
life and power are ultimately and conclusively tied to the Eource 
of funding. lVToreover, this would raise all sorts of direct and in-
direct problems, some of which you have mentioned. It would cer-
tainly weaken the authority and importance of local government, 
which is already suffering from malnutrition and from lost control 
of tax resources. But I am not as concerned with this at the moment 
as I am with possible enucational consequences. 
Onee the state assumes full funding responsibilities, it is 
inevitable that per pupil expenditures will have to be essentially 
the same throughout the state. Certain variations woul be allowed -
for difrerences in cost of living, to accommodate imtted special 
education programs and the like. But T rlo not believe substantial 
discrepancies in per pupil expenditures wou d be to erateri po itically 
or would pass judicial 8crutiny. Certainly anthing less than equality 
would provoke a noon 0 litigation. 
In 1971 the cost per pupil in Fairfax County was ~8 0 as con-
trasted with $1, 318 tn neighboring Arlington County. If there were 
state funding, neither the politicians nor the courts would allow this 
discrepancy to continue -although the quality of schools in both 
counties ranks high in the state. Would Arlington be downgraded in 
K '0 
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order to afford approximately the same level per pupil in Fairfax? 
And what about Chesterfield County, in an urbanized area with perhaps 
as much "CAealth as Fairfax and yet a per pupil expenditure or only $647? 
Would it be averaged with Arlington? If so - and these examples can 
be multiplied by the variations throughout most any state - is it an 
anBwer to the citizens of Arlington to say that, after the state has 
taken away all or most of their real estate tax base, somehow they 
can add the "icing on the cake" which the state haF taken away from 
them? 
If the State of Virginia had to level its per pupil expenditure to 
anything approaching the t\rlington level, I hesitate to guess what the 
increased tax burden wou d be on a statewide basis. The meriian 
per pupil cost for all counties and cities in Virginia in 1971 was $649, 
and the average was 724. It is simply politically and economically 
impossible to increase expenditures on a statewide basis to the standards 
of .Fairfax or Richmond, much less Arlington. Thus, in Virginia and 
no doubt in 'J exas, statewide funding almost imvitably would result 
in "leveling down" the education afforded in the localities which have 
had the good fortune both of high incomes and deep interest in schools 
for their children. 
You suggest something intermediate, and less drastic than full 
state funding. But who is to say what constitutes an adequate level of 
. . 
-15-
expenditure for education on an equalized basis across the state? 
Texas claims that its present plan provides funding adequate to meet 
even the compelling state interest test. A three-judge court differs. 
I would like to find a reasoned and principled position that 
avoided destroying the usefulness of local control or the schools, 
and which also minimizes the wide gaps which now exist as a result 
of primary reliance on local funding. But I have not yet identified 
an intermediate position that is based on objective standards, as 
distinguished from rubjective judgment as to what i~ ''a equate.'' 
'fhe "power equalization plan,'' which r confess I do not fully 
understand, does not appear to be a feasible alternative. It would 
involve a major restructuring of state tax rystems with consequences 
difficult to foresee or predict - both egal, political and economic. I 
would hesitate to plunge into the unknown to that extent, at least 
without a firmer grasp of the probable consequences. 
6. We are a court - not a legiFlature. I presently incline to 
the view that if the Court were to hold the Texas plan unconstitutiona , 
the only feasible alternative - that would stand judicial scrutiny -
would be full state funding. I am deeply reluctant for the judiciary 
to plunge 49 states into this sort of a crisis. I remind myself, as you 
have often reminded me in other connections, that we are not a super-
legislature, that judicial restraint is a cardinal virtue when approaching 
-16-
an issue of constitutionality; and this seems especially true in view 
of the venerable age of the present system. There is a considerable 
public pressure for increase state responsibility of education, as 
we have 'vitnessed in Virginia. One wonders whether this complex 
problem of how best to finance public education shoul not be left 
to the emocratic process. 
Note: I have not addressed many points - such as the validity 
of some of the factual assumptions- chiefly because I have run out 
of time. 
L.£'. P., Jr. 
LFP, ,fr.:pls 
Memo to: Larry Hammond 
:&om: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: Rodriguez 
October 25, l972 
A book which we might take a close look at is Crisis in 
the Classroom by Charles E. Silberman. I have no idea whether 
it will be enlightening on our Rodriguez issue. It has, however, 
been recommended to me several times by old friends in Virginia 
who are professional public school educators. 
If the library here doesn't have it, we might ask it to 
obtain a copy. 
L. F. P., .Jr. 
LFP, Jr. :pls 
\ 
'\ 
1 I ' I 
~aprttnt <!Jo:u:rt ~f tqt ~ttittlt ,jhttes 
'JlUasfttngton. ~. <!}. 2!lgt,..;t 
CHAMBERS OP'" 
JU S TICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
October 25, 1972 
Dear Thurgood: 
It is fine with me if you 
~ndertake the dissent in No. 61-1332 - Rodriguez, 
and No. 71-732 - Bustamante. 
'-.JoJ W. 0. D. . 









TO: \tfr. I arry A. Hammond DATE: November 13, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
This memorandum wUl comment briefly on your first rough draft 
of an opinion -which I have read but had no opportunity to study carefully. 
I consider it a good start on a difficult case to write. I do not 
agree that the draft is "sinkingly disappointing". I agree, however, that 
your second draft should deal more deeply with the three areas mentioned 
in your covering memorandum, I make the following more or less haphazard 
comments: 
1. ~damental right. Your draft is already fairly strong on 
this point, but no doubt can be strengthened along the lines you suggest. 
One question which puzzles me is whether there is a difference between 
a "fundamental right" and a "fundamental interest". The terms seem to 
be used interchangeably. Yet, it is easier for me to think of education 
as being a fundamental interest than as being any sort of "right" in a 
constitutional sense. 
Whatever the terminology may be, the compelling state interest 
test is applicable only with respect to a right rooted in or derived from 
the Constitution. It is here that our opinion should be strong and clear. 
' '. 
2. 
I do not have the briefs with me (I am dictating this at home), but I recall 
that Charlie Wright was fairly good on this. Also, Judge Harvey in the 
Maryland District Court had a quotable paragraph or two. 
In terms of pure analysis, it is difficult to see that education could 
possibly be a fundamental constitutional right. It is virtually conceded 
that the state has no constitutional obligation to provide free public 
education. The state is obligated to protect the other fundamental rights 
identified by the Court -notably under the llrst and Fifth Amendments 
(and Fourteenth). 
2. State tax structure. Your second point relates to the "delicate 
and significant state interest in gathering money within its borders". I 
consider this a point major of dimensions. In terms of finding a 
"rational basis" for the Texas system, you have properly emphasized 
two grounds: (a) the legitimate state interest in local control and 
incentive with respect to schools; and (b) the state interest in allocating 
sources of tax revenue as between the state itself and the localities. 
Both of these can be developed further in the opinion. I believe you can 
derive some help from Charlie Wright's brief as well as from the brief 
filed on behalf of 29 states. 
I also wonder whether there are not some decisions (of this Court 
or other courts which emphasize the right of a state to determine the 
types of local taxes and the allocation of revenue sources (~. ~· property 
taxes v. sales taxes) between state and localities. The importance of 
this point -as we have discussed - goes in final analysis to the heart 
of federalism. If the federal judiciary can order the states to confirm 
to taxing systems prescribed by it, we will indeed have rewritten the 
Constitution. 
3. 
In this connection, the draft opinion has not addressed specifically 
the almost certain outcome of appelllees position: namely, that equal 
spending on education will inevitably require full state funding of education 
so that expenditures per pupil will be the same on a statewide basis. 
It is hard to see that anything short of this would be constitutional. Texas 
is now providing 50% of the school funds and appellees say this is not 
to 
enough. Would 75% beeenough? Would 95%- of what? -;ineet appellee's 
argument against financial discrimination. If the localities are still 
allowed to "ice the c*e" there will be disparity regardless of the state's 
contribution. In short, full state funding would be inevitable, and this 
would surely destroy or severely weaken local government. As you point 
out, if the "function of wealth" theory is sound as a matter of constitutional 
law with respect to education, why would it not apply to virtually all 
municipal services: Health, welfare, safety, public works, roads and 
the like? 
3. The wealth discrimination issue. I have already anticipated 
my thoughts on this in the above discussion. 
I suggest that you continue to give this case your first priority 
have 
attention. We will probably/no equally important case this term. And 
the way this opinion is written could have profound influence on 
constitutional doctrine. 





Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: November 13, 1972 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio v. Rodriguez 
This memorandum will comment briefly on your first rough draft 
of an opinion - which I have read but had no opportunity to study carefully. 
I consider it a good start on a difficult case to write. I do not 
agree that the draft is "sinkingly disappointing". I agree, however, that 
your second draft should deal more deeply with the three areas mentioned 
in your covering memorandum, I make the following more or less haphazard 
comments: 
1. Fundamental right. Your draft is already fairly strong on 
this point, but no doubt can be strengthened along the lines you suggest. 
One question which puzzles me is whether there is a difference between 
a "fundamental right" and a "fundamental interest". The terms seem to 
be used interchangeably. Yet, it is easier for me to think of education 
as being a fundamental interest than as being any sort of "right" in a 
constitutional sense. 
Whatever the terminology may be, the compelling state interest 
test is applicable only with respect to a right rooted in or derived from 
the Constitution. It is here that our opinion should be strong and clear. 
2. 
I do not have the briefs with me (I am dictating this at home), but I recall 
that Charlie Wright was fairly good on this. Also, Judge Harvey in the 
Maryland District Court had a quotable paragraph or two. 
In terms of pure analysis, it is difficult to see that education could 
possibly be a fundamental constitutional right. It is virtually conceded 
that the state has no constitutional obligation to provide free public 
education. The state is obligated to protect the other fundamental rights 
identified by the Court - notably under the First and Fifth Amendments 
(and Fourteenth). 
2. State tax structure. Your second point relates to the "delicate 
and significant state interest in gathering money within its borders". I 
consider this a point of major dimensions. In terms of finding a 
"rational basis" for the Texas system, you have properly emphasized 
two grounds: (a) the legitimate state interest in local control and 
incentive with respect to schools; and (b) the state interest in allocating 
sources of tax revenue as between the state itself and the localities. 
Both of these can be developed further in the opinion. I believe you can 
derive some help from Charlie Wright's brief as well as from the brief 
filed on behalf of 29 states. 
I also wonder whether there are not some decisions (of this Court 
or other courts which emphasize the right of a state to determine the 
types of local taxes and the allocation of revenue sources (~. ~· property 
3. 
taxes v. sales taxes) between state and localities. The importance of 
this point - as we have discussed - goes in final analysis to the heart 
of federalism. If the federal judiciary can order the states to con:Drm 
to taxing systems prescribed by it, we will indeed have rewritten the 
Constitution. 
In this connection, the draft opinion has not addressed specifically 
the almost certain outcome of appellees' position: namely, that equal 
spending on education will inevitably require full state funding of education 
so that expenditures per pupil will be the same on a statewide basis. 
It is hard to see that anything short of this would be constitutional. Texas 
is now providing 50% of the school funds and appellees say this is not 
to 
enough. Would 75% be~ enough? Would 95%- of what? -/meet appellee's 
argument against financial discrimination. If the localities are still 
allowed to "ice the cake" there will be disparity regardless of the state's 
contribution. In short, full state funding would be inevitable, and this 
would surely destroy or severely weaken local government. As you point 
out, if the "function of wealth" theory is sound as a matter of constitutional 
law with respect to education, why would it not apply to virtually all 
municipal services: Health, welfare, safety, public works, roads and 
the like? 
3. The wealth discrimination issue. I have already anticipated 
my thoughts on this in the above discussion. 
I suggest that you continue to give this case your first priority 
have 
attention. We will probably no equally important case this term. And 
the way this opinion is written could have profound influence on 
constitutional doctrine. 





Mr. Larry A. Hammond 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-1332 Rodriguez 
DATE: December 12, 1972 
As I work my way through your fine draft more carefully, I may 
dictate -as I go along- an occasional memorandum to reflect comments 
or questions. 
Your Part I (pages 2-12) is excellent and - from my viewpoint -
ready for the printer. It might facilitate readibility if you could find 
two or three appropriate places to indicate subparts by the use of 
capital letters, but I do not regard this as essential in any sense. 
As to Part II 
The introduction (12, 13) also is excellent. 
I follow subpart A (beginning bottom p. 13) with clarity and 
admiration up to page 18. There, I am partially derailed -perhaps 
because I have not sufficiently digested your analysis. 
You start, correctly, with the district court's "wealth discrimina-
tion". After noting that it is geographical in a sense (rather than 
financial) you distinguish the cases dealing with criminal trials and 
appeals, and point out that absolute deprivation - rather than relative 
. ·, 
2. 
ability - was involved. 
At p. 17, the draft points out that the c1ass alleged to be 
discriminated against is "large and diverse" and unlike blacks, aliens 
or indigents. 
Commencing at the bottom of page 17, the draft identifies as a 
"second significant" distinction the fact that former cases involved an 
absolute deprivation of the benefit in question. The first ground of 
distinction was, I take it, the amorphous character of the class. Yet, 
when I read the phrase "second significant factor" at the bottom of 
p. 17, I was momentarily uncertain as to how you had defined the 
"first" distinguishing factor. I am not at all sure that any reworking 
of these pages is desirable. They are quite strong as presently written, 
but I did want to identify this minor break (at least for me) in the smooth 
flow of the draft. 
The full paragraph beginning on page 19 does raise a question 
of possible substance. You ask whether we need answer the question 
whether the Texas program is "adequate". I doubt that this is really 
what you had in mind - unless the question is rhetorical and you wltsh 
to answer in the negative. I do not think it is the business of a court 
to determine whether a state service - even education - is'adequate". 
Moreover, adequate is relative in relation to time (~. ~· science was 
far more important following Sputnik than prior thereto), generally in 
relation to the demands of a complex civilization, and especially in 
relation to available funds and what the public is willing to pay in the 
way of texas. In the section dealing with whether the Texas program 
meets the "rational test" standard, you deal with this correctly. The 
test is not whether we - or educators are other experts -consider the 
Texas program "adequate". It is whether it is a rational approach to 
an extremely difficult and complex problem. 
Perhaps the answer is to omit - certainly at this point - the 
paragraph commencing on page 19. 
~ to Subpart B of Part II 
3. 
This is another beautifully written part of the opinion, with which 
I am entirely in accord. My comments are as follows: 
P. 24 - see rider A attached to the text, which is self exp~ory. 
P. 29 -the paragraph beginjng on this page raises some questions 
in my mind. You will note a change I suggest in the first sentence. I 
wonder, however, whether we need the first two sentences in this 
paragraph? The paragraph wruld cmvey its basic message if it commenced 
with the third sentence. 
Of crurse the Constitution does not require that free public 
)ltducation be provided by the states. If we have any authority for this 
4. 
view, it might be well to cite it. I do not recall when the first public 
schools were provided, but I doult that any were mandated in any of the 
original states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Did 
appellees concede this in their briefs or oral argument? I have in the 
back of my mind that it would be conceded by appellees that public schools 
are not constitutionally required, but if the state \Dldertakes to provide 
them it must do so in conformity with equal protection. 
P. 30 - your footnote 60 makes a valid and persuasive point. 
I wonder whether it would not be well to move the substance of this note 
up to the text just prior to the first full paragraph on p. 30? 
P. 31 - I wooder whether you rely too heavily on Katzenbach. 
Do you think the portion of Justice Brennan's opinion relied upon would 
have been the same if the distinction llad been made by Coogress between 
different foreign languages within the jurisdiction of the United States? 
Although JUstice Brennan's ~:broad enough, I wonder whether 
~¥ ~ 
the fact that the non-American was not the cootrolling point. 
A 
I still think the Brennan quote is pertinent and should be used. 
I questioo, however, whether we should tie ourselves to it quite as much 
as the present draft does. For example, I am inclined to omit the first 
sentence of your text which immediately follows the quote from Katzenbach, 
I think you have abundantly sustained our position on the "fundamental 
right" point without reliance on the Katzenbach argument. I think that 
argument does strengthen our opinion, and yet I conceive of it as a 
"moreover" argument rather than one central to our position. 
5. 
Memorandum to: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-1332 Rodriguez 
December 15, 1972 
I return to you herewith your draft of 12/8/72, which I found to 
be most excellent. 
In view of the unusual importance of the case, I have spent a 
considerable amount of time reviewing it and also have reexamined -
to some extent - the briefs. 
It seems to me that the structure of the opinion is good, the 
reasoning sound, and your use of the precedents is persuasive. My 
suggested changes are indicated either in the text or in riders attached. 
You have worked with me enough to know that none of my suggestions 
is "written in stone." I naturally want the opinion to reflect something of 
my own style, but I am far more concerned with substance and soundness. 
Also, matters of taste, relevancy and restraint are also important to me, 
and I value your judgment on these. 
My suggestion is that you produce, as promptly as you reasonably 
can, a second draft with the view to sending it to the printer for a private 
printing. To the extent that you make major changes -either in what I 
have written or in your draft - I would like to go over them with you. 
We will also follow the practice of last term of having another law 
clerk review the draft before it is circulated. Indeed, I would be happy 
'. 
to delay it unduly. 
t :. ,' Although I think you have handled the mass of secondary authorities 
very well indeed, before we bring down the opinion I hope there will be an 
opportunity to review the principal briefs to see whether we have omitted 
from our footnotes any references that might fairly be entitled to be cited. 
We have such an abundance of material, special care must be exercised 
to assure that we have not misquoted or inaccurately summarized anyone's 
position. 
One random thought: I don't recall that we have mentioned "district 
power equalizing," except in a glancing way in one of my footnotes. Per-
haps it deserves more specific treatment in a note. 
You heard Jay's reference to Professor Grunther' s article. 
understand it - without having read the article - he expressed satisfaction 
that some of the opinions last term (including a couple of mine) pointed the 
way to greater flexibility in equal protection cases, avoiding the extremes 
of "compelling interest" and "rationality." Jay thinks you and I should 
read what Professor Grunther has said, although I am inclined to doubt that 
it applies to our case. 
'' 
· In conclusion, I warmly commend you on a first-rate piece of work. ~·, '·· 




down for a rush printing. You will want to 
I've done with your suggestions and changes. My 
attached notes may help flesh out any areas in which 
I have taken an approach different than you suggested. 
I am confident that when we see the first printed 
draft we each will have a number of things that we will 
I feel uncertain that we 
wish to alter. At tpresent, id#ijij#liiil#ll#illli 
have kept all the loose ends together and that we have 
not been overly repetitive but that will emerge more 
clearly, I tfuink, in a printed draft. We should probably 
anticipate hurriedly scratching through the first draft 
with any last minute changes and then having a second 
printing for circulation. (In fact, we might just ask 
the printers for 4 copies to expedite matters.) 
NOTEs As of tonight Sally & Peggy still have about 
5 pages of footnotes and 10 pages of text to retype. 
LAH 
No. 71~1332 san Antcmo Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
""!' ,.. Here is the first draft of Rodrigue!! delivered to me this 
morning :tJy the printer. 
~ ~ 
)~ 
I am grateful for your willingness to take a took at this before 
it is circulated to the Conference. 
'" 
' .. ~ Wt,!tave not yet proofread this draft, nor- indeed- reviewed it " 
at alL l'am certain that I will have some changes, although I believe 
the basic analysis set forth in the opinion reflects the views of a majority 
of the Court as expressed at our Conference. 
Yoar suggestions will be welcome. My thought is that we will 
not print a seccmd draft for circulation until next week after everyone · 
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(1) P. 29--You have raised here a question that 
has been of considerable concern to me. That is, does 
anything in the constitution require states to provide 
public education? It is true that public education 
was not generally required at the time the Constitution 
became law. It is also true that there is dictum in 
at least one case stating that while the state might 
close its schools altogether, if it provides schools 
to some it must comport with standards of equal pro-
tection. Griffin v. Cty School Bd, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)/ 
You are also right--! believe--that the parties may have 
made the "throw away" concession that the State could 
discontinue education altogether. However, for two 
reasons I decided not to pursue that course. 
First, at oral argument Charlie Wright was asked 
whether, in his personal view, a case for denial of 
constitutional rights could be made out if a state decided 
to close its schools and provided absolutely no education 
at this point in our country's history. "I must say 
i 
I am attracted as a scholar tjo the argument that •t 
might be, despite the intimations of your previous 
cases, that today the failure of a state to provide an 
edmcation altogether would inhibit the First A~andment rights, 
that a state has an obligation to teach children to 
read and to write." 
Second, this notion ties in pretty closel' with our 
emphasis on the fact that we are dealing with relayive 
and not absolute deprivations. I feel that it might 
lend an air of disingenmity to our treatment if we were 
--2--
to say that no education is required. In any event, 
the issue is not necessary tlo our case and I would 
like to maintain the clear impression that your opinion 
is sensitive to the value of education. And, in my 
view, any such statement--politically speaking--under-
cuts that impression. 
(2) P. 32. I like your transition better than 
mine here. I think, however, that we should omit the 
sentence I have marked out since it is almost identical 
to my sentence on page 33. 
In your reference to Baker v. Carr you raise a 
hard question for me. I have purposely not cited the 
reapportionment cases. You're absolutely correct in 
tminking that the cases are pertinent though. That 
area more than any other--except segregation in education--
is an iexample of the Court's entry into an area tradi-
tionally reserved for the states. The biggest difference 
between voting and education is that in the one the 
Ct was able to come up with an easily manageable standard--
one man, one vote. In the educitional area, however, 
short of equal expenditures, which no one seems to 
want, there really is no fairly controllable standard • 
. The problem is that I don't want to say this unless a 
dissent compels us to because it makes the C~urt sound 
asi it is treating this case as nonjusticiahle. That 
is not what we are domng, instead, we are meeting each 
argument head on and applying to the case the traditional 
teats of equal protection. 
With your approval I would rather wait and see 
what the dissent tries to do with the reapportionment 
--3--
cases. 
(3) I improve entirely of your appended footnote 
78, dealing with the relationship between salaries, ratios, 
and quality education. There is scholarly support for 
both views and I will endeavor to uncover them in the 
next few days but I do not think it necessary to hold up 
the first circulation for this purposel. 
(4) In the "rationality" section I think your 
summary is an excellent aid in pulling together the 
threads that I had been trying to develop. It occurred 
to me that it would work well if I attempted to inter-
lace my rational-basis citations into that conclusion. 
Otherwise, it appeared to be overly repetitive. See 
what you think. 
(5) I would like to suggest, concerning your 
rider on page 43, that we not get back into the 
problems of full state assumption and district power 
equalization. Your point is surely to be disputed by 
the dissenters. They will argue that full state 
assumption is not "required." They will also say that 
full state funding does not mean the end of local 
participation in education, i.e. the state could supply 
the money and the districts could spend it in any way 
they see fit. We have already intimated a contrary 
view in the earlier footnote. I tfuink, for the present, 
that that is enough. Let's placeithe burden on them--the 
~d~senters--to explain why remedies can be easily 
effected. It will be easier for us to shoot down 
their suggestions than to write our own defense in 
advance. 
7/-133,2 
Memo to: Larry Hammond 
From: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. January 2, 1973 
Rodriguez 
Here is a University of Missouri law review which Justice 
stewart commended. 
I recall - quite vaguely - that you have seen this. Yet, I 
had not read it until this morning. Although it has no basic ally 
new ideas, it is well written and some of the points are developed 
quite persuasively. 
Perhaps it might generate a note or two for our opinion. 
LFP, Jr. :pls 
Attachment 
·• . 
L. F. P., Jr. 
January 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
/s/ W.H.R. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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MEMORANDUM 
Hammond DATE: February 2, 1973 
P owell, Jr. 
Rodriguez 
In other connections, I have run across the following cases that 
may possibly merit consideration as buttressing points made in our 
opinion: 
New Y~ 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1948): 
"It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils 
of the same genus be erradicated or none at all. 
Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 
f6-o. " 
~!JJ.iamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1954): 
"The problem of legislative classification is a perennial 
one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the 
same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, 
requiring different remedies, or so the legislature may 
think. ~igner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141. Or the reform 
may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative 
mind. Semler v. Dental '""'xaminers, 294 U.S. 608. The 
legislature may select one phase of one field and apply 
a remedy there, neglecting the others. . • . The prohibition 
of the equal protection clause goes no further than the 
invidious dis~rimination." 
On an entirely different point, you might take a look at Justice 
Douglas' draft opinion for the Court in 71-685 and 71-691 (Lake Shore 
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Auto Parts), and his ireU.ance with respect to the wide latitude of states 




.j;upumt Q}onrt ttf tltt 'J!l-nittb ~tafts 
'JlasJrittgfctt.1[l. (!}. 20.?'-~c? 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL January 9, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio School v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
In due time I will circulate a dissent 
in this case. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: Conference 




Note re White's opinion in Rodriguez 
(1) He equates "local control" with local fiscal autonomy 
and thus fails to grapple with our statement that local 
control means more than local financing, it also means 
preservation of the traditional barriers against state 
interference with local affairs, i.e., it protects against 
the prospect that with state money goes state control over 
programs, class arrangements, and a number of other concerns 
preserved for the schools. 
(2) He relies on the state law which imposes a $1.50 
barrier against excess spending. That law was not before 
the ct below and we do not indicate in our opinion whether 
tha! barrier is constitutional. Indeed, one USDC held 
that a similar provision in Florida was impermissible 
and we indicate, via a cf citation, that it might present 
a different case (see n. 82 p, 34 cite to Hargrave) 
(3) In his final paragraph he suggests that we have 
held that there is no ground for invocation of the e.p. cl 
here "because of the difficulty in identifying the class 
that is subject to the alleged discrimination." As I said 
this morning, while there is language in our opinion leaning 
in that direction that was not the thrust of our section 
on wealth. Instead we were explaining why this class, 
however defined, was not suspect. We added the other 
language in an effort to assuage Stewart. We should probably 
retool that section to clarify our points. 
SUMMARY 
The dissent is thin, as you suggest. His reasoning 
that there is no rational basis is unpersuasive on traditional 
e.p. analysis under the rational basis test. It also provides 
little real guidabce to what system would be constitutional 
except to indicate (p. 2) that any such system should 
"extend a meaningful option to all local districts to increase 
their per pupil expenditures." Later, p.S, he says what 
his view does nQt portend and concludes that all that is 
required it is a system which "provides a rational basis 
for the maximatization of local control." Nowhere does he 
suggest how this is to be done short of either some 
scheme of "power equalizing" or full state funding. 
LAH 
,. ~, 
;%;npumt Qionrt of tl!t~1ttift~ ~tatct.l 
'Jl!aslrittgtatt. p. <;. 2rTbfJ~;.1 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS February 4, 1973 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent in 
71-1332, San Antonio Independent School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez. 








Res Schedule for Rodriguez 
Judge 1 
If it meets with your approval I would like to pursue 
the following schedule with respect to finafuizing Rodriguez. 
(a) It should come down on March 19 (the first Monday 
of the next sitting period). 
(b) I would like to devote next week to the mountainous 
task of citechecking and proofing the opinion. As a major 
part of that endeavor, I will respond the Marshall's opinion 
in a few spots, I will see what evidence there is of the 
nature of "local control" in Texas (statutory or otherS-
wise), A significant part of the job will be to read 
quickly through numerous sources to obtain any further 
valuable info (including the most recent Yale LJ article, 
Jencks Report, Mondale Committee Reports and Prints, Civil 
Rights Comm'n report on Educ, a recent Texas Research League 
report on Rodriguez, etc). 
(c) At the same time I have asked Bill to carefully 
edit the opinion before Wednesday of next week. 
(d) it is my goal to have the finally edited and 
beefed up draft on your desk by Firday (or no later than 
Saturday of next week). This would provide ample time 
for you to make whatever final changes you desire and to 
get it printed, circulated, and proofed c l osely one last 
time be f ore publication. 
(e) In order to assure the fiastest process, I suggest 
that we make available to Marshall's clerk any changes 
we make in response to his opinion so that he can be doing 
his final tooling up at the same time. 
--2--
(f) You might also want to (1) get a formal note from 
the CJ for our records, (2) let PS know that we would like 






As far as I'm concerned this is ready to go to the 
printer. Please check the following first. 
(1) I tried my hand at redrafting slightly the 
introductory paragraph of the wealth section. In re-
drafting it I tried to come closer to stating exactly 
what the "threshold" questions were that should have been 
addressed below. I also changed the sentence structure 
to avoid having two sentences in a row with colons. Finally 
I thought it best to tone down the phrase you used in 
describing the salient questions--"merely some relative 
disadvantage characteristic of a free lfifil.ll.f}:fi#democracy." 
I think it might be read as an indication that we are out of 
sympathy with the disadvantageds attendant upon attendence 
to some Edgewood-type school. 
(2) In the concluding paragraph of the section I 
went ahead and added the cite to Kramer and rechecked to 
make sure that my Graijam cite was OK. If you want Kramer 
out just run a line through it. 
(3) I added the sentence you like in the rationality 
section on page 46 but altered it slightly to make it 
fit. See what you think. 
(When you're through you might have Sally put it on 
my desk downstairs and 1°11 carry it to the printer 
first thing in the morning.) 
Thanks LAH 
CHAMBERS O F 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iuvrtmt <qourt of tlft ~nittb ~hdtS' 
._utrmgtou. ~. ~ 2LlpJ!.~ 
February 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis, 
Please forgive my delay in responding to your circulation 
in this case. The delay was occasioned by my intention to write a 
rather thorough memorandum, but that intention has been frus-
trated by a variety of time-consuming factors, ranging from read-
ing abortion fan mail to preparing to leave for California today. 
I shall, therefore, necessarily be brief. 
First of all, I think you have done a magnificent job with 
this extremely important and factually complex case. I agree with 
the result you reach. 
Mter much consideration, however, I have decided I can-
not subscribe to an opinion that accepts the "doctrine" that there 
are two separate alternative tests under the Equal Protection 
Clause, and that the necessary first step in any equal protection 
case is to decide which test to apply, and therefore first to decide 
whether a "fundamental interest" is affected. 
I do not for a moment criticize you for embracing this 
analysis. It is the analysis adopted by the district court in this 
case, the analysis briefed and argued before us, and the analysis 
that finds support in several of our recent cases. I have become 
convinced, however, that the theory that there is a "compelling 
state interest" te.st and a quite different "rational basis" test un-
der the Equal Protection Clause is wholly spurious and unsound, 
in the absence of a "suspect" classification. 
- 2 -
The Equal Protection Clause is typically invoked to attack 
classifications made by state statutes. I fully agree that some few 
classifications are suspect, notably and primarily race, but also 
others, including alienage, perhaps sex, perhaps illegitimacy, 
and indigency. (I under stand indigency to mean actual or function-
al indigency, not comparative poverty vis-a-vis comparative 
wealth. ) A state law that makes such suspect classifications is, I 
think, presumptively invalid. 
A state law that impinges upon an individual liberty or 
freedom explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution is 
also, I think, presumptively invalid. That, however, is not be-
cause of a "compelling state interest" test peculiar to the Equal 
Protection Clause, but because of the constitutional freedom that 
is impinged upon. In other words, a state law that impinges upon 
free speech or freedom of interstate travel is presumptively in-
valid for that reason alone, regardless of whether the state law 
makes any classifications. 
The so-called "compelling state interest" doctrine stems, 
I think, from a passage in the Court's opinion in the Kramer case 
less than four years ago. 395 U.S. 621, 625-630. I understood 
that passage then, and I understand it now, to mean little or no 
more than what is said in the two paragraphs above. It is, inci-
dentally, interesting to compare that passage with what the same 
author had to say about the Equal Protection Clause a few years 
earlier in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426, a case 
in which very bona fide First Amendment claims were rejected. 
Application of the so-called "compelling state interest" 
test automatically results, of course, in striking down the state 
statute under attack. That is illustrated by the concession of the 
petitioner in the present case. There is hardly a statute on the 
books that does not result in treating some people differently from 
others. There is hardly a statute on the books, therefore, that an 
ingenious lawyer cannot attack under the Equal Protection Clause. 
If he can persuade a court that a "fundamental interest" is in-
volved, then the state cannot possibly meet its resulting burden 
- 3-
of proving that there was a compelling state interest in enacting 
the statute exactly as it was written. The end result, of course, 
is to return this Court, and all federal courts, to the heyday of 
the Nine Old Men, who felt that the Constitution enabled them to 
invalidate almost any state laws they thought unwise. 
I have dictated this letter hurriedly, and I hope it is at 
least minimally intelligible. The upshot is that I cannot sub-
scribe to an opinion in this highly important case that will per-
petuate a very recent "doctrine" that I think is basically unsound. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
P. S. -- It occurs to me that some of the above thoughts were 
better expressed in my concurring opinion in the Shapiro 
case, 394 U.S. at 642. 
,Snprtmt <!fonrt d tqt ~tb ,jhdts 
'~ihtsfti:ngton., ~. <If. 21lgt~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
February 8, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio School District v. 
Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
I share much of the concern expressed by Potter in 
his note to you of February 8th about the elaboration of 
the two separate alternatives test under the Equal 
Protection Clause in your opinion in this case. However, 
I joined your opinion not only because I thought it was 
well done and comprehensive, but because I felt that its 
holding was to apply the rational basis test to the facts 
before the Court. My lack of complete subscription to 
some of what I regard as dicta will not change my earlier 
view, and I am "still with you" as the saying goes. If 
Potter does write something that I feel one can consistently 
join while likewise joining your opinion, I will give some 
thought to it at that time. 
sincerely'f' 
Mr. Justice Powell 




Following are my random thoughts as I have worked 
over your suggested changes and several of my own. 
(1) You have suggested citing Gunther's Harv. L. 
Rev. article. Especially you have suggested cites 
to his statements on pp 9 & 10. I am reluctant to 
cite him. 
(a) On page 9 he explains the enthusiasm for new 
categories of strict scrutiny as, in part, a result 
of the fact that the litigators and the commentators 
are the same people. Pointedly, as his fn indicates, 
he is referring to Coons, Clune & Sugarman. While 
he is correct I think he sounds as if he views that 
practice as somehow incestuous. If that is his 
point, I disagree, Indeed, I stand almost in awe 
of their performance. In any event, I see no place to 
put the quote. 
(b) His comments on page 10 refer to the apparent 
"open-endness" of the e.p.cl under the "new" analysis. 
But in so doing he is building on the arguments of 
people like Archie Cox and the plaintiffs in the school 
finance cases. He could not give much credence to the 
open-endedness claim if he read carefully Shapiro, 
Dandridge, and Lindsey v. Normet. If we want to talk about 
the claim that the "new" equal protection analysis is 
open-ended we should cite instead Justice Harlan who 
has most often made that claim. 
(2) I have reread and cited, in two places, the 
Vieira--U of Missouri--articl~t I have backed away, however, 
from any direct reliance on ~••sarticle because it takes 
a siomewhat different view of the fundamental rights 
doctrine than we do. He suggests that voting and criminal 
process are "fundamental" because they are necessary to 
access to the political process. He does not regard 
these as fundamental because they have some nexus with 
the Constitution. 
He makes another argument that you and I have dis-
cussed more than once. That is, if the states may not 
have disparities ~##ji# betveen districts, why may 
the federal government allow difference among states. 
I have tentatively decided not to address the argument 
in our opinion. It involves at least two subtle consti-
tutional questions• (1) is the due process clause of the 5th 
Amendment interchangeable with the equal protection 
clause?; (2) are we ready even to suggest in argument 
that in the due process clause lies the power for this 
Court or the federal Government to deliver the coup de grace 
to federalism? 
(3) The U. Va. law review article, as I may have 
mentioned, deals with intra-district inequalities. While 
it has a fair general discussion of the equal 
protection cases, I think we should not cite it since 
there are, apparently, a number of intradistrict financial 
inequality cases presently pending and I would not want 
us to appear to have decided that question. (There is, 
however, a U. Va. comment on Serrano which I have not 
read but which we might check and cite.). 
1 
(4) I have added a footnote, ~ as per your suggestion, 
mentioning that political subdivisions need not be 
equal in every respect. I have reread two cases you 
cited to me (Bowers & Adickes). I think neither is 
apposite here. It is my judgment that we need to be 
careful not to say too much about the propriety of 
political subdivision lines inview of the fact that 
we have two major groups of cases which will involve 
precisely this question, i.e. the Richmond school 
case and the reapportionment cases. In each case 
the question arises whether the integrity of local subdivision 
lines should override the application of some consti-
tutional principle under the equal protection clause. 
I tmink we are safe by~ saying simply that territorial 
uniformity is not a "per se" requirement. 
(S) I have gone again over Justice White's dissent. 
As my prior memo indicates, two problems bothered me 
most. First, his description of our holding with respect 
to wealth classifications. That is now corrected by 
the redraft I gave you yesterday. (2) His reliance 
on the $1.50 maximum rate. I have added a new footnote 
to dispose of this contention (see fn 107). 
His general thesis of irrationality is already 
adequately, in my view, answered in the opinion. But, 
when Marshall circulates we will probably want to make 
comments relevant to both opinions. 
(6) I have reread the Orange Brief filed by the 
30 States. Relying on quotations therein I have added 
a new footnote 108 which catelogues some of the 
commentary on the widely held belief that control of 
policies goes with control of the punse strings. I 
have asked the Library to get me copies of the sourees 
I have cited so that I can check for better quotes and 
ascertain that what I have is accurate. 
I have also obtained from the Library the Mondale 
Committee hearings and prints (cited late in the 
Orange brief) and will add whatever helpful material I find 
therein for a later draft. 
(7) On page 1 I have changed from opinion for the 
Court to Memorandum (in hopes that eventualii#ly we 
can change it to "Mr Justice Powell announced the judgment 
of the Court."). 
.hputttt <!}ourl l1f t!r~ ~ttittb ~taUs: 
.as:Jri:ttgtou. ~. <!}. 2llgt,.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
February 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
Your preparation of the proposed opinion for this 
very difficult case is a monumental and worthwhile effort. 
I suspect that you and Potter will be able to resolve 
your differences, as expressed by his letter of February 8. 
If you are able to do this, I am, of course, with you. If you 
are unable to do this, I find myself about where Bill Rehnquist 
is, as described in his note of February 8. 
Sincerely, 
1 Itt.;.. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~rttttt <!Jcurl.rf tfrt ~nittb _itattg 
Jrltllltingtcn. ~. <!J. 2ll~'!.~ 
February 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
This note is intended as an addendum to my circulated 
letter of this date. 
I have two very minor suggestions, neither of which is 
very important, but I pass them on to you for what they may be 
worth: 
1. I personally would much prefer to omit the last 
paragraph of footnote 101 as it appears on page 41. Teachers 1 
str1kes are in current vogue across the country. Emotions run 
deep. I fear that paragraph may add fuel to the controversy, 
and I would dislike to see the Court's footnote quoted by one side 
or the other. Teachers undoubtedly have been ~e_r'Q_ai2 in the 
past. But so have nurses. Each profession has made great 
strides recently. Thus I would be inclined to let their economic 
problems be resolved apart from any comment by this Court in 
an opinion. 
2. I found the next to the last sentence of the £ir11t pa ~­
graph of footnote 1011 also on page 41, to be somewhat confusing. 
It would be a little clearer for my benumbed mind if the sentence 
read, "The result is that relatively few school systems have merit 
plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are in-
creased across the board •... " 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Judge: 
Here is the list you asked for. It contains all of 
the major "fundamental rights" cases. There are at least 
13 cases which have struck down state laws under this 
stricter stanards of judicial scrutiny (usually called 
compelling state interest, but not invariably). There 
are about 7 other cases in which laws have been reviewed 
under the traditional approach but the Ct has explained why 
it has not applied the fundamental rights test. 
Although every Justice has at least joined in opinions 
using the two-tier approach, your closest allies are 
on the other side in Rodriguez--Brennan, White, Marshall, 
Douglas. (There's nothing wrong with the dog food , •• 
we 0 re just selling it to the wrong dogs.) 
LAH 
2/13/73 
Res PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHING THE TWO-TIER APPROACH TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
I •. Cases holding that where fundamental rights are 
infringed equal protection requires application of 
strict scrutiny or a compelling state interest. 
(1) Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 1 "strict 
scrutiny" where "fundamental" right of "procreation" 
is involved. (9-0; Douglas, Black, Roberts, Reed, 
Frankfurter, Murphy, Byrnes; Stone & Jacksone•con-
curring) 
(21 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)• "careful and 
meticulous" scrutiny where "fundamental" right to vote 
is involved. (8~1; Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, 
White, Goldberg; Clark & Stewart--concurring; Harlan-~ 
dissenting) 
(3) Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)• deals with 
right of servicemen to vote in the locality in which they 
are stationed. Right referred as as "close to the core 
of our constitutional system" and level of scrutiny 
not labelled but clearly higher than rational basis. 
(7-1; Stewart, Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, Whiteg 
Goldberg; Harlan-~dissenting) 
(4) Harper v. Virginia Bd of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)• 
Virginia poll tax struck down ... - "close scrutiny" is 
required where "fundamental rights and liberties are 
asserted." (6-3; Douglas, Warren, Clarkp Brennan, 
White, Fortas; Black, Harlan, Stewart--dissenting) 
(10) Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Maryland law 
which said that residents at NIH (a federal enclave) 
were not residents and could not vote in state elect-
ions was unconst because it could not survive "close 
constitutional scrutiny." (8-0; Marshall, Burger, 
Black, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White). 
(11) Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)s durational 
residency for voting requirement infringes fundamental 
rights to vote and to interstate travel and must fall 
because it lacks a "compelling state interest." (6-1; 
Marshall, Stewart, Brennan, Douglas, WhiteJ Blackmun-" 
concurring in the result; Burger--dissenting). 
(12) Mosley v. Police Dept of City of Chicago» 408 U,S. 
92 (1972)s anti-picketing ordinance violates equal 
protection because its infringement of first amend-
ment rights is not supported by "substantial govern .. 
mental interest.f#" and cannot withstand "careful 
scrutiny." (9-0; Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, 
WhiteP . PowellJ Burger--concurring; Blackmun & Rehn-
quist--concurring in the result). 
(13) Goosby v. Osser, 40 U.S. ___ (1973)s challenge by 
pre-trial detainees to incarceration which bars them 
from voting raises a substantial federal question 
in view of the rule that infringement of the right to 
vote requires justification under a "stringent com .. 
pelling state interest" test. (9-0s Brennan for a 
unanimous Court). 
(5) Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)• state law 
barring minority political party from the ballot; 
infringement of rights of association and right to vote 
not supported by "compelling state interest." (S ... 4a 
Black, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall; Douglas~-concurring; 
Harlan, White, Stewart & Warren"~dissenting). (Notes 
I think this case, rather than Kramer, may be the source 
of the compelling state interest approach). 
(6) Kramer v. Union Free School Dist, 395 u.s. 621 (1969)• 
deprivation of right to vote in school board election 
violative of equal protection because interfered with 
fundamental right without a "compelling state interest." 
(5-3a Warren, Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall; 
Stewart, Harlan, Black--dissenting) 
(7) Cipriano v. City of Houma 9 395 U.S.701 (1969)a Limitation 
of vote to property owners in revenue bond election 
violative of equal protection becaluse not supported 
by "compelling state interest." (8-0s PC• Warreno 
Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall; Stewart, Blacki 0 
Harlan--concurring in the result). 
(8) Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); residency 
requirement for welfare benefits violates equal 
protection clause because not supported by "compelling 
state interest." (6-.3r Brennan, Douglas 0 White, Fortas, 
Marshall; Stewart--concurring; Warren, Black & Harlan--
dissenting). 
(9) Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)• filing fee for 
candidacy in a primary violates equal protection when 
subjected to "close" or "strict" scrutiny. (7-0; Burger, 
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart 9 White 0 Mrashall 0 Blackmun). 
-. 
NOTE: Ineach of these 13 cases strict scrutiny was applied 
(in one rubric or another) and a state law was abrogated. 
In a number of other cases, the strict scrutiny test was 
discussed and the Court explained why it found it unneces-
sary to apply that more strict case. The following casesp 
then, are not mere dictum but are really necessary to the 
disposition. 
(14) McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1969): 
"Compelling state interest" test, while applicable 
where a "fundamental" right is infringed, is not here 
applied because the refusal of Cook County to allow 
pretrial detainees to vote absentee is not a depri· 
vation of the right to vote. (9-0: Warrenp Blackp 
Douglas, Brennan, Whitep Fortasp Marshall: Harlan & 
Stewart--concur in the result). 
(15) Dandridge v. Williams, 397 u.s. 471 (1970)1 strict 
review not applicable to welfare benefit scheme 
since no "constitutionally protected freedom involved." 
(5-3; Stewart, Burger, Black, White; Harlan--concurring; 
Douglas, Marshall, Brennan--dissenting) 
(16) Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970): dealt with 
Congress's power to enforce the equal protection clause 
with respect to voting (extending the right to vote 
to 18-year olds). Douglasp Brennan, White, Marshall 
cited "compelling interest test" approvingly in the 
area of right to vote. 
(17) Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971)1 Illinois bail 
system must meet only rational basis test since we are 
not dealing with bail in 8th Amendment sense and there 
is, therefore, no "fundamental" right requiring 
a showing of a "compelling state interest." (4-3; 
Blackmun, Burger, White; Marshall~concurring; Douglasp 
Stewart, Brennan--dissenting) 
(18) Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972): refusal to 
apply "compelling governmental interest" test to 
housing statutory procedures since no "fundamental 
constitutional right" was implicated. (S-2; White, 
Burger, Blackmun, Stewart, Marshall: Douglas, Brennan--
dissenting) 
(19) Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)• applied 
rational basis to state law prohibiting distribution 
of contraceptive information and said that "compelling 
state interest" not applicable because no constitution! 
right implicated. (~~L• Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, 
Douglas• White,Blackmun--concurring in the result; 
Burger--dissenting) 
(20) United States v. Kras, 40_ U.S. ___ (1973)s Bankruptcy 
is not a "fundamental" right calling for application 
of "lofty compelling state interest" test. (S-4; 
Blackmun, Burger, White, Rehnquist, Powells Brennan, 
Douglas, Stewart, Marshall--dissenting) 
These are the most prominant cases. I have not explored 
all of the reapportionment cases but there may be more 
"close scrutiny" language there. Also, some commentators 
regard--correctly I think--the "wealth discrimination" cases 
also as "strict scrutiny"-"fundamental rights" cases since 
wealth alone cannot be enough to invoke strict scrutiny. 
If this is a correct interpretation then Griffin, Douglas, 
' " .. ·'· 
• 
Tate , and Williams should be added to the list. 
Hammond 
,jttpnmc <qonrt of tire 'J!Tni:trb .:§htfcs 
'Jill' as lyh~1httt, JD. (!f. 20? JI-2 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
February 13, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, et al. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissenting 
opinion in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
.• 
CHAMBERS OF 
~tttU Qfltltrl 41f tqt ~ttittb _imttg 
Jl'a.glfi:ttgton. !9. <!f. 2llgt~' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
February 13, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
Your careful and detailed opinion reveals that 
you have devoted a vast amount of work and thought to 
this case. 
I am pleased to join your opinion, for I feel 
that it reaches a sound result and is consistent with 
past decisions of the Court. I am interested in the sug-
gestions Potter has advanced in his letter to you of 
February 8, and I shall also be interested in any writing 
along this line he chooses to develop. As he pointed out 
in his letter, he, of course, reaches the same result. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
February 13, 1973 
?/- 1]7 J.-
Dear Harry: 
First, my warm thanks for your "join" note in Rodriguez. It 
is a great comfort to me to have you aboard. 
I thought you might lJe interested in the enclosed memorandum 
which lists the cases - perhaps not all of them - which establish the 
two-tier approach to equal protection. Whatever I may have thought 
of this approach as a de novo proposition, I thought it was taa firmly 
rooted in our past decisions for me to attempt a new basis of analysis. 
I will, nevertheless, talk to Petter and will, of course, consider 
any changes he may suggest short of starting fresh. 
I am sending a copy of this letter and the memorandum to the 
Chief, with whom I talked this afternoon. He is with us in Rodriguez, 
and has suggested a few language changes which I am trying to work 
Into the next circulation. 
Mr • • Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
Enc. 
ce: The Chief JustiCe 
Sincerely, 
• < . \ 
February 14, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez 
Dear Potter: 
Thank you for your thoughtful memorandum of February 8, in 
which you have outlined your reservations with respect tonmy first 
circulated draft in this important case. Unless I misread the essence 
of your views, I see little of substance that separates us. 
I am in complete accord with your views as to "suspect" 
classifications. I do not believe there is anything 1n the opinion as 
presently written that is mcoo.ststent with our shared view. 
The differences between us are 1n the area of Equal Protectic:m 
analysis which has come to be known as the "fundamental" rights 
doctrine. You questim whether "strict scrutiny" is called for where 
State classifieatic:ms interfere with what the cases have been calling 
"fundamental rights". You would prefer, where State laws toueh oo 
rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, to say 
they are presumptively invalid, not under the Equal Protection Clause 
bJt under the particular provision of the Const1tut1m affected. 
Your dissatisfaction with applicatioo of the Equal Protectioo 
guarantee in such cases appears to be threef<Rd: (1) its historical 
origins are questionable; ( 2) the Ttfundamental" rights category is 
open-ended and is reminiscent of the standardless dangers of 
substantive due process; and (3) the "compelling state Jnterest" 
standard sometimes used interchangeably with ether phrases to identify 
the test of strict scrutiny, is itself of doul:tful parentage and leads 
too inexorably to the rejeetlm of state laws. I wUl address each of 
these- briefiy. 
·~ . ., 
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1 agree that the historic origins of the two-level approo.ch to 
equal proteetioo problems are at least dubious. But whatever a close 
examination of history might disclose, I ecmeluded that the considerable 
volume of precedent in this area leaves little room for a de novo review 
unless the Court is willing to start fresh. Numerous eases, dating 
at least as far back as Skinner v. Oklahoma 1n 1942, have accepted or 
artteulated the idea of closer serutbiy Of liws infringing upon funda-
mental rights. Most of those decisi004 as yoo have suggested, are 
of quite recent vintage.- Yet the sheer number of such eases {nearly 
two dozen by my count), • and the firmness with which they express 
and apply the two-tier approach, stand as a rather formidabl' 
impressive barrier to reconsideration of the doctrine. 
Instead, in Rodriguez I have endeavored to rationalize the cases 
and explore their limtfs. I am 1n entire agreement that a ''fundamental" 
rights test which allows judges to ptek and choose rights which they 
desire to accord special prcteetioo because of their mere importance 
and to treat them as fundamental would be unacceptable. But (contrary 
to Thurgood Marshall's dissenting views) I do not read the cases as 
leaving open that possibility. To the contrary, the cases seem to 
establish that to be regarded as "fundamental" a right must have tts 
roots in the Constitution or, as my draft q>inion states, they must be 
fundamental "in a eoostitutional sense." So restricted, I don~ regard 
lt as a standardless or unmanageable approach to equal prc:teeticn 
And, since I do not regard as "fundamental" any rights that are net 
"explicitly or implicttly guaranteed by the Constitutim, " I doul:t that 
you and I would arrive at different results in very many cases. 
Finally, you suggest that the term "compelling state interest" 
bas undesirable c<mnotations and is of questimable origins, a view 
shared by Justice Blaekmun as I read his separate ccmeurrence in 
Dunn v. Blumstein. To the extent that we have used this language in 
our prior drafts Of Rodriguez, it was employed simply as a shorthand 
for strict scrutiny. To avoid any possible emfasl<m, I have taken it 
out in my most recent draft, which bas not yet been circulated. Our 
ease involves the questlcm ooly whether a stricter or more rigorous 
review is required. Since I find that educaticm is not fundamental 1n 
a coo.stttutional sense, I have no occasion to diseuss what tests are 
used once such a right is found. If I were to write on the meaning of 
*See attached memo. 
,• 
.. 3-
the test, however, I would conclude that there is nothing talismanic 
about the word "compelling." As Chief JuStice Warren suggested in 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.s. 36'1, 376-77 (1968) it simply is a 
shortbiild way of saying that a state's Jaws must be found to be 
necessary to the furtherance of an important or substantial governmental 
interest if they are to withstand scrutiny. Prqlerly understood, strict 
scrutiny focuses more on the means utilized to achieve legltitnate state 
ends than it does on the importance of those ends. 
In sum, I think we are not far apart. I would greatly appreciate 
any changes you might suggest. 
Sincerely, 




February 14, 1973 
Rodriguez - Equal Protection Analysis 
Potter stewart's position (His letter of February 8, 1973) 
General 
In absence of a "suspect" classification, there should be no 
two-test analysis under equal protection clause. (The distinction 
between "compelling state interest" and "rational basis" is spurious 
in absence of suspect classification. ) 
Suspect Classification 
Agrees that some classifications are "suspect" - primarily 
race, but also alienage, perhaps sex, perhaps illegitimacy and indigency. 
lndigency must be limited to actual or functional indigency, not 
"comparative poverty vis-a-vis comparative wealth." 
A state law that makes suspect classifications is pr~sumptively 
invalid. 
Constitutional liberties 
A law that impinges on an individual liberty or freedom 
implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution is also 
presumptively invalid. 
' . ' 
Compelling State Interest 
There is no such thing. (This, I think is essence of Potter's 
position). 
2. 
The presumptive invalidity of laws that impinge upon individual 
liberty derives from the Constitution. [E. g. some express or implied 
protection: free speech, right to travel, right to vote (?) ]. It is 
immaterial whether there is a classification or not. 
State cannot possibly meet burden of showing "compelling state 
interest. " This test would enable federal courts to invalidate any 
law they disliked by finding it required a showing of compelling state 
interest to sustain it. 
(Query: Cannot same result be reached by finding "presumptive 
invalidity" on ground that the law impinged upon a liberty or 
freedom explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by Constitution? 
If we make it clear that "fundamental" right or interest is 
limited to those explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, do we 
not come out same way?) 

]··"~- ... , . . ' ~: .f·' ... ~ '·. ·: ~--_.;;., .... -_1··•. _._;,·-,_.,!.,·.' ._!"': ~--~·-:-:' -_. __ 1' 
1 I agree that the historic orlgtns of the two-level approach to · 
eqaal proteettcm problems are at 1eut dUblOIII& But whatever a cl 
aamlnatlcm of history mlgbt d18cloee, I ccacluded that the considerable 
voJmllte". of precedent in thts area ,J.8avesllttle room for a de novo review 
less the Court is wWmg to at&:rt fresh. Numeroae cuii, ""'diBDg 
.at 1eUt as far bact as Skinner v. Oklahoma Jn 1942, have accepted or 
artthlated the idea of closer sc~tny ofliwa infringing upon funda-
"meatal rtpta.:~,&. Most of tba.e decilllcu, u ,.oa 1umt saggested, are 
of ~te, ~ent ~~P·· Y~ the sheer ,number of such eases (nearly' 
o dozen by my count), • and the ftrJmleaa .wU:b which they express 
appll',. the ,two~tler approach; itand as a rather formlt:ialg 
' m' '-~ '"f''i :r' ' 
~esslve· barrier to reeonslderaticm' of the doctrine. 
F .I.'J ; ~~~ ' 
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the teat. however, I woald coaclude tbat there ta aotlatac tallamaale 
&bait the word ttcompel.Ung.. " M Chief Juttce Warren auggeeted Ia 
t1ldted states Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 36'1, 3'76-'1'1 (1968) lt simply ls a 
iliOitbiiid ftJ of sa.JIIlgtbat a state'• lawa mut be foaad to be 
uc••I'J to the fartheraDCe ~ aa lmportaDt or aabetutlal pernmeatal 
lltereat U they are to withstand acrutlny. Properly anderatood, strict 
eentlay foca.a mon Gil tbe m-.w..cl to aehtfte lqltlmate state 
eacltl thaD lt does 011 the importance of thOM eada. 
In sum, l thb1t we are not far apart. I would creatlJ appreelllte 
aa.y ehanges you might suggest. 
Sincerely, 
r. Justice stewart 
lip/sa 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: r. Larry A. Hammond DATE: February 20, 1973 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Rodriguez 
In Justice Marshall's dissent, it is argued that there is ncTmuch 
substance to our point as to the importance of local control by school 
boards. 
If we add a footnote on this point - as we may very well do, take 
a look at Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 623, which 'f 
emphasizes the authori~e local school boards under New York law. 
You might also take a look atth:e-Texas statutes to see whether school 
boards are authorized by the Constitution or by legislative action, and -the extent to which their powers are specified. 
I know, from personal experience, that the local school boards in 
Virgbia have far more operational responsibility than the state Board 
of Education, although the latter lays down broad policy and does control 
certain matters" In Virginia, the local board T ong other things -
employs, promotes and "fires" all personnel, subject to general teacher -
qualifications prescribed by the State Board; the local board assigns - -
teachers and supervisory personnel to the various schools, just as it 
I -
assigns pupils; it prepares the school budget, and requests appropriations 
2. 
from the city council or board of supervisors as the case may be; the ----.. 
appropriations are in lump sums, with the school board empowered to 
determine all budget items within the total sum; it locates school buildings, 
' --..... 
purchases property therefor, determines attendance zones; it is 
responsible for discipline; although the State Board of Education approves 
textbooks and the general courses for the curricula, the local board has 
a good deal of flexibility in both respects - and may add textbooks or 
courses, subject to the pro forma approval of the state board; athletic 
and recreational activities and policies are locally controlled; community 
relations are, of course, in the hands of the local board (we would rarely 
have a school board meeting without having various groups of parents, 
PTA's and the like appear before us . ); the local boards control the 
school libraries, use of the school buildings for community purposes, 
the transportation of pupils (busing!!!), and a myriad of other things. 
L. F. 1?, Jr. 
MEMORZNDUM 
TO: :- February 20, 1973 
FROM: 
71-1 J ~""V Rodriguez 
In Justice Marshall's dissent, it is argued that there is no much 
substance to our point as to the importance of local control by school 
boards . 
. , , If we add a footnote on this point - as we may very well do, take 
a look at Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 623, which 
emphasizes the authority of the local school boards under New York law. 
You might also take a look at the Texas statutes to see whether school 
boards are authorized by the Constitution or by legislative action, and 
the extent to which their powers are specified. 
~; " , · , I know, from personal experience, that the local school boards in 
Virginia have far more operational responsibility than the state Board 
• 
of Education, although the latter lays down broad policy and does control 
certain matters. In Virginia, the local board - among other things -
employs, promotes and "fires" all personnel, subject to general teacher 
qualifications prescribed b~ the State Board; the local board assigns 
teachers and supervisory personnel to the various schools, just as it 
assigns pupils; it prepares the school budget, and requests appropriations 
2. 
from the city couneti or board of supervisors as the case maybbe; the 
appropriations are in lump sums, with the school board empowered to 
determine all budget items within the tttal sum; it locates school buildings, 
purchases property therefor, determines attendance zones; it is 
responsible for discipline; although the state Board of Education approves 
textbooks and the general courses for the curricula, the local board has 
a good deal of flexibility in both respects - and may add textbooks or 
courses, subject to the pro forma approval of the state board; athletic 
and recreational activities and policies are locally controlled; community 
relations are, of course, in the hands of the local board (we would rarely 
have a school board meeting without having various groups of parents, 
PTA's and the like appear before us.,); the local boards control the 
school libraries, use of the school buildings for community purposes, 
the transportation of puPiJls (busing!! I), and a myriad of other things. 
L. F. E, Jr. 















P. 13--This is our first characterization of the 
questions before the Court and is, therefore, very 
imE.ortanj: to me. So, I have done two things s Tfj 
I have added what I regard as the essence of our 
view of the two-level approach "impinges upon a 
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected 
by the Constitution." (2) Instead of his language about 
arbitrary and capricious I have tracked verbatim your 
phrasealogy from McGinnis "rationally furthers some 
legitimate, articulated state purpose." But, in 
deference to PS I have left in the "invideous" phrase. 
P. 24--I have changed this only slightly. Again, though, 
this is an important point in the opinion because it 
r~rase' in direct terms the course we are pursuing, 
Therefore, I changed on "guaranteed .. to "protected." 
I have a sense that the word guarantee is too explicit/ d 
in its mandate, i.e. a right might be accorded consti-> r 
tutional protection even though it is not among what )_1~ 
we usually regard as the constitutional guarantees. -
P. 29--I have added the sentence I mentioned to you this 
morning that I got from PS last night • 
P. 30--I have added his word "liberties.' Additionally, 
I have changed the first two sentences to reflect more 
clearly that our discussion is focusing on whether, 
because of the close nexus between education and speech/ 
voting, it is a right implicitly protected. 
P. 31. ~ you $uggested I dropped the word "constitutional" 
from the text. V Also I have added PS's phrase to fn 78, 
however, I changed eligible to "qualified" because in reread-
ing the voting cases it is repeatedly dsaid that the States 
):lave the power to set voter "qualifications." 
/ Also note that I have added page citations in fn 74 
on page 29 (as well as;.adding cites to Oregom v. Mitchell 
and Gray v. Sanders). VThese cites buttress my conclsuion 
that voting is a constitutionally protected right. As y 
Justice Douglas said in Oregon, it is a right "rooted 
in the Constitution." -
P. 33. I go half way with PS here. In the first sentence 
I would leave in fundamental right because we are talking 
about how the DC characterized the case. I added, however, 
PS's pet "liberty" language. I also made his suggested 
second change to "constitutionally protected" since that 
is an area in which we are discussing the Ct's jurisprudence. 
P. 35 I would accept his first phrase. 
But, I would be reluctant to adopt his deletion of 
rational basis. He uses the negative form~lation in a 
case in which I wanted to illuminate the positive. Note 
we say "affirmatively supports." Therefore I have rewritten 
the sentence and have used language from your Weber 
opinion, 406 U.S., at 172. 
P. 39. I have added his 1st & 3d changes but cannot 
approve the 2d. What we are trying to say in this 
transitional paragraph is that considerations of 
federalism, fiscal autonomy, and flexibility with respect 
to the resolution of unsettled and complex educational 
questions help us conclude that the Texas system is 
reasonable and rational. It seems to me to demean our l 
point to say that these factors indicate that the schem~ 
is "not so invideously discriminatory." ____. 
}._~-9 ~~~~.~~'~ 
-1-o  Pl-<-Jzfr- 13~3s-, ~ ~ 
~t- ~ . ~'/e. .. u'o/ ~ ~ • 
0{(/' p' 44 I agree with you that his suggested change is 
V / awkward and, therefore, I have tried my hand at a new sentence or two there. See what you think. I 
~. P. 45--Have done. 
P. 46 I have gone half way again. Here we are reciting, 
in almost a shorthand fashion, the usual test, which has 
recently included the term "fundamental". I wish not to 
depart from it too far so I simply added the word 
"constitutional" but kept fundamental as well. ~ 
I added "liberties" again and aaaed Shelton (with th~ 
appropriate page citation). 
P.48-49. I approve of his change on 48, in exchange for 
its repetition on page 49. There I have har~e9 ~~ to 
McGinnis. Here I think it not amiss even t~ite your 
opinion. (I also approved his word "survives instead 
of "meets.") 
k_~~ 





As per your instructions , I have sent our opinion back to 
the printer with the changes. 
(1) You suggest that I cite Weber in the sentence in which 
I quote its language. I hesitate to cite it because, 
as I think the scholars will conclude, it is not a 
straight rational basis t e st. As you know, the Marshall 
dissent and the brEfs for the appellees relied sgni 
significantly on Weber since you intimate a special solici-
tude for those disadvantaged by the "status of birth" 
and because you refer to "sensitive and fundamental personal 
rights" and ghe need to weighi the relative fundamentality 
of the interest--all indicating (1) a sliding scale 
approach, and (2) a lack of a specific requirement that 
a "fundamental" right have its roots in the Consti. 
(2) I entirely approve of your change on p 39 to add 
consistency of expression . 
(r~: rM~~;(/UJ~ 
''}Ut, 'J~I'~ ~ ~ ~ 
'f~ ~·· I~~~ 
~ A ~ ,j-_,#j 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.:inp-rtmt <Q:~ud ~f tqt ~ttitt~ ;ihtttg 
Jfagqmghm. ~. <!):. 2ll~Jt..;l 
February 26, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332, San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis, 
I sincerely appreciate your patient and 
generous effort to accommodate my views in this 
case, expressed to you orally and in writing. While 
you have not found it possible to accept all of my 
suggestions, the modifications in the draft recirculated 
on February 23 are such that I am able to join your 
opinion, and I gladly do so. 
It is more than likely that I shall write 
a brief separate concurrence, but I shall await 
Thurgood's forthcoming recirculation before finally 
deciding whether or not to do so. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Februar y 27, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 Rodriguez v. san Antonio 
Independent School DistriCt 
Thank you for your note of February 26, joining my opinion In 
~.odrtsu..!!· 
Although I have not yet received a formal note from the Chief 
Justice, he told me informally that he was with us. This gives us a 
Court. 
I appreciate a great deal your suggestions and comments - as 
you say both "orally and in writing". They cootrtbuted materially to 
the improvement of the draft opinioo. 
Sincerely, 
lfp/ss 





.hprtutt <!fourl ltf tlrt ~nit.tlt ~taUs 
.Ml{i:ttgbm. ~. <!f. 2llbf.)J..;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
February 27, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join ·me in your circulation of February 23. 
Sincerely, 
/1. v.. ;.,, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez 
This refers to the discussion at Friday!& Conference as to when 
Rodriguez (the Texas school property tax case) wW be ready to come 
down. Although I have a "court", including your verbal concurrence, 
I stated on Friday that I was not quite ready. 
In addition to some further verificaticm and checking of 
authorities cited in the nctes, I wanted to see the next circulation of 
Thurgood's dissent- which I believe he said was about ready for the 
prJnter. Potter also may add a "snapper. " 
Since the Conference, I have reviewed the situation and from my 
viewpoint -unless Thurgood's recirculation requires substantial 
revision- I will be ready by our March 16 Conference. 
I certainly imply no need for expedited action by Potter and 
Thurgood. The case is important and difficult, and we should - as 
always - not rush the decisiooal process. I write merely to report my 
personal situation, as it now appears to me. 
SJncerely, 
The Chief Justice 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu:prtmt <!J~urt d t!rt ~ttittlt .itatts 
Jr~ts!riughttt. ~. <!J. ZllbiJl..;l 
March 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1332 - San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez 
Dear Lewis : 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Judge a 
Re: Rodriguez 
(1) I have incorporated most of your rider on page 
7, with one small exception. You stated that the 
comparison reflects the extent to which disparities 
exist despite "the impressive progress made in recent years 
towards a more equitable balance." I would prefer not to 
use the latter clause. As you know State funding in Texas 
has its good and bad aspects. On the plus side, the State 
has poured out a lot of money in recent years. On the 
negative side, more has gone to the "rich" than to the 
"poor." Thus, appellees and Justice Marshall have 
heavily emphasized that state aid is in some respects 
"anti-equalizing" and at best only "mildly equalizing." 
I have countered by emphasizing the overall improvement 
in the schools without trying to defend the particular 
allocation formula. Therefore, I would conclude the sentence 
with the phrase "despite the State's impressive progress 
in recent years." 
(2) You have asked whether it wouldn't be a good idea 
to state specifically that no PPE is available for 
1970-71. You have placed your finger on a ticklish 
problem. The record contains two kinds of statistical 
information• (1) that w~ich is organized in an understand-
able manner for presentation in an affidavit or in some 
other proper form, and (2) three coffin boxes full of 
computer print outs of statistical evidence. Several 
months ago I set out to unravel the statistical 
mishmash to determine what was actually available but 
soon tired of the confusing task. In short, while I 
think that PPE are not available for 1970-71 I can't 
be sure. All I know is that it was not presented as 
part of any tabular presentation in affidavit form. 
Therefore, I think it siafest to simply state, as we do, 
that 1967-68 provides the only "compliete statistical 
breakdown. 
(3) You have asked me to explain the last two sentences 
in fn 35 on page 10. This is related to my comments 
on the first page of this memo. This is an effort on may 
part~ to take some of the heat off the claim that the 
foundation program is "anti-equalizing" because it 
givies more money to the richer schools. Note that 
Edgewood raises$26 on its own while Alamo rraises $333, 
about a ratio of 13 to 1. But, after state aid which 
gave in 1967-68 a roughly comparable amount of money to 
each, the ratio was no longer so shocking, indeed it had 
drmgped to about 2 to 1, i.e.,® $558 to $248. 
(4) Your changes in fn 38 (p. 10-11) are good. 
You have also asked whether we should include the year of 
the study by Berke. Again, you have touched on one of 
the anomalies of this case. The affidavit submitted 
draws on statistics for a number of unconnected years. 
The median family income stats are based on 1960 figures; 
the race statistics are based on an unrelated Civil Rts 
Comm'n study which seems to be based also on 1960 
figures but it is unclear. The remainder of the stats 
are for a two-year period preceding 1970. But, I think 
the data was gathered in a two-yr period but I think 
it reflects 1967-68 statistics. In sum, I'm simply not 
sure enough to state what the dates are. 
(5) I have, as you suggest, resurrected the intro-
ductory paragraph in ~~the wealth section (p. 14-15) 
(5) The word deletions on p. 16 were Bill's suggestions, 
stemming, I think, from a feeling that the added words 
were unnecessary. I was inclined to accept his change be-
cause it seemed to sacrifice nothing and I was in need of 
more short sentences. 
(7) Your addition on page 19 is helpful. (The State 
provides 12 years and local districts may, add on a pre-
school year, so it is most accurate to say 12 years.) 
(8) Changes on p~27 are good. 
(9) Your question regarding my citation to Eisenstadt 
is a good one and requires some exposition. I have cited 
at the end of this paragraph the remainder ol6f all the 
so-called fundamental rights cases in order to show that 
our theory is consistent with every expression of the 
theory heretofore. The footnote in Eisenstadt is 
helpful because it notes that a higher level of review is 
i 
required if a Grdswold right had been found. Griswold 
involves an iimplicit constitutional right of privacy. 
It is, therefore, a Brennan opinion supportive of our 
narrow understanding of the meaning of fundamental right. 
Of equal importance, I think, is that we have avoided no 
case in this iarea (except Weber) and I think that is one 
of the strengths of our position. 
{10) Page 33--lgood change. 
(11) Page 39--Good change. I have made a slight 
word change because you had "as to" in two succeeding 
sentences. I changed the second one to "regarding." 
(12) Page 48--good. 
(13) Yes, I have checked the three sources I cite 
in fn 114 and they support the statement in text, But, 
this is not a simple matter and is a subject of considerable 
debate. I have emphasized that higher taxes and lower 
PPEs are likely if any alternative designed to achieve 
greater equality of expenditures is pursued. Those who 
reject this line of aiijnalysis claim that the short ajnswer 
is that the legislatures will have to be sensitive to 
the urban problems and itake into consideration their 
higher "cost" factors, especially higher teacher salaries 
necessary to lure qualified teachers into the urban schools. 
This is Simon's thesis. 
(14) Your suggested footnote for the final section 
dealing with the abrogation of other ldi~l#dl#iiiiiid 
uses of the property tax raises a problem. An affirmance of 
the DC would not necessarily occasion the unprecedented 
upheaval of other financing systems for public services . 
. · . 
Only if the Texas system were struck down on a rational 
basis test would the other forms of financing be threatened. 
I think we have made this point forcefully on page 48 
and I would be reluctantly to restate it again. 
In the interest of expedition, I have returned this 
draft to the printer. We can discuss further any of 
the points made in our respective memos and make any 
further changes in the middle of the week. 
LAH 
No. 71-1332 Rodriguez v. San Antonio 
Independent School District 
Here is the 5th Draft of my proposed opinion for the Court ill 
this case. 
Although there have been a number of changes .of verbiage and 
the addittoo. of footnotes (as indicated in the usual way) the basic 
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RODRIGUEZ 
This case involves the attacf n the validity of the Texas 
system bf funding public school education. Under that system, 
I --
almost half of school revenueyare distributed on a statewide 
basis. Each school district/supplements this state aid through a 
J • J..~ 
property t~.fvithin,..its Ajurisdiction. In view of variations in the 
property tax base, and in tax rates, funds derived locanyf ary 
widely among the districts. These variations, in turn, result in 
I 
substantial disparities1in per pupil expenditures. 
A three-judge district court invalidated the Texas system 1 
of dual state and local funding. The system was held to discriminate 
invidiously fg;ainst children who live in districts/ with a low property 
tax base. 
We disagree with the District Court}tnd reverse its 
judgment for the reasons stated in our opinion. 
Without attempting any comprehensive summary, I will 
~
mention only the contours ~f the rationale of our decision: 
1\ 
2. 
We were asked, first, to apply the strictest standard of 
judicial scrutiny ecause of the acknowledged importance of 
education. Yet, free ublic education is ~t a fundamental righy 
guaranteed by the Constitution itself. / We have consistently reached 
:s 
J!f-similar conclusioi'y<vith respect to social and economic legislation -
i . ,. 1 
~· _g. , public welfare and housin~ 
Nor do we thinkf hat the Texas sytem disadvantages fny 
defineabl~us ect class of citizens -the term suspect clasf aving 
been limited by our decisionfrimarily to classifications based on 
race and alienage. 
The appropriate test is whether the Texas plan has a 
reasonable or rational basis. We find that it does. Texas assures 
a basic education/ for every child in the state. Moreover, its ----
combined use 1of state and local funding/ encourages significant 
local control of schools - long regarded as a vital feature of our 
.....____......._ - ' 
educational system. 
But this case represents far mor fthan a challenge to the 
manner in which Texas provides for public education. We have 
) 
3. 
here nothing less/ han a direct attack on the way in which Texas -
and at-rinlft ~ o~er states -have chosen to raiso/and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked, in effect, to condemn 
the state's judgmen; ';, conferring on political subdivisions/me 
power to tax local propert to supply or supplement revenues for 
local interests. Appellee~hus would have the judiciary/intrude 
into an area/traditionally reserved under our systemf o the legis-
cases/ have been hailed as the means I through the judiciary - / 
of achieving unprecedented advancer4n public education, especially 
I 2'' 
for childrell{who live in urbanized school districts. 1\ It is by no 
I 
means clear (from the evidence and studies now available) that 
the core city area~ould benefi from court invalidatio~ ~f the 
Texas type system. Often, the highest tax values are .found - due 
to commercial and industrial properties - in districts largely 
populate/ by minoritf and relatively impecunious citizens. There 
are many unanswered question in this uncharted area. Several 
4. 
studies have concluded that ~financing alternativeftesigned to 
achieve greater equality of expenditures,j could lead to higher 
taxation,fo.nd lower educational expenditures/ in many ~n centers. 
In short, and certainly without endorsing either the status -
~or the ~isd~m of any particular funding system/ we conclude that 
the vastly important/and complex probleniof how best to fund k nd 
.. L I ('. /, A - ,-
control public educatimy must be left to democratic legislative 
processes. 
* * * * * 
Mr. Justice Stewart, who joins the opinion of the Court, 
has filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a 
dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice White also has filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan have joined. Mr. 
Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. 
Justice Douglas has joined. 
RODRIGUEZ 
This case involves the attack on the validity of the Texas 
system of funding public school education. Under that system, 
almost half of school revenues are distributed on a statewide 
basis. Each school district supplements this state aid through a 
property tax within its jurisdiction. In view of variations in the 
property tax base, and in tax rates, funds derived locally vary 
widely among the districts. These variations, in turn, result in 
substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures. 
A three-judge district court invalidated the Texas system 
of dual state and local funding. The system was held to discriminate 
invidiously against children who live in districts with a low property 
tax base. 
We disagree with the District Court and reverse its 
judgment, for the reasons stated in our opinion. 
Without attempting any comprehensive summary, I will 
mention only the contours of the rationale of our decision: 
''·" . 
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2. 
We were asked, first, to apply the strictest standard of 
judicial scrutiny because of the acknowledged importanbe of 
education. Yet, free public education is not a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution itself. We have consistently reached 
a similar conclusion with respect to social and economic legislation -
!· ,g., public welfare and housing. 
Nor do we think that the Texas sytem disadvantages any 
deftneable suspect class of citizens -the term suspect class having 
been limited by our decisions pritn:arily to classifications based on 
race and alienage. 
The appropriate test is whether the Texas plan has a 
reasonable or rational basis. We find that it does. Texas assures 
a basic education for every chUd 1n the state. Moreover, its 
combined use of state and locai funding encourages significant 
local cootrol of schools -long regarded as a vital feature of our 
educational system. 
But this case represents far more than a challenge to the 






here nothing less than cl direet attack on the way in which Texas ... 
and at least 48 ether states ... have chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked, in effect, to condemn 
the state's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the 
power to tax local property to supply or supplement revenues for 
local interests. Appellees thus would have the judiciary intrude 
into an area traditionally reserved under our system to the legis-
lative branch. 
It may not be inappeoprtate to note that this, and similar 
cases, have been hailed as the means - through the judiciary .. 
of achieving unprecedented advances in public education, especially 
for children who live in urbanized school districts. D: is by no 
means clear (from the evidence and studies now available) that 
the core city areas would benefit from court invalidation of the 
Texas type system. Often, the highest tax values are found -due 
to commercial and industrial properties - in districts largely 
populated by minority and relatively impenunious citizens. There 
are many unanswered questions in this uncharted area. Several 
. .. 
4. 
studies have concluded that any financing alternative, designed to 
achieve greater equality of expenditures, could lead to higiter 
taxation and lower educational expenditures in many urban centers. 
In short, and certainly without endorsing either the status 
~ or the wisdom of any particular funding system, we coo.clude that 
the vastly important and complex problem of how best to fund and 
control public education must be left to democratic legislative 
processes. 
* • * * * 
Mr. Justice Stewart, who joins the opinion of the Court, 
has filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a 
dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice White also bas filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan have joined Mr. 
Justice Marshall has fUed a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. 
Justice Douglas has j otned. 
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RODRIGUEZ 
This case involves the attack on the validity of the Texas 
system of funding public school education. Under that system, 
almost half of school revenues are distributed on a statewide 
basis. Each school district supplements this state aid through a 
property tax within its jurisdiction. In view of variations in the 
property tax base, and in tax rates, funds derived locally vary 
widely among the districts. These variations, in turn, result in 
substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures. 
A three-judge district court invalidated the Texas system 
of dual state and local funding. The system was held to discriminate 
invidiously against children who live in districts with a low property 
tax base. 
We disagree with the District Court and reverse its 
judgment, for the reasons stated in our opinion. 
Without attempting any comprehensive summary, I will 







We were asked, first, to apply the strictest standard of 
judicial scrutiny because of the acknowledged importante of 
edueattoo. Yet, free public education is not a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Constitution itself. We have cmststently reached 
a similar conclusioo with respect to social and eccmomic legislation-
!·g .. , public welfare and housing .. 
- Nor do we think that the Texas sytem disadvantages any 
defineable suspect class of citizens - the term suspect class having 
been limited by our decisions primarily to classUicattcms based on 
race and alienage. 
The appropriate test is whether the Texas plan has a 
reasonable or rational basts. We find that it does. Texas assures 
a baste education for every ehUd in the state. Moreover, its 
combined use of state and local funding encourages significant 
local emtrol of schools - long regarded as a vital feature of oo.r 
educational system. 
. 
But this ease represents far more than a challenge to the ~ 








here n<thing less than • d.treet attack on the way 1n which Texas -
and at least 48 <ther states -have chosen to raise and dlslxtrse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked, in effect, to condemn 
the state's judgment In conferring on polltlealsubdivteioo.s the 
power to tax local property to supply or supplement revenues for 
local interests. Appellees thus would have the judiciary intrude 
tnto an area traditiooally reserved under our system to the legis-
lative branch. 
It may not be tnappeoprtate to n<te that thts, and similar 
cases, have been ha.Ued as the means - through the judiciary -
of achieving unprecedented advances in public education, especially 
for children who live 1n urbanized school distriCts. 1t is by no 
means clear (from the evidence and studies now avallable) that 
the core city areas would benefit from court invalidation of the 
Texas type system. Often, the highest tax values are found - due 
to commercial and industrial properties -in distrtets largely 
populated by minority and relatively impeaunlous citizens. There 
are many unanswered questims in this uncharted area. Several 
., 
4. 
studies have concluded that any financing altemative, designed to 
achieve greater equality of expenditures, could lead to higher 
taxattoo. and lower edueational expenditures in many urban centers. 
In short, and certainly 'Without endorsing either the status 
~or the wisdom of any particular funding system, we ccnclude that 
the vastly important and complex problem of how best to fund and 
cootrol public education must be left to democratic legislative 
processes. 
***** 
Mr. Justice Stewart, who joins the opinion of the Court, 
has filed a concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a . 
dissenting opinion. Mr. Justice White also has filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan have joined. Mr. 
Justice ~.farshall bas filed a dissenting opinion, in whJeh Mr. 
JUstice Douglas has jotned. 
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Judge: 
Here is the printer's final copy of Rodriguez. 
Over the last two months I have spent several hours 
helping Putzel's people check my cites, especially the 
historical material. The changes made in the first 10 or 
so pages are all ones I made during that process to 
assure complete accuracy. 
I think all the changes are OK, but you might take 
a special look at the suggested changes on pages 22 and 
44. 
With your approval (please initial Putzel's letter), 
Spencer can return this to them. They have spent, I 
would guess, at least 50 hours on this opinion since 
there was a great deal of citation work and lots of 
things to make consistent with the dissents. You might 
write a short note to Mr. Putzel, indicating that you 
realize the difficulty of their task (they, like every-
lr
one else around here, are apparently woefully understaffed) 
and the consistent quality of their work. 
LAH 
. •. . • .,. ~ # 
Rodriguez a 
Judge a 
(1} I would approve both of Justice Blackmun's 
suggested changes (see p 42) 
(2) P. 18. I would prefer not to omit that sentence. 
He needn't worry about breeding litigation in the school 
finance area. I think any decent ,,,._~l#lli&#li~F 
!:1 
llil,ilattorney will tell his clients that, after all the 
ways in which we foreclose the result, the hall game is 
over. Here the sentence adds symatry. And, without it, 
it appears that we are simply disposing of the Texas case 
on the basis of the facts found in another State. 
(3} I have incorporated in the master copy every one of 
the other suggested changes in the CJ's draft that you 
approved. 
(4) I have reviewed the opinion in an effort to drop 
any indication that we regard "compelling state interest" 
as a li'l talisman. I have changed the two references 
that are of any moment (see pp 35 and 39). The words 
appear in Section I (pp 11, 12, 13) where I explain and quote 
from the DC opinion. Here I think it is merely an accurate 
reflection of what the lower ct did. The only other place 
where the word appears is in a quote from Brennan in fn 
73. It is now fair to tell Justices Stewart and Blackmun 
that we do not embrace the phrase. Also the road is now 
clear for you in another case (maybe Rosario or Griffiths 
to explain that "compelling" is not the critical plhrase. 
I would like to reread the master before we send it 




Attached are your riders in Section A of Rodriguez. 
I have incorporated the substance of each in the opinion 
which is now at the printers. I have tinkered with the 
language a little to avoid redundancy with what we had 
said elsewhere and to avoid overstaing our position. You 
should compare your riders with the printed draft to 
t 






On page 11 you questioned by use, first, of "Close" 
and "strict" interchangeably in connection with the 
higher level of scrutiny test and, second, of "interest" 
and "right" interchangeably in reference to the 
fundarnentality aspect of the equal protection analysis. 
The terms have heretofore been used interchangeably in 
the Court's many cases. I think it is appropriate 
to continue that usage. Moreover, as to the use of 
"interest" and "right", I have intentionally used 
both terms in an effort to avoid the implication that 
our opinion is resurrecting the old, and ill-starred, 
right-privilege distinction. Our point is equally valid 
no matter how it is phrased, i.e., "constitutionally 
fundamental right" = "constitutionally fuddamental 
interest." If any particular usage strikes you as 
undesirable in any particular portion of the opinion 
we can change it but I see no need in systemativally 
adhering to one term or the other. 
This draft incorporates each of Justice Stewart's 
suggested changes as I presently understand them. After 
we recirculate I will make a special effort to talk again 
with his clerk to see if there are ways in which we 
can further satisfy him without detracting from what we 
have already done. 
; 
--2--
This draft also incorporates a large number of 
changes that you have suggested or that I have made 
on my own, usually for obvious reasons. I have tried 
to tone down your footnote 92. Upon rereading it I 
came away with a sense of inevitablility about the 
status quo. If, indeed, no alternative other than what 
we have today is politically feasible this is the best 
reason for the Court to intervene. In this sense, 
the present case is much like Baker v. Carr. The majority 
is so wedded to the status quo and/or so unwilling to 
respond to the present disparities in educational expendi-
tures that nothing other than judicial intervention 
can break the log jam. Our ~mphasis, in my view, should 
be on the positive rather than negative side. That is 
why I have so heavily emphasized Texas' recent gains in 
expenditure levels. It is well to point out that any 
alternative is going to meet grave political hurdles, but 
I hesitate to do more than that. 
As far as I'm concerned, we can send this back to the 
printer as soon as I incorporate the rest of your changes 
on the draft you marked up. I never finished incorporat-
ing those items before giving it back to you. 
LAH 



















































































































































































· The Schools and Equality 
The traditional method of paying for this country's 
.PUbliC schools, by local taxes on real estate, is clearly 
disorderly and unfair. But,lllthe Supreme Court held yE-s· 
terday, it is not unconstitutional. The disorder and the 
unfairness are deplorable, and require the most active 
' I 
attention. The force for improvement will have to comE' 
. from citizens working at their state capitals. 
Neither the Court, nor anyone else, has been able to 
devise a single nationwide rule of equality that would 
not create new kinds of injustice, and threaten new re· 
straints on the improvement of American education. 
There is a strong national interest in permitting local 
school systems to raise their own standards and their 
own budgets. There is a strong public interest in the 
kind of experimentation that goes forward only when 
local systems control their own budgets. There is much 
benefit in the custom of permitting ambitious and pros-
perous school districts-like Montgomery and Arlin&rton 
Counties-to lift their own standards and, indirectly, ex-
ert a force on other school districts to keep up. There is 
a strong public need for a floor to expenditures and 
standards in the schools. But there can be no public in-
terest in reducing, or holding down, the resources that 
the leaders are able and willing to devote to their local 
IChools. 
Perhaps the Supreme Court might have ruled other· 
wise, if the majority had been persuaded that the most 
deprived children live in the poorest districts-or that 
they would benefit from any simple rule of equality in 
distributing property tax revenues. In fact, as the judges 
discovered, neither of those premises is correct. This 
case comes from Texas, a state in which the variations 
among local tax resources are extreme. The plaintiffs 
emphasized the differences between selected districts 
with high and low bases. But as this case moved towaril 
the Supreme Court, scholars and analysts began a mon· 
rigorous examination of the distribution of tax revenur.'-
It rapidly appeared that, in most states, any rule of eqtw I 
expenditure would take funds away from the central 
cities. But it is in the central cities that bitterly-deprived 
children live in the greatest concentrations. The big citir~ 
ihave substantial commercial and industrial tax ba&es. In 
some states, a rule of equal distribution would have tahen 
·~ 
money from these cities and diverted it into suburbs 
where there is no tax base but residential subdivisions 
where few of the children are deprived. The Supreme 
Court would have been wanton to overlook this conse-
quence of a doctrine of equal d~strlbution and, quite 
properly, it drew back from the lower court's far too easy 
assumptions . 
Justice Powell alluded to these uncertainties when he 
wrote, in the Court's decision: "The complexity of these 
problems is demonstrated by the lack of consensus with 
respect to whether it may be said with any assurance that 
the poor, the racial minorities, or the children in over-
burdened core-city school districts would be benefitted 
by abrogation of traditional modes of financing educa-
tion." The Comt.'s decision may be described as a very 
cautious one, in an issue in which caution is essential. 
There will be a tendency, perhaps, to regard this deci-
sion as a signal by the Court that it intends to end the 
cycle of great cases that, over the past quarter of a cen-
tury, have vastly strengthened the rights of American 
citizens in education. Indeed Justice Marshall, in his ring-
ing dissent., denounced the majority's conclusions as "a 
retreat from our historical commitment to equality of 
educational opportunity." But in cases of racial discrimi-
nation, it was very clear who was ·being burt, how they 
we1 e being hurt, ancl what the· remedy would be. In the 
present Cilse, none of those crucial questions could be 
answered with any degree of precision. It is accurate to 
say that, in regard to the relationship between money 
aud educational opportunity, the controversy among pro· 
fessional Nlncators and scholars is more complicated and 
chaotic now than it wa~ five years ago. While the inequal-
if iP . .; of financing \\'NC apparent enough, no one could 
e<'frr a judiri al rc·mccl~· that gave any real promise of 
I 
working sat isfactMily. 
nut t hE>n· r1rc ot ]1('1' kinds of remedies. The Court has 
said tli:11 !hl' cli s)'arities in the financing of public schools 
~rt• not lllH:on .., tittt1ional. But that does not make those 
di~paritit • ., , in thrir pr('~cnt form am! scale, either neces· 
~ar:>· o :· right The Court's decision does not make the 
IH ··d for rd0ru1 all)' less urgent. The responsibility now 
lies. :~s it rr.ally h~s always lain, with the govemors and 


















'Novel Theory~ of -~ch~o 
Spending Cashiered by Cour~--- -···-
By Willlam Greider 
Washington Post StnlC Writer . 
~t was. going to be another 
epic socwl reform, inspired 
by an obscure law professor 
named John E. Coons who 
fathered a novel legai the-
ory that would transfor 
the fi1~ancing of publ~~ , 
schools 111 America 
The name was· familia1· 
~!1ly to a. s.mall network of 
egal' acttvists, who read 
Coon s book "PI·· t 
W 1 
• IVa e 
. ea,th ~nd Public Educa-
~wn antl followed the pat 
ern of his textbook brief-
More than four do l . suit . . zen aw-
.s were filed across the 
natton, attacking t11 . 
qu l't' · e Jne· a 1 Jes of school spe d' M . ·· n Jn" 
aJor foundations can~~ 
forward with "rants L'b . l and "' · 1 era 
. progressive organiza-
t~o~ls, wh? were allies in the 
CIV1 nght · 8 movement 
umted again in popular SUlJ' 
pwL · .. 
d 
o.n~y yesterday -by a 5~ 4 
eCJStOn the U 's . . 
Court U;rew , th~ .b Supr~me 
back at C ook nght 
theories ou~ons, tossed his 
nu.llified mos~f ottthtrt, and 
smts. e law-
"It hurst" 'd "wh 't' ' sai Coons 
· en 1 s so close " ' 
. Thr University ~f Califor 
~~:i~:~~s~o:r:~:1~ched. at hi~ 
conceal th ~· clid not 
most b t e anguish of al-
- u not 't ing a 1 d qlll e-foster-
t.he hig~~s(~~~~'t~eci sion by 
"1 think that the prin . l . eventually . 
· cated" cip e Will be vindi· 
"Arte'r all Coons lnsi strd. 
of tl
1
e ' one vote. Think 
power i 1 tl 
vote If [f r Jat one · ormer J t' 
[former Justice At~s 1Cr Abc] 
tras or G llb t t hm] For-
o c er" had t 
the court 11 • " · JCen on .a shado , ;cie wouidn't be 
it \VI w o a cloubt about 
· 10 knows b time." ' may e next 
"'l'f'c' .• 
The principle whirh 
Coons and his associates as-
serted was that the inequali· 
ties in local school spending 
acro~s America are deter-
mined mainly by the differ· 
ences in private wealth from 
school district to school dis-
trict via the property tax 
which provides most of tllr 
money for public schools. 
Coons theorized how law· 
yers might attacl< this as a 
violation of the "equal pro-
tection" clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, arguing 
that education was a funda-
mental right of citizens 
such as voting or a fair trial: 
California Supreme Court 
bought the theory and, in ef-
fect, declareq the status quo 
in violation of the state con-
stitution. It did not say 
what system of ra1smg 
money for schools would be 
fair and acceptable but il 
sent the lawyers back to the 
trial ,-ourt to argue over 
remedies. 
The Serranot decision 
spread the idea rapidly. In 
Washington, the Lawyers 
Com mitt <ee for Civil Rights, 
arme(\ with a Ford Founda-
tion grant, became a clear· 
inghousc and strategy cen-
ter for lawyers across the 
country who launched simi· 
l ar ~-uits. 
While Coons talked about 
"rich districts" and "poor 
districts," his hook did not 
confront what is a common 
happenstance across the na-
tion-that sometimes "rich 
districts" include large num-
bers of poor people. 
In the major cities, the ed-
ucational tax base is often 
above rural areas in the 
same state or even the aver· 
age for the suburbs. Thus, if 
a court or a state legislature 
attempted merely to equal-
ize the spending per pupil it 
might take tax dollars awav 
from San Francisco or :1\e\V 
York or Oakland or Atlanta. 
The classic example was 
Baldwin Park, a Los· Ange-
les suburb which can raise 
only $700 per child from it~ 
meager tax base, while 
across town Beverly Hills 
spends $1,800 per child--Oil 
In all, 52 lawsuits have 
been filcd-27 of them in 
fr·r!eral courts, 25 in state 
rourts. One of those was the 
Ho<lri gucz complaint from 
'ft!Xns which reached the U.S. · · 
·~It is entirely possible," 
wrote Joel S Berke and 
John C. Callahan, two ana-
lysts of public finance, "that 
revisions in state finance 
that come in the wake of the 
new legal doctrines maY re-
sult in higher taxes" and 
lower or at best no greater 
educational expenditures for · 
urban education." 
a property tax rate half thr:'. 
of Baldwin Park's. 
Sn]Wrl.nc Court. Mexican-
' ;\Jnt!I'JC"an parrnts in Ed"e· 
: wood, an impovPrished s~b­
urb of San Antonio argued · 
The Coons thesis, pub-
lishe~ in 1970, was !wavy 
readmg but the idea tonk 
off like a jet. Legal sen·ice~ 
lawy~rs in Los Angeles. 
workmg at the federally fi . 
nanced Western Cente; on 
Poverty Law, picked up on 
th_e theory before they had a 
~ilent. Two of them bumpt' d 
mto J?hn A. Serrano at :1 
cockt~tl party where he wn' 
descnbing the shocl dv 
schools of 'j':ast Los Angel'~; 
. Serrano, a psychiatriC' ~--·•· 
eta~ w_orkcr, became the k ;u i 
plamttff (though he suhH' 
quently moved to Whitt it·t· 
where the schools were lw' 
te_r financNI). "To be hon t' · 1 
With you, I didn't think \' .. 
would ·win and 1 wa~ 11 - 1 
a.war~, of all the imphl';, . 
t10ns, Serranto said. 
I that tlwir t ; tx-poo~ school 
s~:~tcm could ne\'er catch up 
"tlli the educational quality 
of more prosperous districts 
and I hat the Texas state aict 
<hd n?t make much of a 
cl_cnl m the gross inequali-
tw> bet wcrn rich districts 
and poor districts. 
Bul Coons' theory als 
snrtN~ catching a lot o~ 
fliik. Some of the organiza-
UL>11 ' l lk<' the Urban Coali-
t 1< •11 wine I\ rushed to en-
dnr ·· " tlw lllO\'cmcnt began 
t~J );;, vc sccconcl thoughts. 
I· 1, •111 n number of studies it 
\)(' canw cvidrnt thnt some of 
1 I, " ci~ izl'ns who were 
cuppOS(• d \0 be helped 
t:• '11· ,,:,t-·:Hl, be hurt-
. >.<~>t<'IY . puur people. espe-
_<: '"11:' l'nor JH:'Ople who lived 
1n lw: ci\i(• :;. 
But in August, 1971, I he 
,., ( 
; .. · 
Furthermore, bia city in· -
terests like the Url~an Coali-
tion argued that thrir school 
systems need extra dollars 
per child, not equal dollars. 
Urban schools,they pleaded, 
cost more to operate and re-
quire extra money to oyer-
come the educational handi-
caps of the poor, 
The Supreme Court's ma · 
jority opinion concluded 
that, when the experts thfil111· 
~elves cannot agree on the 
Jmpact of judicial interYen· 
tion, the courts should keep 
out. That will not stop fur· 
thcr litigation in state 
courts, where Serrano acln>-
cates have won several pre: 
lim inary victories but it ef· ~· 
fectively thwnrts' any hope 
of a sweeping national re-
form. · 
Oma.ha, Nebraska 
March 22, 1973 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
Justice of the SupremE Court 
·.{ashington ;). c. 
Dear Justice Powell: 
The recent school property tax decision, for 
which you wro t e the majority opinion, is exceeded in me anness of 
spirit only by the Dred Scott decision. 
For our highest court to take refuge from the 
unfortunate fact that our fundamental document makes no mention about 
education at all is exceeding strar1ge, although it's true that the 
men in Philadeplphia in 1787 saw fit t6 exclude mention of education 
in the Constitution. 
But the Ordinance of the same year put the federal 
government into the educating of the young field officially, and it ' s 
been there ever since, with a shabby performance record. 
The full impact of the decision you •t~rote will not 
be felt keenly soon , but its cumulative affect will be explosive . A 
bright child residing in poor school dis trict that abuts another that 
is wealthy will view you in the same light as did bright Blacks view 
Roger Taney, whose opinion in the Dred Scott ca se was unnoubtedly an 
on b al ance popular one some 121 years ago . 
Because of an indifferent,and, in retl'oe;peC' tr 
stupid omission on the part of the writers of the Constitution , our 
educational system is chaotic, enormously expensive and ridiculously 
inefficient. So far as I have been able to determine it, all 50 of 
our state Constitutions ~uarantee the children o~ those states an 
equal educational opportunity, and each state constitutes a school 
district divided into smaller districts, all arms of the state in its 
education function . 
So far as the equal opportunity guarantee is 
concerned, every state , including Hawaii (although that state has the 
only enlightened and fair method for financing education in public 
schools), has f a iled to deliver, some miserably. 
Your decision will be read in London, Paris and 
Peking, and in future textbooks. My disappointment is a shriveling 
one, for the proper decision was one that should have had our Supreme 
Court saying suffer little children to come unto us and you will re-
ceive open-handed and fair treatment, each and everyone of you. 
The property tax as a basic financial support 
system for public schools in the United States , nistrict by district, 
cynically disregards the equal opportunity guarantee, and this lliJJDI!H~rt:a 
hypocrisy on such a mas s ive scale is a difficult load to carry, but 
your decision has given respectability to a complex discriminato~y 
educational system . I'm sorry now that I felt relief and reassurance 
when your name quieted the furor over those of Haynesworth, Carswell 
and others. Had any of them written the property tax opini on, it may 
not have been so polished ~nd meticulously erudite, and seemingly 
rational, but it would have been the same. I had expected that you 
were a larger man than you are . 
Sincere~y ~urs 
~ /_·~ /fa...._,_ 
\e[m . J. Haney / 
2217 Niskayuna Drive, 
Schenectady, N. Y. 12309 
March 26, 1973 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, ~r., 
As soeia te Justice, U. S. Supreme Court, 
Supreme Court Building, 
Washington, D. c. 
Deer sir, 
I am trained in the law and am now a retired member of the New 
York State Bar. While not a Constitutio~al lawyer, I have always 
made it a hobby, reading and rereading the more important decisions 
of the Supreme Qourt. 
The decision in the Rodriguez Case I find completely incomprehensible. 
It is as though you had first decided on the outcome you wanted 
to produce and then east about in the recesses of the Constitution 
for some eruftbof support, however fragile, to lend credence to it. 
Your entire reasoning, if the media correctly , reported it, seems 
to be predicated upon the undisputed fact that the Constitution 
provides no right to education. But the Constitution provides no 
right to highways, drinking water, sanitary condition• or 99.9% 
ot all the matters which Congress and the State legislature have 
decided to be important enough to pass laws about; further the t 
the Supreme Court has dealt with many of them even though they 
are ~mentioned in the Constitution. 
I urge you to look at that Constitutton yet another time. Look 
at the XIV Amendment "nor deny to any person within it jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the lawso" You admitt~d that the real 
estate tax is unfair and that "the need for reform is •:parent, 
but the ultimate solution must come from the lawmakers. Fine; I 
have no argument with that proposition. BUT '!HE LAWMAKERS HAVE 
ALlEADY MADE A SOLUTIONJ IT IS UP 'ro 'IHE SUPREME COURT 'ro DO X'lS 
DUTY. That duty is not to legislate1 but to declare the Texas law 
violative of the XIV Amendment as other courts have done with other 
laws and tell the Texas Legislature to make the law Constitutional. 
TWo centuries ago it was possible to accurately measure a persop's 
ability to pay a tax by the value or the land he owned. To-day 
I am very certain that even the members or the Supreme Court have 
oYer 9~ of their holdings in intangibles. ~al Estate ownership 
is not a proper measure for taxation. The lower court had guts 
enough to face up to the problem now. Eventually, you know as well 
as I that this inequity must be corrected regardless of what 
complexities it may generate. 
The que tion before the court was properly: shall we do it now in 
a legal orderly fashion, or shall we wait for the inevitable 
violence to eorree injustice? You nine men have to decide it. 
~U%:1~~ 
EFREM B. NEISULERo 
CENTER FOR ADVANCED STUDY IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
202 Junipero Serra Boulevard • Stanford, California 94305 
March 23, 1973 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20000 
Dear Mr. Justice Powell: 
Telephone 1415) 321-2052 
In the New York Times of 22 March 1973 you are quoted as saying in regard 
to your majority opinion in the Texas school finance case, "The Justices of this 
Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary 
to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of 
public revenues." If this statement is accurately reported, it is truly incredible. 
The implications are obvious: 1) If you do not have "the expertise and familiarity" 
then how is it possible for you to render an opinion?; 2) It follows that given the 
limitations on your knowledge, your decision is unwise; 3) If your knowledge is 
limited and your decision is unwise, then you should have (given that you are a 
fair-minded man) disqualified yourself from rendering any decision. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that the duty of someone in your august 
position is to familiarize yourself with "local problems" so that you might better 
render wise opinions: That is your job for whose support we, the citizens of this 
country, are taxed. 
However, in the climate of these times, ignorance and prejudice in high places 
seem to be rewarded. And those who are poor, disadvantaged, Black, Mexican or 
Indian are penalized by people like you who fail to acquaint themselves, "acquire 
expertise", and familiarize themselves with their problems; by people who are in 
positions of power and influence and who have neither charity nor wisdom, nor the 
inclination to acquire expertise or familiarity with problems, local or general. 




Herbert Weiner, M.D. 
Fellow 
... 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
2500 Red River 
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78705 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
April 25, 1973 
Thank you very much for your warm letter of April 20th. I am 
very pleased to have a copy of your remarks to the Fifth Circuit 
for my file on the Freund Committee. 
I agree with you about the way the press has treated the report 
of that Committee but I am afraid the reasons for that treatment do 
not seem opaque to me. It seems to me wholly consistent with the 
attempts of the Washington press corp to smear the Chief Justice at 
every opportunity. The reasons for their hostility to him are a 
mystery to me but the existance of that hostility I regard as abso-
lutely clear. 
When the Chief announced his designees to the Commission on the 
structure of the appellate courts even the wire services somehow 
thought it relevant to point out that Bernie Segal and I had also been 
members of the Freund Committee and the readline in the Washington 
Star was "Mini-Court Advocates Appointed." Clearly the press has pre-
pared to prejudge the work of that Commission before it is formally 
organized because of the taint that Bernie and I bear. No member of 
the press thought it relevant to note that Bernie and I are also both 
members of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
and were initially appointed tofuat by Chief Justice Warren. Nor does 
anyone think it relevant that we are both members of the Council of the 
American Law Institute by election of the Institute. Nor has it 
occurred to anyone that both of us have devoted a major part of our 
careers to improvements in judicial administration with particular refer-
ence to federal courts. It is all very disappointing but I have had 
too much experience with the press to be surprised by it. 
I am delighted to hear that you will be at the Fourth Circuit 
Conference and I certainly hope that your Court finishes its term in 
time for you to do that. When I consider, however, the difficulty and 
importance of some of the cases that were argued last week and this 
week I am concerned about when the Court will be able to rise. 
·~ ' ' . 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Page Two 
Since rehearing was denied on Monday in Rodriguez it is no longer 
inappropriate for me to say what a splendid opinion I thought you 
wrote in that case. Clearly I am not without bias in the matter, but 
I thought that the opinion was an exceptionally clear and forceful 
statement for precisely the right reasons for the decision the Court 
reached. I am glad to say that the prospect for reform of the Texas 





·----- ------ - --- - --··--







DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE 
ENGINEERING AN D MATERIA LS SCIENCE 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr . 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D. C. 
My dear Mr . Justice Powell: 
March 26, 1973 
I have just read the newspaper article describing your decision 
concerning the financing of schools through prope~ty taxation . Although 
I do not have the background to understand all the legal reasoning that 
went into the decision, I do have one qualification that you clearly 
lacked: in my capacity as a recruiter of students for Rice University, 
I have visited many schools in both the Edgewood and Alamo Heights 
districts . The comparison is so profound that any person of goodwill 
would disagree with your decision . Edgewood High School bas offices 
and rooms lighted by one bare bulb banging from the ceiling, while 
Alamo Heights bas the most commodious of physical plants . The affluent 
district bas a large staff of counselors, all specialists at getting 
their students into coll ege . This counselling staff bas more recep-
tionists than Edgewood schools have counsellors . 
Having this firsthand knowledge of the bones and sinew on which 
your facade of legalism was based, I found it very difficult to use the 
pro forma title of Justice in my salutation . I am glad that I will not 
be held accountable for the future generations of students that will 
remain trapped by the continuing reality of unequal opportunity that 
was sustained by your decision . 
MLR : jbd 
Sincerely, 
M. 1 . Rudee 
Associate Professor of Materials 
Science 
DDMENGEAUX & WRIGHT 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
320 WE S T MAIN STREET 




SOB F". WRIGHT 
TELEPHONE 233 - 3033 
LA LOUISIANE EST BILINGUE 
FRED M . SMITH 
WM. P. RUTLEDGE 
TERRY E. THERIOT 
WILLIAM H. LAMBERT 
JACK C. FRUGE. JR. April 30, 1973 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, D.C. 
RE: School District v. Rodriguez 
Dear Justice Powell: 
I guess this judgment is final and a fit decision for public 
discussion. 
I sadly read your opinion. The effort is a trevail of 
tears. It is long. Its very length is indicative of many 
things. 
Common sense informs all men alike that the constitution 
does not protect education. Education saves the constitu-
tion. Wealth is a prerequisite of democracy. Without 
wealth, there cannot be education; and without education, 
there cannot be democracy; and without democracy, there 
cannot be a constitution. 
To the children, education is a constitutional fundamental. 
It cannot be compared with anything else. To the children, 
it is a right of citizenship . Free . And it must be equal 
to be constitutional. Physically equal . Spiritually equal. 
Equal education is indispensable. Sufficient education is 
indispensable. Democracy cannot live without it. The 
constitution cannot live without democracy. 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
April 30, 1973 
Page - 2 -
The taxpayers, adults, states, j~stices, are by fate bound 
to this whether they like it or not. It is inevitable to 
the continuance of democracy as procreation. 
I come from the south. We tried to shut down public educa-
tion. Those before you would not let us because of con-
stitutional guarantee. I am ashamed of your decision here. 
WPR:cf 
May 1, 1973 
Dear P<tter: 
The enclosed is a copy of a paragraph on Rodriguez, contained 
in a letter on another subject from Prof. Charles Alan Wright. 
As you contributed significantly to the opinion, and especially 
to the subtleties of its equal protection analysis, I thought you would 
be interested in Prof. Wright's comments. 
As he concedes, he is hardly without bias. Yet, I suppose a 
scholar is more likely to be detached about the quality of a favorable 
decision than the average rough and tumble practitioner. 
Again, my warm thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice stewart 
lfp/ss 
j}u.;rrmtt (!Jttltrl of t4t ~ta j;bttts 
'JilasJri:ttgton.lO. <!f. 2.11~~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
Dear Lewis, 
May 2, 1973 
Many thanks for sharing with 
me Charlie Wright's comments about 
the Rodriguez opinion. It was a good 
opinion, and the credit for it belongs 




Mr. Justice Powell 
.. ~ 
COLOATa W . DARDEN, JR. 
1111 vtaOIMIA MATIOMAL IAMit IUILDIMO 
NOJlPOLJC, VIJlOINIA a1110 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Supreme Court of the United States, 
Wasbin&tdn, D. c. 205~3. 
Dear Lewfs: 
May J, 1973. 
! have read and re-read with the keenest1 1nterest your opinion in the Texas school case, which you were good . enou~ 
to send ~ so .. time back. I find ayself in accord with it. If 
its philosophy ts adhered to I think we shall be able to surmount 
the violence that tears at the vitals of our school system today, 
, because we shall keep the localities harnessed to the probJ.ems 
while at the sa.e time alertin~ them to the need to stru~~le 
ceaselessly toward the equalization of opportuaities. 
The constitutional provisions wbich ·we were able to 
~et into the Vir~inia Gonstitution will do that for us, and like 
provisions elsewhere will brin~ it about in other states as time 
~oes on. In fact public opinion, which is the most powerful 
weapon of all, is bringing this about now as you point out in 
the Texas case, even without a constitutional mandate. I liked 
very much the way you marshalled your arcwaents and I believe 
this will be re~arded as the .ast important opinion written by 
you durin~ your stay on the Bench. 
The .avin& opinion written by Mr. Justice Marshall 
impressed me deeply, and but for the fact I believe action by 
the Supreme Court is not the most effective way to bring about 
what is thought desirable, I would not be able to escape his 
reasonin~. His opinion brought back a lively discussion which 
I heard many years a~o between Mr. Justice Frankfurter and 
prominent members of Australia's bench and bar. In 1958 the 
Association of American Universities was invited to attend the 
Con&ress of the Universities of the Commonwealth, meetin~ in 
Montreal. I attended representin~ the University of Virginia. 
Following the Montreal get-together some of the &roup visited 
Washington. It fell to my lot to accompany the visitors on 
a visit to the Supreme Court Building. We were received by 
F. F., the court not bein~ in session. The Australians of the 
~roup were particularly interested in the scope of the 14th 
Amendment, and the visit was taken up almost entirely by a far 
ran~in~ talk about the authority of the Supreme Court under 
this amendment. 
The Australians argued with force that the 14th 
Amendment created a national state and that no activity is 
beyond the reach of the federal &overnment. Justice Frank-
furter a&reed that the wordin& of the amendment was such that 
it could support the view put forward by the Australians, but 
'.· 
be tlaou.pt the exercise of restraint oa the part of tbe Bupreae 
Court .ade such an outcoae unlikely. 
It is the restraint iD your opinion that so appeal• to 
ae. I think the amendment is subject to the interpretation 
of the Australians! but such an interpretation would be, I think, 
of very doubtful w sdom. The Supreae Cou~, with all due respect 
to it, is aiaply not wise enou~ to deal with all of the inequi-
ties which afflict the American people. lor fo~ that matter is 
the Congress, an9 unless we can manage a reasonable distribution 
of power between the several states and the national government 
it is difficult to .see how we can continue. · 
I do hope we shall fall in with one another before too 
long. The beautiful spring weather, which has come to Vir~inia, 
is about all there is to. gi ye us cause for optimism. 
Sincerely, 




Mr. Larry A Hammond DATE: May 4, 1973 
l ewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Rodriguez 
The petition filed by counsel for Rodriguez, on the discussion 
Apparently two motions are involved: one to be allowed court 
costs, which the Court will clearly deny; and the other a second motion 
to be allowed, retroactively, to appear in this Court lon an IFP msis. 
I was not prepared to discuss the second motioo.. Some of the 
Justices were willing to grant it although others pointed out that this 
would entitle counsel for Rodriguez to reimbursement of about $2, 300. 
I lmow nothing about this aspect of the matter. It just does not 
seem reasonable to me for such a motion to be given retroactive effect; 
nor am I familiar with the applicable ground rules. 
Before next Friday's conference, I will need enlightenment from 
L. F. P., Jr. 
In view of your current family interest in the University of 
Virginia and your role in Rodriguez, I thought you might like to see 
the enclosed letter from Colgate w: Darden, .Jr. 
Colgate Darden, to whom I sent a copy of Rodriguez, was 
President of the University of Virginia prior to Dr. Shannon; he is 
a former Governor; a leader for many years of the "liberal" wing of 
the Democratic Party; an advocate of moderation in public education 
who served with me during my entire tenure on the State Board of 
Education. 
Perhaps the wisest Virginia statesman of his time, he is now 
in his middle seventies. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBE RS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POW E LL, JR. 
Dear Jay: 
~tlttt C!Jottrl ttf flrt ~tb $5taftg 
~as-fringtMt, l9. C!J. 211gi.ll-~ 
March 11, 1976 
My present law clerks, who have read your Equal Protection 
article with admiration, also read it - with amusement - as 
criticizing sharply my opinion in Rodriguez. See 61 U.Va. 
Law Review at pp. 991-993. 
I certainly do not object to your entertaining differing 
views about Rodriguez. Almost the essence of being a lawyer 
is to be independent minded, to make one's own judgments, 
and to respect the differing judgments of other lawyers. 
Thus I write not to imply criticism of your present views. 
They are certainly arguable, and no doubt entertained by many 
others. Rather, I want to record my recollection of "Powell 
Chambers history" on this case. So far as it may be relevant 
to your comments, my recollection is as follows: 
I devoted considerable time during the summer to Rodriguez, 
and had made rather extensive notes myself. From the outset 
you were with me as to how to decide the case; Larry and Bill 
were inclined the other way. It was "Larry's case", and so 
he and I worked on it for many weeks. Revisions were made to 
accommodate the thinking of another Justice. We had a dis-
cussion in my Chambers in which you, Larry and I participated. 
I am not sure that Bill was present. The discussion focused 
specifically on whether I should adhere to the two-tier 
analysis or go to what one of you then called a "sliding 
scale" type of analysis. Although I think we had the Gunther 
article before we brought the case down, it may not have been 
available at the time I was asked to write the opinion. 
My recollection is clear that the three (or four) of us 
agreed that two-tier analysis, with all of its flaws, was 
the established law of the Court at that time. There also 
was a general feeling, in which I think you concurred, that 
<.' \ 
- 2 -
"sliding scale" equal protection analysis enabled a Justice 
in every case to apply a wholly subjective test. In any 
event, in the fall of 1972 I elected to stay with the two-
tier analysis for Rodriguez for two reasons: (i) the 
precedents seemed to require it, and (ii) the case had 
been presented and decided by a majority of the Court within 
this framework. I also thought, and still think that you 
agreed. 
You certainly agreed then on the merits. Although 
Larry initially had misgivings, he told me after working 
on the case that he also had been "converted". 
I consider the case one of the most important I have 
written. Had it been decided otherwise, it is difficult to 
visualize the ultimate impact on local and state government. 
This is no place to reargue Rodriguez. I merely ask you to 
contemplate, as you address your classes, how one could have 
distinguished education from some of the other governmental 
services provided primarily by local governments. As the 
opinion states: 
"Furthermore, the logical limitations on 
appellees' nexus theory are difficult to perceive. 
How, for instance, is education to be distinguished 
from the significant personal interests in the basics 
of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination 
might well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, 
ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most 
ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment. If so appellees' 
thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority 
of Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v. 
Normet, supra." 
In addition to welfare services, what about public housing, 
public sanitation and health (sewage, water, etc.), public 
transr.ortation, and so on. None of these is a "fundamental 
right' required to be provided by the Constitution. 
State and federal governments now help with all of these 
local services. But the argument in Rodriguez was that the 
Equal Protection Clause commanded equality on a statewide 
basis: i.~., per pupil expenditure on education must be 
identical, and only the state could assure this. Presumably 
this principle would require equal expenditures per citizen· 
on other public services. And, would the Fifth Amendment 
. ' 
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then require that the federal government equalize education 
and other public services among the 50 states? 
Even if the principle of equality of public services 
were somehow limited to the states, the result would be a 
serious denigration of local government. Schools in 
particular have been a special interest and concern of the 
local community. The quality of education depends upon 
adequate fund~ng, but quality certainly does not vary 
directly with the amount of funding. The per pupil 
expenditure in Washington, D. C., is substantially higher 
(more than double, I believe) than in Henrico County, Virginia. 
It is much higher in Richmond than in Henrico County. Would 
anyone who knows about education suggest that it is of better 
quality in Washington than in Henrico? 
The meaningful ingredients (as I know from personal 
experience) of quality education also include the concern, 
interest and participation (through PTA's, etc.) of families, 
and the resulting community demands on teachers and the school 
board. These ingredients become increasingly attenuated if 
the state government (remote to most people) becomes the 
primary source of funding, making local effort · immaterial, 
and with funding, remote state control becomes inevitable. 
Arguably, this may be desirable. But it would represent a 
fundamental change, by judicial decision, in the function and 
responsibility of the traditional levels of government in 
this country. 
As Rodriguez is one of my favorite "children", I am not 
entirely disinterested when one of the "midwives" casts doubt 
upon its legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, we all think your article (at least the 
rest of it) is splendid. 
As ever, 
Professor J. Harvie Wilkinson, III 
School of Law 
University of Virginia 
Charlottesville, Virginia 22901 
lfp/ss 
cc: Larry A. Hammond, Esquire 
William C. Kelly, Jr., Esquire 
P.S. Incidentall(., you say no one has ever adequately defined 
a "suspect class.' Take another look at the definition in 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 28. 
PAUL .J . MEYER 
.JOSEPH P . MARTORI 
EDWIN F. HENDRICKS 
DAVID VICTOR 
H . BARTOW FARR m 
LAWRENCE A. HAMMOND 
.J. MICHAEL HENNIGAN 
ANDREW D . HURWITZ 
WILLIAM .J . MALEDON 
.JONES OSBORN n 
LAW OFFICES 
MARTORI, MEYER, HENDRICKS & VICTOR 
A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION 
May 18, 1976 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Judge: 
TWENTY- SIXTH FLOOR 
3003 N ORTH CENTRAL AVENUE 
PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85012 
TELEPHONE 263-8287 
AREA CODE 602 
MAY 2 1 1976 
I am happy to have the knowledge that you have undertaken 
to represent me before the court of your distinguished clerks. 
I am sure Jay and I are in the best of hands, although I, too, 
recognize that your case may be indeed a difficult one to defend. 
I have been meaning for several weeks now to set aside 
an afternoon or an evening to respond at length to your correspon-
dence with Jay regarding Rodriquez. I have obtained, out here 
in the desert, a copy of Jay's Law Review article, but have only 
had an opportunity to peruse it hastily. I am looking forward to 
spending some time with that document somewhere in a cabin at the 
bottom of the Grand Canyon in a couple of weeks. Let me say though, 
at this point, that there is really no question but that you have 
faithfully recalled and recorded the history of our office's 
deliberations on that case. Indeed, there is one additional tidbit 
with which you may not be as familiar as I am. During my months 
of revising the sections that dealt with the "two-tier" approach 
to Equal Protection, I found that one of the most difficult 
precedents with which we had to deal was your first opinion for 
the Court---Aetna v. Weber. Jay, as you will recall, was your aide 
on that case, and you may also recall that there is at least one 
line in that opinion which is suggestive of a version of the 
"sliding scale" approach to the Fourteenth Amendment. Jay and I 
discussed that opinion at some length in an effort to determine 
whether your opinion in that case had established you as a devotee 
of the "sliding scale" analysis. Our ultimate conclusion, as I 
recall it, was that the language of Weber did not place you firmly 
in one camp or the other, and that in any event it was clear that 
you had not intended at that early date to even attempt to resolve 
any questions in your own mind with respect to so large and 
important a question as Fourteenth Amendment philosophy. 
I am sure that Jay will remember our conversations on that 
score, but I frankly do not recall whether Jay personally preferred 
the two-tier analysis to a less structured approach. There is 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
May 18, 1976 
Page 2 
absolutely no doubt in my mind that he agreed with the result 
in Rodriquez from the very outset. In fact, one substantial 
portion of my conclusion that my initial appraisal was in need 
of re-examination was the fact that Jay so firmly adhered to the 
view that a result striking down Texas' school financing scheme 
would be destructive of equal protection principles. 
I will write both you and Jay another missive after I have 
had the full opportunity to critique his work. I look forward to 
reading it with great relish. 
Again, I wish very much that Frances and I could attend 
the reunion festivities this year. We will be thinking fondly 
of you and Mrs. Powell. 
Sincerely, 
f~/Jil~ 
Larry A. Hammond 
LAH/cd 
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No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
I 
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financ~ng 
elementary and secondary public education, was brought by 
Mexican-American parents whose children are enrolled in the 
Edgewood Independent School District, an urban school district 
1 in San Antonio, Texas. Their suit is also a class action on be-
half of school children throughout the state who are members of 
minority groups or who are poor and who live in school districts 
in which the property tax base is low. Named as defendants were 
the State Board of Education, the Commission of Education, the 
State Attorney General, and the Bexar County Board of Trustees. 2 
Although the case was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge 
district court was empanelled in January of 1969,3 the panel's 
decision was not handed down until December of 1971. 4 The trial 
was held in abeyance for two years in order to permit extensive 
pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending Texas 
, r ... ~ .. , .. >,_:-
-2-
legislative investigation into the problems of financing public 
education.5 Mter it became clear that the case would not be 
a 
mooted by legislative action, the district court rendered/per 
curiam judgment holding the Texas scheme of financing public 
education unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stayed its mandate for 
two years to provide Texas with an opportunity to remedy its system 
but retained jurisdiction to issue a remedial order of its own if 
the state failed to comply with the court's order .6 The State 
appealed and this Court noted probable jurisdictionk in order to 
give plenary consideration to the difficult and far-reaching 
constitutional issues here presented. U.S. ---
(1972). For the reasons stated in this opinion we now reverse the 
decision of the court below. 
The Texas system of financing public education, which 
is similar in its broad outline to the system in operation throughout 
7 
this country, combines funds derived from both state and local sources. 
A significant portion of the money for every public school in the state 
(approximately 50 percent) is provided out of general revenues 
- 3 -
8 
under the statewide Minimum Foundation Program. While the 
Program has meny statutory complexities, its general contours 
may be simply stated. The State has established a program which 
expends over a billion dollars a year to provide salaries for teachers 
and administrative personnel as well as funds for school maintenance 
and student transportation. While approximately 80 percent of this 
program is financed directly from the State's general revenues, the 
remainder is provided by the local school districts under a Local 
9 county's 
Fund assignment. Generally, each ~ assessed contribution 
to the Fund reflects that county's XXK relative taxpaying ability in 
comparison to the other counties in the State. Likewise any district's 
share of the county's assessment is based on that district's portion 
9a 
of taxable real property in the county. The poorest districts, 
therefore, make the mmt smallest contributions to the program. 
Indeed in some districts the State's contribution to the foundation 
10 
program is in excess of 98% of the cost of the program. Because 
the State Fund is earmarked for specified items in the school's 
budgets, the grants are roughly comparable as between schools, 
.... ~C-'&.'·.J u• " ') ,. 
!: ~·, the amount of state moeny allocated for each district, computed 
-4 -
on a per pupil basis, is approximately the same for X:!llioc each 
11 
district. 
It is not, however, the state's contribution to school finance 
under the foundation program that has created the controversy in 
this case. Rather, this suit challenges Texas's commitment to local, 
district level, financing for any funds above the amount provided by 
the State since it is this aspect of educational finance that is 
responsible for substantial interdistrict disparities found in Texas. 
The Texas Constitution transfers to the individual school districts 
the power to impose an ad valorem property tax on property within 
each district and to spend the revenues, derived from that tax 
12 
locally. The amount of money gathered in any particular district 
1QmH depends, first, on the amount and value of available taxable 
property and, second, on the rate at which local residents decide 
13 
to tax that property. Because of wide variations in those factors -
especially the former - the extent to which local funding supplements 
the State foundation grant varies markedly from district to 
district. 
- 5 -
The districts in the San Antonio area provide a fair example 
of how the state-local financing scheme operates. The Edgewood 
Independent School District is one of seven districts in the metropolitan 
area. Approximately 22, 000 students are~ enrolled in 
its 25 public schools. The district is situated in the core city sector 
in a residential neighborhood that has little commercial or industrial 
property. The residents are predominantly of Mexican-American 
8'is9mx descent: approximately 90% of the students are Mexican-
Americans and over 6% are Negro. The assessed property value per 
person is $5, 960, the lowest in the area, and the median family 
{ft!, C St.) 
income ($., 6&6-) is also the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1. 05 
per $100 of property valuation - the highest in the area - the district 
contributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school 
year. The State foundation program supplied $222 per pupil for a 
14 
state-local total of $248. 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted 
with the Alamo Heights School District, the most affluent district 
.... · ..... 
- 6 -
in San Antonio. Its six schools, handling approximately 5, 000 students, 
are also situated in a residential community but the community 
character is quite dissimilar to Edgewood. The school EipNiatiE 
population is predominantly white, with approximately 18% Mexican -
Americans and less than one percent Negroes. The assessed property 
value exceeds $49, 000 and the median per family income is $8, 001. 
The tax rate ($. 85 per $100 of valuation) yielded $333 per pupil in 
1967-68. Coupled with state aid of $225, the district was able to 
15 
supply $558 per student. 
These two districts, respondents contend, reflect a condition 
that exists in varying degrees throughout the State of Texas. Respondents 
claim that not infrequently the minorities and the poor are clustered 
in property-poor school districts that cannot supplement state funding 
to the same extent that more wealthy districts may. Respondents 
16 
and the court below relied on an affidavit filed by Professor Berke 
of Syracuse University in which the results of a study of 110 Texas 
school districts were reported. His study indicated that a direct 
correlation exists between the amount of taxable property and the 
- 7 -
17 
level of per pupil expenditures, and that an inverse xxxx correlation 
exists between the level of expenditures and the percentage of 
18 
minority-group pupils attending public schools in the district. 
~ His study also found that the districts which spent the 
most on education in the sample had the highest median family 
incomes and that the districts which spent less had the lowest family 
19 
incomes. While these findings have been subjected to some 
20 
criticism in the briefs and scholarly journals, for purposes of 
examining the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may 
~"u: .. 
accept the ~thrust of each of those demonstrated correlations. 




level of per pupil expenditures, and that an inverse xxxx: correlation 
exists between the level of expenditures and the percentage of 
18 
minority-group pupils attending public schools in the district. 
~ His study also found that the districts which spent the 
most on education in the sample had the highest median family 
incomes and that the districts which spent less had the lowest family 
19 
incomes. While these findings have been subjected to some 
20 
criticism in the briefs and scholarly journals, for purposes of 
examining the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may 
'"'' accept the l:Cbl" thrust of each of those demonstrated correlations. 
It is to a consideration of that thesis that we now turn. 
II 
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
"no State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. " Whatever broad or narrow purposes 
the proponents of this constitutional prohibition may have hoped it 
to achieve, this clause has become central to this Court's jurisprudence. 
Its protection has been invoked to eliminate invidious discrimination 
- 8 -
against a broad range of insular minorities and to condemn disparate 
treatment affecting the full~ span of a State's ~contacts with 
its people. The Amendment's potential breadth has become, over 
this first century of its life, as much a source of comfort and 
optimism for the egalitarian philosopher as it has become a source 
of wkepticism and concern for the judicial restraintist and the 
federalist. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is not - at this 
time or possibly at any time over the last hundred years - a tm:CJa'XIXlK 
unanimity of viewpoint among the nine Justices on the Court as to 
the parameters of the Equal Protection Clause. Nor it is surprising 
that no single test has been developed to meet each of the innumerable 
problems presented to the Court under this Clause. Yet despite the 
lack of unanimity of viewpoint, and despite the absence of a single 
pervasive formulation, the Court has fashioned a workable and 
coherent framework for resolving the many conflicts between the 
States and those subject to their jurisdiction. ~Nothing we decide 
today requires a departure from the maturely considered precedents 




The usual or traditional approach to claims of denial of equal 
protection calls for a determination whether the State's classification 
is reasonably or rationally related to some legitimate state interest. 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Oldahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). This test reflects the Court's 
traditional respect for the presumptive validity of the judgments 
hammered out by the States' lawmaking processes. McDonald v. 
_ Boar~of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806, 808-09 (1969). It 
also reflects a recognition of the fact that resolution of a State's 
practical problems often calls for a rough - and sometimes imperfect -
accommodation of competing interests. Of equal importance is the 
consideration, which finds expression repeatedly in the decisions 
of this Court, that deference to rational state decisionmaking is 
mandated lest the majority of Justices impose their personal views 
of wise policy on the States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 
484-86 (1970). 
The "rational basis" test has been invoked primarily in cases 
touching upon a state's regulation of business, economic and social 
1 
- 10 -
interests. Not in all cases, however, has the Court found it appropriate 
consistent with protection :fX of the constitutional guarantee, to accord 
such deference to the States'~ legislative determination. When 
state action has operated to disadvantage certain specific, definable 
minorities within our society, the Court has held that those actions 
must meet a higher standard of scrutiny. Absent a showing of some 
compelling state interest. We have not tolerated discrimiatnions, 
21 22 
. for instance, on the basis of race, lineage, 
22 
or alienage. At 
the same time the Court has applied a similarly strict standard in 
reexamining state decisions that interfere with or impinge upon the 
exercise of rights which are clearly recognized as fundamental in 
24 
a constitutional sense. 
Appellees' constitutional theory in the instant case relies on 
a convergence of these two categories of circumstances which have 
heretofore Emxjmagl occasioned departure from the usual mode of 
equal protection analysis. They contend that education is a "fundamental" 
interest and that wealth is a "suspect" classification. Believing that 
- 11 -
the State is providing education discriminatively in the basis on 
wealth, appellees urge the Court to subject Texas' system to close 
scrutiny. The District Court found this rationale persuasive: 
"More than mere rationality is required . . . to maintain 
a state classification which affects a 'fundamental interest' 
em which is based upon wealth. :XIXmx Here both factors 
are involved. " F. Supp. at --
Applying the more demanding test whether there was any "compelling 
state interest" to~ support the Texas finance practices, the 
District Court found it lacking. Moreover, the court concluded that 
the State had failed "even to establish a reasonable basis for these 
classifications. " Id. While the court was willing to K leave to the 
State the opportunity to remedy its practices, it does require that 
whatever financing program the State adopts must meet a standard 
of "fiscal neutrality, " !: ~, "the quality of public education may not 
be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a :xztrocx 
23 
whole." Id. at --
Appellants virtually concede that the degree of judicial scrutiny 
applied to Texas' historical dual system of financing public education 
- 12 -
is critical to the ultimate resolution x of this case. That is, if the 
Court places on the State a "heavy burden" to justify its practices, 
if the Court requires that the State's plan meet a test of'precision" 
if the State must prove that financing is carefully'tailored" to achieve 
legitimate objectives, and if it must convince the Gha Court that it 
26 
has pursued a formula of least "drastic means, " the Texas 
financing system - and its counterparts in nearly every other state -
will not pass muster. The State candidly admits that "[n]o one 
familiar with the Texas system would contend that it has yet achieved 
27 
pi perfection. " Although the State admits that its financing scheme 
28 29 
is "far from perfect" and that there "are still defects in it, " it 
forcefully disputes the finding of the court below that there is no 
ilK "rational basis" underlying its system. 
This, then establishes the framework for our analysis. We 
1p.ust decide, first, whether the Texas financing scheme must be 
subjected to the rigors of close scrutiny. If so, the judgment of 
the District Court must be affirmed. If not, the Texas' claim to a 
- 13 -
rational basis must then be considered. The first question turns in 
large part on whether we must view education among the small group 
of interests that have been rightly deemed fundamental. Before 
undertaking a close consideration of that XHX question, however, it 
may be wise to address two issues argued here which did not receive 
full treatment by the three-judge court. 
As outlined above, appelless contend that classifications 
29a 
on the basis of wealth - like classifications on the basis of race -
are inherently suspect and will not be sanctioned absent some 
persuasive showing of legitimacy. Wisely, however, they do not 
seek to prove too much by this argument for no JSIXRRRNR precedent 
of this Court can be found which places race and wealth on a parity 
for constitutional purposes. To be sure, the Court has struck down 
a substantial number of state laws as invidiously discriminatory 
against the poor. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and their property have 
invalidated state laws that deny indigents fair and adequate access 
- 14 -
to a criminal appeal. Williarn:; v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1910) and 
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) held that indigents convicted of 
crimes could be subjected to incarcertaion simply because they lack 
resources available to other more affluent defendants. Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and in Bullock v. 
~arter, 40 U.S. (1972). because the right to vote was implicated, 
the Court struck down barriers that fell with "unequal weight" on voters 
30 
·· possessing the least financial resources. Lindsey v. Normet, 
40 U.S. (1972) overturned Ean Oregon statute requiring a 
double appeal bond as a precondition to appealing a landlord's eviction 
suit because it discriminated "against the poor" in an "arbitary" 
and "irrational" manner. Id. at 
None of these decisions are premised on the view that state 
laws that burden the poor more than the rich are inherently 
31 
impermissible under the 14th Amendment. In many of our cases 
the state laws fell because of its impact on a fundamental constitutional 
interest and in others the laws were simply unable to withstand the 
basic requirements of statutory reasonableness. We do not understand 
- 15-
appellees to suggest in this ease that a wealth impact is alone sufficient. 
Rather it is the presence of the wealth aspect in an area touching upcm 
32 
education that is critical. 
There ta a further problem in this ease, which has received 
considerable attention by the parties and the commentators but which 
was ignored by the District Court. A major premise underlying the 
equal protection thesis of this case is that per pupil expenditures 
adequately measure the relative quality of one's education. stated 
differently, it is assumed that the -.x quality of the educational 
opportunity received by children in districts that spend less per 
person is lower than the quality of education in district that spend more. 
This thesis raises a peculiarly perplexing problem. Almost 
instinctively educators, legislators, and judges assume that, in 
the main, money equals quality in education. The entire history 
of public education in the country reflects the unquestioned belief 
that the quality of our schools is reflected in the amount of money 
we expend of them. The supposed answer to every educational 
.. 16-
problem has been the itk infusion of economic resources. This 
assumption includes virtually every federal and state program in 
the field of education. More money buys more qualified teachers 
who can teach smaller classes. It • buys extracurricular programs 
and more attractive facilities. All have been thought to contribute 
to the quality of education. 
Yet in recent years social science studies have questioned 
these premises and found them faulty. The hoped-for correlations 
between class size or teacher qualifications (measured in terms 
of experience and educational achievement) and educational "results" 
I 
has r~ot been found. Infusion of money has not reflected itself in 
higber test scores on standarized tests. These findings have been 
I 
critic,lzed because the testing apparatus is faulty. others have 
I 
crtUcized the notion that the quality of education can be 'I. effectively 
m,easured through any sophisticated testing system. Instead they 
I 
assert that the value of an education must be measured in terms of 
33 
other less tangible criteria. 








Recognizing that there is no simple and satisfactory way for 
this Court to resolve the cost-quality question, the parties have 
resorted to more formalistic approaches. We are urged to place 
on the state the burden of proof of a lack of correlation since the 
state has always heretofore acted as if money were synonymous 
with education. Indeed, it is suggested that the state's burden be 
made insurmountable; that it be estopped now from disputing a 
fact that bt•JD•Iww&::&:i:tM: underlies its entire system. Moreover, 
it is even asserted that the issue properly should be disregarded 
altogether on the ground that those who raise the claim are engaging 
in the worst sort of disingenuity. We u: are told that those who most 
fiercely t resist giving up the money they have are the most 
34 
determined advocates of the inconsequentiality of money. 
Because of the ultimate judgment we approve in this case 
we need not select one or another of the proffered means of disposing 
of this question. It is enough to point out that if we were impelled 
to adopt the view that state educational disparities raise issues 
- 18-
of fundamental constitutional significance we would have the gravest 
difficulty resolving the cost-quality dispute. The problem is complex 
and intractable and well beyond the competence of Justices on this 
Court to resolve. At the same time none of the formalistic alternatives 
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FOOTNOTES: (San Antonio, etc. v. Rodriguez) 
1. Not all of the children of these complainants 
attended public school. One family's children were enrolled in 
private school "because of the condition of the schools in the 
Edgewood Independent School District.n Third Ammended 
Complaint, app. at 14. 
2. The complaint also named the seven major 
school districts in the San Antonio (Bexar County) area as 
defendants. After a pretrial conference, however, the district 
court issued an order dismissing the several school districts. 
Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District (the 
former defendant whose name this case bears) has adopted 
plaintiffs' claims and has filed an amicus curiae brief in support 
of that position in this Court. 
3. A three-judge court was properly convened in this 
case and there are no questions regarding the district court's 
jurisdiction or the direct appealability of its judgment. 28 U.S. C. 




4. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 
F . Supp. (1971). --
5 . Id. at , n. 11. 
6 . Id., at --
7. President's Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, 
People and Money, Final Report, at (1972). An amicus ---
curiae brief filed on behalf of 29 states indicates that each of the 
signatory states on the brief has a financing system similar to 
Texas'. Other sources indicate that every state, with the possible 
exception of Hawaii, utilizes local property taxes as a significant 
source of educational funding. Coons, Cline & Sugarman, Private 
Wealth and Public Education at __ (1970). 
8. Texas Educ Code§~ 16.0l~seq. 
9. Texas Educ Code §§ 1671-1673. 
Footnotes 
-3-
9a. Unlike many states, school district lines in 
Texas often do not follow county and city lines. While there 
are 254 counties in Texas there are approximately 1200 school 
districts. B€xar County alone, which encompasses the metro-
politan San Antonio area, has ll school districts. 
10. A second state-funded program, the Available 
School Fund, calls for uniform per pepil payments to every district 
in the state. In 1968 this Fund allotted $98 per pupil. However, 
because the contribution of each district's entitlement under the 
Minimum Foundation Program is always subtracted from the 
amounts paid under the Available Fund Program, it plays no 
significant role in state funding of public education. 
ll. The major share of the state fund is devoted to 
teacher salaries and makes higher payments to schools wlnse 
teachers have more years of experience and more advance degrees. 
As a consequence of this incentive aspect of the state program, 
districts that can afford to hire more experienced teachers often 
Footnotes 
-4-
benefit more from the state fund than poorer districts. 
12. Tex. Const. Art VII, ~ 3; Tex. Educ. Code 
f§ 20. Ol ~seq. 
13. Pursuant to the Texas Constitution, the local 
tax rate is set by a majority vote of the "qualified property 
taxpaying voters of the district." Tex. Const. Art VII, §I 3. 
14. Federal funds added another $108 per pupil 
for a grant total of $356 per pupil. While the federal assistance 
has an equalizing effect on total school budgets between wealthy 
and poor districts, the district court rejected an argument made 
by the state in that court that it should weigh in the federal grant. 
F. Supp at ___ . The state has not renewed that contention 
here. 
15. The dollar figures used in this comparison are 
not identical to the figures utilized in the district court opinion 
.. . . -
r UOI:ll0tt:o:5 
-5-
but any differences are statistically inconsequential and are 
merely a result of relying upon different but comparable 
statistical figures. 
Berke 
16. Professor~ is the Director of the Education 
Finance and Governance Program of the Policy Institute at 
Syracuse University. His study of Texas school districts was 
part of a broader survey, funded by the Ford Foundation, of 
finance systems in several states. 
17. 
Categorized by Equalized Property Values, 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 
Market Value of Median Family Per Cent State & Local 
Taxable Property Income From Minority Revenues Per 
Per Pupilt 196a- Pupils' Pupil\ 







$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 23% $483 
(30 Districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 31% $462 
( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 79% $305 






20. See, e.g. , Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities 
in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serran v. Priest 
and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, (1972); appellant's 




E.g., LovinB v. Virginia,#** U.S. 1 (1967) 
22/ 
E.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. (19 ) 
23/ 
E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. (1970)/ 
24/ 
Ef.g., Police Dept of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 
40 u.s. (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 u.s. (1972); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
25/ 
The test of "fiscal neutrality" is the product of 
the scholarship of the authors of the book that is widely 
acclaimed as the major work in a campaign to correct 
interdistrict disparities in the resources available 
for education '. CUne, Clunes & Sugarman, Private Wealth 
and Public Education at 303-04 (1970). 
26/ 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S. (1972). 
,. 




·Appellants' brief, at 11. 
28/ 
Appellants' Reply Brief, at 17. 
29/ 
Appellants' Brief, at 11. 
~-r-~ 
30/ 
See also McDonald v. Bd of Election Comm'rs, 394 
802 
u.s. ·k)@ (1969). 
31/ 
Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 
371 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. #&L (1971). 
32/ 
(1971); Boddie v. 
In their seminal text, the authors of Private Wealth 
and Public Education#(who have filed a thorough and helpful 
amicus cl.ffuriae brief in this Court), concede that "h~-
ever they may be interpreted, the poverty cases by themselve 








There is considerable disagreement on the question of 
who actually comprises the class discriminated against on 
the basis of wealth. The District Court found a correlation 
between personal wealth (measured in terms of mei~dian family 
within a district and that district's property wealth 
income) it~tA:f!i!:fNJ.fUMPifi.#il/6 iMU#MAdfi.it#.ies:fNI#dledfA#i!ifi.r#A. F. 
(measured in terms of taxable property per pupil). 
Supp. at ___ • Since it also found that property-rich 
districts expended more for education, it may be reasonable to 
conclude that the District Court found a correlation between 
personal wealth and educational expenditures. The thrust of 
-the arguments presented in this case, however, focus more 
precisely on the poverty of the district in terms of assessable 
property than on the poverty of the individual families. That 
focus has caused appellants to argue that this case is unlike 
. 
any previous "wealth" case because the Court has heretofore 
always dealth with questions of individual poverty rather 
than district poverty, i.e. it is poor individuals and not 
poor political subdivisions that deserve the special pro-
tection of the Court. 
While we fully comprehend that this case presents 
wealth discrimination in a novel context (but see Bullock 
v. Carter, 40 U.S. ___ (1972)), we fail to perceive how 
this difference operates to require a different form of 
analysis under the equal protection clause. In reality, 
the disadvantaged class is composed of children who are 
" I 
~ 
. , -\ . 
"poor" in the only resource that the State has deemed relevant 
for providing public education. Apart from the possibility 
that families with high personal income may take their 
the level of personal 
children out of the public schools, ii#l##~l#i~m~ieiiml#i~Mt 
fzmily income appears immaterial. We experience no difficulty 
in holding that the Texas educational finance program 
operates in a manner that disadvantages some of its 
school children on a wealth basis and that the claim of 
that class--however it is defined--is cognizable under the 
Coastitutional. .4.u.- v~ )J~ " J./~1 
33/ 
The quality-cost .issue has received considerable 
attention. Among the most notable authorites are the 
c. 
following. C. Jencks, Inequality (1972);/Silberman, Crisis 
in the Classroom (1970);0ffice of Education, Eq,1lality 
of Educational Ooportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); 
On Equality of Educational Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & 
Mosteller eds); J. Guthrie, G. Kleindorker, H. Levin, 
& T. Stout, Schools and Inequality (1971); President's 
Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, People & Moneys The Need 
For Educational Reform (1972). 
34/ 
It has also been urged upon us that this question should 
be decided finally on the record made in the District Court. 
The record does show that Edgewood has fewer teachers with 
the necessary teaching degrees; that a higher percentage 
of its faculties are rated as "substandardY by the State 
Education Agency; that the student-counsellor ratio is higher 
in Edgewood than in the more affluent districts; the 
facilities are relatively more crowded (fewer square feet 
per pupil); the library ~j has fewer books; there ~ 
l~d~i a less diverse curriculum than in other area schools; 
and there is a higher drop-out ratio\ in the Edgewood schools. 
Affidavit by Superintendent of EISD, app at 234-39. 
fn 10 
These conclusions were nowhere mentioned in the District 
Court opinion and, because of the manner in which evidence 
was received in this case, were never subjected to cross-
examination. Nevertheless, even if they would justify 
a finding of a direct correlation in the subject district, 
it is highly questionable whether these findins could 
justify statewide relief. The question becomes even more 
difficult when it is understood that the constmtutional 
theory pressed here would apply in every State in the Union. 
35/ 
The courts that have, to date, found state financing 
schemes improper have not faced this question because the 
of the posture in which those cases arose. Serrano v. 
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (appeal on a 
demurer which admits all al~egations in the complaint); 
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971) 




MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The federal three-judge court opinion we review today is one 
striking down under the Equal :protection Clause the state of Texas' 
system of financing public education. It is a decision whose impact, 
I 
I woi cause a revolution In public education In that state. For 
bett~r or for worse, its principle would have similar applicability 
' 
Jevery state In the Union. Moreover, the court's reasoning has 
J / 
· P,. grave implications for the constitutionality of a broad range of 
' st~te and local expenditures funded out of local ad valorem property 
I 
ta1~es. Of equal importance are the questions this case presents with 
respect to the proper role of the fedaal courts in implementing the 
! 
, Equal Protection Clause. We approach our reviewing function with 
· the special circumspection that grows out of a full awareness of the 
enormity and significance of the task at hand. 
'I 
·' .._.,. . . ~. 
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m 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. " So said a unanimous Supreme Court 
eighteen years ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.s. 493 
(1954) in striking down the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. What 
was said there in the context of racial discrimination has lcs t none 
of its va:1ltrB vitality over time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance 
of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument 
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping 
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonable be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of education. Such an opportunitywhere the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be :III1X made available to all on .:q; equal terms. " 
Id. 
This theme expressed in Brown has been underscored repeatedly 
in the opinions of Justices of this Court. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 _u.s. 
(Mr. Chief Justice), ( Mr. Justice White) (1972); --
,. 
- 20-
Abington School Dist. v. Sehempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum 
v. Bd. of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 263 U.s. 390 (1923); Interstate 
RR Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). The importance of 
our system of free public education cannot be overstated. And, nothing 
this Court holds today, in anywy departs from our consistent dedication 
to that institution. 
Yet one might well wonder whether the steadfast belief of nine 
Justices in the high value of education is the sole criterion for invocation 
of the standards of searching scrutiny reserved for state laws touching 
upon "fundamental" interests. If the judgment of this Court on the 
relative importance of a particular state activity is the key to 
constitutional adjudication under the equal protection clause then 
there may be considerable merit to Mr. Justice Harlan's charge 
in Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.s. 618, 655, 661 (1969) that the Court 
was making itself into a "super-legislature". It -w» uld indeed be 
reminiscent of the period in the Court's history when, under the 
doctrine of "substantive due process," the Court felt empowered to 
.... -.. ,'If t.' , 
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strike down state laws ''because they may be unwise, improvident, 
or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." Williamson 
v. Lee Opitcal Co., 348 U.s. 483 (1955). 
The Court has not pursued such an open-ended, policy-oriented 
course. Rather, it has always abided by the constraints of the 
Constitution itself. Thus, in Shaprio v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 642, 
Mr. Justice Stewart effectively responded to Mr. iii••• Justice 
Harlan•s:Btaa stated fear: 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular human 
activities, characterizethem as "fundamental," and give 
them added protection ..• ' To the B:illdatrN contrary, 
the Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established 
constitutional rights, and gives to that right no less 
protection than the Constitution itself demands." 
(Emphasis from original). 
This statement in Mr. Justice Stewart's separate concurrence merely 
served to emphasize what Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court 
makes unmistakably clear. In refusing to apply the traditional rational 
relation test to state welfare eligibility statutes imposing a one-year 
durational residency requirement a as a precondition to receipt of 
AFDC benefits, the Court stated the salient point: 
'· ' 
- 22-
"in moving from state to state . . . appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classification 
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, 
unless shown to be necessary to promote a co~ 
governmental interest, is unconstitutional. " 
Id. at 634 (emphasis from original). 
The right to interstate travel had been repeatedly recognized as a 
36 
right of constitutional significance, and the Court's judgment required 
37 
no balance of the importance of that interest in a vacuum. 
Last Term, in Lindsey v. Normet, 40 _U.s._ (1972), presented 
with an effort to have state legislation invalidated under "a more 
stringent standard than mere rationality. " Id. at That case 
involved a challenge to the procedural limitations on tenants in suits 
brought under Oregon's Forcible Entry and WIIX Wrongful Detainer 
statute. The tenants • argued that those limitations implicated 
"fundamental interests which are of particularly importance to the 
poor" in the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain 
peaceful possession of one's home." Id. The Court's analysis is 
instructive: 
J. ~ • ' 
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''We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does 
not provide judicial remedies for every social and 
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that 
document any constitutional guarantee to access to 
dwellings of a particular quality of any recognition 
of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property 
of his landlord beyond the term of the lease, without 
the payment of rent • • . . Absent constitutional 
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the 
definition of landlord-tenant relationships is a legis-
lative not a judicial function. " Id. at (emphasis 
supplied). 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), the Court's 
sensitivity for the fact that the "administration of public welfare 
assistance . . . a involves the most basic economic needs of 
impoverished human beings, " Id. at 48 5, provided no basis for 
departing from the usual mode of constitutional analysis of questions 
of economic and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central 
importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate foundation 
38 
for application of the compelling state interest test. See also 
- 39 
Eisensta~ v. Baird, 40_ U.S. _ (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 
- 40 
40 u.s. (1972); ?olice Department of the City of Chicago v. 
Mosley, 40_U. S. 
- 41 
(1972). 
Anticipating that the conceded societal importance of education 
would not alone propel the Court to depart from the usual standard of 
r ~,. .,. ; 
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of reviewing a state's social and economic decisions, appellees now 
argue that education is different than welfare assistance and housing 
because it impinges upon the full exercise of other rights accorded 
protection under the Constitution. Specifically they assert that 
education is essential to the effective utilization of First Amendment 
freedoms and to the intelligent use of the ballot. As to the asserted 
nexus between sp•••• speech and education, appellees urge that 
speech is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating 
his thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of 
ideas~ft is an empty forum for those »aaJwJaag lacking the basic com-, 
, I 42 















follo·<ved with respect to the right to vote. Exercise of the franchise 
CiMtnot be divorced from the educational background of the voter. 
'i 
I' 
Be The electoral process, it is urged, depends on an informed 
electorate and a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless he 
43 






We would dispute neither of these propositions other than to 
register the Court's reluctance to find in education a fundamental 
Interest upon such attenuated :blat bases. While the Court is surely 
capable of protecting the right to speakllr and the right to vote from 
unjustifiable governmental interference, we have never presumed 
to possess the power or capability to guarantee to the citizenry the 
most effective speech :mutbeauax or the most Informed electoral 
these 
choice. That :tilDe may be the goals of a system of freedom of 
expression and of a representative form of government is not the 
critical determination. These are goals hopefully to be pursued b~\ 
\ ( 
\ 
a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from JJNMactox'*'Eild:ai , 
\ 
·\ 
governmental Interference. They are not values to be implemented \ 
I 
' \ 
by judicjial Interference with otherwise :liJiylalu legitimate state action. \ 
I Moreover, we might still doubt whether this thesis adequately 
' 
I 
set,s educat ion above the significant personal Interests 1n basically 
decent food and shelter. Empirical examination might buttress the 
likely estimation that the ill-fed, the ill-clothed, and the ill-housed 






process :aa:RitHbja that they make the least use of the benefits of the 
First Amendment. To the extent that this reasoning is foreclosed 
by Dandridge and Lindsey we think that appellees' educational nexus 
theory is also foreclosed. 
One final but significant difficulty remains. We are dealing, 
in this case and the several others that have been litigated to date, 
not with anything approaching the absolute denial of educational oppor- . 
tunity by the states. The deprivations have all been relative. In the 
instant case, for example, we are cmsumed with the relative inferiority 
of an education supported by the expenditure of $248 as opposed to an 
44 
education costing nearly twice that amount. Whatever claims might 
be made about the relative inequality between the offerings in these 
schools, we have heard no charge that any of Texas' schools fail to 
provide their students with an opportunity to acquiesce, JMt.•NyD. during 
the a course of twelve years of training, the basis communicative 
tools. If it were shown in another case that, for instance, particular 
schools or school districts were not successfully introducing their 





perplexing case. For it may well be that there are certain features of 
' any system of public education that are so inextricably tied to the 
\ 
free enjoyment of constitutional rights as to be fairly invoked as 
tundamental. 
For the present, however, we hold on the basis of the facts 
befo~e us that public education in Texas, allM!it of the greatest social 
importance, is not a fundamental interest in a constitutional sense. 
Tllerefore, as we indicated at the outset, Texas' system of financing 













Appellees attack on the Texas system of financing public 
education comes down to the question whether that system has 8.11 
r~asonable or rational basis grounded in some a legitimate state 
inte/st. The District Court founded that it did not. We disagree. 
,1., The applicable traditional standard has been characterized 
f I I 
and its bounds refined in a large number of eases. Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) pulls together the relevant threats of 
the test: 
"In the area of economies and social welfare, a 
state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
liiDII: merely because the classifications mate are 
imperfect. If the classification has 'reasonable basis, ' 
it does not offend the Constitution simply because the 
classification' is not made with mathematical nicety 
or because in practice it results in some inequality.' 
. • . 'The problems of government are practical ones 
and may justify, if they do not require, rough aeeom-
modations-illogieal, it may be, andx••"••tdr: unscientific.' 
• • • " Id. at 485. 
The State concedes that its method is "imperfect," that "in practice 
it results in some inequality," and that the balances it strikes may 
45 
be fairly characterized as "rough accommodations." Yet, as 




Dandr!~ makes clear, these blemishes on the state's educational 
offering are not alone enough to strike down a system fashioned out 
of experience, practicality, and compromise. 
Every school district in Texas derives its financial resourses -
apart from federal assistance 9 from two sources: ( 1( state aid 
under the Minimum Foundation Program, and ( 2) revenues from 
taxation of local property. On a statewide average approximately 
46 
half of the total revenues comes from each source. The state's 
contribution is designed to provide floor or foundation that assures 
47 
a minJA:num educational offering in every school district. Allocations 
/ 
I 
fror,il this fund are geared to assuring the existence of one teacher 
;' 48 
~6r every 25 student~ one "special service" teacher for each 20 
/ 
I - 49 principal 
I teachers (behavior, nurse, doctor, etc.), and one p:iiducqdle per 
I 
50 
20 teacpers. state law also provides for vocational teachers, 
51 
couns,elors, and specialist teachers, additional funds are earmarked 
52 
for I operating expenses and student transportation. The state 
53 
r1rovtdes also for free textbooks for all public school children. 







means, establishing teacher qualification standards and school 
55 
accreditation. 
The amount of state aid has increased steadily since the 
programs inauguaration, and if the increases reflected in the Fund's 
allotment for the Edgewood Independent School District are indicative 
I 
of a statewide trend, the increments have been substantiali:. Figures 
in the .rrecord show that the state F\md contributed $222 per pupil for 
the j967-68 school year but that by the 1970-71 year the Fund 
I 
C1ontribution was $3!56 per pupil. In just three years the state aid 




Edgewood's total expenditures from state, local and federal sources 
combt/ned in 1967. 
I 
I 
j In its dual reliance on state and local funding, Texas' system 
' 
of1 schbol finance is comparable with its counterparts 1n virtually 
' i 
56 
every other state. The "foundation grant" theory upon which the 
I 












Babetk Robert M. Haig in the 1920's. Their efforst were aimed at 
providing a system Xlfx for financing4JCiljJB:: public education that would 
guarantee a minimum education throughout the state W. thout sacrificing 
local controlof the institution. The 1t1a;t Strayer-Haig thesis, as 
embodied in the present Texas system, may be best understood as 
an imperfect attempt to accommodate two competing forces. Professor 
Coleman has articulated the tension underlying the dual finance sche~ 
in this country: 
"The :btalli: history of education since the industrial \ 
revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: , 
the desire by members of society to have educational \ 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family 
58 to provide the best education it can afford for its own child •• , 
I~ ocal control of public education has long been a cherished 
1ntere;st of political sul:Miivisions within the states. Appellees do not 
I 
qur1stion the legitimacy of the state's interest in "subsidiarity," as 
59 
it is labelled. Quite to the contrary, they applaud the preference 
for local decisionmaldng with respect to all aspects of the educational 
environment. The intensely personal attachment to government.ic 





and interdistrict ••'P"MMiraax competition are desirable and are 
maximized as local independence increases. 
Despite their expressed preference for local control appellees 
c hallenge the Texas system. They argue persuasivelyk that for the 
districts with the least amount of taxable wealth local option is 
meaningless. No matter how much the district's residents value 
education their relative property-poverty precludes significantly greater 
expenditures. Appellees contend that any number of alternative 
' \ 
systems might be derived that would prese;\ve or even Ilk enhance 
\ 
local autonomy while ••'P• improving educ~tional offerings. We need 
not de~ide, however, whether in factiJebl!X better systems could be 
i 
I ' 
devts£~d - although we concede that t bey might. Nor do we need to 
rejetbt appellee~ contentions that locaH control is not uniformly and 
! . \ 
ecvdlally available to teach of Text.ts' t,· 200 school districts. state 
1 ·~~s are not irrational or arbVtra:rcy r,dm:ply b~cause they only imperfectly 
I 
I . ,, 
\ 
f!ffectuate the state's good. .~Atndridg~ . .\V. ::&~ WilJMms, supra . 
./ 
A system of compromise loetween state subv,~ntion and subsidiarity 7 , 
I ' I \ 




does not fail to withstand judicial scrutiny under traditional approaches 
because it is not narrowly "tailored" to at satisfy the state's interests 
or because the state has failed to select the "least drastic means" 
60 
cl. promoting legitimate goals. ThM"e are the progeny of the more 
searching compelling state interest test, and it is precisely such 
differences that lend substance to the •'"'*'KilliJX ------
Appellees argue that Texas' system 1s irrational and arbitrary 
for yet another reason. They point out that the amount of available 
taxable property in any geogra.phical subdivision 1s a matter of almost 
I 
pur~ h'ppenstance. District lines are often products of historical 
I 
aclciden·~s which have little or nothing to do with providing a educational 
I ' 
I 
r,Ssoutces. To a significant degree per pupil property values depend 
,I 
/ 




f·~tor, more than differences in the value of residential property, whlch 
I I 
;' I 




1 argue that it is entirely irrational to allow expenditure levels to turn 
on sucJh. coincidences. 
- 34-
State dedication of local property revenue resources to the 
localities to pay for local programs is aa old as the institution of 
state governments in this •••k country and this Court has always 
exhib~ed a wise reluctance to impinge upon a State's selection from 
among local taxation alternatives. If local taxation and local 
expenditure are cr; irrational for purposes of funding education this 
alternative is equally impermissible as a source of revenues :fa for 
local police and fire protection or for local hospitals or any other 
programs historically funded out of property taxes. w~ are unwilling 
to take away from the states the prerogative of turning this source 
of public funds over to its political subdivisions for their local needs. 
In sum, we are unable to ascertain any serious basis for the 
conclusion drawn by the District Court that the Texas educational 
finance s¢heme violates the Equal Protection Clause. In so holding 
this CrLJu.rt has not at all succumbed to an obfuscating tyranny of 
lab',els. OUr analysti!:J d does not nan rest on the mere wooden 
application of artificial categories. Rather our adherence to the 




"fundamental" right, "compelling" interest, "rational" basis) 
reflects an appreciation of the constitutional philosophy underlying 
the 14th Amendment. The crux of that philosopl'fl is that, except 
1n the cases where state laws trench upon the rights of insular 
minorities or intrude upon the exercise of fundamental rights, state 
judgments are entitled to respect and we will decline to replace 
state choices withour own views of wise policy absent a finding that 
the state has acted in some unsupportably irrational manner. These 
teachings of a century of experience with the equal protection cd.ause 
demonstrate that restraint is nowhere more appropriate than in 
scrutinizing a state's ecooomic and social programs. There can be 
no more intractable and complex area of state decisionmaking than 








The District Court opinion and its California predecessor, 
Serrano v. Priest, 5 CaL 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 ( !971), have been 
widely and enthusiastically received as providing, finally, a workable 
solution to the seemingly insoluable technical and political problems 
that have impeded state legislative reform of the inequities of public 
61 
school finance. These decisions have been variously hailed as 
the "answer" to removing the intractable roadblocks to educating 
62 
the poor and the racial minorities. They have been received as 




education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for the result, the recent 
proponents of "fiscal neutrality" have givenit much more credit than 
64 
its architects have ever claimed. 
The truth is, as inceeasingly more commentators are coming 
to recognize, Bib: eradication of the property-tax basis and 
implementation of "fiscally neutral" alternatives would have highly 











demonstrated there is no dependable correlation between the location 
65 
of impoverished families and the presence of inferior schools. 
Nor is there any more than a random chance that racial minorities 
will be clustered in school districts that are short-changed in terms 
66 
of assessable property. Moreover, there is no reason to suspect -
and some reason to fear - that any alternative form of financing is 
likely to increase the flow of educationalimputs into our urban case 
67 
areas. Under such uncertain circurrs tances, if this Court sat as 
a policy tribunal, we might doubt the ultimate efficacy of the attractive 
egalitarian concept this case offers. 
The clear limitations on this Court's constitutional function 
I 
rest~in us from embarking upon ahy such political or philosophical 
I 
un~rtaking. That role is preserved for Congress and for the state 
legts~~tive bodies and we do not violence to the values of federalism 
I , 
and separation of powers by slaying our hand. So long as this Court's 
i/ 








them do not embrace our holding as an endowment of an educational 
68 
system in need of reform- we "nine old friends of the children" 
can do nothing more for this "constituency" than to turn these important 
and difficult issues over to those more suited to the MDa: thorough 
and gbaK vigorous undertaking demanded if the American educatioo.al 
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No. 71-1332 San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing public edu-
cation, was initiated by Mexican-American parents mose children 
attend the elementary and secondard schools in the Edgewood Indepen-
dent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. 1 
They sued on their own behalf and on behalf of school children through-
out the state who are members of minority groups or who are poor 
and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named 
2 as defendants were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San 
Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case was filed in the summer of 1968 
and a three-judge court was ·impaneled in January, 1969.3 In December, 
1971 4 the panel rendered its judgment in a pexj:uriam opinion holding 
the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenthe Amendment. 5 The state appealed 
'!",: 
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and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching consti-
tutional questions presented. u.s. (1972). For the reasons 
stated in this opinion we reverse the decision of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry 
into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of 
free schools. 6 Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach 
toward the financing of those schools, relying on mutual participation 
by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the State 
Constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school 
districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of 
local taxpayers, for the "erection of school buildings" and for the 
"further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds 
as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
8 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds. 
The Permanent School Fund, established in 1854,
9 
was endowed with 
millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source 
of income for school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which re-
-3-
ceived income from the Permanent Fund as well as from State 
property taxes, served as the disbursing arm for most state 
educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this 
Century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in State property taxes 
was used to finance a program provkling free textbooks throughout 
the State • 11 
In the early years of Texas statehood this dual finance 
structure, not unlike the system employed in most other states, 
could serve adequately the State's educational requirements. Until 
recent times Texas was a predominantly rural state and its popu-
lation and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the 
12 
state. Sizable differences in the value of assessable property be-
tween local school districts became more evident, however, as the 
State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.13 The location of commercial and 
industrial property began to play a more significant role in determining 
a school district's resources for financing education. These growing 
disparities in population and taxable property between school districts 
-4-
were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in 
levels of local expenditure for eduation • 14 
At the same time, it was becoming more apparent to those 
concerned with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient fully to ameliorate 
these disparities •15 Prior to 1939 the Available School Fund con-
tribUed money to every school district at a rate of $17. 50 per school-
age child. 16 Although the amount was increased several times in 
the early 1940's, 17 by 1946 the Fund was providing only $46 per student. 18 
Recognizing the need to provide increased State funding to help 
offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educa-
tional needs, the State Legislatiare in the late 1940's undertook a close 
evaluation of public education in Texas with an eye toward major reform. 
In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators, 
was appointed to explore alternative systems in other states and to 
propose a State fundilg scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child in the state and that would help 
overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's 
-5-
efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer:.. Aiken bills, named for the 
Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program. 19 It is this Program that accounts today for 
approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. 20 
The Program calls for b State and local contributions to a 
fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses, 
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general 
revenues, finances approximately 80 per cent of the Program and the 
school districts are responsible - as a unit - for providing the re-
maining 20 per cent. The districts' share -known as the Local Fund 
Assignment- is apportioned among the school districts pursuant to 
a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability. 
The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant 
to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative 
value of each county's contribution to the state's total income from 
manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers 
each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and, 




the State. Each county's assignment is then divided among its 
school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable 
property within the county. 22 Each district then finances its share 
of the Assignment out of its local property tax assessment. 
The design of this cbmplex formulation was two-fold. First, 
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have 
an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts 
by placing the heaviest burdens on those districts most capable of 
paying. Second, it was the desire of the Program's architects to 
establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children22a but that 
would not by itself exhaust any district's resources. 23 Today virtually 
every school district does impose a local property tax from which it 
derives locally expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary 
to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since the Foundation Program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education - from State as well as local 
sources - have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967 expenditures 
-7-
24 
increased by approximately 500 per cent. In the last decade alone 
the total public school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion25 
and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 26 Minimum teacher salaries-
by far the largest single item in any school's budget- have increased 
from $2, 400 to $6, 000 over the last 20 years. 
In order to illustrate the manner in which this dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent to which, 
despite Texas• impressive gains, substantial interdistrict disparities 
persist, the plaintiff school district may be compared with another 
more affluent district in San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent 
School District is one of seven public school districts in the metro-
politan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 
elementary and secondary schools. The district is situated in the core-
city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little 
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly 
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90 per cent of the stu-
I 
de~t population is Mexican-American and over 6 per cent is Negro. 
:;,;;~ ' . 
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The average assessed property value per pupil is $5,960, the lowest 
in the metropolitan area, and the median family income ($4, 686) is also 
the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1. 05 per $100 of assessed 
property- the highest in the metropblitan area- the district contri-
buted $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school year 
above its Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program. 
The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a State- local 
total of $248. 27 Federal funds added another $108 for a grand total 
28 of $356 per pupil. 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with 
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, the most affluent 
school district in san Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 
5, 000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantlt white, 
having only 18 per cent Mexican-Americans and less than BBil 1 ~r cent 
' I 
' \ 





and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-68 the local tax rate 






contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225 
provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558 
per student. Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal 
sources, Alamo Heights was able to spend $594. 
Although the 1967-68 school year figures provide the only com-
29 
plete statistical breakdown for each category of aid, more recent 
partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing 
State aid has been significant. For the 1970-71 school year the Foundation 
School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per pupil. This con-
stituted a 62 per cent increase over the three-year period since 1967-68. 
Indeed, State aid alone ••••kbedequaled Edgewood's entire budget-
from local, State, and federal sources -in 1967-68. While Alamo 
Heights received a similar increase to $491 per pupil, these recent 
figures indicate that the Local Fund Assignment, at least as to these 
two districts, does reflect a rough approximation of the relative tax-
paying potential of each. Alamo Heights, because of its relative prop-
ert~ wealth, was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
I 
1 ~~ 












Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46 
per pupil, which is only about 2.4 per cent of its grant. 30 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict dis-
parities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail 
in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State31 still 
exist. And it was these disparities, largely attributable to differences 
in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation, 
that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of 
public school finance violated the equal protection clause. The 
District Court held that the effect of the Texas SJstem was to dis-
criminate on the basis of wealth - a "suspect" classification- in the 
manner in which education, a "fundamental" interest, was provided 
for its people. F. SUpp. at 2.__. Having found both factors present, 
the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only 
J 





Jt~te interest. _!!!. at • On this issue the court concluded that 
./ '[D)ot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state 
I 
/ 
interests ••• they fail even to establish a reasonable basis for these 
' . 
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classifications." Id. at 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically-rooted dual system 
of financing public education could not withstand the close judicial 
scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative 
judgments that interfere with fundamental rights32 or that touch upon 
suspect classifications. 33 If, as we have frequently held, close 
scrutiny means that the state's system is not entitled to the usual 
presumption of validity, that the state rather than the complainants 
must carry a "heavy burden of justification," that the state must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been crafted with'pre-
cision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives, and 
that it has selected the "least drastic means" for effectuating its 
objectives, 34 the Texas financing system .. and its counterparts in 
virtually every other cte - will not pass muster • 
'· . ' 
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The state has candidly admitted that "£tYo one familiar with the Texas 
system would contend that it has yet achieved perfection. "35 Yet in 
spite of its concession that educational finance in Texas has "defects"36 
37 and "imperfections," the State defends the sy&em's rationality 
and vigorously disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a 
"reasonable basis. " 
This, then, establishetl the framework for our analysis. We 
must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public edu-
cation may be subjected to meticulous judie ial scrutiny. If so, the 
judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. If not, Texas' 
claimed rational basis must be considered. We now turn to the e:xami-
nation of these two questions. 
II 
The District Court's opinion, which appears to regard each of 
the essential elements of its judgment as conclusively established, fails 
to reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed 
by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. That court 
) .. .. t-. 
what it regarded as ample precedential support for its conclusion 
that strict judicial scrutiny was required. It relied on this Court's 
decisions dealing with the indigent's right to equal treatment in the 
criminal trial and appellate processes, 38 and on cases disapproving 
wealth barriers imposed on the right to vote. 39 Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classifica-
tion. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the 
basis of wtMx wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling. 
It then reasoned, based again on decisions of this Court affirming 
40 
the undeniable importance of education, that there is a fundamental 
right to education and that, absent some compelling state justification, 
the Texas system could not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which is in every significant 
as~ct sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the mosiac of constitu-
/ 
I 




/ , ;several reasons that follow, we find in this case neither the suspect 
I 
I 
I classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive. 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court is 
-14-
quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore 
reviewed by this Court. Since all children in any given school district 
reveive the same public education, irrespective of family wealth, the 
District Court found the operative class to be all citizens in "poor 
school districts." _F. Supp. at __ • The State's dependence 
on local property taxation to pay a portion of the total cost of educa-
tion was found to impose a de facto discrimination against those school 
districts that have, vis a vis other school districts, relatively less 
property to tax per pupil to be educated. Because higher rates of 
taxation failed to compensate for disparities in property value, the 
class was found to be expending relatively less in its schools and, 
therefore, providing a lower quality education for its children. 
In one sense this discrimination is geographical rather than 
financial. But the Court has never questioned the state's power to 
draw reasonable distinctions between its political subdivisions. 
McGowanv. Maryland, 366 u.s. 420,427 (1961); Balsburgv. Maryland, 
346 U.s. 545 (1954). Recognizing the force of those cases, appellees 
have focused instead on the individuals who reside in the relatively 
~~ '· < 
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disadvantaged districts. Yet the status of these individuals is 
simply not comparable to the status of the individual complainants 
who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws as~~ 
discriminatory against the poor. 
In Griffin v. nunois, 351 U.s. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 312 U.s. 353 (1963) and their progeny, the Court invalidated 
state laws that denied a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. 
Similarly, Williams v, Ulinois, 399 u.s. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short, 
401 U.s. 395 (1971) struck down criminal penalties that subjected 
indigents to tn.tlgmut~:D:a incarceration simply because they were 
unable to pay fines. In each of those cases the Court was not dealing 
with relative impecunity but with some level of absolute poverty, b !.·, 
1: because11their indigency, each •••aptw~ complainant fs 
\ 
\ 




impose a weighty but not insurmountable burden. It Bk is clear that 
t 
\ 
the mere fact that it may have been more difficult for one citizen 
than another to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal 
- 16-
/ y 
~not alone have11 enough to compel judicial invalidation of those 
barriers. The Court has never questioned that the nonindigent 
citizen must pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have 
never held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's 
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens created by 
a system of absolute fines. In the instant case, appellees have 
endeavored to show only that children from relatively poorer 
41 




No ef1ort was made to prove, however, that the financing system 
operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more clearly 
definable class of indigents. Indeed, there is reason to suspect , 
that tbe poorest families may not be clustered in the poorest 
distJtcts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in 
I 
I I 
Connecticut concluded that "[t]t is clearly incorrect •.. to 
c, tend that 'poor' live in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major 
I 
i fa tual assumption of Serrano--that the educational finance systerp 
I 
42 
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Defining "poor" faDiillili families as those below the Bureau of 
43 
the Census "poverty level, " the Connecticut study found, not 
surprisingly, that the poor are clustered around commercial and 
industrial areas--those same areas that provide the most lucrative 
44 
sourees of property tax income for school districts. 
Thus, it must be recognized that we are asked in this case 
to extend the Court's closest protection to a large and diverse class. 
and, unlike our racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it 
is not a class saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such 
a position of political powerlessness, aa•JaotaoUJ or subjected 
to such a history of unequal treatment as to deserve extraordinary 
judicial protection from the majoritartan political Jill process. It 
has never been the design of this Court to discredit state action 
simply because in its effect its budens fall more heavily on those 
of lower than--.average income. 
Moreover, the nature of the injury sustained by the 
disadvantaged class provides a second significant factor 
'· :.... .; 
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differentiating the present case from its predecessors. In our 
former cases an absolute inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the benefit in question. Disparities in school 
financing, however, has its impact along a continuum of educational 
expenditures, .!· ~·, the relatively poorer districts in terms of 
assessable property per pupil devote relatively less to education. 
=~..vt In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury waseftt - denial of 
a transcript on appeal - and the remedy could be easUy and 
effectively secured. What was required was some means of 
assuring an "adequate appellate review. " 351 U.S. at 18. The 
Court did not hold that lllinois was required to provide a full 
stenographic transcript in every case: broad leeway was permitted 
for the state to select its own means of meeting its constitutional 
obligation. See, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 _U.s. _ i (1971) 
Britt v. North Carolina, 40 _U.S. _ (1971). Likewise, Douglas 
~ 
v. Califomia, supra, sMle requiring counsel for indigents 
perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained from 
- 19-
mandating "absolute equality." 372 U.S. at 357. No attempt has 
yet been made to guarantee that the poor receive the same high 
45 
quality of legal representation available to the wealthy. 
Efforts to analogize to the remedies afforded in those eases 
raise questions of considerable e omplexity where, as here, the 
alleged deprivation is not absolute but is relative. Since "absolute 
equality" is not required, must the existence of invidious discrimination 
and the availability of relief depend on whether 'ixas is presently 
providing through its dual financing system an ''adequate" educational 
opportunity to children in the poorer districts? The founders of 
the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that. 
By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds, 
the Texas Legislature hoped to "guarantee, for the welfare of the 
state as a whole, that all people shall have t at least an adequate 
program of:BCDC education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum 
46 
Foundation Program of Education.'" Must we decide whether, 
in fact, Texas has fulfilled its promise and that, as the state 
'~o·"'.· l.i(!,.. 
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repeatedly asserts in its briefs in this Court, ''the state has 
47 
assured every child in every school district an adequate education"? 
There are, then, these two demonstrable differences between 
the present case and those relied on by the District Court: ( 1) the 
claimed disadvantaged class is significantly larger as well as more 
ubiquitous and diverse; (2) the injury sustained is in no sense 
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance 
system might be hypothesized, however, tn which the analogy to the 
wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If 
elementary and secondary education were available by the State 
only to those who are able to meet tuition assessed against each 
pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of ''poor" people -
definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum -
who would be u absolutely precluded from receiving an adequate 
education. That case presents a good deal more compelling set 
of circumstances for 111 judicial assistance than the case before 





more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has 
endeavored to provide some education for all children and has drawn 
no explicit lines designed to separate out the poor for disfavored 
treatment. 
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding of 
wealth discrimination alone has never been held to cmstitute a 
sufficient basis for subjecting state legislation to rigorous judicial 
48 
scrutiny. Before such close review is required, a state's laws 
must be found to interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" 
right. And, it is this question whether education should be counted 
among the small circle of rights that have heretofore been found 
to be'!undamental" which has so consumed the courts and commentators 
49 
1n recent years. 
I 
- 22 .. 
B 
In ~!'~wn v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) a 
unanimous Court recognized that "education is perhpas the most 
important function of state and local governments." Id. at 493. 
What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has 
lost none of its vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance 
of our most basic x••r....at responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, 
in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms. " ld. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the high 'Vdx: value 
of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions 
of Justice of this Court writing both before and after Brown was 
decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 u.S. , (Mr. Chief - - - ---
Justice), (Mr. Justice White) ( 1972); Abington School Dist. 
v. Sehempp, 374 U.s. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 
333 U.s. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s. 510 
(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate RR Co. 
v. !'4assachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907). 
Nothing this Court holds tooay in any way departs from 
our historic dedication to public education. We find ourselves 
in complete agreement with the coo.elusion of the three-judge panel 
below that ''the grave significance of education both to the individual 
50 
and to our society" cannot be doubted. But the importance of 
a service performed by the state does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under 
the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Harlan, long an opponent 
of the Court's~standards for approaching equal prctection 
cases, admonished that "[v ]irtually every state statute affects 
important rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 665, 661 
(1969) (dissenting opinion). In his view, if the degree of scrutiny 
of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of 
-24-
the importance of the importance of the right affected, we would have 
gone "far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Id. 
Close examination of the Court's decisions, however, evidences a 
consistent respect for the limitations on judicial power and for the 
primacy of the legislature's function. Mr. Justice Stewart's 
response in Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's charge of judicial legis-
lation effectively exposes the narrow limits of the "fundamental rights" 
aspect of the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection •••• ' 
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, 
as it must, an established constitutional right, 
and gives to that right no less protection than 
the Constitution itself demands." 394 U.S. at 642 
(Emphasis from original.) 
Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the 
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clur. In subjecting to close 
judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-
year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
/ 
.-. J ,. 
"in moving from State to State .•• appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classi-
fication which serves to penalize the exercise of 
that right, unless shown to be necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest, is un-






The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of 
constitutional significance, 51 and the Court's decision therefore did 
not require an ad hoc balancing of the relative importance of that 
52 
right. 
Lindsey v. Normet, 40 U.s. _(1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's clear view that social im-
portance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving 
a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits 
brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful 
Detainer law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." Id. at 
The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "funda-
mental interests wbich are of particular importance to the poor," 
I 
such 1as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peace-
/ 
I 
ful possession of one's home." Id. The Court's analysis is instructive: 
' .. 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe 
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not 
provide judicial remedies for every social and econo-
mic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document 
'' -
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any constitutional guarantee to access to dwellings 
of a particular quality or any recognition of the 
right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his 
landlord beyond the term of the lease, without the 
payment of rent. • • • Absent constitutional mandate, 
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition 
of landlord-tenant relationships is a legislative not 
a judicial function. 11 Id. at_. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.s. 471 (1970), 
the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration 
of public welfare assistance . . . involves the most basic economic 
53 
needs of impoverished human beings, " provided no basis for de-
parting from the settled mode of constitutional analyses of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social policy. As 
in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to 
the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to justify 
its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 40 U.S. _(1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 
(1971). 
The lesson of these cases for the question now before the Court 
is plain. 'I'he key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" 












of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found 
by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel. 
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether, in terms of the Consti-
tution itself, the right to education is fundamental . Eisenstadt v . Baird , 
40 
54 
U.S._(l972); Dunn v . Blumstein, 40 U.S._(l972); 55 
56 
of the City of Chicago, 40 U .S._(l972); Skinner v. Oklahoma , 
316 u.s. 535 (1942). 57 
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would 
not alone cause the Court to depart from the usual standard of review-
ing a state's J3ocial and economic legislation, appellees contend that 
education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided 
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other 
I 
rights accorded protection;under the Constitution. Specifically, they 
I 
insist that education is a, fundamental personal right because it is 
I 
) 
essential to effective erercJse of First Amendment freedoms and to 
/ / 
intelligent utilization of tJae right to vote . In asserting a nexus between 
I 
'I 




ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts in-
telligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty 
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, the 
corollary right to receive information 58 becomes little more than 
a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, 
assimilate and utili~e available knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the 
right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be 
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. 'rhe electoral 
process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on 
an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently 
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately 
developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has 
long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental 
interference for the individual's constitutimal rights to speak and to 
vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or 









or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable 
goals of a system of freedom of expeession and of a representative 
form of ·government is not to be doubted. 59 These are indeed goals 
to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from 
governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented 
by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. 
In any event, to whatever extent a nexus exists between educa-
tion and speech and between education and exercise of the franchise, 
it must be entirely clear that the Constitution stops well short of re-
quiring the states to impose standards of uniform equality with respect 
to the exercise of those personal rights. Even if it were conceded that 
soJe quantum of education is a constitutionally protected peerequisite 
( 
7the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no Indication that 
11 
~e ,present levels of educational expenditure in Texas fall short. What-
, I 




occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its 
I 
I 













levels are involved and where -as is true in the present case - no 
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each 
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal tools necessary 
for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of participation in the 
60 
political process. 
We have carefully surveyed each of the arguments supportive 
of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right 
and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present conteat. 
Even a contrary conclusion, however, would not compel this Court 
to subject the Texas public school finance system to searching judicial 
scrutiny. For in one most basic sense, the present case is signifi-
cantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied 
close scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon fundamental 
\ 
rights. Each of our prllor cases Involved legislation which "de~ve9," 
"infringed," or "interferred'' with the free exercise of some func. amental 
personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942; - ' 
I 
39 1./ (,I! \ ;., 
Shapiro v. Thompson, -9M' U.s. Bill; 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumst~'in, \ 
&Z-'ca.V 1\ 
40 --+-U.S. _ , __ (197 2) • The c iPitieal dis tine tion between th~~se 
\ ' 





cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to 
do with respect to education. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the 
Court in Katzenback v. Morgan , 384 U.s. 641 (1966), expresses well 
61 
the salient point: 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ••. has unO 
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right 
to vote but rather that Congress violated the Con-
stitution by not extending the relief effected[to 
others similarly situatedJ •••• 
"(The federal law in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the fran-
chise to persons who otherwise would be denied 
it by state law. • • . We need decide only whether 
the challenged limitation on the relief effected 
••• was permissible. In deciding that •estion, 
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny 
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights 
••• is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged 
by appellees is presented only as a limitation on 
a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing 
barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, 
in deciding the constitutional propriety of the 
limitations in such a reform measure we are guided 
by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not 
invalid under the Constitution because it might 
have gone farther than it did,' ••• that a legislature 
need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' and 
that 'reform may take one step at a time, address-
ing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the legislative mind •••. '' Id. at 
656-57 (Emphasis from original.) 
Fairly viewed, the Texas system of finance touches on "fundamental 
rights" in much the same manner as the federal legislation in 
Katzenbach affedted the right to vote. Every step leading to the estab-
lishment of the system Texas utilizes today - including the decisions 
-32-
permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid ... was implemented in an effort to 
62 
extend public education and to improve its quality. Of course, 
every teff)f)m that benefits some more than others may be dondemned 
for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, 
therefore, is entitled to be scrutinized under judicial principles 
more sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts. 
c 
It should be abundantly clear, for the several reasons stated 
above, that this is an inappropriate case in which to subject state 
action to the sort of searching scrutiny reserved for laws that involve 
suspect classifications or fundamental interests. To focus exclusively 
upon the inappropriateness of the compelling interest test, however, 
is to disregard an even more important coosideration in the case 
now before us. As Katzenbach suggests, in several significant 






traditional rational basis approach. The reasoning underlying 
this judgment, which finds deep roots in a century of Supreme 
Court adjudication under the equal protection clause, deserves 
recitation here. 
This case represents more than a challenge of the manner 
in which Texas provides for the education of its childrm . In a 
fundamental sense, it is a direct k attack on the way in which 
Texas has chosen to raise and disburse revenues. It condemns 
the State's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the 
power to tax local property to supply revenues for loeal interests. 
In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area 
63 
in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsbn v. J. C. Pen~, 
311 U.s. 435 (1940), against overzealous interference with the 
state's fiscal policies is worth repeating: 
"ft lbe responsibility for devising just and productive 
sources of revenue challenges the wits of legislatures. 
Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to •.. 
inject themselves in a merely negative way into the 
delicate processes of fiscal policy-making." Id. at 
445. \' 
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The Justices a of the Court lack both the technical expertise and 
the familiarity with local problems necessary if effective legis-
lation is to be promulgated affecting the acquisition and disposition 
of public revenues. Yet we are urged to order the states either 
to alter drastically the present system or to tax throw the 
property tax out altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. 
Are we to counsel the States that an income or sales tax would 
prove ~es_!. discriminatory against the relatively kJqln 
impecunious.: elements of society? 
Coupled with the inherent complexity of matters involving 
state taxation, the present case touches as well on inevitable and 
perplexing problems encountered Jilin the effect to provide this 
most important social benefit to all people in the State. Education, 
even more than public B welfare assistance programs, presents 
a myriad of "intractable economic, social and even philosophical 
problems." DandridS! v. Williams, 397 U.S. 487. The very 
complexity of the problems of educational finance suggest that 






"there will be more than one constituionally permissible method 
of solving them," and that, within the limits of rationality, "the 
legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled 
to respect. .refferson v. !faclmey, 40_ U. S. 1972). On even 
I the most basic questions in this area the researchers and 
educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the hottest 
sources of controversy concerns whether there is any demonstrable 
correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of 
64 
education - an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this 
case. Related to the questioned relationship between the cost and 
quality t of education, is the equally unsettled controversy regarding 
64a 
the proper goals of a system of public education. Neither question 
is amenable to ultimate resolution through the judicial process, 
yet any decision that departs from the status quo must inevitably 
have a great impact on those problems. 
Finally, it must be remembered that every case arising 
under the equal protection clause a has implications for the 
- 36-
relationship between national and state power under our federal 
system. Questions of federalism are inherent in and indeed 
lie at the basis of the judgment, compelled by the equal protection 
clause, whether a state's laws are to be subjected to meticulous 
judicial examination. In reaching that judgment we also decide whether 
the state's judgment is entitled to deference and whether it oa the 
complaining party must bear the burden of justification. While 
"[t ]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost 
consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
65 
which this Court examines state action, it would be difficult 
to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our 
....a:»d federal system than the one now before us, which threatens 
to abrogate the systems of public education presently in existence 
in virtually every state. 
These considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas' 
system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for 
close judicial scrutiny. Inevitably, these same considerations 
I ~,;• 
'. 
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must also affect our evaluation of whether such discriminations 
as result from that system may be said to be supported by a 
reasonable or rational basis. And, it is to that question that 
we must now turn our attention. 
- 38-
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The contours of the Texas school finance system have been 
traced at the outset of this opinion. Apart from federal assistance, 
each school receives its funds from the state and from its local 
school district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
66 
amount of funds is derived from each source. The state's 
contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed 
to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school 
in the state. Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one 
teacher -compensated at the state-supported minimum salary- for 
67 
every 25 students. Each school district's other supportive 
68 
personnel are provided for: one principal for every 20 teachers; 
one "special service" teacher - librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. - for 
69 
every 20 teachers; vocational instructors, conselors, and 
170 
educators for exceptional children are also provided. Additional 
funds are earmarked for current operating expenses and for student 
71 72 
transportation. The state t also provides free textbooks. 
\ 
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The program is administered by the Texas Education Agency, 
73 
which also has responsibility for school accreditation and for 
74 
monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards. As 
reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood 
75 
School District over the last three years, the State's financial 
contribution to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas' 
school districts, however, has been content to rely, alone, on 
funds from the Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund Assignment, 
every district must pose an · ' 4 ••• ••• • •• ad valorem tax on property 
located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was designed 
to remain sufficiently low, however, to assure that each district 
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational 
76 
program. Every district supplements its foundation grant in 
this manner. For some districts the local property tax contribution 
is insubstantial, as, for instance, in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. For other districts the local share 
may far exceed JBliJ!Il" even the total Foundation grant. In part 
.. 40-
local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of 
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category 
1177 
of property exceeds its assessed value. The greatest inter-
district disparities, however, are attributed to differences in the 
amount of assessable prq>erty available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, are 
more capable of raising money for their schools. In large measure, 
these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher teacher 
salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing 
ailt»:.D attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower 
78 
pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules. 
This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance structure. 
Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by 
disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children 
in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious 
discrimination. The District Court found that the state had failed 
''to establish a reasonable basis for these classification." 




The texas system is comparable to the systems employed 
79 
in virtually every other state in its reliance on state as well as 
local resources. The power to tax local property for educational 
80 
purposes has been recognized in Texas at least since 1883. It 
has long provided the means to assure that education is controlled 
at the local level. When shifts in the distribution of :2ppt population, 
ace om panted by changes in local property wealth occasioned by 
the growth of commercial and industrial centers, began to create 
disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling 
for a considerable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas educators 
based the Gilmer-Aiken btlls, was a product of the pioneering work 
11: of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George 
81 
D. strayer and Robert M. Haig. Their efforts were devoted to 
establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educa-
t tonal program without sacrificing local coo.trol. The Strayer-Haig 
thesis represented an accommodation between these two competing 






"The history of education since the industrial 
revolution shows a c ootinual struggle between two 
forces: the desire by members of society to have 
educational opportunity for all children, and the 
desire of each family to pr~V'ide the best education 
it can affDrd for its child. " 2 
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality 
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring a basic 
education for every child in the state, it permits and encourages 
control of each district's school at the local level. In an era that 
has witnessed a c ens is tent D trend toward centralization of the 
functions of government, local control of public education has 
survived. The persistence of this attachment to government at the 
lowest level where education is concerned reflects the depth of 
commitment of its supporters. In part, local control means, as 
Professor Coleman suggests, the freedom to dedicate more money 
to the education of one's child. Equally important, however, is the 
opportunity it offers for participation in the decision-making process 
that determines how those local tax dollars will be spent. Each 
locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism 
is likely to encourage experimentation, lnnvocation, and a healthy 
competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-state 
- 43-
relationship in our federal system seems tmiquely appropriate. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as ooe of the peculiar strengths 
of our form of government each state's freedom to "serve as a 
83 
laboratory ••. and try novel social and economic experiments." 
No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity 
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public 
84 
education. 
Appellees do not question the validity of Texas' dedication 
to local control of education. Rather, they attack the school 
financing system on the ground that it debases the cooeept of 
local control because it does not provide tbe same fiscal flexibility 
to poor districts as it accords the rich. It is certainly true that 
reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides 
less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some 
Jib districts than for others. Local control, however, connotes 
more than the power to make an autonomous decision on how much 
to spend. It also contemplates freedom to decide how available 
- 44-
funds will be allocated. Moreover, the Aatles State's sytem may 
not be found irrational or baseless because, in practice, it results 
in "some inequality. " McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.s. 420, 425·26 
(1961). It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the state's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 
485. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to which 
Texas' system is entitled, Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to remember that at every 
stage of its development it has constituted a "rough accommodation" 
of interests in an effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 u.s. 61, 69-70 (1913). 
Appellees urge that, apart from the questions regarding 
1ocal control, the Texas system of financing education is unconstitutionally 
arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources 
to turn on happenstance and fortuity. They con tend that no justification 
can be offered for a system that allows the quality of education to 
fiuctuate on the basis of the historical accidents and coincidences 
that often account for the positioning of the :b:xa:iidllpx "'"boundary 
- 45-
lines of political subdivisions and for the location of valuable 
commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of local 
taxation -indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental 
units - requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that 
are inevitably arbitrary. Equally inevitably, it would seems, some 
localities are going to be blessed withm more taxable assets. Nor 
is local wealth a static quantity. Are boundary lines to be redrawn 
with every shift in population or with every discovery of valuable 
minerals or with the completion of every new industrial park? 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional 
method of providing for education then it must be Jllll(ik equally 
impermissible in providing every other service currently financed 
from local:poproperty taxes, including local police and fire 
protection, public hospitals and water treatment facilities. We 
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of property 
taxation as is suggested by appellees' contentions. 
' , • .. ' ..... ,, 
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In sum, insofar as the Texas system of school finance may 
be said to work a discrimination on any class of children in the 
State,. we find ilbat discrimination to be the product of a system that 
is reasonably and rationally based. Its shortcomings are well known 
and Texas has made no effort to minimize their existence here. 
The State has persistently endeavored, however, to compensate 
for the failings of its system. And we are unable to say, given the 
complexity of this most significant state function, that Texas' 




In light of the unprecedented attention focused on the 
District Court opinion in this ease and on its California predecessor, 
~errano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary 
postscript seems appropriate. These decisions have been widely 
and enthusiastically hailed as providing, finally, a workable 
solution to the seemingly insoluble technical and policial problems 
that have impeded state legislative reform. These decisions have 
been various touted as the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to 
augmenting the education offered the poor and the racial minorities. 
They have been received as providing the ultimate solution, as well, 
for the urban crisis 1n education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
the result, the recent proponents of "fiscal neutrality" have given 
85 
it much more credit than its architects have ever claimed. 
The truth is, as increasingly more commentators are 
coming to recognize, eradication of the property-tax basis and 
implementation of "fiscally neutral" alternatives would have highly 
questionable consequences. At least one detailed empirical adxlpt 
' ..
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study has ec demonstrated that thereis no dependable correlation 
between the location of impoverished families and the presence 
86 
of inferior schools. Nor is there at this time any more than a 
random chance that racial minorities will be clustered in school 
87 
districts that are short-changed in terms of assessable property. 
Moreover, there is no reason to suspect -and some reason to fear .. 
that any alternative form of financing is likely to increase the now 
88 
of educational imputs into our urban core areas. Under such 
uncertain circumstances, if this Court sat as a policy tribunal, 
we might doubt the ultimate efficacy of the attractive egalitarian 
concept this case offers. 
The clear limitations on this Court's constitutional :laDt 
function restrain us from embarking upon a11J any such political 
or philosophical undertaking. That role is reserved for Congress 
and for the state legislative bodies and we do no violence to the 
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
So long as this Court's action today is net viewed as placing its 
- 49-
judicial impramatur on the status quo - so long as the lawmakers 
and those who select them do not embrace our holding as an 
endorsement of an educational system in need of reform- we 
89 
"none old friends of the children" can do nothing more for this 
"constituency" than to defer to those more suited to the thorough 
and vigorous undertaking demanded if the American educational 






San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This suit , attacking the Texas system of financing public edu-
cation, was initiated by Mexican-American parents mose children 
attend the elementary and secondar~ schools in the Edgewood Indepen-
dent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.
1 
~L:r&-~CU:.~ ·. 
They their own behalf a:c.d on behalf of school children through-
out the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor 
and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named 
as defendants
2 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San 
Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case was filed in the summer of 1968 
and a three-judge court was impaneled in Januart 1969. 3 In December f:_ 
1971 4 the panel rendered its judgment in a ~-_riam opinion holding 
k : 
the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Pro-




and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching consti-
tutional questions presented. 1_ U.S. ~{1972). For the reasons 
stated in this opinion we reverse the decision of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry 
into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of 
free schools. 6 Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach 
i+.s 
to~ the financing of thos~ schools, relying on mutual participation 
by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the~ate 
Constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school 
districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of 
local taxpayers~or the "erection of school buildings" and for the 
"further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds 
as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
8 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds. 
The Permanent School Fund, established in 1854,
9 
was endowed with 
millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source 
of income for school support. 10 The Available School Fund, which re-
-3-
ceived income from the Permanent Fund as well as from State 
property taxes, served as the disbursing arm for most State 
educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this 
Century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in State property taxes 
was used to finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
ll the State. 
1iltheearly years of Texas statehood this dual finance 
s7 e, not unlike the system e ployed i 
could serve adequately the State's educational requirements. Until 
recent times Texas was a predominantly rural state and its popu-
lation and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the 
12 
State. Sizable differences in the value of assessable property be-
' I 
/~~ 
tween local school districts became"~ evident;Jk~ as the 
State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced. 13 The location of commercial and 
industrial property began to play a MS! e significant role in determining 
~ /J I • ..J,..;:_J. 
h~ OhKIN.~'- (~A  w~ h ~ ~ · .., 
;~ o<>hael disl•iol' • resouro"t fep fiRft...,iBg ellaeatief\, These growing 
disparities in population and taxable property between ..iGR:e~ districts 
-4-
were responsible in part for inc rea singly notable differences in 
levels of local expenditure for educaion. 14 
1/- Ld..q ~ q--~ 
At the same time, it was "QecQrning moPe apparent to those 
A 
concerned with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient~ to ameliorate 
these disparities .15 Prior to 1939 the Available School Fund con-
tribtied money to every school district at a rate of $17. 50 per school-
age child. 16 Although the amount was increased several times in 
Recognizing the need~creased State funding to help 
.1\ 
offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educa-
.. 
~" +ho~ov~h 
tiona~ :Ae6Q.S, the ( tate egislature in the late 1940's undertook a .elost 
evaluation of public education~ with an eye toward major reform. 
In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators, 
was appointed to explore alternative systems in other ¥iates and to 
propose a State funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child ~ and that would help 
overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable resources. The Committee's 
-5-
efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the 
Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program. 19 It is this Program that accounts today for 
approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. 20 
The Program calls for :b: dtate and local contributions to a 
fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses, 
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general 
revenues, finances approximately 80 per cent of the Program and the 
school districts are responsible - as a unit - for providing the re-
maining 20 per cent. The districts' share - known as the Local Fund 
Assignment - is apportioned among the school districts pursuant to 
a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability. 
The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant 
to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative 
value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from 
manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers 
each county's relative share of all payrolls paid within the State and, 
to a lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property in 
-6-
21 
the State. Each county's assignment is then divided among its 
school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable 
Tlu-
property within the county. 22 Eaeh district then finances its share 
1-ev~vc. ~ ~r(FW\/ · 
of the Assignment out of ~local property -tax a&ilessmeath ttL. 'lC d.J h 1M· 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. First, 
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have 
an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts 
& 
by placing the heaviest burdenf on tftese<"\districts most capable of 
paying. Second , it v;as the desiPe of the Program's archite~ 
" 
establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
;l3 
district to contribute to the education of its children~ but that 
l~ 
would not by itself exhaust any district's resources.~ Today virtually 
every school district does impose a ~ property tax from which it 
derives locally expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary 
to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
~ 
In the years since the F'otinda:tion j rogram went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education - from itate as well as local 
sources - have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967 expenditures 
-7-
loS 
increased by approximately 500 per cent • .2t In the last decade alone 
t..' 
the total public school budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion~ 
and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
"L1 
pupil expenditures throughout the State.~ Minimum teacher salaries-
by far the largest single item in any school's budget -have increased 
.' -;.t., 
from $2, 400 to $6 , 000 over the last 20 years. V 
in Of'd:e-r To illustrate the manner in which this dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent to which ,.-{ 
despite Texas' impressive gains substantial interdistrict disparities 
persist ,the plaintiff school district may be compared with another 
more affluent district in San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent 
School District is one of seven public school districts in the metro-
politan area. Approximately 22, 000 students are enrolled in its 25 
elementary and secondary schools. The district is situated in the core-
city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little 
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly 
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90 per cent of the stu-
dent population is Mexican-American and over 6 per cent is Negro. 
-8-
--The average assessed property value per pupil is $5, 960~ the lowest 
in the metropolitan areai and the median family income ($4' 686) is also 
the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed 
property - the highest in the metropolitan area - the district contri-
buted $26 to the education of each child for the 19,67-68 school year 
above its Local Fund Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program. 
The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a State- loca 
~~ I 
total of $248. ~ Federal funds added another $108 for a ~total 
. 30 
of $356 per pupil.~ 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with 
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, the most affluent 
school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 
5, 000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly white, 
having only 18 per cent Mexican-Americans and less than mm 1 per cent 
Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49,000 
and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-68 the local tax rate 
I' of $. 85 per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above its 
- 9 -
contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225 
provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558 
per student. Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal 
sources, Alamo Heights was able to spend $594pvt-~ .. 
Although the 1967/)68 school year figures provide the only 
I~ ~ 
complete statistical breakdown for each category of aid, more 
recent partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend 
of increasing_Jfate aid has been significant. For the 1970-71 school 
year the Foundation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
~ 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62~increase over the three-
year period since 1967-68. Indeed, ,State aid alone in 1970-71 
equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-68 school budget -from local, 
/ ate and federal sources. Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar 
increase under the Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil. 
These recent figures also reveal the extent to which 9agb: • '!!' 
wt~u +h 




contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. Alamo Heights, 
·, 
- 11 -
the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show 
that it was premised upon some compelling state interest. ~at 
2g 2. -g'i . On this issue the court concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants 
unable to demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications. II Id. Aat zK~ 
-----1' --
Texas virtually concedes that its historically-rooted dual 
system of financing public education could not withstand the close 
judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriatex in reviewing 
legislative judgments that interfere with constitutionally fundamental 
~ ~ 
rights or that involve suspect classifications. If, as we have 
frequently held, close scrutiny means that the state's sytem is not 
entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the state rather 
than the complainants must carry a "heavy burden of justification," 
that the State must demonstrate that its educational system has been 
structured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least drastic 
J 
~ 
means" for effectuating its objectives, the Texas financing system -
and its counterparts in virtually llltdB every other ~tate -will 
, 
not pass muster. -
-12-
The State...Ms candidly admit&. that "[riJo one familiar with the Texas 
J$ 
system would contend that it has yet achieved perfection."~ ¥et ~ 
3 
~~ its concession that educational finance in Texas has "defects" 
~· . 
and "imperfections, .,3'j the State defends the syltem's ratio~'(~--
and v-igQFQYSly disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a 
"reasonable basis." 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We 
must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public edu-
'1--1~ ~ 
cation .may be subjected to metieul~ judicial scrutiny. If so, the 
1\ 
~ 
judgment of the District Court "ffittat be affirmed. If not, Texas' 
claimed rational basis must be considered. 
II 
The District Court's opinionr whlefl: appeaFs- to Fegaf'd each ef 
the essefttial-e:lements of its--jl:lagmeftt--as ee-BClnsi't'ely establi~ 
~~ 
.t9 reflect the novelty and complexity of the constitutional questions posed 
A 
by appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. ~!:;~-
-J3-
W'ha:t it -Pcga rd.ed as ample p1 eeeEiential suppGrt fGr its oe-nc-lusion 
~~ ~~ 
A that strict judicial scrutiny was required) ~ relied on tl:f=hM-ifii"B =t0~e'l'l:l1:1t1'r'f!l£'~g 
~ I~ h f ~ () .;. 11'1 ,;. I J +~ 
decisions dealing with theA :i.na:i~eat' s Pig~ to equal treatment in the 
criminal trial and appellate processes, S and on cases disapproving 
'1 
wealth barriers imposed on the right to vote. 3fb Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classifica-
tion. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the 
basis of 1mX'iifx wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling. 
It then reasoned, based~ on decisions of this Court affirming 
the undeniable importance of education, 4i that there is a fundamental 
right to education and that, absent some compelling State justification, 
the Texas system could not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which w in euery significant 
Q ~~ 
aspe~ generis, may be so neatly fitted into theAmosiac of constitu-
tional analysis under the equal protection clause. Indeed, for the 
-
several reasons that follow, we find Hi this easq_ neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court is 
-14-
quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore 
reviewed by this Court. Since all children in any given school district 
receive the same public education, irrespective of family wealth, the 
District Court found the operative class to be all citizens in "poor 
school districts." Z ] F. Supp. at ?-f2. . The State's dependence 
on local property taxation to pay a portion of the total cost of educa-
(~M,-tr; 
tion was found to~fftP~ de facto discrimination against those school 
districts that have, vis a vis other school districts, relatively less 
property to tax per pupil to be edaea:teQ. l Because higher rates of 
taxation failed to compensate for disparities in property value, the 
class was found to be expending relatively less in its schools and, 
therefore, providing a lower quality education for its children. 
In one sense this discrimination is geographical rather than 





draw reasonable distinctions between its political subdivisions. ~ 
.4~ .Q-~~..d-~~~~~) ~ 
J1 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 
346 U.S. 545 (1954). Recognizing the force of those cases, appellees 
have focused instead on the individuals who reside in the relatively 
-15-
~ iwtJ '~ /lLA 
disadvantaged districts. Ye~~he status of these individuals is 
flu,._;f-
simply not comparable to the status of the individual complainants 
-"1 
~e 
who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws as iwlideousl~ 
discriminatory against the poor. 
1. InGriffinv. illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) andDouglasv. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963~nd their progeny, the Court invalidated 
state laws that denied a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. 
Similarly, Williams v. illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)....and Tate v. Short, 
~' --
401 U.S. 395 (197l~truck down criminal penalties that subjected 
indigents to :indige=nts=t@:ima incarceration simply because they were 
unable to pay fines. In each of those cases the Court was not dealing 
with relative impecunity but with some level of absolute poverty, !: ~·, 
because;t.eir indig~ncy, each KE:qdmbo!so::sXoo~vxx complainant was 
totally unable to pay for the ~state-proffered benefit. 
Those cases did not deal with the plight of those on whom state laws 
impose a weighty but not insurmountable burden. !t Hk is elcaF t:ha.t 
fue mere fact that it may have been more difficult for one citizen 
than another to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal 
... · .... 
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~one have~ gh to compel judicial invalidation of those 
barriers. The Court has never questioned that the nonindigent 
citizen must pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have 
never held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's 
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens created by 
a system of absolute fines:f/:, the instant case, appellees have 
endeavored to show only that children from relatively poorer 
~families tend to reside in relatively poorer districts. 
No effort was made to prove, however, that the financing system 
operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more clearly 
~ 
definable class of indigents. Indeed, there is reason to -suspeet-
' 
~~~ 
that the poorest families A may not be clustered in the poorest 
districts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in 
Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to 
contend that 'poor' live in 'poor' districts .... Thus, the major 
~ 
~ 
factual assumption of Serrano- -that the educational finance system 'I' 
discriminates against the 'poor'- -is simply false in Connecticut. " 
~ 
- 18 -
Defining "poor"~ families as those below the Bureau of 
~ 
the Census "poverty level, " the Connecticut study found, not 
surprisingly, that the poor are clustered around commercial and 
industrial areas - those same areas that provide the most attractive 
" sources of property tax income for school districts. 4t,. 
Thus, k we are asked in this case to extend for the first 
time the Court's most exacting equal protection standard to a 
larg)~ diverse And, unlike racial 
minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it is not a class saddled with 
. 
such disabilities, or relegated to such a position of political 
J 
powerlessness, or subjected to such a history of unequal treatment 
as to command extraordinary judicial protection from the majoritarian 
political process. It has never been~ within the con-
stitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify state action simply 
because its burdens fall more heavily on those of lower than average 
income. 
2. Moreover, the nature of the injury alleged by the 
disadvantaged class provides another significant factor 
l'l -.-
differentiating the present case from those relied upon by the 
District Court. The disadvantaged class identified by appellees in 
the poorer districts in terms of assessable property per pupil tend 
0 
to dev4ite relatively less to education. This difference poses 
questions of considerable complexity in terms first of determining 
J J 
.;. ~~ J ,·~ ~ 
whether equal protection has been denied and, second, of aseertai:ni~ 
and~ and imposing an appropriate remedy. 
In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury was apparent - denial 
of a transcript on appeal - and the remedy could be easily and 
effectively secured. What was required was some means of 
assuring an "adequate appellate review." 351 U. %at 18. The Court 
did not hold that Illinois was required to provide a full stenographic 
~~ 
transcript in every caseh. 8road leeway if} permitted for the State .S , 
f.~ 
to select its own means of meeting~ constitutional obligation. 
See, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 _!i u. S. )J.l (197~Britt v. 
North Carolina, 40 l{ U. S. ~ __ ( 1971). And, where an "adequate 
substitute, " Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969), is 
-z,D -.-
provided) the Court will approve its use. _Se_e B_rr_·tt_v. North Carolina, 
supra; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. 
Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958). Likewise, in 
Douglas v. California, supra, the Court, while requiring counsel 
for indigents perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, 
refrained from mandating "absolute equality." 372 U. S'f'at 357. 
No attempt ~ has yet been made to guarantee as a constitutional 
~quirement that all citizens, regardless of relative wealth, 
~ ,., 
receive the same quality of legal representation. 
In analogizing from those cases in which the deprivation 
was absolute to the present case in which such deprivation as 
exists is relative) must the threshold finding of unconstitutional 
discrimination depend on whether Texas is presently providing 
an "adequate"e education to children in poorer districts? The 
,Founders of the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do 
.~· 
exactly that. By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and 
operating funds, the Texas Legislature hoped to "guarantee, 
for the welfare of the State as a whole, that all people shall have 
,., 
- II> -
at least an adequate program of education. This is what is meant 
by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of Education' . 
decide whether, in fact, Texas has fulfilled its promise and that, 
as the State repeatedly asserts in its briefs in this Court, "the 
state has assured every child in every school district an adequate 
education''? 
Even assuming that the Court possessed the tools and expertise 
to conclude that the present system is inadequate, how are we to 
implement the remedy? Appellees have steadfastly asserted that 
they do not demand equal expenditures. Rather, they profess to 
endorse almost any system of expenditures that is not limited by 
the local district~ lack of relative taxable wealth. Yet any 
alternative short of equal expenditures is bound to result, at least 
occasionally, in lower expenditures in schools attended by children 
of poorer families. In each such case, our prior wealth discrimina-
tion cases would indicate that the Court must decide whether the 
amount spent in the disadvantaged schools is sufficient to guarantee 
those children as adequate an education as is afforded other 
,.v 
-et-
children in the State. That is a function for which we are quite 
obviously ill-equipped. 
There are, then, these two demonstrable differences between 
the present case and those relied on by the District Court: (1) the 
claimed disadvantaged class is significantly larger as well as more 
ubiquitous and diverse; and (2) the injury alleged is in no sense 
an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance 
system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the 
wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If 
elementary and secondary education were made available by the 
State only to those who are able to pay a tuition assessed against 
each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people -
to 
definable in terms of their inabilit~pay the prescribed sum -
o who would be absolutely precluded from receiving an adequate 
education. That case would present a far more compelling set 
of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us 
today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good deal 
\,.!1 
-It-
more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has 
provided what it considers to be an adequate base education for 
all children and has drawn no explicit lines designed to separate 
out the poor for disfavored treatment. 
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding of 
wealth discrimination alone has never been held to constitute a 
sufficient basis for subjecting state legislation to rigorous judicial 
s 
~ 
scrutiny. :JD::bt Before such close review is required, a state's 
laws must be found to interfere with the exercise of some 
"fundamental" right. It is this question - whether education should 
re counted among the small circle of rights that heretofore have 
been found to be "fundamental" -which has so consumed the attention 
4iJ S 
of courts and commentators in recent years. 
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954~ 
unanimous Court recognized that "education is per~s the most 
important function of state and local governments. " ~at 493. 
' 
What was said there in the context of racial discrimination has 
lost none of its vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance 
of our most basic ~ responsibilit,ies, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, 
in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms " I../} 1/\ . ~0 
vc..W-~ 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the high 'B value 
of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions 
of Justicf of this Court writing both before and after ~rown was 
1\ 
decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40 U.S. - -
1~t-1.1.'1 
~~ 
(A$ , 2 13 (:~.k. Chief -- /\ 
Justice), 237 \Mr. Justice White)( 1972); Abington School Dist. 
- j 
v. Sehempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 
333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
e.. 
(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate RR Co. 
v. Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 ( 1907). 
Jel.,o.c..+.s 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way G9paP~ from 
our historic dedication to public education. wp .fJUFSe!ve:l}j 
in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel 
I below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual 
~~~ 
and to our society" cannot be doubted. But the importance of 
a service performed by the ~ate does not determine whether it 
::::: 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under 
~~~ 
the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Harlan .lsa~ ill '?fi'p?nspt 
~ ~ ~· ~ef~~i:<J 
M-Hte CtJilrt' S ~:idltit!Sfbl RWI ooehiot!j R'f'O 1 pwtooOi•m 
~~~~~~~~ 
~admonished that "[v ]irtually every state statute affects ..-, t 
important rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 665, 661 " 
jvJ,·r.,a-1 
(1969),~eHel!I8Bii.n~ 8fliRi9.. In his view, if the degree ofJscrutiny 
of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of 
t-K...~'-44 
the importance ~-~~'*iliiilii~QQ. of the Figh-t affected, we would have 
" 
~ (Close examination of the Court's decisions, however, evidences a 
__fLJj_ \._ ~ Rider A, p. 24 Rodriguez (12/13/72) 
~ ming a legislative role and one for which 
We would indeed be assu 
" t But Mr. Justice 
the Court lacks both authority and compe ency. 
M Justice Harlan's . ~;ax Shapiro to r. 
Stewart's response m  
· . ·t f the "fundamental 
c ctly articulates the narrow hmi s o 
conern corre 
" . 1 f the Court's equal protection decisions: 
rights" rahona e o 
___ ___ J , .. uc '-'uu.n. ::nmp1y recognizes, 
as it must, an established constitutional right, 
and gives to that right no less protection than 
the Constitution itself demands." 394 U. S~at 642 
(Emphasis from original . ) 
Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the 
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to close 
judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-
year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classi-
fication which serves to penalize the exercise of 
that right, unless shown to be necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest, is un-
constitutional." Id. at 634 (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of 
s 
constitutional significance, 5- and the Court's decision therefore did 
not require an ad hoc balancing of the relative importance of that 
right.~~ 
Lindsey v. Normet, 40 ~ U.S. S ~ (1972) , decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's ~view that social im-
portance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving 
a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits 
brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful 
Detainer law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." Id~t 7 3. 
The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "funda-
mental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," 
such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peace-
ful possession of one's home." ~Jbe Court's analysis is instructive: 
(ir 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe , 
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not 
provide judicial remedie$ for every social and econo-
mic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document 
any constitutional guarantee to access to dwellings 
of a particular quality or any recognition of the 
right of a tenant to occupy th~ real property of his 
landlord beyond the term of ~ lease, without the 
payment of rent. . . . Absent constitutional mandate, 
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition (}A.[J... 
of landlord-tenant relationships Ht-ft.legislativ~ not 
ft judie ia) func tim.P. '' ~at .1!t. (Emphasis supplied. ) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), 
the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration 
of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic 
needs of impoverished human beings, " '5I provided no basis for de-
I 
parting from the settled mode of constitutional analys~s of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social policy. As 
in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to 
the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to justify 
its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 40 12._ U.S. L 1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 7 ~ 
(1971). 
~~ 
The lesson of these cases fei> the question now before the Court 
I\ 
is plain. The key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" 
is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance 
"" -·--v1 
of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found 
by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel. 
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether, in terms of the Consti-
tution itself, the right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. Baird , 
s ~ 
40 U.S. (1972);& Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 
of the City of Chicago, 40 _u .S.J1.(1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 u.s. 535 (1942). 5 
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would 
not alone cause the Court to depart from the usual standard of review-
ing a state's social and economic legislation, appellees contend that 
education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided 
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other 
rights accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they 
insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is 
essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to 
intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between 
speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-
ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts in-
telligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty 
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, the 
4~ 
corollary right to receive informationfrfb becomes little more than 
a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, 
assimilate and utilize available knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the 
right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be 
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral 
process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on 
an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently 
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately 
developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has 
long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental 
~ 
interference~ the individual's constitutimal rights to speak and to 
1\. 
vote. Yet we have nev.er. presumed to possess either the ability or 
~ ~ .. p 
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech 
--~-
~~ 
or the most informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable 
goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative 
" form of government is not to be doubted.~ These are indeed goals 
to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from 
governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented 
by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. 
[ In any event, to whatever extent a nexus exists between ed r-
.,.,-
tion and speech and betweerreducation and exercise of the franchise, 
"" it *l~leaF that the Constitution stops well short of re-
_/ ~ 
......... -... .. --- ~ 
quiring the statesik *a1,91 st~elS Of ufiitbi1ii%q&&ltt!fwith respect 
e exercise of those'personal right~ conceded that 
~-- ~ some quanturrr of"tHiucatwn is a constitutionally protected prerequisite 
to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that 
~,., fl.,, I c. ~ vc:.. f1Wl +-h ... t 
the present levels of educational expenditure)\in Texas fal l,sshort. What-
ever merit appellees' argument might have if a ~tate's financing system 
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its 
children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference 
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending 
----
levels are involved and where - as is true in the present case - no 
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each 
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills 
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full 
participation in the political process. 
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficult to perceive. Now, for instance, is education 
to be distinguished from the significant personal interests in the 
rS 
basi~ of decent food and shelter? Empirical examination might 
well buttress an assumption that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and 
ill ... housed are among the most ineffective participants in the 
political process and that they derive the least enjoyment from ,. 
6fb 
the benefits of the First Amendment. If so, under appellees' 
thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra and Lindsey v. Normet, 
supra, would no longer be good constitutional law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive 
of the District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right 
J 
33 -.-
and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context. 
In one further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate 
case in which to subject state action to close judicial scrutiny. 
For in OllQ most l9asie sen~e"f The present caseJ · s significantly 
different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied 
close scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon funda-
mental rights. Each of our prior cases involved legislation which 
"deprived, " "infringed, " or "interferred" with the free exercise 
of some fundamental personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 
) 
(1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S. ~~0, (1972). The 
critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us 
lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. 
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 




~ ;;.-. .,. 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right 
to vote but rather that Congress violated the Con-
stitution by not extending the relief effected [ to 
others similarly situated] .... 
" [The federal law in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the fran-
chise to persons who otherwise would be denied 
it by state law. . . . We need decide only whether 
the challenged limitation on the relief effected 
... was permissible. In deciding that question, 
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny 
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights 
... is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged 
by appellees is presented only as a limitation on 
a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing 
barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, 
in deciding the constitutional propriety of the 
limitations in such a reform measure we are guided 
by the familiar principles that a 'statute is not 
invalid under the Constitution because it might \ 
have gone farther than it did,' ..• that a legislature 
need not 'strike at all evils at the same time,' and 
that 'reform may take one step at a time, address-
ing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the legislative mind ..•. " Id. at 
656-57 (Emphasis from original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the federal 
legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. Every step 
leading to the establishment of the system Texas utilizes today -
irxDlH including the decisions permitting localities to tax and 
expend locally, and creating and continuously expanding state 




and to improve its quality. Of course, every reform that benefits 
some more than others may be condemned for what it fails to 
ace omplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, the thrust 
of the Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, therefore, 
should be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the 
~ 
nature of the State's efforts. 
c 
It should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated above, 
that this is an in appropriate case in which to subject state action 
to the sort of searching scrutiny reserved for laws that involve 
suspect classifications or fundamental rights. 
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the 
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A century of 
Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection clause 
affirmatively supports the application here of the traditional 
rational basis test. This case represents far more than a challenge 
to the manner in which Texas proviCies for the education of its 
children. We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and :s: disburse state and 
local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn the state's judgment 
in conferring on political subdivisions the power to tax local property 
to supply revenues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has traditionally .. 
~ 
deferred to state legislatures. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 
admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny, 311 U.S. 435 (1940) 
against interference with the state's fiscal policies is worth 
repeating: 
"[t ]he responsibility for devising just and productive 
sources of revenue challenges the writs of legislatures. 
Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to ... 
inj:§'t themselves in a merely negative way into the 
delicate processes of fiscal policy-making. " Id. at 
445. 
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution, the 
Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity 
with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions 
with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet 
we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the 
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether in favor 
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of some other form of taxation. Are we, for example, to counsel 
the states that an income or sales tax would operate less 
discriminatorily against the relatively impecunious elements of 
6'f 
society? 
Nor is this Court - indeed any court - competent to make 
informed judgments on the critical issues confronting those who 
must determine educational policy at the state and local levels. 
Education, perhaps even more than public welfare assistance 
programs, presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social 
and even philosophical problems. " Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
oJr 
U.S. 487. The very complexity of the problems of~ 
1 
financing and managing a statewide public school system suggest 
that "there will be more than one constitutionally permissible 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits of rationality, 
"the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled 
to respect. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972). 
On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and 
- 38 -
educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of the hottest sources 
of controversy concerns the extent to which there is a demonstrable 
correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of 
1 
education - an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually ever legal conclusion drawn by the District Court in this 
case. Related to the questioned relationship between cost and 
quality, is the equally unsettled controversy as to the proper goals 
of a system of public education. And the question of the proper 
relationship between state boards of education and local school 
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and degree of 
control, is now undergoing searching reexamination. It hardly 
need be said that none of these questions is amenable to intelligent 
resolution through the judicial process. Indeed, the ultimate wisdom 
of these and like problems of education is not likely to be devined 
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the 
issues. At the very least, the judiciary should not circumscribe 
or handicap - by interposing inflexible constitutional constraints -
the continued research and experimentation so vital even to partial 
solutions and to keeping abreast of changing conditions. 
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It must be remembered also that every case arising under 
the equal protection clause has implications for the relationship 
between national and state power under our federal system. 
Questions of federalism are inherent in the process of determining 
compelling 
whether a State's laws are to be subjected to the ~ interest 
or the rational basis test. While "[t ]he maintenance of the principles 
of federalism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the 
7D. 
pertinent provisions under which this Court examines state action, 
it would be difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before us, in which 
we are urged to abrogate the systems of financing public education 
presently in existence in virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our EmiEH conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an :Xlm: inappropriate 
candidate for close judicial scrutiny. These same considerations 
are relevant to the determination whether that system, with its 
conceded imperfections, is supported by a reasonable or rational 
basis. It is to this question that we next turn out attention. 
--- -~- III 
Rider A, p. 38 Rodriguez 12/14/72 & 
M ~ ~ the FiSIE of Uflduly p;rslooging tais sp · · hI . 
. +htvf 
Hll9Q, !We Will describe 
1\ 
m more detail ~'Pen t 
~ sys em and how it operates, as these facts 
bear directly upon the issue of rationality. 
1 
J 
contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed L_ 
to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school 
in the state. Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one 
teacher- - compensated at the state-supported minimum salary --for 
q 
every 25 students. Each school district's other supportive 
personnel are provided for: one principal for every 20 teachers; 
one "special service" teacher - librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. - for 
7 
~ ~ ~ 
every 20 teachers; vocational instructors, conselors, 
1\ ~ 
educators for exceptional children are also provided. Additional 
funds are earmarked for current operating expenses and for student 
transportation. The state x also provides free textbooks. 
t.JJ -.-
The program is administered by the\Texas Education Agency, 
~ 
which also R¥ responsibility for school accreditation and for 
monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards. As 
reflected by the 62 \ increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood 
~ 
q 
School District over the last three years, the State's financial 
contribution to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas' 
school districts, however, has been content to rely~one~ 
funds from the Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund Assignment, 
I~P•t~ 
every district must ~ an~ ad valorem tax on property 
A -
located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was designed 
to remain sufficiently low~ to assure that each district 
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational 
program. Every district supplements its foundation grant in 
<JN'-
this manner. ~r some districts the local property tax contribution 
is insubstantial, as~ in Edgewood where the supplement 
'k 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. Fer other districts the local share 
~ 
may far excee~ even the total Foundation grant. In part 
local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of 
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category 
~ 
v ~~--·, C.J J:. ~0""" :H ,. 
of property ~cee~ its assessed value. The greatest inter-
district disparities, however, are attributed to differences in the 
amount of assessable property available within any district. Those 
~ 
districts that have more property, or more valuable property,,{ are 
~ . . 
1~~~9ft~~==~~ -
these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher teacher 
salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing 
xt£riB: attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower 
pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules. ~ 
This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance structure. 
Because of differences in expenditure levels occasioned by 
disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children 
in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious 
discrimination. The District Court found that the state had failed 
~ , , 6:.. /.lAf"-'~~ -~k ~ 
~"to establish a reasonable basis fo1 tnes8 classificatiofl:~ 
 
~c-£-u F. Supp~ at _!_. We disagree. ~~ 
-~~~ -
The Texas system ·s comparable to the systems employed 
i-.6 
m its reliance on state as well as 
( local resources1j The power to tax local property for educational --- ~ 
8'8 
accompanied by changes in local property wealth occasioned by 
the growth of commercial and industrial centers, began to create 
disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling 
for a considerable investment of state funds. --
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas educators 
based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product of the pioneering work 
lx of two New York educational refo mers in the 1920's, George 
~ 
D. strayer and Robert M. Haig. Their efforts were devoted to 
establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educa-
~v-:_hul.-~~~~ 
t ional program without sacrificing!\1-eea.l control. The strayer-Haig # 
thesis represented an accommodation between these two competing 
forces. As articulated by Professor Coleman: 
t~'f -.-
"The history of education since the industrial 
revolution shows a continual struggle between two 
forces : the desire by members of society to have 
educational opportunity for all children, and the 
desire of each family to provide the best education 
it can afford for its child."~ (j '/ 
_Herein lies J:he asserted reaaonablenes s_and .Ar......,a .... h...,· o,...n,..,a..,.,l~it'-.Ly ______ _ 
Rider A, 'Page 4~, Rodriguez· 12/14/7~ 
~ 
( The ¥ftftte of local control ei=etmea*iqn was recognized 
last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright 
v. Council of City of Emporia, 40 U.S. _ 1(1972). Mr. Justice 
Stewart stated there that "r c!l irect control over decisions vitally 
affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly 
a:am6Hi~hed that "[ll ocal control is not only vital to continued 
public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance 
from an educational standpoint as well." ~t £11~. 
and a healthy 
competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-state 
~s­-.-
relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths 
of our form of government each state's freedom to "serve as a 
laboratory ... and try novel social and economic experiments." 
ttJ 
~ 
No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity 
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public 
~ 




t o local control of education. Ratlu~r, 1he~attack he school 
financing system on the ground that it debases the concept of 
local control because it does not provide the same fiscal flexibility 
to poor districts as it Jtords the rich. It is ·~t~ue that 
1\ 
reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides 
less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some 
Ritx districts than for others. Local control, however, connotes 
more than the power to make an autonomous decision on how much 
to spend. It also contemplates freedom to decide how available 
in "some inequality. " McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. 
(1961). It may not be condemned simp 
220 U.S. 61, 78 (191 , it is important to remember hat at every 
lopment it has constituted a "rough ace 
of intere s in an effort to arrive at practical and workable olutions. 
ropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69- (1913). 
fu--Hu.--v ~ 
Appellees urge that,......apa~ :fpom -the questiens regat dtng -
-\ 
~ the Texas system sf-Hnaneing edtteati8R is unconstitutionally 
arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources 
II .._~ II '' ~ 
to turn on happenstance.ana fe ·'y. They sootQad tQa.t no justification 
-1 
}~~~~, 
.eMrbe off.ered for a system that allows the quality of education to 
" 
fluctuate on the basis of th~~s oad gsifteitleHees 
tlutt oft.eR..account- for the positioning of the~boundary 
17 ---
lines of political subdivisions and jer- the location of valuable 
commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of local 
taxation -indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental 
units - requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that 
91- ~ M-a::t 
are inevitably arbitrary. ~)?qually inevitably~ some 
~~ 
localities are going to be blessed with:m more taxable assets,-\ Nor .I 
is local wealth a static quantity. Are boundary lines to be redrawn 
with every shift in population or with every discovery of valuable 
minerals or with the completion of every new industrial park? 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional 
method of providing for education then it must be ~ equally 
~ 
impermissible in providing every other service currently financed 
1\ 
from local:::poproperty taxes, including local police and fire 
~~ ~t4'-'-'~~~~ 
protection, public" hospitals, and f..t.,.,~eat ... eftt Hteilities. We 
~ 
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation ofjproperty 
, 
~~~~ f.wp ?Jly~~ 
taxation~a'S i:8 Sttgg€Sted:::by appellees' contentions~ 
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In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school finance 
results in discriminatory treatment of children who happen to reside 
in certain districts, we cannot say that such discrimination is the 
product of a system that is without rational basis. Its shortcomings 
have been acknowledged by Texas, which has persistently endeavored -
not without success - to ameliorate the differences in levels of 
expenditure without destroying the acknowledged benefits of local 
participation. The continued persistence of "some inequality" is 
not alone a satisfactory basis upon which to conclude that the 
Texas system lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 
420, 425-426 (1961). Nor may it be condemned simply because it 
imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U. S. at 485. 
The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, ill -
conceived legislation. It is certainly not the product of purposeful 
discrimination against any group or class. On the contrary, it 
is rooted in decades of experience in Texas and elsewhere, and 
- 49 -
in major part is the product of responsible studies by qualified 
people. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to 
which the Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to remember that 
at every stage of its development it has constituted a "rough 
accommodation" of interests in an effort to arrive at practical 
and workable solutions. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 
228 U.S. 69-70 (1913). One also must remember, when weighing 
the issue of rationality, that the system here challenged is not 
peculiar to Texas or to any other ~tate. In its essential 
characteristics the Texas plan for financing public education reflects 
what many educators for a half century have thought was an 
enlightened approach to a ::piXJbe problem for which there is no 
perfect solution. We are unwilling e~fit,...were tifl:e fl1netion e= 
~ to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to 
that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 states, -
especially where the alternative proposed is only recently conceived 
and nowhere yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether there 
is a rational basis for the challenged state action. We hold that 
the Texas plan abundantly meets this test. 




In light of the unprecedented attention focus on the District 
I 
Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, 
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), a 
cautionary postscript seems appropriate. These decisions have 
been widely hailed as providing a constitutional mandate for major 
)f 
state legislative reform. The decision have been variously touted 
as the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have even 
viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban crisis in 
education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for the result desired by 
all, some advocates of "fiscal neutrality" have given it considerably 
more credit than its architects have ever claimed. 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness of 
the concept and the absence of a broader base of empirical study, 
to make considered judgments as to the :iaJlt intrinsic merit or 
the political feasibility of the "fiscal neutrality" doctrine. Already, 
second thoughts have begun to emerge from some commentators. 
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It is beginning to be recognized that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally neutral" 
alternatives could have consequences disquietingly different from 
9~ 
those initially assumed. There is, in particular, increasing 
concern as to whether the Coons plan would not in fact be counter-
productive especially as to the lowest income~ 
families who tend to reside in urban areas where the assessed value 
of commercial and industrial property is high. Professor Berke, 
whose affidavits as to the relationship between ~poverty, race 
and educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the District 
~ 
v 
effects of KRXRrl several alternatives to the present system of 
$}. tj f 
educational finance. That study indicates that it is entirely 
}!''J!!"8'lrtlmc possible that an equal-expenditures alternative to the 
present system would lead tohigher taxation and lower educational 
'S'3"" 7 
expenditures in the Jml2jx major urban areas. At least one 
detailed empirical study also has concluded that there is no 
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dependable correlation between the location of impoverished 
' families and the presence of inferior schools. Nor does it 
appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial 
minorities will be clustered in school districts that have relatively 
1 
less assessable property. In view of these uncertainties, if 
this Court were sitting as a policy tribunal) we would hesitate to 
embrace - at least at this time - the ultimate efficacy of the appealing 
egalitarian concept which launched this case. 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional 
function restrain us from embarking upon any such political or 
philosophical undertaking. That role is reserved for Congress 
and for the l}ate legislative bodies and we do no violence to the 
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be 
viewed as placing its judicial impramatur on the status quo. The 
~ O.f' / f 
0 
needf \for reform in a tax system which may have relied t~ heavily 
on the local property tax, and for reform in public education to 
- 53 -
assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity~ 
/,\ 
cfu;f~:;::.~:~ou ~. They merit the continued attention 
of the scholars who already have contributed much by their 
challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the 




1. Not all of the children of these complainants attend 
public school. One family's children are enrolled in private 
school "because of the condition of the schools in the Edgewood 
Independent School District. " Third Amended Complaint, ~ 
!iPP/ at 14. 
2. The San Antonio Independent School District, whose 
name this case still bears, was one of seven school districts 
in the San Antonio metropolitan area which were originally named 
as party defendants. After a pretrial conference, the District 
Court issued an order dismissing the school districts from the 
case. Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District 
has joined in the plaintiffs' challenge to the State's school finance 
system and has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that 
position in this Court. 
3. A three-judge court was properly convened and 
there are no questions as to the district court's jurisdiction = :: 
2. 
or the direct appealability of its judgment. 28 U.S. C. §§ 2281, 
1253. 
4. The trial was delayed for two years~ to permit 
extensive pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending 
Texas legislative investigation concerning the need for reform of 
its public school finance system. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. 
School Dist., ill F. Supp. 7_~0 , lgS n. 11 (W. D. Tex. 1971). 
5. b '3- F. Supp. . The District Court stayed its 
mandate for two years to provide Texas .... an opportunity to 
remedy the inequities found in its financing program. The court, 
however, retained jurisdiction to fashion its own remedial order 
if the State failed to offer an acceptable plan. Id. at 2.g 
~ 
6. Tex. Const. , Art. X, Sec. 1: 
"A general diffusion of knowledge being essential 
to the preservation of the 18fEX rights and liberties 
of the people it shall be the duty of the Legislature 
of this State to make suitable provision for the 
support and maintenance of public schools. " 
Id., Art. ::& X, Sec. 2: 
"The Legislature shall as early as practicable 
establish free schools throughout the State, and 
shall furnish means for their support, by taxation 
on property. " 
3. 
7. Tex. Const. 1876, Art. 7, Sec. 3, ~s ~mended, Aug. 
"" t ' 
14, 1883. 
8. Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§3,4,5. 
9. Gammel's Laws of Texas p. 1178. See Tex. Const., 
Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 (interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor's 
Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge and the 
Chance 27 (1969) hereinafter Governor's Committee Report 
10. Tex. Const., Art. 7, ' § 5 (see also the interpretive 
commentary); V Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12. 
s 
11. Tex. Const., Art. 7, ~. 3, as axpepdeQ. Nov. 5, ...,'C' "\ l 
1918 (see interpretive commentary). 
12. I Governor's Committee Report, at 35; J. Coons, 
W. Clune, S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 




13. By 1940 one-half of the state's population was 
clustered in its metropolitan centers. I Governor's Committee 





14. Gilmer-.Aiduwl Committee, To Have What We Must (1948). 
' 
15. R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken B~lls 11-12 (1950); 
Texas Bd. of Educ. , T~e :re~as Statewide School Adequacy Survey 
(1938). 
16. R. Still, supra n~ 15, at 12. 
17. 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1939, 
at 274 ($22. 50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th 
Legis/ Reg. Sess. 1943, c~ . 161, at 262 ($25. 00 per student). 
~ 
18. General Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg . 
.11 
Sess. 1945, c; . 53, at 75. 
19. For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of 
a foundation program, see R. Stills, supra noie 15. See also ---=-; 
V Governor's Committee Report, at 14; Texas Reserach League, 
School Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972). 
20. For the 1970-71 school year this state aid program 
accounted for 48. o% of all public school funds. Local taxation 
contributed 41. 1% and 10. 9% was provided in federal funds. Texas 
( 
Research League, supra note 19, at 9. 
J 
5. 
21. V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48. 
22. At present there are 1, 161 school districts in Texas. 
I I() ) 
Texas Research League, at 12. 
I) 
~ 
~· In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that 
some school districts were not levying any local tax to support 
education. 
I f-f-e.-4. J 
Gilmer-Aiken Commt\' supra note l!f_, at 16. 
'.l 'f , ~,~ ~ ~a e.t. , ; ') f I J.f.J (.( f -16". 
2!· Gilmer-Aiken Committe~, Tg Wave V~at We Mast~ 
~1948 7{;, 
6 
2 . I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
"t. 
-2f. Texas Research League, supra note J1, at 2. 
In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average 
per pupil expenditure for all current operating expenses increased 
from $206 to $493. In that same period capital expenditures 
increased from $44 to $102 per~pupil. I Governor's Committee 
Report, at 53- 54. 
':J .III.. ..xJ o v'f!-, n (I J.! C..(; m m 1 ff e c:. I?~ peJ J.- fj a;l- II :J - 'It; 
2tf"'tit. The Available School Fund, technically, provides a 
second source of state money. That Fund has continued as in 
1Jo-ke..
1 
C J '-""ll.cJirrl • ~ w w.l~ 
7h T .UtA4 .).J~ r; ~~' tt 
~ 
fi A~21:J-~-· -s-- --. 
"J • U0 L, ~. r-; 
~-----~ I I 
(pe J-t~'J.. (1 97J) . 
~ 
6. 
years past (see text accompanying notes ~-~ supra)to 
distribute uniform per pupil grants to every district in the State. 
In 1968 this Fund allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the 
available School Fundxxtx contribution is always subtracted 
from a district's entitlement under the Foundation Program, it 
plays no significant role in educational finance today. 
~~ 
~· While ~ federal assistance has an ameliorating effect 
on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor 
districts, the District Court rejected an argument made by x 
the state in that court that it should consider the effect of the 
federal grant in assessing the discrimination claim. 3- 1 F. Supp. 
at '? .. <is'f . The State has not renewed that contention here. 
~· 9j. The figures quoted above vary slightly from those 
utilized in the District Court opinionA. :) 37 F. Supp. at 1g2. . These 
trivial differences are apparently a product of that court's reliance 
on slightly different statistical data than we kx:ximre have relied upon. 
l'l.r 
.aft, Texas Research League, supra note _lj_, at 13. 
£ t 
The Economic Index, which determines each county's 
•, 
share of the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on 
a complex formula conceived in 1949 when the Foundation 
Program was instituted. I#t has frequently been suggested 
by Texas# researchers that the formula be altered in 
several respects to provide a more accurate reflection 
of local taxpaying abjility, especially of urban 
schools. V Governor's Committee Report, at 48; Berke, 
Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra note 28, at 680-681. 
! 
7. 
S"t The District Court relied on the findings presented 
in an affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His 
sampling of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct 
correlation between the amount of a district's taxable property and 
I 
its level of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct 
correlation between a district's median family income and per 
pupil KXJU[RRK expenditures as well as an inverse correltion 
between percentage of minorities and expenditures. 
Categorized by Equalized Property Values, 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 












Per Cent State & Local 




$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 23% $483 
(30 Districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 31% $462 
( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 79% $305 
( 4 Districts) 
Although theJiiAA!?"~! ~correlations with respect to family 
~---income and race appear only to exist at the extremes, and 
&' ~affiant's methodology has been questioned (see Goldstein, 
Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing; a Critial Analysis 
j 
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because of its relative property wealth, was required to contribute 
out of its local property tax collections approximately $100 per pupil, 
~ 
or about 2 its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
) 32.. 
:itk~ 
paid only $8. 46 per pupil, which is about 2. 49ft of its grant. 
c.----~----
~ It does appear then that, at least as to these two 
districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect a rough 
approximation of the relative taxpaying potential of eac~ 
Despite these recent increases, a substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the District Court to 
prevail in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State, 
still exist. And it was these disparities, largely attributable to 
! 
-3L 
differences in the amounts of money collected through local property 
taxation, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual 
system of public school finance violated the ~ equal protection 
clause. The District Court held that the ::efiBd: effect of the Texas 
system was to discriminate on the basis of wealth in the manner 
in which education was provided for its people. ll/ F. Supp-j) at 
"1Jf2.. Finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that 
.ij::.. 
education is a "fundamental'tterest, the District Court held that 
8. 
of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 
. (,7 ( 11) 
S.; J - l...S 11'11· {(1972)), insofar as any of these three correlations is relevant 
to the constitutional thesis presented in this case~ we may 
l ~·g., Police Dept· o~City of Chicago v. ~ 
< J. 
Mosley, 40f u. S. fJ!'L (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 400 U.S. ~ 30 
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
~ ~-g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 3 (,'Q (197.&; 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ( 1967). 
it .§~ Dunn v. Blumstein, 40~ U.S. 330, 3 4.3(1972) and 
:sk the cases collected therein. 
\ 




. Tr.!<' or. arg.1 at 3. 
/ 
-Bi· ~·g., Griffin v. Illinois, ~ 351 U.S. 12 (1956); 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1964); 
McDonald v. :Bd. of Elections, 394 U.S. 80 (1969); Bullock v. 
Carter, 40.5 U.S. \ bL\(1972). 
., , v 
------ ~ As indicated inti note~ supra, there is reason to 
\ 
question whether « - even in Texas - there is a direct correlation 
between family wealth measured by inc orne and district wealth 
measured by assessed IDIX property valuations. Studies in other 
States have found even less correlation. Ridenour & Ridenour, 
Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 
213, 225 (1972) (:X"it can be argued that there exists in Kansas 
almost an inverse correlation: districts with highest income per 
pupil have low assessed value per pupil, and districts with high 
assessed value per pupil have low income per pupil. "); Davies, 
The Challenge of Change in School Finance, in Nat'l Educational 
Ass'n, lOth Annual Conf. on School Finance (1967). 
Col 
4§· Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance 
Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. 
Rev. 1303, 1328-29 (1972). 
"' 4J. Id. at 1324mx n. 102. 
\ 
~ Id. 
4-t, Em at 1328. 
~! Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) in 
which an indigent's due process right of access to a divorce 
a, 
10. 
tribunal was found not to require more than{ "meaningful opportunity" 
to obtain a divorce. Id. at 379-380. The Court did not command 
that the procedures available for rich and poor be equal: it only 
required that they be adequate and effective. Id. at 382. 
4fi. Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra note lj_, at 
13 (emphasis added). 
ij. Appellants' brief, at 3 5; Reply brief, at 1. But 
see 5 Governor's Committee Report, at 32. 
& 
~ For this reason appellees' were able to draw little 
precedential sustenance from the Court's cases dealing x with 
wealth classifications touching on the right to vote. Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. '- (196 !_); Bullock v. 
Carter, 40 6 U. S. J3 i (1972); McDonald v. Bd. of Election~, 
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)(dictum). Each of those cases 
11. 
involved the right to vote on an equal basis with thex rest of the 
electorate - a right repeatedly held to be constitutionally 
~3·-~ 7 
fundamental. E. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 40~ U.S. 3~~(1972). 
~ See Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d 5 ~'I , "''r) I Z 4 I 
r - (), 
(1971); Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp. '10 (197 .l); 
~ ,' II $1 I\L :r, ~(/p~~ •• 2 23) 
Robinson v. Ca~ll _xk N. i'" _, 2~ A. 2d Jn ( 197 2 ); 
3.37 
W• "' 
J. Coons, ~· Cl e and S. Sugarman, supra~ote l'L , at_; 
5 
1)1,,...,. 
Goldstein, supra note~' at _ .. _; Note, Educational Financing 
& Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1324, 1335-42 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing 
Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 
Ariz. L. Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972). 
~ 
~ '3 ~ 1 F. Supp. at tl'J. 
E·~·" 
. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Oregon 
/l 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970). 
~ a..~+er 
~ Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) there 
A 
could be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation 
for the Court's holding in Shaprio. In Dandridge the Court applied 
I' 
12. 
the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family 
grant provision under k its AFDC program. A federal district 
court held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter 
standard of review. In the course of reversing the lower court, 
~d...A~ 
the Court distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that~ 
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally 
protected freedom of interstate travel. '\ Id. at 484 n. 16. 
~ 
~ The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test 
despite its .&:l5llliwa:npc contemporaneous recognition in 
1oohistoer~ Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) that 
"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, 
housing and medical care. " 
" 
f> , 
34· In Eisenstadt the Court striCk down a Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, 
finding that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal 
protection standard. " Id. at ~"\] n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, 
the Court recited the proper form of equal protection analysis: 
L 
13. 
"if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges 
upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (196 S )~ the statutory classification would have to be not merely 
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the ,_... .. 
achievement of a compelling state interest." Id. \ (emphasis in 
original). 
Dunn fully canvasses this Court's equal protection -
voting rights cases and explains that '~his Cou~as made clear that 
jYI ele.ci-JV'o1.f 
a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate on 
A 
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction. " Id. at 3 3:: 
L ~,:J~o ~"t~P~.u..J J • 
The <X» constitutional BHDXf'ilxi underpinnings of the right to equal 
treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted even though, 
as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere 
expressly mentioned." .See Bullock v. Carter, 40j_ U.S. 13~ (1972); 
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
14. 
\) 
In Mosley the u~~ Court strzck down a Chicago 
whi c."' anti-picketing ordinance~ exempted labor picketing from its 
prohibitions. The ordinance was held invalid under the equal 
pxmtet protection clause after subjecting it to careful scrutiny 
and finding that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn. The 
stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the 
ordinance was one "affecting First Amendment interests. " 
Id. at I J \ . 
..frZ Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a 
state law permitting forced sterlization of ''habitual criminal~' 
Implicit in the Court's opinion is the nm recognition that the right 
t!/ 10A. 
~ procreat1 is among the rights of personal privacy -@r protected 




See Roe v. Wade, u.s. --' 
"51'. See, ~· ~·, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. ~ FCC, 
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 
(1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
15. 
~ The States have often pursued their entirely legitimate 
interest in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise, " 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966), through 
~ 
such Qt;&rgss as literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to 
vote. See id.; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). And, 
where those restrictions have been found to promote intelligent 
use of the ballot without discriminating against those racial and 
ethnic minorities heretofore deprived of an equal educational 
opportunity, this Court has upheld their use. Compare Lassiter 
v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), with Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 133 (Mr. Justice Black), 144-47 (Mr. Justice 
Douglas), 216-17 (Mr. Justice Harlan), 231-36 (Mr. Justice 
Brennan), 282-84 (Mr. Justice stewart), and Gaston County v. -
United states, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
"" e~. P'tirM'tel'hiOi'e, the lbgtcal ltmltatt&IS WI ft:~Q]lp~' 
.aeJatEI the ox~ axe diffietdt te ~ereeive, Rom, for instance, is --... 
education to be distinguished from the :Dgt:Ykw4 significant 
16. 
6 See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public 
Education, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-90 (1971); Comment, 
Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Teilllants' 
Association, 47 Texas L. Rev. 1160, 1172-73 n. 61 (1969). 
aL Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered 
voters in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English 
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six~ years 
of education at an "American-flag" school in that country even 
though the language of instruction was other than English. This 
Court upheld the questioned provision over the ~ claim that 
it discriminated against those with a sixth grade education obtained 
in x non-English speaking schools other than the ones designated 
by the federal legislation. 
6. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kick, 
313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). 
• I 
1 7 • 
6 See Schflb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971_t McDonald 
v. Board of RHmar:tbo Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802 ( 1969 ). 
6 See, ~· ~·, Bell's Gap RR v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 
232 (1890); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 508-509 
(1937); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959). 
6 Those who urge that the present system be invalidated 
offer little guidance as to what type of school financing should 
replace it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing 
syst~m, however, would be statewide financing of all public 
education with funds derived from taxation of property or from 
the adoption or expansion of sales and income taxes. The authors 
of Private Wealth and Public Education, supra note 12, at 201-242, 
suggest an alternative scheme, known as "district power equalizing. " 
In simplest terms, the State would guarantee that at any particular 
rate of property taxation the district would receive a stated number 
of dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the 
subsidies to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from 
the "wealthier" districts that collect more than the stated amount 
18. 
at any given rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments 
for and against "district power equalizing, " beyond noting that 
commentators are in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, 
how it would work, and indeed whether it would not violate the 
fJ I 
Equal Protection theory .u~ appe lees' case. President's 
Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); 
Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 
J. Urban L. 701, 706-708 (1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. 
L. Rev. 591, 594-96 (1971); Wise, School Finance Equalization 
~Jits: A Model Legislative Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. "'' 
Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971); Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities 
in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief under the iXplx 
Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wise. L. Rev. 7, 29-30. 
. The quality···Cost controversykx has received considerable 
attention. Among the notable authorities on both sides are 
the following. C. Jencks, Inequality ( 1972); C. Silberman, Crisis 
in the Classroom (1970); Office of Education, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller eds); J. Guthrie, G. 
Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. stout, Schools and Inequality (1971); 
President's Comm'n on School Finance, 
'Flle Nssel FoP EducatiQBal RefuFm 19-7- ; Swanson, The Cost-Quality 
Relationship, in lOth Nat'l Conf. on School Finance, The Challenge ... 
of Change in School Finance 151 (1967). 
~. See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's 
statewide survey on the goals of education in that state. I. 
Governor's Committee Report, at 59-68. See also Goldstein, supra 
note ?...<l , at 519-22; Schoettle, supra note C,~ authorities cited 
in Note .tl supra. 
1 
'6(). Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 
'J'L 
(1959) (Mr. Justice Brenna,, 'concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 u.s. , 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting). 
, i 
"'6'tt. In 1C 1970 Texas expended approximately 2. 1 billion 
:Um dollars for education and a little over one billion came from 
the Minimum Foundation Program. Texas Research League, 
~ '?Vf/' I, 111 ~·I • 
Pablis Schoo] i'iRaaee P1?99lem~ ht 'f'eKI\g (19'i~ 
h11 Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 13. 
1 -6lf Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 18. 
Tex. Educ. Code§ 16.15. 
Code §§ 16. 16, 16. 17, 16. 19. 
7 . Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 45, 16. 51. 
Code § 12. 01. 
Code 11. 26( 5). 
Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 301 et. seq. 
( J . .4. 
7ft ~~-~llt· ~ d-"' 
MZ%?=~ ~tt i, ,;It IS . 
7~. Gilmer-Aiken Committee, !I:o Have WHat Vi'e Mt'l~t (194~. 
7l There is no uniform statewide assessment practice 
in Texas Commercial property, for example, might be~ 
, 
taxed at 30% of market value in one county and at 50% in another. 
V. Governor's Committee Report, at 25-2~ 
' . 
Rider ~, p. 40 oariguez f2/14/72 
C6 
Add to Footnote i:8, in addition to the present reference: 
s oted snpra, p ~the extent to which the quality of 
o'' J ) 
~ # of education varies with expenditure per pupiJI is debated inconclusively 
~ by the most thoughtful students of public education. While all would 
agree that there is a correlation up to the point of providing the 
recognized essentials, the issues of greatest disagreement include 
Jt-~u~ 
the effect on quality of pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary 
t. 
schedules. The state funding iniDe!m Texas is designed to assure, -
~~~ 
on the average, one teacher for every 25 students, c-eaeedea to be 
"' 
a favorable ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary 
of $6, 000 per year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers 
~~~~ 
may be more debatable) espesially dependingAupon the location of 
the school district. But there appears to be little :k empirical data 
H..P- · -~
dv ntage of any ;::isfPupil te~r ratio or 
which documents the view that ever higher salariesx result in more 
competent teaching. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' 
salaries is the absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques 




~ judging-tnt; ability all performanc~o£ tgQehei r. The result is 
that relatively few school systems have merit plans oJ any kind, 
with teachers' salaries being increased "by rote" and across the 
board in a way whichn rewards the least deserving on the same 
basis as the most deserving. Most systems raise§ alaries 
~~~ 
\ automatically on the basis of predetermined "step~ extending over 
10 to 12 year pe_riods.~In making these observations, we ha.v~e 
;__,._~~ ' ~ 
tll8\l~kt ef criticiz~xisting practices and certainly we imply no 
" i\ 
opinion that teachers' salaries generally are adequate. As compared 
with others of comparable education there is every reason to believe 
that~:es ~~)unduly low base ift fRilSI ]IR"al:ilie!s, A ~ st l 
have failed even to keep abreast of inflation. We have included 
this commentary on pupil-teacher. ratios and salary levels not to 
~a..efL~o/ 
express any opinion with respect to_Jthose m Texas or elsewhere, 
but merely to indicate that the two ~principal factors distinguishing 
the schools in the more affluent districts from those elsewhere do 
not - in the opinion of many experts - demonstrably and necessarily 
f{..,t_ t 
affec\ quality.~Jj flu-~ . 
,. 
3. 
' '• I: 
-
'H.b Texas Research League, supra note J!_, 
President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra note_, 
at 3_. Until recently Hawaii was the only §tate that maintained -
a purely _3tate-funded educational program. In 1968, however, that --
State amended its educational finance statute to permit counties to 
ElDbat: collect additional funds locally and spend those~ 
amounts on its schools. The rationale for that recent legislative 
choice is instructive on the question before the Court today: 
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from 
doing anything in this area, even to spend their 
own funds if they so desire. This corrective legis-
lation is urgently needed in order to allow counties 
to go above and beyond the state's standards and 
provide educational facilities as good as the people 
of the counties want and are willing to pay for. 
Allowing local communities to go above and beyond 
established minimmms provide for their people 
encourages the best features of democratic gov-
ernment. " Hawaii Sess. Laws, Art. 38, § 1 
( 1968). 
. See text ace ompanying note f supra. 
_)1. 
. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the state 
I 
of New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution 
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of 
educational finance, see J. Coons, W. Cltle & S. Sugarman, supra 
1 




8' J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note 12, 
Foreward by James S. Coleman, at vii. 
New State Ice Co. v. _Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 
311 (1932). 
91, "Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors 
Coons, Clune and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of 
public education may not be a function of wealth other than the 
wealth of the state as a whole. " J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, 
supra n*' 12, at 2. Their thoughtful and imaginative work paved 
' 
the way for the suits, including the present one, attacking the 
school finance system. Indeed, the District Court approved the 
authors' thesis verbatim. 337 F. Supp.~ at 285. The authors 
have often cautioned their supporters, however, against speculating 
that "fiscal neutrality" would be a panacea for the poor or for racial 
minorities. Id.~ Coons, Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of 
Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971). 





~· An initial problem, more obvious to elected officials 
than to those of us who write opinions for the courts or essays for the 
~ 
law reviews, is the~ one of money. Whatever formula may be employed, 
penditure~(even approximately) in every school district: (i) expenditures 
" 
could be equalized by taking revenues away from some districts and 
applying them to the benefit of others, a process of leveling down to -ft.~ 
common denominator; or (ii) vast additional tax revenues would have to 
be raised to elevate per pupil expenditure to the highest level now obtain-
ing in the districts which provide the greatest supplementation of §late --
funds. Neither of these alternatives seems realistic. The residents of 
a district which, with good fortune and dedication to public education have 
) 
a high level of expenditure ~e not likely to be tolerant of a leveling plan 
that reduces funding for their district to increase it elsewhere. Would 
teachers' salaries in that district be reduced correspondingly? If pupil-
teacher ratios were increased, what would happen to the teachers no longer 
employed? What, indeed, would happen to school bonds issued pursuant 
to a vote of citizens proud of their schools and willing to pay more? 
The other alternative, the raising of sufficient additional tax money 
statewide, is no more palatable politically. It is estima:~ that $2.4 
billion of additional school funds would be required to bring all Texas J ...J__L . 1 ~t.\;J 
~ .. u.J.ro.J ~ ' 
"' 
districts up to the present ~ level of expenditure;\- an amount more 
than double that currently being spent in Texas on public education 
1 e~~.. ~ .. ~ 1,;11 1 I tl. 
+AtJfJella:ntsl btief' 1:3 I e I At a time when every !!ate and locality 
-::. 
is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for ser-
vices of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers already resisting 
tax increases, only those who live in a dream world could believe that 
a decision of this Court nullifying present state taxing systems would 
result in doubling public funds committed to education. Rather, the re-
sult in terms of confusion and disruption would be profound, and in the 
end the leveling process ~ould well mean a lower quality of education 
for all. 
3.3 ~AOJ. I , :::.: ':--
25. 
9i.t4 Select Comm. on Equal Educational fappcrllll 
Opportunity, Inequities in School Finance (1972) (Monograph 
prepared by Professor Berke). :F 
98. See also U.S. Office of Education, Finances of Large 
City School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW 
Publication). 
94. See, Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance 
Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. Rev. 
1303 (1972); see text accompanying note 45 supra. 
9~ See Goldstein, supra, n<llle~, at 526; J. Coons, W. 
Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note 12 at 356-57 n. 47, have noted 
that in California, for example, "59% of minority students live in 
districts above the median average valuation per pupil. " In Bexar 
County by far the largest district - the San Antonio Independent 
School District - is above the local average in both the amount of 
taxable wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72 percent 
of its students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-68 it spent 
' .. 
26. 
only a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and 
North Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7 ~..cent 
0 
and 18 pereent Mexican-American :X enrollment respectively. Berke, 
• . v. " ~.r . • , 
LAH/ pls 12/ 8/ 72 
No. 71-133 2 San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion for the Court. 
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing public edu-
cation, was initiated by Mexican-American parents vhose children 
attend the elementary · and secondar~ schools in the Edgewood Indepen- · 
dent School District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas •
1 
. ~~'-'-1 LT 6- C-L',,:.A--.__, ( .J <::. /r_..t .' ~,....._ 
They sued on their own behalf and on behalf of school children through-
out the State who are members of minority groups or who are poor 
and reside in school districts having a low property tax base. Named 
as defendants
2 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar County (San 
Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case was filed in the summer of 1968 
and a three-judge court was impaneled in January, 1969. 3 In December, 
1971 4 the panel rendered its judgment in a pe4curiam opinion holding 
the Texas school finance system unconstitutional under the Equal Pro-
. 5 
tection Clause of the Fourteenth/~ Amendment. The State appealed 











and we noted probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching consti-
tutional questions presented. u.s. 0 0(1972). For the reasons 
stated in this opinion we reverse the decision of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' entry 
into the Union in 1845, provided for the establishment of a system of 
free schools. 6 Early in its history, Texas adopted a dual approach 
i+.s 
to~ the financing oft~ schools, relying on mutual participation 
by the local school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the State 
Constitution was amended to provide for the creation of local school 
districts empowered to levy ad valorem taxes with the consent of 
local taxpayer~~or the "erection of school buildings" and for the 
"further maintenance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds 
as were raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
8 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School Funds. 
The Permanent School Fund, established in 1854,
9 
was endowed with 
millions of acres of public land set aside to assure a continued source 








ceived income from the Permanent Fund as well as from State 
property taxes, served as the disbursing ar:rh for most State 
educational funds throughout the late 1800's and first half of this 
Century. Additionally, in 1918 an increase in State property taxes 
was used to finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
11 the State. 
. ,.I.-"' :..>::. - ·• In the· early years of Texas statehood this dual finance· \. 
yvo i ' . ,f \ 
6 
~ 
, .. '" ... r .· " 
' I '., "" . 
, • Jit ~ I r '" 
•' ' 
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c auld ~ate ly the ~tate ~s-educational l'e~r.:_!ll.~~ts ~~Until 
recent times Texas was a predominantly rural state and its popu-
lation and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the 
12 
State. Sizable differences in the value of assessable property be-
' I 
d .-'f,<-C,J-<.L- ·'U-<-Lf ~~ 
tween local school districts became more evident, however, as the 
'\ 
State became more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced. 13 The location of commercial and 
industrial property began tci play a ~ significant role in determining 
h 
~.vvvt e./;-~ ON~ ·_h £A:J, ~ce~ ~ • + e 0 , , 
..:p ;f.et' s regpp~for financing education.. These growing 






















were responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in 
levels of local expenditure for eduction·. l4 · 
At the same time, it was becoming more apparent to those 
concerned with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient [-f~!fi to ameliorate 
these disparities . 15 Prior to 1939 the Available School Fund con-
tribtted money to every school district at a rate of $17. 50 per school-
age child. 16 Although the amount was increased several times in 
the early 1940's, 17 by 1946 the Fund was providing only $46 per student. 18 
Recognizing the need to provide increased State funding to help 
offset disparities in local spending and to meet Texas' changing educa-
. +hoYOCJ"fh 
tional needs, the State Legislature in the late 1940's undertook a .elosft IJ 
evaluation of public education .h\. 't~xa~ with an eye toward major reform • 
. / 
In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed of educators and legislators, . 
was appointed to explore alternative systems in other ~ates and to -
propose a State funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child in the State and that would help 









efforts led to the passage of the Gilmer-:Aiken bills, named for the 
Committee's co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program. 19 It is this Program 1 hat accounts today for 
approximately half of the total educational expenditures in Texas. 20 
The Program calls for idlH State and local contributions to a 
fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, operating expenses, 
and transportation costs. The State, supplying funds from its general 
revenues, finances approximately 80 per cent of the Program and the 
school districts are responsible - as a unit - for providing the re-
maining 20 per cent. The districts' share - known as the Local Fund 
Assignment - is apportioned among the school districts pursuant to 
a formula designed to reflect each district's relative taxpaying ability. 
The Assignment is first divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant 
to a complicated economic index that takes into account the relative 
value of each county's contribution to the State's total income from 
manufacturing, mining, and agricultural activities. It also considers 
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21 
the State. Each county's a s signment is then divided among its 
school districts on the basis of each district's share of assessable 
property within the county. 22 . Each district then finances its share 
~vvn:J~ ~ + ~-~./ 
of the Assignment out of its (local property tax aseessment?; t ()_ '1. CL h CIYI • 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. First, 
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Program would have 
an equalizing influence on expenditure levels between school districts 
by placing the heaviest burdenp on those districts most capable of 
paying. Second, it was the desire of the Program's architects to 
establish a Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children22a but that 
would not by itself exhaust any district's resources. 23 Today virtually 
every school district does impose a loeal property tax from which it 
derives locally expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary 
to satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since the Foundation Program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education - from State as well as local 
sources - have increased steadily. Between 1949 and 1967 expenditures · 
.... 




increased by approximately 500 per cent. In the last decade alone 
the total public school budget rose ;rom $750 million t~ $2.1 billion25 
and these increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 26 Minimum teacher salaries-
by far the largest single item in any school's budget - have increased 
') (p 0..., 
from $2 , 400 to $6,000 over the last 20 years. V 
in order-to illustrate the manner in which this dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent to which ,.-{ 
~~ ~ _despite Texas' impressive gains substantial interdistrict disparities 
------ .--·~- -- .. 
/ 
persist, the plaintiff school district may be compared with another 
!1 ) 
more affluent district in San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent 
School District is one of seven public school districts in the metro-
politan area. Approximately 22, 000 students are enrolled in its 25 
elementary and secondary schools. The district is situated in the core-
city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighborhood that has little 
commercial or industrial property. The residents are predominatly 
of Mexican-American descent: approximately 90 per cent of the stu-













The average assessed property value per pupil is $5, 960t. the lowest 
in the metropolitan areat and the median family income ($4' 686) is also 
the lowest. At an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed 
property - the highest in the metropolitan area - the district contri-
buted $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-68 school year 
I , 
above its Local Furid Assignment for the Minimum Foundation Program. 
The Foundation Program contributed $222 per pupil for a State- local 
total of $248. 27 Federal funds added another $108 for a ~total 
of $356 per pupil. 
28 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been contrasted with 
the Alamo Heights Independent School District, the most affluent 
school district in San Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 
5, 000 students, are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is predominantly white, 
having only 18 per cent Mexican-Americans and less than mm 1 per cent 
Negroes. The assessed property value per pupil exceeds $49,000 
and the median family income is $8,001. In 1967-68 the local tax rate 
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contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled with the $225 
provided from that Program, the district was able to supply $558 
per student. Supplemented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal 
sources, Alamo Heights was able to spend $594. 
Although the 1967-68 school year figures provide the only com-
' 29 
plete statistical breakdown for each category of aid, more recent 
partial statistics indicate that the previously noted trend of increasing 
State aid has been significant. For the 1970-71 school year the Foundation 
School Program allotment for Edgewood was $356 per pupil. This con-
stituted a 62 per cent increase over the three-year period since 1967-68. 
~ 7-;_; -~-1) ----- · 1 f {.. 1- (_. S /.1.-c k<.' r -X. 
Indeed ,\State-ai& alone'~UJmds:lEd equaled Edgewood's entire budget -
, '.1f \ \ 
from local, State, and federal sources ,. ~dP. ;1967 ~ 6&. While Alamo 
t~ 
Heights received a-similar increase to $491 per pupil, these recent 
· I 
figures indicate that the Local Fund Assignment, at least as to these 
two districts, does reflect a rough approximation of the relative tax-
paying potential of each. Alamo Heights, because of its relative prop-
erty wealth, was required to contribute out of its local property tax 












Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, paid only $8.46 
per pupil, which is only about 2.4 ~er cent of its grant. 30 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict dis-
parities in school expenditures found by the District Court to prevail 
in San Antonio and in varying degrees throughout the State}1 still 
exist. And it was these disparities, largely attributable to differences 
in the amounts of money collected through local property taxation, 
that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' dual system of 
public school finance violated the equal protection clause. The 
District Court held that the effect of the Texas system was to dis-
criminate on the basis of wealth 
~ 
_ .,..-
manner in which education c.,_ ' ~ .. was provided 
, ~ " - l t _/_ f ,. 
~L...<-<-; J-(,.,. .-f' l.C-< .c·-l . .i/._ L--£--· c~-- .---J.·'-'--s--1-z...-·c . 
- ( dr.:. -~ -t-<-f-<-<<-- 1' ,_._.. ',_.__..._ #--/t.,t. t .... o<( - ~'-· c.·- :1......,~;~.- '-"-' <:: ·-
for its people. F. Supp. at ' :·. Having-found-both-factors present,_ 
1\ -- I' 
I( . ., ' ' ·-:r·. iJ 
/--1-'--"~"Ki >-<-1~-"L- lA-<-J--<CT'C-£:1 ) 
. the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only 
; \ 
if the State could show that it was premised upon some compelling 
state interest . Id. at On this issue the court concluded that 
',~njot only are defendants unable to demonstrate compelling state 













clas sifications." Id. at .. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically-rooted dual system 
of financing public education could not withstand the close judicial 
scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative 
c cr K-.J-L(_ /-~.. '- !c. l U<'- ( Lu .. / 1 .. / ' 
I v;..t-t.. ~ u '--' 
judgments that interfere with fundamental rights32 or that touch-upon 
r \ 
t 1 'f' t' 33 suspec c ass1 1ca Ions. If, as we have frequently held, close 
scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual 
presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants 
must carry a "heavy burden of justification, " that the State must 
<1.. h'-t-1.-C.. kL-+Li.Y.... 
demonstrate that its educational system has been crafted with'pre._ 
cision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve legitimate objectives, and 
that it has selected the "least drastic means" for effectuating its 
objectives, 34 the Texas financing system - and its counterparts in 















The State.·has candidly admitt~ that " [rijo one familiar with the Texas 
system would contend that it has y~t achieve,d perfecti~n. "35 Yet ~ 
~~ its concession that educational finance in .Texas has "defects"36 
and "imperfections, "
37 
the State defends the syS:em' s rationality 
and vigorously disputes the District Court's finding that it lacks a 
"reasonable basis.,; 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. We 
must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public edu-
·h tA.<-J.-f 
cation may be subjected to meticulous judicial scrutiny. If so, the 
'\ 
4/c..t~( 
judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. If not, Texas' 
claimed rational basis must be considered. We now turn to the exami-
nation of these two questions. 
II 
The District Court's opinionr\vfiich appears -to rega-rtl-eae-h-ef-
t.:~~ 
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"::7 ' ' (L-
I--1-<----'" . c. c 2 l-<..~ e. ......_,__,/ I t'-"-- r- <! c u ....... · 
that strict judicial scrutiny was required) ·It relied on this--Cou-rtLs 
A / \ 
· ~~~ ht. ~ oJ. n-,~l · vrnd· .s 
decisions dealing with the indigent's rig~ to equal treatment in the ,, 
criminal trial and appellate processes, 38 and on cases disapproving 
wealth barriers imposed on the right to vote. 
39 
Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a suspect classifica-
tion. Finding that the local property tax system discriminated on the 
basis of lBliiitx wealth, it regarded those precedents as controlling. 
It then reasoned, based again on decisions of this Court affirming 
. 40 
the undeniable importance of education, that there is a fundamental 
right to education and that, absent some compelling State justification, 
the Texas system could not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which ~ in every significant 
~'rt::f..-4Yr~.)~ 
aspect sui generis, may be so neatly fitted into the mosiac of constitu-
~- ~ 
tiona! analysis under the equal protection clause. Indeed, for the 
several reasons that follow, we find~n this -ca-~ neither the suspect 
'- .-
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District Court is 


















quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination heretofore 
reviewed by this Court. Since all children in any given school district 
receive the same public education, irrespective of family wealth, the 
District Court found the operative class to be all citizens in "poor 
school districts." __ F. Supp. at ___ . The State's dependence 
I. 
on local property taxation to pay a portion of the total cost of educa-
tion was found to impose a de facto discrimination against those school 
districts that have, vis a vis other school districts, relatively less 
7 property to tax per pupilrtO be educated~ Because higher rates of 
1.-. -·-' 
taxation failed to compensate for disparities in property value, the 
class was found to be expending relatively less in its schools and, 
therefore, providing a lower quality education for its children. 
In one sense this discrimination is geographical rather than 
financial. But the Court has never questioned the State's power to 
draw reasonable distinctions between its political subdivisions. 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg.v. Maryland, 
346 U.S. 545 (1954). Recognizing the force of those cases, appellees 
have focused instead on the individuals who reside in the relatively 
r- .. ' . 
-15-
disadvantaged districts. Yet the status of these individuals is 
simply not comparable to the status of the individual complainants 
who have heretofore successfully challenged state laws as (~;ict~~~~i;::tJI 
discriminatory against the poor. 
In Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v. Califor-
- '10~ 
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) and their progeny '!the Court invalidated 
state laws that denied a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. 
Similarly, Williams v. illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short, 
401 U.S. 395 (1971) struck down criminal penalties that subjected 
indigents to indigents.:to::Dmx incarceration simply because they were 
unable to pay fines. In each of those cases the Court was not dealing 
with relative impecunity but with some level of absolute poverty, :!:: ~·, 
b ( ft, h . . d. . h ""''Silill:IXbiDim~!OOctxi:Jlyxx 1 . t ecause,; e1r m 1gency, eac ...... comp aman was 
totally unable to pay for the~ state-proffered benefit. 
Those cases did not deal with the plight of those on whom state laws 
impose a weighty but not insurmountable burden. It :sX is clear that 
the mere fact that it may have been more difficult for one citizen 
than another to purchase a transcript or to hire an attorney on appeal 
.,. ....... ,;.........,... ., 







<)" 1 ' .c·' • 
LL. not alone have , ~~ough to compel judicial invalidation of those 
/ J ,, 
barriers. The Court has never questioned that the nonindigent 
citizen must pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have 
never held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's 
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens created by 
<f( 
a system of absolute fines. . In the instant case, appellees have 
endeavored to show only that children from relatively poorer 
~families tend to reside in relatively poorer districts. 
No effort was made to prove, however, that the financing system 
operated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more clearly 
io_(._~ 
definable class of indigents. Indeed, there is reason to suspeet-
c.;: ~, ... c..- ~ t.~..::r- (..-t,..(A,. 'r./ . .,-~d~tPy 
that the poorest families may-no~be clustered in the poorest 
districts. A recent and exhaustive study of school districts in 
Connecticut concluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect . . . to 
contend tJ?.at 'poor' live in 'poor' districts .... Thus, the major 
41 
factual assumption of Serrano- -that the educational finance system 
42 
discriminates against the 'poor'- -is simply false in Connecticut. " 
. '.'• ' ~ .,. . . 















Defining "poor" :Faam:ldt families as those below the Bureau of 
\ 
43 
the Census "poverty level, " the Connecticut study found, not 
surprisingly, that the poor are clustered around commercial and 
industrial areas--those same areas that provide the most lucrative 
I 
44 










Thus, it--=must-bs reeognized that we are asked in this case . . 0 f: . .•l-:/c K.. !.~ ~'- : 
J , J ·- I , ... ,..- '1-~ .. ..,_t ~'- )4 <::t C: ~--~-.._;..,/ .:.:t ., -.c.. I.. / 1- >'-..'- / ._ <.:'_ ·~;. ~-' 
r -.-"- 1~ -,-....~ t ·H-~ _.....- 1 ' \ 
to exten\ the Court's,{c~o~st-pr-ete~tion to a large and diverse lclass. 
,h!nd, unlike our racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it 
is not a class saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such 
a position of political powerlessness, ~or subjected 
C~l'"t........._.'-4...._~ ( 
to such a history of unequal treatment as to deserve extraordinary 
·I 
judicial protection from the majoritarian political Jm process. It 
''J.--t..&.,_L(_i_..fr 
~c.,J.~ WIt--h ,' n t-h G C. V>'l ~ f- I #'-1.1 i- I e-ll If.. \r; ~ ~ ;. C1 (' CJ.. h v ~ _j 
has 1never bee~~ of this Court to, discredit state action 
simply because in-its-ef.feGt its budens fall more heavily on those 
of lower than :.IIXIJe'll. average inc om e. 
Moreover, the nature of the injury sustained by the 
disadvantaged class provides a second significant factor 
" • . 
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' . ,· J•A'-'- I U''V-~L. 
'- vv' }-r-·--11} 4:..1--V~ I~ t. , _ 
l ...... :-z-<-' ., 
differentiating the present case from its predecessors_. In our 
• t\ . . 
former cases an absolute inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the benefit in question. Disparities in school 
h~v~ ( 
financing, however, has it& impact along a continuum of educational 
the relatively poorer districts in terms of 
+-~ct +0 
assessable pro:rerty per pupil \devote relatively less to education. 
' Y~'<-;' A• ·'_f. . 
In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury was a:pprent - denial of 
a transcript on appeal - and the remedy could be easily and 
effectively secured. What was required was some means of 
assuring an "adequate appellate review. " 351 U. S. at 18. The 
Court did not hold that Illinois was required to provide a full 
stenographic transcript in every case: broad leeway was permitted 
for the State to select its own means of meeting its constitutional 
obligation. See, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 _U.S. 9 (1971) 
Britt v. North CaJ:.:Qlina, 40 U.S. (1971). Likewise, Douglas 
,,.~·--
v. California, supra, shile requiring counsel for indigents 
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I 
mandating "absolute equality. " 372 U.S. at 357. No attempt has 
. . ; _LL....-}.. e .,'--i. '£;_"1'=..--................... ..,...( 
tv<:,()..; ~U\t.~ nut~ 
yet been made to guaranteelthat the poor receive the same high-z,-
A .1\.j . 
.:; .. ;,- 45 
quality of legal representation .available-to-tlla wealthy. 
Efforts to analogize to the remedies afforded in those cases 
raise questions· of considerable complexity where, as here, the 
alleged deprivation is not absolute but is relative. Since "absolute 
? 
equality" is not required, must the existence of invidious discrimination 
and the availability of relief depend on whether ':€xas is presently 
providing through iti ®~fu:m.Ileing syste\¥ an "adequate" educatiomil 
opportunity to children in the poorer districts? The founders of 
the Minimum Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that. 
By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds, 
the Texas Legislature hoped to "guarantee, for the welfare of the 
State as a whole, that all people shall have kat least an adequate 
program .of :ECtK education. This is what is meant by 1 A Minimum 
46 
Foundation Program of Education. 111 Must we decide whether, 






repeatedly asserts in its briefs 'in this Court, "the ·state has 
47 
assured every child in every school district an adequate education"? 
There are, then, these two demonstrable differences between 
tile present case and those relied on by the District Court: (1) the 
claimed disadvantaged class is significantly larger as well as more 
. . . . ,:_£&,_.,:, •U.:!__ 
ubiquitous and diverse; (2) the injury susta~ed is in no sense ~ 
absolute deprivation of the desired benefit . An education finance 
system might be hypothesized, however, in which the analogy to the 
wealth discrimination cases would be considerably closer. If 
~~~t{L 




only to those who are able to imeet ituition assessed against each 
"\ 
pupil, there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people -
definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed sum -
who would be xx absolutely precluded from receiving an adequate 
1..<.-~-Lo.... 
education. That case1 presentd a good-deal more compelling set 
A\ 'f 
of circumstances for m judicial assistance than the case before 
us today. Texas x has.)after all
1















more than provide an education to those who can afford it. It has 
~_;/- t-1"" C.~ u.-J-<A.~·~•-c. _, f/ ~ c:....cG'-~ - L<.~ lt ; -6-ro..<L..r<__ 
endeavored to provide' s-<m1e education for all children and has drawn 
,A 
no explicit lines designed to separate out the poor for disfavored 
treatment. 
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding of 
wealth discrimination alone has never been held to constitute a 
sufficient basis for subjecting state legislation to rigorous judicial 
48 
scrutiny. Before such close review is required, a state's laws 
must be found to interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" 
~ 
right. Anq, !lt is this question:;;ether education should be counted 
/ \ 
among the small circle of rights that~~ heretofore}..,been found 
y ~=;T.:u.~ of J:"~,_ 
to be'fundamental'~ which has .. so consumed theA courts and commentators 
49 
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B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) a 
w1animous Court recognized that "education is perhpas the most 
important function of state and local governments. " Id. at 493. 
What '\Vas said there in the context of racial discrimination has 
lost none of its vitality with the passage of time: 
''Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performance 
of our most basic ~ responsibilities, even 
service in the armed forces. It is the very founda-
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, 
in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason-
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied 
the opportunity of education. Such an opportunity 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms. " Id. 
V(..ftJ._}-- -~ 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the high-vdK-value 
of education in a free society, may be found in numerous opinions 
> . 
of Justice of this Court .writing both before and after Brown was 
1\ 
decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 40_ U.S. __ , 
-~ tWL-, 
(Mr-. Chief -- /\ 
















v. Sehempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 
333 U.S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 · 
~ 
(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Interstate RR Co. 
v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 ( 1907). 
J t!. t .., o.c..+.s 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way'\dQpaP~ from 
. I 
c.t...,~ 
our historic dedication to public education. We ' f.ind-ourselve-~ 
--1 
in complete agreement with the conclusion of the three-judge panel 
below that "the grave significance of education both to the individual 
50 
and to our . society" cannot be doubted. But the importance of 
a service performed by the ~ate does not determine whether it --
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination under 
. ..--.~ 
the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Harlan{long an opponent -
f'4 ;-.-~ /, --~ 
of the Court's ·ppev-iling standards for approaching equal protection 
caseJ admonished that ,;·[v ]irtually every state statute affects 
.A 
impo.rtant rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 665, 661 
(1969) (dissenting opinion). In his view, if the degree of scrutiny 
of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of 
..... 
-24-
~t 1<1-/'<-t t 
the importance o.f lhe-impoJ>haollQ.{i}. of the right affected, we would have 
' ~ 
gone "far toward making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" 
... _ .... - -- -·-
p. 24 Rodriguez (12/13/72) 
~ 
We would indeed be assuming a legislative role and one for which 
1\ 
the Court lacks both authority and competency. But Mr. Justice 
Stewart's response in :ikXflxXrx Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's 
L' 
conern correctly articulates the narrow limits of the "fundamental 
·\ 
righ~" rationale of thedCourt'.s ,eaual Protection
1
decisions: 
The court toda oes not ptck aut parbcu ar 
-----.::;-; activities, c ar:trnrrzethe~un.d.a: 
mental,'' and ii~@: tll&m a~<i:QAQt_~G.t:ion .... ' 
To the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, 
as it must, an established constitutional right , 
and gives to that right no less protection than 
the Constitution itself demands." 394 U.S. at 642 
(Emphasis from original.) 
Mr. Justice Stewart's statement serves to underline what the 
opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. In subjecting to close 
judicial scrutiny state welfare eligibility statutes that imposed a one-
year durational residency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classi-
fication which serves to penalize the exercise of 
that right, unless shown to be necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest, is un-
constitutional." Id. at 634 (Emphasis from original.) 
.. 
-25-
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized as a right of 
constitutional significance, 51 and the Court's decisi~n therefore did 
not require an ad hoc balancing of the relative importance of that 
. ht 52 rig . 
Lindsey v. Normet, 40 U.S. __ (1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's c-lea-r view that social im-
portance is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, involving 
a challenge to the procedural limitations imposed on tenants in suits 
brought by landlords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful 
Detainer law, urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." Id. at 
The tenants argued that the statutory limitations implicated "funda-
mental interests which are of particular importance to the poor," 
such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to retain peace-
ful possession of one's home." Id. The Court's analysis is instructive: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe 
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not 
provide judicial remedies for every social and econo-





















any constitutional guarantee to access to dwellings 
of a particular quality or any recognition of the 
right of a tena.nt to occupy the real property of his 
landlord beyond the term of the lease, without the 
payment of rent.... Absent constitutional mandate, 
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition 
of landlord-tenant relationships is a legislative not 
a judicial function." Id. at . (Emphasis supplied.) - -- · 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams , 397 U.S. 471 (1970), 
the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that the "administration 
of public welfare assistance involves the most basic economic 
needs of impoverished human beings," 
53 
provided no basis for de-
I 
parting from the settled mode of constitutional analyses of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social policy . As 
in the case of housing, the central importance of welfare benefits to 
the poor was not an adequate foundation for requiring the state to justify 
its law by showing some compelling state interest. See also Jefferson v . 
Hackney, 40 U.S. _(1972); Richardson v. Belcher , 404 U.S. 
(1971). 
- v . 
~ ..::;l.,~.~~-J-,!.~v-<( 
The lesson of these cases for the question now before the Court 
1\ 
is plain. The key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" 
is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance 
-' 




of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found 
by weighing whether education is as important as interstate travel. 
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether, in terms of the Consti-
tution itself, the right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. Baird , 
40 U. S._(l972); 
54 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 u. s._(l972); 
55 
PoHc-e-Depa-:Pt-nleRt-~-t-he-~4t-y-ef-G.k~ Mosley v. Police Department 
56. 
of the City of Chicago , 40 U .S._(l972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 u.s. 535 (1942). 
57 
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of education would 
not alone cause the Court to depart from the usual standard of review-
ing a state's social and economic legislation, appellees contend that 
education is distinguishable from other services and benefits provided 
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close relationship to other 
rights accorded protection under the Constitution. Specifically, they 
insist that education is a fundamental personal right because it is 
essential to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and to 
intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In asserting a nexus between 
speech and education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-









ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts in-
telligently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" is an empty 
forum for those lacking basic communicative tools. Likewise, the 
corollary right to receive information58 becomes little more than 
a hollow privilege when the recipient has not been taught to read, 
assimilate and utilize available knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect to the 
right to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is contended, cannot be 
divorced from the educational foundation of the voter. The electoral 
process, if reality is to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on 
an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently 
unless his reading skills and thought processes have been adequately 
developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The Court has 
long afforded vigorous protection against unjustifiable governmental 
IAJ~~t .. 
interference fer the individual's constitutim al rights to speak and to 
1\, 
vote. Yet we have never presumed to possess either the ability or 













or the mos t informed electoral choice. That these may be desirable 
goals of a system of freedom of expression and of a representative 
form of government is not to be doubted. 
59 
· These are indeed goals 
to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from 
governmental interference. But they are not values to be implemented 
by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state activities. 
In any event, to whatever extent a nexus exists between educa-
tion and speech and between education and exercise of the franchise, 
- ~ . 
i~rmtSt be-.. 8-ftti:t>el~P-that the Constitution stops well short of re -
,;(~ . 
' I ~ f 
' 1:.'7....-j/j.LC•P<.(3',.. ,(, :_. ~.(...</".#l''!..i.~ _.•'l, ';'-~A-\.< -4.,.i \ ~~(. 1.,; 
quiring the states tdlimpose-standards--of-uniform equality' with respect k -j 
to the exercise of those personal rights. Even if it were conceded that 
some quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite 
to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that 
~ "Cl .., I j ·t.. ~ e. j (..1 .;;.. .'\. f I WI +-h {1.. T 
the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas fal ls short. What-
; \ 
ever merit appellees' argument might have if a state's financing system 
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its 
children, that a1'gument provides no basis for finding an interference 
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in spending 
---.-----·· 











levels are involved and where - as is true in the present case - no 
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each 
. :z,k .,_i_t_,j-) 
child with an· opportunity to acquire the basic minimal teal-s necessary 
~ 
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. ./ / · UU.LU~_.,C.:'-~ 
' 
r-V We hav~ carefully surveyed each of the arguments supportive 
• I • (\ 
' ... / 
• t' ,; v• .<,) . 
•' , : ; ' of the District Court's finding · that education is a fundamental right 
\;"~ ..,..,. '. )· -- y 
f I I. 
' ' 
' { ;tt . 
'hi ". 
and have found those arguments unpersuasive in the present context • 
Even a contrary conclusion, however, would not compel this Court 
to subject the · Texas public school finance system to searching judicial 
scrutiny. For in one most basic sense, the present case is signifi-
cantly different from any of the cases in which the Court has applied 
close scrutiny to state or federal legislation touching upon fundamental 
rights. Each of our pri::>r cases involved legislation which "depriver!," 
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of some fundamental 
personal right. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, ])4 U.S. 618·, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 
L'~,];-~ _.._t. 
40 u.s. (1972). The ciFitical distinction between those ---






cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to 
do with respect to education. Mr. Justice Brennan, ·writing for the 
Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well 
the salient point: 
61 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right 
to vote but rather that Congress violated the Con-
stitution by not extending the relief effected{to 
others similarly situateq] •.•• 
" [The federal law in· question;} does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the fran-
chise to persons who otherwise would be denied 
it by state law.... We need decide only whether 
the challenged limitation on the relief effected 
... was permissible. In deciding that question , 
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny 
of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights 
... is inapplicable; for the distinction challenged 
by appellees is presented only as a limitation on 
a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing 
barrier to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, 
in deciding the constitutional propriety of the 
limitations in such a reform measure we are guided 
by the familiar principles that a 1 statute is not 
invalid under the Constitution because it might 
have gone farther than it did, 1 ••• that a legislature 
need not 1 strike at all evils at the same time, 1 and 
that 1 reform may take one step at a time, address-
ing itself to the phase of the problem which seems 
most acute to the legislative mind ..•. " Id. at 
656-57 (Emphasis from original.) 
c-::. .. t , }I • tt' ... :;/·· J ~ (,. t-, ~ r:~ l 
J!airly viewe}!J the Texas system o~!finance touches on "fundamental 
rights" in much the same manner as the federal legislation in 
Katzenbach affected the right to vote. Every step leading to the estab-
lishment of the system Texas utilizes today - including the decisions 
..... 
















permitting localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid - was implemented in an effort to 
extenq public education and to improve its quality. 62 Of course, 
every reform that benefits some more than others may be condemned 
for what it fails to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, 
.' 
the thrust of the . Texas system is affirmative and reformatory and, 
therefore' is entitled to be scrutinized under judicial principles 
~<!~~ A, p. 32 Rodriguez 12/14/72 
It 
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the in-
bov 
appropriateness of the compelling interest test. A century of Supreme 
a t 
Court adjudication under the Equal Protection clause affirmatively sup-






ports the application here of the traditional rational basis test . This 
I 
' il 
case represents far more than a challenge to the manner in which Texas 
I' 
provides for the education of its children. In terms of the ultimate 
consequences, appellees are asking the federal judiciary to intervene 
' decisively in areas long reserved for state democratic processes . We 
bave here nothing less than a direct attack on the way in which Texas ] 
has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues . We are 
/ asked to condemn 
I 




('l;-A .- k~ +J ~ ... 
r ~ H'-:.__ '· r 
L.--tr..aditiooal rational basis approa:ch. The reasoning·underlying 





{.. ' _,__ ~ 
' '' 
c...- - · ·· ..... . ~ 
this judgment, which finds. deep roots in a century of Supreme 
Court adjudication under the equal protection clause, deserves 
aj /-<--> ,.._ ~--r 
r ·ecitation here. 
+o . 
This case represents more than a challenge ..og. the manne 
in which Texas provides for the education of its childrm. In a 
fundamental sense, it is a direct k attack on the way in which 
Texas has chosen to raise and disburse revenues. It condemns 
-----------~-------------------------
the state's judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the 
power to tax local property to supply revenues for local interests. 
In so doing, appellees would have the Court intrude in an area 
63 
in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures. . . 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny, I 
! 
. ~ .J _( [_ 311 u.s. 435 (1940), againstc:verzealou~interference with the r 
state's fiscal policies is worth repeating: 
"[t }he responsibility for devising just and productive 
sources of revenue challenges the wits of legislatures. 
Nothing can be less helpful than for courts to ... 
inject themselves in a merely negative way into the 





· .•1.-V I t' 1-iu t..• '-~ /c~_'u.-c( 
the familiarity with local problems necessary if-effective legis-
.\ , \ 
. . or. tv-c...~ ~.c-<~<--<-v~ l -<Ft.-L.t,__ -~ · .t ; z...• c.-( ·ID 1-lt..z -r'-.:··-"-----l--<-~'c 
lation-is -to be promulgated affecting the acquisition and disposition , 
cL-,.'-"-Gt 
of public revenues. Yet we are urged to order the states either 
to alter drastically the present system or to idm: throw the 
property tax out altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. 
J I-' v ~c1.-..-<<..-jul.L I 
Are we to counsel the States that an income or sales tax would 
1\ 
0'-P~~~less discriminatory against the relatively mqmx 
~ (,~~ 
impecunious ooc elements of society? 
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relationship between national and state power under our federal 
'1 !--(;._.._ ?,.(.,;...,;(..~-<-<-c.'--(. I J-J.-.e -<-«"- I/~ . ~ z ~ 
system. Questions of federalism--are inherent in and-indeed 
.\ 
lie- at...the..])asiS-Of-the judgment,-compelled-by-the-equal.-protection-
~ -~-<-Y'"l-""-'"· ~ .... -(. ~ -<r 
I (_,;.....~ ei~ e( !:l:::> I -~- '" !..._._....-.:-~ ....._____ J ;I • 
('- - I J: -·--· . :-- •···----- /-1 ... ~ c.: ~ ~-'-l~...(:t..•-Lf!. 
--clause,· whether a State's laws are to be subjected to ·meticulous 7 
- .1\ - .\ 
/'. (' ~.-._..,f-._· P-< 
1
/ c.• 7 '-' / , /,_'-. - } <-c_ '/-<--.: J..~.:L L. - v-.:.·-L L -J.-' /--~ L- - .. 
, judiciaL.examination~-In -reachjng:_that_judgmenLwe._also decide_whether . ~ . 
the-State-ts -judgmenLis entitled .to. deference-and whether it or-the 
complaining- party-must-bear-t-he-burden-of-justification. While 
"[t ]he maintenance of the principles of federalism is a foremost 
consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
65 
which this Court examines state action,'' it would be difficult 
to imagine a case having a greater potential impact on our 
~- t<.· - i-~.-<.Jt._ U.'-~ 
~federal system than the one now before us, ·which-threatens 
. ~ 
~~ t~v-·'- -~~J/ 
to abrogate the systems of 'public education presently in existence 
~ A 
. '' 
in virtually every State. 
ft -~-</ th4<-<f'_ 
Thes.e considerations buttress our conclusion that Texas' 
·'\ 
system of public school finance is an inappropriate candidate for 
~ ·, . ~~..L .;._ 
~-:tz:./;,:>~ 3 , Lh"<._.. ~iu. ·~LA.-L..--/ · 
close judicial scrutiny. InevitablY; fhese same considerations!\ 
•P"t ... ~. ~ ... I, 
~· ... f. 




.I- J·· j , , ' . . I- . J r-r-... --~.r-- L.."-~ ., - )... ... - {. ... ........ ..... 1- <- ... ~ . 
must-also affeet- our-evaluation of_whether. such discriminations 
-\ -;- ._.,.. . ) . -
'- v---..c: _t~ '-....._ t-- .c.·-e- "U...c., ·.l.-Lc( '-'1- <- <--jc.: .,•- ' ·-c- l-c1/k t....-' 
) j lrt>'t rbj~. t.A--' ('- ) 
as-result from that system may-be-saiG-t-9-be supported by a 
' ~ 
f-iu ·-L... 
reasonable or rational basis. Anc;l, -1t is to that question that 
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. ~1.~.:""' 
-At thfH' is:ki of...Ynduly pPolooging- this-<>phrion, ~~ will describe 
·\ 
in more detail the Texas system and how it operates, as these facts 
bear directly upon the issue of rationality . 
... ~ ... -- I 
contribution, under the Minimum Foundation Program, was designed 
to provide an adequate minimum educational offering in every school 
in the State. Funds are distributed to assure that there will be one 
teacher-- compensated at the state-supported minimum salary --for 
·67 
every 2 5 students. Each school district's other supportive 
68 
personnel are pro:vided for: one principal for every 20 teachers; 
one "special service" teacher - librarian, nurse, doctor, etc. - for 
69 !.. '-- 1!. 
vocational instructors, conselors, and 
A I , 
every 20 teachers; 
8 70 
educators for exceptional children are also provided. Additional 
funds are earmarked for current operating expenses and for student 
71 72 
transportation. The State x also provides free textbooks. 
I 
- 39 -
The program is administered by the Texas Education Agency, 
73 
which also has responsibility for school accreditation and for 
74 
monitoring the statutory teacher qualification standards. As 
reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted to the Edgewood 
75 
School District over the last three years, the State's financial 
contribution to education is steadily increasing. None of Texas' 
school districts, however, has been content to rely, alone\ on 
)--- ;~ 
funds from the Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund Assignment, 
I ....,. fHI ' (.. 
every district must ~ an~ ad valorem tax on property 
1\ -
located within its borders. The Fund Assignment was designed 
to remain sufficiently low,. 1fow~ver\ to assure that each district 
would have some ability to provide a more enriched educational 
76 
program. Every district supplements its foundation grant in 
9-v---
this manner. .Fe,r some districts the local property tax contribution 
is insubstantial, asjfur"fhstanc~ in Edgewood where the supplement 
k. . 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. FBr other districts the local share 
~ 
may far exceed Jemel' even the total Foundation grant. In part 
4ii' 
- 40-
local differences are attributable to differences in the rates of 
taxation or in the degree to which the market value for any category 
v ~ ··:t ~ J ;.t:,.owt. i& 77 
of property e-xcee~ its assessed value. The greatest inter-
district disparities, however, are attributed to differences in the 
amount of assessable property available within any district. Those 
/~.- er <-'-'-
districts that have more property, or more valuable property, are 
•\ 
';;:-;,.u~<---k--1~ cc- f>-G:.L·~l.J-L(l of ·~Lf-t.f1--l~u..;._.~'1· .<J2,c._c;:_ F"~.L--c..- ' 
~ m·ore-capabie-of- raising--money-for-their-school~ In large measure, 
these additional local revenues are devoted to paying higher teacher 
salaries to more teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing 
xibtXH attributes of schools in more affluent districts are lower 
\ ~ 
\ pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary schedules. 
This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance structure. 
disparities in property tax income, appellees claim that children 
in less affluent districts have been made the subject of invidious 
discrimination. The District Court found that the State had failed 
~ ,, . 6:... . /lA..j·-t-- '14':..................- -..Jt'~- '-- .,4?~.· /~ t.. v..-
r "to establish a reasonable basis for these-classification-.-' .. ~ 
A ~ ~ . 
C.l!..-<-f'-f--z ,._.;..., r 
--<2.~ ~_.(_, ~ .:·-v 
/4-P-..--J t--uj<.-~{ F. Supp. at We disagree. 




The Texas system ·s comparable to the systems employed 
79 -----------
in virtually every other State m - 1fsreliance on state as well aS) 
/.'. ~ __..... --. ====------- ' . 
~ <rhe-power to tax local property for educational 
80 / -·-
:u~~~~~as been r .ecognized in -~~~a~-~~ -~~ ~It~ ~'1a_~ 
:?~ ~l ~~~(%- v~~';_:;.tyv.._. ;:,~ 
ha-s-longzrc.ov}ded--th~e~to.ilssur~hat::ed. ucatiort:lS...,ConkoHed -{ 
~~ ~ l_o~_:._~~_;:L ~7.~-f_~--· ----- .j 
at-:t-hs:l'ooal leve[ Wlien shifts in the distribution of ::ppc population, 
. 
accompanied by changes in local property wealth occasioned by 
the growth of commercial and industrial centers, began to create 
disparities in local resources, Texas undertook a program calling 
for a considerable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas educators 
based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product of the pioneering work 
lx of two New York educational reformers in the 1920's, George 
81 
D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig. Their efforts were devoted to 
establishing a means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educa-
~ ~,,_;_1-z-Jz._ _d.z..--~~r ~t/ .t~ ~~~*..._ 
t ional program without sacrificing loca.l-eootr.ol. The Strayer-Haig ' 
1\ 
thesis represented an accommodation between these two competing 
forces. As articulated by Professor Coleman: 
- 35 -
than one constituionally permissible method 
,;there will be more . 
within the limits of rationality' "the 
of solving them," and that, 
blems" should be entitled 
legislature's efforts to tackle the pro 
to respect. 
H Ckney 40 U.S. Jefferson v. a ' -
1972). On even 
. . /Jc£~ic..~-L-t--
. - . . is area the researchers and 
the most basic queshons m th . /...-~ 
d one of the nettest 
educational experts are divided. Indee ' j\J 
I {"" f t.v /..<- <.. ~ L:i...--
.~J .... ~ £-"1-Y--c~.-<.. • L ·demonstrable 
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~·· 
Rider A, page 35, Rodriguez 12/14/72 
v r 
And the question of the proper relationship between state boards of 
education and local school boa.xls 1 in terms of their respective respon-
Y 
sibility and degree of control, is now undergoing searching reexamination. 
ls 
It hardly need be said that none of these questions is amenable to intelli-
r 
gent resolution through the judicial process. Indeed, the ultimate wisdom 
on these and like problems of education is not likely to be devined for all 
time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues. At 
the very least, the judiciary should not circumscribe or handicapp- by 
c 
interposing inflexible constitutional constraints - the continued research 
and experimentation so vital even to partial solutions and to keeping 





• •. "i .. .. 
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relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate . . 
Mr. Justice Brandeis identified as one of the peculiar strengths 
of our form of government each state's freedom to "serve as a 
laboratory . and try novel social and economic experiments. " 
HOdti {:i;ltCZ 
Rider A, Page 43 ~ 12/ 14/ 72 
The relief sought by appellees - certainly if all fiscal 
"inequities" are to be obliterated - would require full state funding 
of public schools. Only in this way can a state guarantee equality 
in per pupil cost in each school throughout the state. Yet, despite 
the virtual end of local participation which appellees' rationa:ewould 
83 
~><fl._ 4~~.J. 
compel, they nevertheless acknowledge some merit in the <:-en'\lentional 
dedication to local control of education. * 
\· 
* Larry: Here add a note generally to the effect that appellees - or at 
least Professor Coons (whose theory they have adopted) - would preserve 
a measure of local control through an untried technique called "district 
power equalizing." Then, you might identify what this means and pick up 
the substance of the draft of Rider A, Page 34. This may be a better place 
for that type of commentary than back on page 34. 
rJ 
not be found irrational or baseless because, in practice, it results 
in "some inequality. " McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 
(1961). It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 
485. In giving substance to the presumption of validity to which 
Texas' system is entitled, Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to remember th~t at every 
stage of its development it has constituted a "rough accommodation" 








j--c.J-i..v~1./'-~-----·-- ··- -·-~·~~·- ,..,. " -· / 
Appellees urge that ,._. apart-.. frem-the-questions--regardi.ng-
-\ 
.JGcal-control, the Texas system· s:f.-Hnanc.ing:....edueatiOR is unconstitutionally 
arbitrary because it allows the availability of local taxable resources 
II ..,, II '' ~ 
to turn on happenstance. and fet !aity. They G-Glltentl-that no justification 
"\ 
) a-t,_ 1-tu·""t ~ 'l-L. .;...; ..... 1...4 ~ J 
ean-be-ef.fe-red for a system that allows the quality of education to 
" " . f-cy--~·'l.L-1.---' 
fluctuate on the basis of the' ~istor-icai-aoe-idents.a.n!.L:G-oineidenc-es­
A 
that-often....a.ccount for -the positioning of the~ boundary 
; .. •! .. 
- 45 -
lines of political subdivisions and f6r the location of valuable 
commercial and industrial property. But any scheme of local 
taxation -indeed the very existence of identifiable local governmental 
units - requires the establishment of jurisdictional boundaries that 
9-1- ~ /~ 
are inevitably arbitrary. ~ ,E'qually inevitably,"' :it ~u4!.fiaem.a~ some 
1-tt.e...-.; c~-.'-"'-' 
localities are going to be blessed withm more taxable assets,;\ Nor 
. 
is local wealth a static quantity. Are boundary lines to be redrawn 
with every shift in population or with every discovery of valuable 
minerals or with the completion of every new industrial park? 
J 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an unconstitutional 
method of providing for education then it must be ~ equally 
-~ 
impermissible in providing every other service currently financed 
1\ 
from local::poproperty taxes, including local police and fire 
protection, 
~i--t- ~-t..<.. l-~ ju..£~ ~ l-<-1-.J...:t<-{ ~-J.A . .- Fu -1.-- c:-~ 
public hospitals) and :'at-er-tr-eat-menHae1lit-ies. We e~-o---c.-" uz... 
1\ 1\ ~·2. 
J!..c-G<.._..J.?_, 
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of 'property 
... 
- 46 -
,Ji-L k ;{"; k ~t:-J-t ..t-f- ·-- -- --
insofar-as the Texas system of school finance may:::_ 
~Ck ·~ d<A.t:.-.-<-~.:1-.'"f .,:,,_,~~J- \ 
1\ .4 
-A'~ ~:::::r-...z......_, c.. , ' 
tv-<- C~.AAA·~+~ e-=c I ~ ("" L-t_..; 
i Stat~,  ibad: discrimination te-be the product of a system that 
.-\ 1\ ~ J 
~ wd-l.uru:f-~~<-~ L-<4JL ~ ..... -(.../ ' ' ~~ /2_.,,_."-_____ 
. " 
is reasonably and .'raHonally-based. Its shortcomings are-well-known 
\ ~ ~ 
~·'l-<-...f.t~~t .e-,_1 T ~~·....-"t.-- 1 c~(_ 4 t~;~-.,L~'-( 
-and-T-exas-ha-s--made-no-effort-to-min-imize-their-existene-e-here. 
~~<~-o-<AJL - ·?~cc..rc..t.~-M:t ~~-~-t...--t.--' - fo ~~~·+~ 
I ~ ~e-Stat~-has_pers-i-stently-endea.V-or..ed,-llOweve·r;-to-C\Jmp-en-sare 
~ cl.<---j--f_.:_.r..e~-""1-- ~ _e£-<~~ c:~ ~7"--ft..x..~~  I 
t
or--the--fa·ilings-ef-.its-system-;--And-we--are-una ble-to-say,-given·t~e 
1~ ~~---2-~-t-~ ~ r-tu._ CL~.t.. --(. .<.4-~~-~_L__.}/,.._ , ..--~-z-<:"'';/f11r 
-omplex,itY-Of-'-this-Jn()st-signifieant-stat~unetion;-that-Texas' 
• I 




In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school finance 
results in discriminati>ry treatment of children who happen to reside 
in certain districts, we cannot say that such discrimination is the 
product of a syste~ that is ~-Efflftbl€-8.1*f without rational basis. 
u.~~'---L 
Its shortcomings have been acknowledged by Texas, and-it has 
:rmx persistently endeavored - not without success - to ameliorate 
the differences in levels of expenditure without destroying the 
acknowledged benefits of local participation. lhnu~ed 
~ 
that the Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, ill conceived 
~- ~~ 
legislation. It is certainly not the product of intended discrimination 
·\ 
against any group or class. On the contrary, it is rooted in decades 
t-4.) 
of experience in Texas and elsewhere, and{~ in major part the 
A 
)4---1~£ cu:-T . 
nmk-reS\tit of responsible studies ffiafte by qualified people. One 
r\ 
also must remember, when weighing the issue of rationality, 
~ c~.£4>~;7-J!)..._ ( TP~~ 
that the T-e:HQS system' is not peculiar to -that. or to any other state. 
~ A 
Yfo<- t..-t.,___"_e~~~~ c-l~"-v4.rt' ~--c...!-<-<::a_ _. 
As-conceded-by-appellees,~ the Texas plan for financing public 
~-~ ;:6; 
education reflects what leadin-g educators for a half century have· 
'. ' <. . . 
. . 
2. 
thought was an enlightened approach to a problem for which there 
is no perfect solution. We are unwilling, even if it were the function 
of a court, to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to 
that of legislators, scholars and educational authorities in 49 states, 
especially where the alternative proposed is only recently conceived 
and nowhere yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether there 
is a rational basis for the challenged state action. We hold that 
the Texas plan abundantly meets this test. 
- 47-
IV 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on the 
District Court opinion in this case and on its California predecessor, 
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary 
postscript seems appropriate. These decisions have been wJ..Qe:ly-
tJ~&~/ ~ ~:A~ t t" -Jw .. l-=o L-£_, 
an~nthusiastically hailed as providing,r:finally ,a-wer-kable-
~ ·\ 4 I 'L____.. 
_r-~·1,~:;::~·='-:~J !:":~J."we== 1 ~ Q ·{ () <:~Gzapp I' C, .'- L·~ 
~,. _ , ,.,,____ e ; _,~ 
~-- . ; 
selut-ion-t-e-the'-S-eemin-gly-inseluble-teGhnical-and-polie1al-pr-oblems 
U- ~/JAA.-~fu_ . .J.u,_...~ "~ r--v ~r·~ 
that-have-impeded state legislative reform. The~ decisions have 
A 
been various touted as the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to 
k 
fer the urban crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
~...,w2.A- -f.-.i a...i!12~; ~·~ d..-:e...-.<·-G.<-- f<;--L _ 
the result{ the--rec-ent--pFoponents of "fiscal neutrality" have given 
c. t 'J-t.A ......... a!~~ 8 5 
it mu<!h more credit than its architects have ever claimed. 
"\ 
iW ~tr:.Yetrufh- is, as il:.crffisingl;;;:.ore ca"m;;e~t~;o~~--~r~! . 
~ coming to recognize, eradication of the property-tax basis and v 
~ implementation of "fiscally neutral" alternatives would have highly 
questionable consequences. At least one detailed empirical~ 
-----:- ... .....___,___.,-----
Rider Az Page 47, Rodriguez 12/15/72 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness of the con-
cept and the absence of a broader base of empirical study, to make con-
sidered judgments as to the intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of 
the "fiscal neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have begun 
to emerge from some commentators. It is beginning to be recognized 
that the abrupt eradication of the property tax basis and the implementation 
of "fiscally neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquietingly 
85a different from those initially assumed. There is, in particular, 
increasing concern as to whether the Coons plan would not in fact be 
counter-productive especiallym; to the lowest income families who tend 
to r~ide in urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
in~ustrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affidavits as to 
I 
, ihe relationship between poverty, race and educational expenditure t n 
I 
I \ 
Texas were relied on by the District Court, see note , supra, has\ - ' \ 
\ 
J 
/ since published a study of the possible effects of several alternatives to \ 
the P,tesent system of educational finance. Berke, Inequalities in School 





ssiblle that an equal-expenditures alternative to the present system 
would lead to higher taxation and lower educational expenditures in the 
85b major urban areas. At least one detailed empirical study also has 
concluded that there is no dependable correlation between the location 
of impoverished families and the presence of inferior schools. 86 
In view of these uncertainties, if this Court were sitting as a 
policy tribunal we would hesitate to embrace - at least at this time -
the ultimate efficacy of the appealing egalitarian concept which launched 
this case. 
I o, \:. 
... 
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between the location of impoverished families and the presence 
86 
of inferior schools. Nor is there at this time any more than a 
random chance that racial minorities will be clustered in school 
districts that are short-changed in terms of assessable property. 
( 
Moreover, there is no reason to suspect -and some reason to fear -
) 
vn I 
that any alternative form of financing is likely to increase the flow 
. A 88 I 
of educational imputs into our urban core areas. Under such 
uncertain circumstances, if this Court sat as a policy tribunal, 
\ 
we might doubt the ultimate efficacy of the attractive egalitarian 1 
, ____ __ .:._ ____ _[ 
hta~~~-1::'--' 
The GJ.OO:i" limitations on this Court's constitutional ili:mt 
" 
function restrain us from embarking upon xkJ any such political 
or philosophical undertaking. That role is reserved for Congress 
and for the state legislative bodies and we do n·o violence to the 
values of federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
WL ~6.1 .~4t .:-o..et2~ .~- l-1~ k 
S<H.ong-as this Court's action today is not viewed as placing its ., 
~.". ' 
-·~--- .... 
- 49 - __....---· . __ ·----- \ ---.--
·udicial impramatur on the status quo - so long as the lawmakers 
nd those who select them do not embrace our holding as an 
endorsement of an educational system in need of reform -we d 
I 
-n,' e. 89 
\'~ old friends of the children" can do nothing more for this 
) \ 
'!'constituency" than to defer to those more suited to the thorough 
syst~~~~ ~-y!t~~:_- ---~-- _ _ -·------- ~ 
Reversed. 
Rider A, p. 34 Rodriguez 
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in 
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not 
a case in which the challenged state action must be subjected 
to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws which in-
volve suspect classifications or fundamental constitutional rights • 
.. 
Rider A, Page 42, Rodriguez 12/14/72 
The value of local control of education was recognized 
last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright 
v. Council of City of llinporia, 40 _U.s. _(1972). Mr. Justice 
Stewart stated there that "Ld/irect control over decisions vitally 
affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly 
felt in our society." Id. at_. Likewise, the Chief Justice 
admonished that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued 
public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance 








•._ •'•Y :: • 
nour1guez 
Rider A, Page 43 liD·~ 12/14/72 
The relief sought by appellees - certainly if all fiscal 
"inequities" are to be allliterated- would require full state funding 
of public schools. Only in this way can a state guarantee equality 
in per pupil cost in each school throughout the state. Yet, despite 
the virtual end of local participation which appellees' rationa.Bwould 
compel, they nevertheless acknowledge some merit in the conventional 
dedication to local control of education. * 
i Larry: Here add a note generally to the effect that appellees- or at 
least Professor Coons (whose theory they have adopted) - would preserve 
a measure of local control through an untried technique called "district 
power equalizing." Then, you might identify what this means and pick up 
the substance of the draft of Rider A, Page 34. This may be a better place 
J for that type of commentary than back on page 34. 
IV. 
In light of the considerable attention that has focused 
on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California 
precedessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 
(1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot 
be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the 
District Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today 
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval 
in public education. And many commentators have concluded 
that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs 
that might be devised and approved, the result could simply not 
avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is utlaoc nothing 
I 
simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases, 
there is nothing simple about predicting the consequences of . 
I 
I 
' massive change in educational finance. Those who have devoted 
the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of 
these cases have found no simple, dependable a''**'' answers an, d 
their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the 
desirability of change. 
I ,> ~~· ; ... 
The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by 
the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be aaid 
with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or the 
children in overburdened core-city school districts will be 
benefitted by abrogation of traditional modes of financial education. 
Unless there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures 
on education across the board .. an event the likelihood of which 
111 is open to considerable question - these groups stand to 
realize gains in terms of increased per pupil expenditures 
only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively 
low levels, i.e., in those districts that would benefit from the 
redistribution of existing resources. Yet recent studies have 
indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered 
in the most impecunious school districts.ll2 • Nor does it now 
appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial 
minorities are co!X!entrated in property-poor districts. 1131 Addi-
tionally, several research projects have concluded that an}r 
fina!X!ing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality Gf 
I 
expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower edUt~a-, 
114 
tional expenditures in the major urban centers, a result 
• ""-! .... 
that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing condi-
tions in those areas. 
These practical considerations, of course, play no 
role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented 
here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional 
limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and 
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation 
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes 




federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. we 
' I 
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not b> be vieW\ed 
\ 
as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need 
is apparent for reform in tax systems which tnay well have relied \ 
\ 
too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly 
innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods and its 
funding, is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and 
greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the con-
tinued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much 
'' 
by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come 
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of 
those who elect them. 
·• . 
Rider A, p. 1 (Rodriguez) 2/11/73 
Rather than focus on the unique features of the alleged 
discrimination, the courts in these cases have virtually assumed 
their answers by a two step process of analysis: since some poorer 
~ 
people receive less expensive education than other more affluent people 
/\ 
' 
under the traditional systems of financing public schools, these 
systems discriminate on the basis of wealth. In this simplistic 
approach, the hard threshold questions have been largely ignored: 
what precisely is the~ asserted discrimination, how is the 
class of disadvantaged "poor" to be defined or identified, and has 
the discrimination resulted in an absolute deprivation or merely 
some relative disadvantage characteristic of a free democracy? 
Before a State's laws and its justification of the challenged classification 
bl are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, we think these threshold 
questions must be examined.xiXJr far more analytically than they 
were in the court below. 
J Rodriguez Rider A, p. 14 (12/26/72) 
(i) the class claimed to be disadvantaged (all citizens in the poor 
school districts) is diverse and amorphous; and (ii) the injury alleged 
is in no sense an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit. 
1. The cases reliel.upon by appellees have involved 
indigents - a specific and identifiable class. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), 
44 
and their progeny, the state laws invalidated were found to deny a 
fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. Similarly, in 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short, 401 
U.S. 395 (1971), we struck down criminal penalties that subjected 
indigents to incarceration simply because they were unable to pay 
fines. In each of those cases, the Court was not dealing with some 
undefined class characterized as "the poor", but with a level of 
absolute poverty (indigency) which rendered each complainant 
totally unable to pay for the state-proffered benefit. 
The first difficulty with appellees argument is that the 
class simply cannot be ascertained if it is defined as "the poor" 
rather than all persons who live in the particular school district. 
2. 
Once we depart from the accepted standard of indigency, the word 
"poor" describes no identifiable class of persons except in a 
relative sense. This Court has never tested the validity of legislation 
under the 14th Amendment by asking whether it discriminates against 
the relatively poor in favor of the relatively rich. Or, putting it 
differently, in a society as diverse as ours - and in which there is 
no stratification of citizens into social or economic classes - it would 
be impossible to draw constitutional lines on the basis of who is 
relatively rich as compared with who is relatively poor. 
The difficulty with such a formulation is well illustrated 
by this case. Appellees have endeavored to show generally that 
to reside in relatively poorer districts. Perhaps this is true as 
a generalization with respect to some districts. It is certainly 
not acceptable as an invariable premise. Indeed, as studies in 
other states have indicated, there is reason to believe that the 




Rider A, p. 17 Rodriguez 12/26/72 
The mere asking of this question suggests the difficulty -
if not impossibility - of answering it in the courts. Whether any 
particular form, level or extent of education is "adequate" depends 
upon so many variables, and inherently is such a subjective 
inquiry, that the experts disagree widely.* But even if there were 
some formula which enabled the Court to KERifilx conclude that 
inadequate education is being provided, the problem of devising 
and implementing an appropriate remedy would remain. 
*Larry: Either make some cross reference to other notes or 
supply some general reference - if you have one. 
Rider A, p. 18 Rodriguez (12/26/72) 
Yet any alternative system which falls short of providing 
equal expenditures per pupil (or at least per district) will inevitably 
result in continued disparities. Perhaps it could be argued, under 
some such system, that the disparities of expenditures wire 
" 
~ less than under the present system. Again, in 
an area in which there are no absolutes and few objective standards, 
who is to say what level of disparity is discriminatory or results 
in an x inadequate education?* If, as the logic of appellees' position 
would require, the remedy were to be equal expenditures on a 
per pupil or per district basis, the result would not necessarily 
benefit the children of relatively~ poorer :JiaaDtldtHxx families. 
As noted elsewhere in this opinion, in view of the tendency of low 
-1--ftv~~~ 
income families to live in districts witli) comme rcial and industrial 
properties, th&-r~1.dt of an equal expenditure remedy would beaefit 
. ~~ 
tj-t~~a~t;:=~ in others. We have 
not been confronted with any such episodic and unpredictable 
result in prior cases involving elements of wealth discrimination. 
*Larry: If we use this rider, there should be~ cross 
references here to one or two of the footnotes which discuss the 
practical and political problems of adopting some different system 
as being constitutionally mandated: e. g. notes 85 and 92. 
~ j:- Larry: Here, we could cross reference to the text pp. 15 and 
43. 
Comment to Larry: 
I am not at all satisfied with this Rider. Perhaps the 
difficulty results from our discussing the "remedy" as well as 
whether equal protection has been denied. As the main thrust 
of the opinion at this point is focused on the equal protection 
analysis (no absolute deprivation or denial), perhaps a discussion 
in the text of the "remedy" problem is a distraction. We might 
drop it into a note or omit entirely. 
Rider B, p. 18 Rodriguez 12/26/72 
There are, then, two significant differences between the 
present case and those relied on by the Jlistrict e ourt as supporting 
its finding of wealth discrimination: The class, being diverse and 
amorphous, cannot be identified with sufficient exactitude; and 
there is no absolute deprivation of the right or benefit in question. 
These differences would be sufficient to cast serious :DecxK doubt 
as to the correctness of thej hstrict cimrt's holding. There is, 
however, a further ground for questioning the soundness of that 
court's constitutional analysis. A finding of wealth discrimination 
alone has never been held to constitute a sufficient basis for 
52 
subjecting state legislation to the compelling interest test. 
l• 
.. •... 
ry .HJ ron Hlaer A, p. o 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed 
seriously the fact that there is no absolute deprivation of the asserted 
right as there was in each of the foregoing cases. The argument 
here is not that the children in Edgewood District were receiving 
no public education; rather, it is that they were probably receiving 
a poorer quality of education than the children of Alamo District 
because expenditures per pupil in that richer district were 
substantially greater. ~for subsequent comment whether 
Cill!fi!i /JJie/ tnk'·"*J !c-Y.£> ~/ 
there is ReeessarHy 1 correlation between the quality of education 
and the cost thereof, a sufficient answer to appellees argument is 
~~~ 
that the equal protection clause does not fD1X require absolute /f 
~~ {Jr2- ~ 
·e~ 'Nor, indeed, in view of the infinite variables and the 
nature of the education process, can any system assure equal quality 
1~~~ 
1\ except in the most relative sense. 
, ... ' 
Texas does assert that the Maximum Foundation Program 
provides an "adequate" education for all children in the state. By 
assuring teachers, books transportation and operating funds, the 
*Can we cite a case or two for this.? 
: '· 
2. 
Texas legislature intended to "guarantee, for the welfare of the 
state as a whole, that all people shall have at least an adequate 
program of education. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum 
49 
Foundation Program of Education. '" The state's repeated 
assertion in this case that Texas has fulfilled this intention and 
that it now assures "every child in every school district an 
50 
adequate education" has not been refuted by any evidence offered 
at the trial. Even had such evidence been offered, the prior 
decisioss of this Court would not have required a judicial evalution 
of relative differences in the quality of BD a service made 
ru-e;..,~~~~ 
availablejto all 11J1X1D persons within a particular political subdivision."' 
But appellees press their claim on a somewhat different 
and novel basis. They argued, and the Xlri.staldcUa District Court's 
opinion in effect holds, that invidious wealth discrimination 
nonetheless inheres in the Texas system on the ground that 
I 
expeJJ.ditures for education (and hence its quality) are directly 
i 
cottrelated to the wealth of school districts. As a predicate for this 
I 
I 







holding, the District Court found that those districts most rich in 
property .•. have the highest median family income •.. while the 
poor districts are poorer in income • . • . " 337 F. Supp. at 282. 
This finding is based on an affidavit provided by Prof. Joele S. 
Berke of Syracuse University, who submitted an exhibit :zatx 
reflecting a statistical examination of approximately one tenth of 
Texas' school districts. Prof. Berke's exhibit, and an analysis of 
the correlations deduced tila»idutherefrom, are set forth in the 
margin below. The District Court further concluded on the basts of 
the Bwckaix Berke statistics that relatively wealthy districts spend 
:ma: relatively more on education while relatively poorer families 
reside in poorer districts that devote relatively less to education 
(Larry: should we not cite the page in the District Court's opinion). 
Although the relevancy of this conclusion may be doubted even if 
it were supported by the evidence, the fact is that the principal 
thrust of the Berke exhibit is precisely to the contrary of what the 
lower court found. As shown in the margin below (note_) only 
14 of thexwt 110 districts examined, or 12. 7% of the sample, 








reflect the correlation which would lead to the District Court's 
finding, while the other districts point toward a contrary conclusion. 
It is evident, therefore, that the relationship relied upon below -
between educational expenditures and median income and between 
expenditures and the quality of education - is attenuated at best. 
Note 55. 
We thus look in vain for a theory or an~ analysis 
that identifies a disadvantaged class with the exactitude required 
by the equal protection clause. Certainly there is no "suspect" 
class comparable to racial minorities, aliens or indigents. The 
asserted discrimination is one based on wealth -not of a definable 
group but of a geographical area embraced within a school district. 
The class alleged to be disadvantaged within the district is ioxswabyx 
loosely characterized as the "poor". But once we depart from 
the accepted category of indigency the word "poor" describes no 
identifiable class of persons except in the most relative sense. 
This Court has never illllx tested the validity of legislation under 
\ 
\ 
the 14th Amendment by asking whether it discriminates against the 
relatively poor in favor of the r elatively rich. 





:"' ,.. .. 
5. 
But accepting arguenda that there may be a class disadvantaged 
on account of its relative lack of wealth, we next consider appellees 
contention that education must be included among the small circle 
of rights that heretofore have been found to be "fundamental", 
requiring a compelling state interest to justify any classification 
57 
which interferes with the exercise thereof. 
Rider A, p. 9 Rodriguez (12/30/72) 
theory is founded on an unproved assumption, n~ely, that 
the quality of education varies directly w· 
funds expended on · . Appellees~ argue, and sought to prove, 
~ l • 
wi'H11"1 
that there is a correlation between"personal wealth of citizens ~ 
~ 
-i district and the expenditures therein for education. They then 
submit that the poorer a person is the less adequate is the quality 
of education he receives from the ~ate. The principal evidence 
Ld. ~ -~.e<-tt.<J...  
(~1,,_,{1 ...; 1 .. '4::> ~ 
A etll:nRitteel ~support~- the comparative discrimination theory is 
!'~ 
the affidavit of ..Pre£; Xfle Joele S. Berke of ~ Syracuse 
University. Relying in major part upon this affidavit, the District 
Court accepted the substance of appellees' theory. First, it noted 
a direct correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured 
in terms of assessable property per pup~) and their levels of per 
pupil expenditures. Second, the Court found a direct correlation 
between district wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. Supp. at 282. 
). 
2. 
If, in fact, these two correlations could be sustained, 
appellees' theory would still face grave and unanswered question,s, 
including: what degree of correlation would constitute a sufficient 
basis for concluding that the financing system is designed to I§ operate 
58 
to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor, and 
whether a class of this size, diversity and amorphous character 
* 
could ever claim the special protection acc~ed "suspect" classifications? • 
Neither of these questions need be addressed H in this case, however, 
since appellees' proof falls far short of supporting their ~ 
allegations / or the conclusions of the District Court. 
The correlation conclusions of that court are based on a survey 
made by Prof. Berke of approximately 10% of the Texas school districts. 
*The classification based on comparisons between districts is essentially 
one based on property and geography rather than people. Moreover, 
as shown, supra p. of this opinion, there is no reason to believe -
and certainly no proof in this case - that the relatively poor (however 
defined) are concentrated in the districts with the least property 
values. Nor is there reason to believe that there are not significant 
variations in "wealth" among the citizens of any particular district. 
B1derA, p. 3 Rodriguez(12/30/72) 
Each of these descriptions of the class may well be too vague 
and imprecise to identify a classification for equal protection purposes. 
It :itx is clear, in any event, that the class as designated under each 
of these forumlations is markedly dissimilar to the types of classes 
involved in the precedents relied upon by appellees and the court 
below and lacks the traditional indicia that have rendered other 
classifications suspect. 
Rider A, p. 9 Rodriguez (12/30/72) 
This theory is founded on an unproved assumption, namely, that 
the quality of education varies directly with the amount of public 
funds expended on it. Appellees then argue, and sought to prove, 
that there is a correlation between personal wealth of citizens of 
a district and the expenditures therein for education. They then 
submit that the poorer a person is the less adequate is the quality 
of education he receives from the state. The principal evidence 
submitted in support of the comparative discrimination theory is 
the affidavit of Prof. :De Joele S. Berke of ~afh Syracuse 
University. Relying in major part upon this affidavit, the District 
Court accepted the substance of appellees• theory. First, it noted 
a direct correlation between the wealth of school districts, measured 
in terms of assessable property per pupil and their levels of per 
pupil expenditures. Secon~-~., the Court t~d 9- direct correlation 
between district wealf~;.l and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in-~erms of median family income. 337 F. Supp. at 282. 
~ A • ,. '0. .t , . 
2. 
If, in fact, these two correlations could be sustained, 
appellees' theory would still face grave and unanswered question,s, 
including: what degree of correlation would constitute a sufficient 
basis for concluding that the financing system is desi.gned top operate 
58 
to the peculiar disadvantage of the comparatively poor, and 
whether a class of this size, diversity and amorphous character 
* 
could ever claim the special protection accoded "suspect" classifications? 
Neither of these questions need be addressed 11 in this case, however, 
since appellees' proof falls far short of supporting their~ 
allegations for the conclusions of the District Court. 
The correlation conclusions of that court are based on a survey 
made by Prof. Berke of approximately 10% of the Texas school districts. 
*The classification based on comparisons between districts is essentially 
one pased on property and geography rather than people. Moreover, 
as shown, supra p. of this opinion, there is no reason to believe -
and certainly no proof in this case - that the relatively poor (however 
defined) are concentrated in the districts with the least property 
values. Nor is there reason to believe that there are not significant 
variations in "wealth" among the citizens of any particular district. 
Rodriguez Rider A, p. 44 (12/29/72) 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitutional 
function restrain us from undertaking through the judiciary the 
initiation of fundamental reforms in state taxation and education -
subjects of great complexity and vital concern to the states and 
localities. That role is reserved for the legislative processes of 
the various states, and we do no violence to the Dll: values of 
federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We 
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to be viewed 
as placing its judicial kR:p:u: imprimatur on the status quo. The 
need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have 
relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And 
certainly innovative new thinking as to public education is necessary 
to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity. 
. . 
,, ...... ~ .. 
Rider A, P. 1 Rodriguez 
The District Court vaguely identified the class as all citizens 
in "poor school districts," obviously too imprecise a definition 
to merit serious consideration. Viewing the appellees' case in 
the most favorable light, we find no identifiable class or group 
of individuals that bears any similarity to the class involved in 
any of the precedents relied on by appellees or the court below. 
Indeed, whether the class here involved be deemed citizens of 
poor districts, children in such districts, or the poor in such 
districts, the result is a diverse and amorphous class not sus-
ceptible of rational identification. Our inquiry might well end 
at this point. In view, however, of the importance of this case 
and fact that other courts apparently have accepted the asserted 1 
basis for equal protection relief, we will now test in detail appellees' 
\ 
claims against the precedents relied upon. 
\ 
Rodriguez Rider Az p. 14 (12/26/72) 
(i) the class claimed to be disadvantaged (all citizens in the poor 
school districts) is divers and amorphous; and (ii) the injury alleged 
is in no sense an absolute deprivation of the desired beaefit. 
1. The cases relieLupon by appellees have involved 
indigents - a specific and identifiable class.. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. Californ~ 372 U.S. 353 (1963), 
44 
and their progeny, the state laws invalidated were found to deny a 
tair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. Similarly, in 
~illia~~ v. Illinois, 399 U.s. 235 (1970) and Tate v. Short2 401 
U.S. 395 (1971), we struck down criminal penalties that subjected 
indigents to incarceration simply because they were unable to pay 
fines. In each of those eases, the Court was not dealing with some 
undef4ned class characterized as "the poor", but with a level of 
absolute poverty (indigeney) which rendered each complainant 
totally unable to pay for the state-proffered benefit. 
The first difficulty with appellees argument is that the 
class simply cannot be ascertained if it is defined as "the poor" 





Once we depart from the accepted standard of :lndigency, the word 
"poor" describes no identifiable class of persons except in a 
relative sense. This Court has never tested the validity of legislation 
under the 14th Amendment by asking whether it discriminates against 
the relatively poor in favor of the relatively rich. Or, putting it 
differently, in a society as diverse as ours - and in which there is 
no stratification of citizens into social or economic classes - it would 
be impossible to draw constitutional lines on the basis of who is 
relatively rich as compared with who is relatively poor. 
The difficulty with such a formulation is well illustrated 
by this case. Appellees have endeavored to show generally that 
children from relatively poorer faBtblkfe!ia.Wwaidnecl families tend 
to reside in relatively poorer districts. Perhaps this is true as 
a generalization with respect to some districts. It is certainly 
not acceptable as an invariable premise. Indeed, as studies in 
other states have indicated, there is reason to believe that the 






Comment to Larry: 
I am not at all satisfied with this Rider. Perhaps the 
difficulty results from our discussing, at this point, the "remedy" 
as well as whether equal protection has been denied. As the main 
thrust of the opinion at this point is focused on the equal protection 
analysis, perhaps a discussion in the text of the "remedy" problem 
is a distraction. We might drop it into a note or omit entirely • 
. .. 
~der A, p. 16 Rodr_iguez 12/26/72 
There is no absolute deprivation of education and no showing that 
the quality of education provided is not reasonably adequate. The 
application of c onventtonal equal protection analysis to this situation 
presents :aJb(itB: unique problems, first, in identifying the alleged 
invidious discrimination and, second, if such is found to exist, 
in devising an appropriate constitutional remedy. 
Rider A, p. 17 Rodriguez 12/26/72 
The mere asking of this question suggests the difficulty -
if not impossibility - of answering it in the courts. Whether any 
particular form, level or extent of education is "adequate" depends 
upon so many variables, and inherently is such a subjective 
inquiry, that the experts disagree widely.* But even if there were 
some formula which enabled the Court to B:BII.Itiu conclude that 
inadequate education is being provided, the problem of devising 
and implementing an appropriate remedy would remain. 
*Larry: Either make some cross reference to other notes or 
supply some general reference - if you have one. 
Rider A, p. 18 Rodr1S\!ez (12/26/72) 
Yet any alternative system which falls short of providing 
equal expenditures per pupil (or at least per district) will inevitably 
result in continued disparities. Perhaps it could be argued, under 
some such system, that the disparities of expenditures ware 
uiadtx: relatively less than under the present system. Again, in 
an area in which there are no absolutes and few objective standards, 
who is to say what level of disparity is discriminatory or results 
in an a inadequate education?* If, as the logic of appellees' position 
would require, the remedy were to be equal expenditures on a 
per pupil or per district basis, the result would not nec-Jssarily 
benefit the children of relatively JPClCI&' poorer b'*tOM••x families. 
As noted elsewhere in this opinion, in view of the tendency of low 
income families to live in districts with commercial and industrial 
properties, the result of an equal expenditure remedy would benefit 
the poor in some instances and penalize them in others. We have 
not been confronted with any such episodic and unpredictable 
result in prior cases involving elements of wealth discrimination. 
*Larry: If we use this rider, there should be it11WXCMCBB CrOSS 
references here to one or two of the footnotes which discuss tine 
practical and political problems of adopting some different sy·stem 
as being constitutionally mandated: e. g. notes 85 and 92. ' 




Rider B, p. 18 Rodriguez 12/26/72 
There are, then, two significant differences between the 
present ease and those relied oo by the district court as supporting 
its findin of wealth discrimination: The class, being diverse and 
amorphous, cannot be identified with sufficient exactitude; and 
there is no absolute deprivation of the right or benefit in question. 
These differences would be sufficient to east serious rclll!iiaoc: doult 
as to the correctness of the district court's holding. There is, 
however, a further ground for questioning the soundness of that 
court's constitutional analysis. A finding of wealth discrimination 
alone has never been held to constitute a sufficient basis for 
52 
subjecting state legislation to the compelling interest test. 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
R-
DRAFT SYLLABUS 
(Based on draft 
No. 4 of the opinion) 
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al 
v. RODRIGUEZ et aL 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Texas 
No. 71-1332. Argued October 12, 1972 ... Decided , 1973 
The financing of public elementary and secondary schools in 
Texas ia a product of state and local participation. Almost half of the 
revenues •re derived from a largely state-funded program designed to 
provide a basic minimum educational offering in every school. Each 
district supplements state aid through an ad valoeem tax on property 
within its jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class action on behalf of 
school children said to be members of poor families who reside in school 
districts having a low property tax base, making the claim that the Texas 
system's reliance on local property taxatioo favors the more affluent 
and violates equal protection requirements because of substantial inter-
district disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting primarily from 
differences in the value of assessable property among the districts. The 
District Court, finding that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that 
education is a "fundamental" right, concluded that the system could be 
upheld only upon a showing, whibh appellants failed to make, that there 
was a compelling state interest for the system. The court also concluded 
- 2-
that appellants failed even to demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis 
for the state's system. Held: The Texas school-financing system does 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Pp. 14-49. 
( 1) This is not a proper case in which to examine a State's laws 
under standards of strict judicial scrutiny, since that test is reserved 
for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect 
classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties 
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution. P. 14-40. 
(a) Thelexas system does not disadvantage any suspect class. 
It has not been shown to discriminate against ay definable class of 
. -~ ~ .. , . 
''poor" people or to occasion relative discriminations depending on the 
relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as the 
flnancing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their individual 
income characteristics, reside in relatively poor school district., the 
resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. Pp. 14-24. 
(b) Nor does the Texas school-financing system impermissibly 
interfere with the exercise of a "fundamental" right or liberty. Though 
education is one of the most important services performed by the State 
it is not within the limited category of rights and liberties recognized 
~this Court as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even if some identifiable 
' .. 
- 3-
quantum of education is arguably entitled to constitutional protection to 
make meaningful the exercise of other constitutional rights, here there 
is no showing that the Texas system fails to provide the basic minimal 
skills necessary for that purpose. Pp. 25-35. 
(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to invoke 
strict scrutiny since it involves the most delicate and difficult questions 
of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and federalism, 
considerations counseling am.re restrained form of review. Pp. 35-40. 
(2) The Texas sytem, though concededly imperfect, bears a 
r ational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. While assuring 
basic education for every child in the Sttlte, it permits and encourages 
participation in and significant cootrol of each district's schools at the 
local level. Pp. 40-49. 
337 F. Supp. 280, reversed. 
:rmangucz '11-l;}"'JZ 
FOOTNOTES 
1. Not all of the children of these complainants attend 
public school. One family's children are enrolled in private 
school "because of the condition of the schools in the Edgewood 
Independent School District. " Third Amended Complaint, ~ 
app. at 14. 
2. The San Antonio Independent School District, whose 
name this case still bears, was one of seven school districts 
in the San Antonio metropolitan area which were originally named 
as party defendants. After a pretrial conference, the District 
Court issued an order dismissing the school districts from the 
case. Subsequently, the San Antonio Independent School District 
has joined in the plaintiffs' challenge to the State's school finance 
system and has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that 
position in this Court. 
3. A three-judge court was properly convened and 
there are no questions as to the <;!istrict ~ourt' s jurisdiction 
. -;: = 
2. 
or the direct appealability of its judgment. 28 U. S.C. §§ 2281, 
" 
1253. 
4. The trial was delayed for two years )'it;o6ct~·~ to permit 
extensive pretrial discovery and to allow completion of a pending 
Texas legislative investigation concerning the need for reform of 
its public school finance system. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. 
School Dist., F. Supp. --
__ , n. 11 (W. D. Tex. 1971). --
5. F. Supp. The District Court stayed its --
mandate for two years to provide Texas with an opportunity to 
remedy the inequities found in its financing program. The court, 
however; retained jurisdiction to fashion its own remedial order 
if the State failed to offer an acceptable plan. Id. at __ 
6. Tex. Const., Art. X, Sec. 1: 
11A general diffusion of knowledge being essential 
to the preservation of the ~ rights and liberties 
of the people it shall be the duty of the Legislature 
of this State to make suitable provision for the 
support and maintenance of public schools. " 
Id. , Art. fk X, Sec. 2: 
"The Legislature shall as early as practicable 
establish free schools throughout the State, and 
shall furnish means for their support, by taxation 
on property. " 
3. 
· 7. Tex. Canst. 1876, Art. 7, Sec. 3, as amended, Aug. 
14, 1883. 
8. Tex. Canst. , Art. 7, § § 3, 4, 5. 
9. Gammel's Laws of Texas p. 1178. See Tex. Canst. , 
Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 (interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor's 
Committee on Public School Education, The Challenge and the 
Chance 27 (1969) [hereinafter Governor's Committee Report]. - -
10. Tex. Canst., Art. 7, § 5 (see also the interpretive 
~ommentary); V Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12. 
11. Tex. Canst., Art. 7, Sec. 3, as amended Nov. 5, 
1918 (see interpretive commentary). 
12. I Governor's Committee Report, at 35; J. Coons, 
W. Clune, S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education 
49 (1970); E. Cubberley, School Funds and Their Apportionment 
21-27 (1905). 
13. By 1940 one-half of the state's population was 
clustered in its metropolitan centers. I Governor's Committee 





14. Gilmer-kKkfax Committee, To Have What We Must (1948). 
' 
15. R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken B~lls 11-12 (1950); 
Texas Bd. of Educ. , The Texas Statewide School Adequacy Survey 
(1938). 
16. R. Still, supra note 15, at 12. 
17. 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1939, 
at 274 ($22. 50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th 
Legis/ Reg. Sess. 1943, ch. 161, at 262 ($25. 00 per student). 
r_ 18. General Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg. 
Sess. 1945, ch. 53, at 75. 
19. For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of 
a foundation program, see R. Stills, supra note 15. See also 
V Governor's Committee Report, at 14; Texas Reserach League, 
~ 
Public School Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972). 
20. For the 1970-71 school year this state aid program 
accounted for 48. o% of all public school funds. Local taxation 
contributed 41. 1% and 10. 9% was provided in federal funds. Texas 
Research League, supra note 19, at 9. 
' < 
5. 
21. V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48 . 
22. At present there are 1, 161 school districts in Texas. 
Texas Research League, at 12. 
22a. In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that 
some school districts were not levying any local tax to support 
education. 
I f-f-G-4.. J 
Gilmer-Aiken Comml\' supra note 11._, at 16. 
, v e ~o (J.. ) ; r:J f ~ I J..f,J t~~ f J G". 
23. Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Have \1/ftat \tie M~s~ 
24. I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
25. Texas Research League, supra note_, at 2. 
26. In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average 
per pupil expenditure for all current operating expenses increased 
·from $206 to $493. In that same period capital expenditures 
increased from $44 to $102 per:::pppupil. I Governor's Committee 
Report, at 53:-54. 
'(;Ct.. .:r::ri. .xJo v·O· I1t~J.f C., t;-;nm ' ff~~ l?epoJ· ij ~ 1/3 -'it. ~ 
27. The Available School Fund, technically, provides a 
second source of State money. 'I11at Fund has continued as in 
,· 
6. 
years past (see text accompanying notes ___ supra)to 
distribute uniform per pupil grants to every district in the state. 
In 1968 this Fund allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the 
available School Fund xxtx contribution is always subtracted 
from a district's entitlement under the Foundation Program, it 
plays no significant role in educational finance today. 
28. While the federal ass~stance has an ameliorating effect 
on the difference in school budgets between wealthy and poor 
districts, the District Court rejected an argument made by x 
the State in that court that it should consider the effect of the 
federal grant in assessing the discrimination claim. F. Supp. 
at . The state has not renewed that contention here. 
29. The figures quoted above vary slightly from those 
utilized in the District Court opinion/\ _ F. Supp. at __ . These . 
trivial differences are apparently a product of that court's reliance 
on slightly different statistical data than we kxwmoo have relied upon. 






31. The District Court relied on the firidings presented 
in an affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His 
sampling of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct 
correlation between the amount of a district's taxable property and 
its level of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct 
correlation between a district's median family inc.ome and per 
pupil RXJmlUlK expenditures as well as an inverse correltion 
between percentage of minorities and expenditures. 
Categorized by Equalized Property Values, 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 












Per Cent State & Local 




$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 23% $483 
(30 Districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 31% $462 
( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 79% $305 
( 4 Districts) 
Alth~u~- the ! acc~racy~h~ correlations with respect to family 
income and race appear only to exist at the extremes, and 
d--although the affiant's methodology has been questioned (see Goldstein, 
Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing; a Critial Analysis 
J 
8. 
of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 
(1972)), insofar as any of these three correlations is relevant 
to the constitutional thesis presented in this case~ we may 
accept its basic thrust. 
32. ~· ~· , Police Dep. of City of Chicago v. ~ 
Mosley, 40 _ U. S. -- (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S. 
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
33. ~· ~· , Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. (1970); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
34. §~ Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S. _, (1972) and 
:sk the cases collected therein. 
35. Appellants' brief, at 11. 
36. Id. 
37. Tr. or. arg.
1 
at 3. 
38. ~· ~·, Griffin v. Illinois, ~ 351 U.S. 12 (1956); 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
39. Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1964); 
McDonald v. Bd. of Elections, 394 U.S. 803 (1969); Bullock v. 
Cart.er, 40 U.S. _ (1972). 
' ,.( •. \ 
9. 
40. See cases cited in text at infra. ----
~~[ _OA ~ ~;) 
41. As indicated in ~ note supra, there is reason to 
question whether EX - even in Texas - there is a direct correlation 
between family wealth measured by inc orne and district wealth 
measured by assessed ~ property valuations. Studies in other 
States have found even less correlation. Ridenour & Ridenour, 
Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 
213, 225 (1972) ~"it can be argued that there exists in Kansas 
:almost an inverse correlation: districts with highest income per 
. pupil have low assessed value per pupil, and districts with high 
. assessed value per pupil have low income per pupil. "); Davies, 
The Challenge of Change in School Finance, in Nat'l Educational 
Ass'n, lOth Annual Conf. on School Finance (1967). 
42. Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance 
Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. 
Rev. 1303, 1328-29 ( 1972). 






44. iXk at 1328. 
45. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, · 401 U.S. 371 (1971) in 
which an indigent's due process right of access to a divorce 
tribunal was found not to require more than "meaningful opportunity" 
to obtain a divorce. Id. at 379-380. The Court did not command 
that the procedures available for rich and poor be equal: it only 
required that they be adequate and effective. Id. at 382. 
46. Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra note _, at 
13 (emphasis added). 
47. Appellants' brief, at 35; Reply -brief, at 1. But 
see 5 Governor's Committee Report, at 32. 
48. For this reason appellees' were able to draw little 
precedential sustenance from the Court's cases dealing :k with 
wealth classifications touching on the right to vote. Harper v. 
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. (196_); Bullock v. 
Carter, 40_ U.S. (1972); McDonald v. Bd. of Election~, 
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)(_dictum). Each of those cases 
11. 
involved the right to vote on an equal basis with thex rest of the 
electorate - a right repeatedly held to be constitutionally 
fundamental. E. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 40_ U.S. (1972). 
49. See Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal. 3d __ , pd 
(1971); Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp. (197_); 
~.· Robinson v. Ca~ll _xk N. J. _, A. 2d (197_); 
W• ., 
J. Coons, ~· Clp1e and S. Sugarman, supra, note_, at_; 
Goldstein, supra note __ , at __ ; Note, Educational Financing 
. . 
& Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1324, 1335-42 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing 
Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 
Ariz. L. Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972). 
50. F. Supp. at 
F-·~·) 
51. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Oregon 
1\ 
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970). 
a..£-+ct-
52. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970) there 
II 
could be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation 
for the Court's holding in Shaprio. In Dandridge the Court applied 
12. 
I· 
the rational basis test in reviewirig Maryland's maximum family 
grant provision under kits AFDC program. A federal district 
court held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter 
standard of review. In the course of reversing the lower court, 
the Court distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that there 
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally 
protected freedom of interstate travel.'\ Id. at 484 n. 16. 
53. The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test 
despite its~ contemporaneous recognition in 
~ Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) that 
"welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, 
housing and medical care. " 
\J 
54. In Eisenstadt the Court str!Ck down a Massachusetts 
statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, 
finding that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal 
protection standard. " Id. at n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, 
the Court recited the proper form of equal protection analysis: 
13. 
"if we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges 
upon fundamental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (196_)J the statutory classification would have to be not merely 
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the 
achievement of a compelling state interest. " Id. , (emphasis in 
original). 
55. Dunn fully canvasses this Court's equal protection 
voting rights cases and explains that "this Cou~as made clear that 
iYI e le. c. r t(/11.! 
a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate on 
A 
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Id. at _:-r, 
C t--l'Y'vtJJ'\1...;..~ A,.(._, J .~t.J. ) · 
The CXE constitutional :mniRXJ!IW underpinnings of the right to equal 
treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted even though, 
as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 
663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in state elections is nowhere 
expressly mentioned." See Bullock v. Carter, 40_ U.S. (1972); 
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
.. ~· ·· .. ,, 
14. 
- . ~ . 
56. In Mosley the~ Court . str!'Ck down a Chicago 
wh~ c.~ 
anti-picketing ordinance .~ exempted labor picketing from its 
prohibitions. The ordinance was held invalid under the equal 
pxE!iatprotection clause after subjecting it to careful scrutiny 
and finding that the ordinance was not narrowly drawn. The 
stricter standard of review was appropriately applied since the 
ordinance was one "affecting First Amendment interests. " 
Id. at 
57. Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a 
state law permitting forced sterlization of ''habitual criminal1,\' 
Implicit in the Court's opinion is the XRE recognition that the right 
to procreate is among the rights of personal privacy now protected 
under the Constitution . . See Roe v. Wade, U.S. __ , 
(1972). 
58. See, ~· ~· , Red Lion Broadc;:tsting Co. v. :tiD:: FCC, 
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 
(1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
.. .. ~ .. ' 
15. 
59. The States have often ·pursued their entirely legitimate 
interest in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise, " 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966), through 
~ 
such Gl~rsss as literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to 
vote. See id.; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). And, 
where those restrictions have been found to promote intelligent 
use of the ballot without discriminating against those racial and 
ethnic minorities heretofore deprived of an equal educational 
opportunity, this Court has upheld their use. Compare Lassiter 
v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), with Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U. S. at 133 (Mr. Justice Black), 144-47 (Mr. Justice 
Douglas), 216-17 (Mr. Justice Harlan), 231-36 (Mr. Justice 
Brennan), 282-84 (Mr. Justice Stewart), and Gaston County v. -
United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 
· 60. Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' 
nexus theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the ~ significant 
16. 
personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that 
the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most 
ineffective participants in the political process and that they 
derive the least enjoyment from the benefits o~ the First 
Amendment. See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in 
Public Education, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-90 (1971). 
If so, under appellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 
(196_) and Lindsey v. Normet, 40_ U.S. (1972) 
would no longer~ be good constitutional law. 
61. Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by 
registered voters in New York City to a provision of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 that prohibited enforcement of a state law 
calling for English literacy tests for voting. The law~ was 
Rico 
suspended as to residents from Puerto~ who had completed at 
u-6 f~d .. )At.dl_~ , V 
least six years \at an "American-flag" school in that country even 
though the language of instruction was other than English. This 
'· .. ~ . ·. 
17. 
Court upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it 
discriminated against those with a sixth · grade education obtained 
in a non-English speaking schools other than the ones designated 
1\ 
by the federal legislation. 
62. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); 
Sisters 
Pierce v. Society of~ 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. 
Kick, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M. D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 
476 (1971}. 
63. See, ~· ~·, Bell's Gap R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 
U.S. 232 (1890); Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 
Jt 508-09 (1937); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 
(1959). 
----'l 
64. The quality-cost controversy has received considerable 
attention. Among the jXJ.ost notable authorites on both sides are 
the following. C. j Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisis -------
in the Classroom ( 1970); Office of Education, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Educational 
\ 
Rider A, Page 34, Rodriguez 12/14/72 
Add as a footnote something along the following lines: 
Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer 
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace it. 
The authors ofji\"ivate Wealth, supra. p. __ , suggest a scheme 
called "district power equalizing." In simplieS: terms, the state would 
take funds from the "richer" districts and allocate them to the "poorer" 
districts, guaranteeing that a particular tax rate would provide a 
stated number of dollars per pupil regardless of the tax base of the par· 
ticular district. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and 
against "district power equalizing," beyong noting that the commentators 
are in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and 
indeed whether it would violate the Equal ProGlction clause. (Larry: 
here cite the Presidential Commission and perhaps others.) The almost 
inevitable result of invalidating the present system would be statewide 
financing of all public education, assuring - to meet the equal protection 
standards invoked by respondents - substantially identical per pupil ex-
penditures in every school district. There are only two ways to accomplish 
this massive restructuring: (i) expenditures could be equalized by taking 
•• ' •• 'I 
~. /7~ 
-2-
money away from some districts and applying them in others, a process 
of leveling down to a common denominator; or (ii) additional tax money 
would have to be raised to elevate per pupil expenditure to the highest 
level now obtaining in prosperous districts. It has been estimated that 
it would require $2. 4 billion of additional school funds to bring all 
Texas districts up to the present top level- an amount more than double 
that currently being spent in Texas on public education. The other alter-
native, of leveling down districts presently enjoying higher than average 
per pupil expenditure, is hardly more promising in terms of its political 







Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller eds); J. Guthrie, G. 
Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. Stout, Schools and Inequality (1971); 
President's Comm'n on School Finance, Schools, People & Money: 
The Need For Educational Reform (1972); Swanson, , The Cost-Quality 
Relationship, in lOth Nat'l Conf. on School Finance, The Challenge 
of Change in School Finance 151 (1967). 
64a. See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's 
. statewide survey on the goals of education in that State. I. 
Governor's Committee Report, at 59-68. See also Goldstein, supra 
.note __ , at 519-22; Schoettle, supra note _; authorities cited 
in Note 64 supra. 
65. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 
"Jil. 
(1959) (Mr. Justice Brenna, concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
· I 








66. In 'R 1970 Texas expended approximately 2~ 1 billion 
Ibm dollars for education and a little over one billion came from 
the Minimum Foundation Program. Texas Research League, 
~~A~ ~v-, d .-' 
.Public School E.inanee P~s in 'fe~ ( l9-~ 
67. Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 13. 
68. Tex. Educ. Code § 16. 18. 
69. Tex. Educ. Code§ 16.15. 
70. Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 16, 16. 17, 16. 19. 
71. Tex. Educ . Code §§ 16. 45, 16. 51. 
72. Tex. Educ. Code § 12. 01. 
73. Tex. Educ . Code 11. 26( 5). 
74. Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16. 301 et. seq. 
75. See note supra. 
~~ ~w ·- ~d .. --
76. Gilmer-Aiken Committee, ~o Have l3laat We Mnst ( 194~. 
77. There is no uniform statewide assessment practice 
in Texa/,\Commercial property, for example, might be ~ 
taxed at 30% of market value in one county and at 50% in another. 
V. Governor's Committee Report, at 25-26. 
' . 
:... ' '~ . '
J.fO~~· 
(ji)/~;~· I 
p ,;;t:;.-'fy . 20. 
_;?! ~· 
78. Texas Research LeagU.e, supra note_, at 18. 
79. President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra note_, 
at Until recently Hawaii was the only state that maintained 
a purely state-funded educational program. In 1968, however, that 
State amended its educational finance statute to permit counties to 
KEilbet collect additional funds locally and spend those xmimDdxlm 
amounts on its schools. The rationale for that recent legislative 
choice is instructive on the question before the Court today: 
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from 
doing anything in this area, even to spend their 
own funds if they so desire. This corrective legis-
lation is urgently needed in order to allow counties 
to go above and beyond the State's standards and 
provide educational facilities as good as the people 
of the counties want and are willing to pay for. 
Allowing local communities to go above and beyond 
established minimunns provide for their people 
encourages the best features of democratic gov-
ernment. " Hawaii Sess. Laws, Art. 38, § 1 
(1968). 
80. See text ace ompanying note supra. 
81. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State 
. 
of New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution 
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of 
educational finance, see J. Coons, W. Cltie & S. Sugarman, supra 
1 . 
Note_, at 39-95. 
- ' .. 
..ruaer K, 
Add to Footnote 78, in addition to the present reference: 
As noted supra, p. _, the extent to which the quality of 
of education varies with expenditure per pupil# is debated inconclusively 
by the most thoughtful students of public education. While all would 
agree that there is a correlation up to the point of providing the 
recognized essentials, the issues of greatest disagreement include 
the effect on quality of pupil-teacher ratios and higher salary 
schedules. The state funding~ Texas is designed to assure, 
t-v/~"'-- :..,.,u ~-u..~-# ,{ 
on the average, one teacher for every 25 students, c-on(}edsa to be 
1'\ 
a favorable ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary 
of $6, 000 per year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers 
~ -n~<~j't'V j~Lf 
.may be more debatable) espeG-ially depending.!\ upon the location of 
the school district. But there appears to be little :k empirical data 
/ ~ ' ., + . .J - , ·• 
~;- I..{ .·=· ~( . ~- jr]AP·.,/(-<~-o.->--4....._; 
whicl; ~uppdrts an adv ntage of any pree:ts-e pupil teacher ratio or 
/w A 
which doc).lments the view that ever higher salaries:x result in more 
competent teaching. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' 
salaries is the absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques 
2: 
th'-'" 
of judging the ability ot performance of teachers. The result is 
that relatively few school systems have merit plans a{ any kind, 
with teachers' salaries being increased ''by rote" and across the 
board in a way whichXR rewards the least deserving on the same 
basis as the most deserving. M.Qst-s-ystems-raise.:§alaries 
~ (A..4.-<. .... ,_e. t2y ._,.....c~~Q. 
~automatically on the basis of predetermined "steps", extending over 
10 to 12 year periods.~ In making these observations, we h~ 
~k~L /V<-Q . . (.,._v 
thoy.gflt-ef criticiztrH(existing practices and certainly we imply no 
1\ 1\ 
opinion that teachers' salaries generally are adequate. As compared 
with others of comparable education there is every reason to believe 
teC--<" ~fu:.A-1-.J i ~ p~~..-l-df2y) . 
that sueh salaries starting from an unduly low base in-m~eaiities, 
A I l 
have failed even to keep abreast of inflation. We have included 
this commentary on pupil teachers ratios and salary levels not to 
H..t_ e:L£•·~~.Af u(/ 
express any opinion with respect to_/hose m Texas or elsewhere, 
but merely to indicate that the two ~principal factors distinguishing 
the schools in the more affluent districts from those elsewhere do 
not - in the opinion of many experts - demonstrably and necessa:dly 
' ,. 
f'0__ I 
affect quality.c-j /1c...:.- ~L--~ --h 
·\ ----, 
(Note to Larry: I think it is desirable to add the 
substance of the foregoing to your footnote 78. It is 
a delicate area and yet I know from my own personal 
experience that the substance of what I have said is 
probably correct and certainly is widely debated. 
I say this in spite of the fact that I fought with the 
City Council in Richmond, and later with the legislature, 
over a period of many years for annual increases in 
teachers' salaries. If you have some citations of 
scholarly discussions of these issues, you might add 




82. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note _, 
Foreward by James. S. Coleman, at vii. 
83. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 
311 (1932). 
84. The value of local control of education was recognized 
( last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright 
\\ \ v. Council of City of Emporia, 40_ U.S. (1972). Mr. Justice 









felt in our society. " Id. at _. Likewise, the Chief Justice 
admonished that 11 [1 ]ocal control is not only vital to continued 
.\ 
\ public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance 
~ 
from an educational standpoint as well. 11 Id. at 
85. "Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors 
Coons, Clu~ and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of 
1 . 
public education may not be a function of wealth other than the 
total wealth of the state. 11 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, 




i u+ i ,.v, 
,.. . 
22. 
supra note _ _ , at __ . Their· thoughtful and imaginative work 
paved the way for the suits, including the present one, attacking -the.. 
school finance system. Indeed, the District Court approved the 
authors' thesis verbatim. F. Supp. at The authors --- ---
J j '-t"#..MAJ 
have often cautioned their supporterAagainst speculating that 
"fiscal neutrality" would be a panacea for the poor or for racial 
I 
minorities. ]Jd. at _ _ ; Coons, Clune & Sugarman, xxRx A First 




p nv 0 
See also u.s. Office of Education, Finances of Large City 





., .. ,. 
" 
Rider A, page, 22 of Footnotes Rodriguez 
85a. An initial problem, more obvious to elected officials 
than to those of us who write opinions for the courts or essays for the 
law reviews, is the gut one of money. Whatever formula may be employed, 
there are essentially only two ways to accomplish equal per pupil ex-
penditure (even approximately) in every school district: (1) expenditures 
could be equalized by taking revenues away from some districts and 
applying them to the benefit of others, a process of leveling down to a 
common denominator; or (ii) vast additional tax revenues would have to 
be raised to elevate per pupil expenditure to the highest level now obtain-
ing in the districts which provide the greatest supplementation of state 
funds. Neither of these alternatives seems realistic • The residents \of 
\ 
a district which, with good fortune and dedication to public education ha've 
\ 
a high level of expenditure, are not likely to be tolerant of a leveling plan \ 
that reduces funding for their district to increase it elsewhere. Would 





teat~her ratios were increased, what would happen to the teachers no longer 
e1L7fl.ployed? What, indeed, would happen to school bonds issued p\suant 
tp a vote of citizens proud of their schools and willing to pay more '' 
1 A 
! ' i\\ 
\ I 
I. 




statewide, is no more palatable politically o It is estimated that $2 0 4 
billion of additional school funds would be required to bring all Texas 
districts up to the present top level of expenditure- an amount more 
than double that currently being spent in Texas on public education 
(Appellants' brief, Po 40). At a time when every state and locality 
is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands for ser-
vices of all kin~s burgeoning and with weary taxpayers already resisting 
tax increases, only those who live in a dream world could believe tht 
a decision of this Court nullifying present state taxing systems would 
result in doubling public funds committed to education. Rather, there-
sult in terms of confusion and disruption would be profound, and in the 













88. Professor Berke, whose affidavits regarding the 
relationship between povei·ty, race, and educational expenditure 
~ "n CI f C. - /.lA.N~) 
in Texas were relied on by the District Court,;\has since published 
a study of the possible effects of several lad alternatives to the 
present system of educational finance. Berke, Inequalities in 
School Finance, 33-34, 66-69 (1972). That study indicates that 
it is entirely possible that an equal expenditures alternative would 
~ead to higher taxation and lower expenditures in the major urban 
~reas. See also U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City 
School Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW publication). 
89. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra note __ , 
~t vi (dedication). 
1st DRAFT 
(17-/?-t/77.-) 
SUPREME COURT OF 'l'HE UNITED STATES 
No. 71- 1332 
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the 
District et al., Appellants United States Dis-
trict Court for the 
Western District of 
v. 
Texas. Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al. 
[January -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the 
Court. 
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.' 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who arc members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low properLy tax base. Named as defendants~ 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not afl of the children of thrse romplain:lllt ::; attend public ~chool. 
One f:unil~ ·'::; children are enrolled in priyate ,.:chool "hec:lu,.;e of the 
rondit ion of t hr ~rhool,.; in t hr Edgrwood Indeprndeni School Di::;-
trict.'' Thii'([ Amrndecl Complaint, App., at 14. 
~ Thr San Antonio IndrpE'nd<'nt School Di~trict , whose name thi::; 
case ~ till be:1r,.; , was one of ;;even ,.;chool dist ril't~ in the San Antonio 
metro]1olitan area which were originally nnmed :1~ part~ · defendant~. 
After a prrtrial confNenre, the Di:;trict Court is,.;urd nn ordc•r cliH-
mi~,.;ing the ,.;chool di~t rirt,.; from the rase. Rubsrqurntl~·. thr San 
Antonio IndepC'ndent Sc·hool Dist riet has .ioinrd in the plaint iff::;' 
challenge to t IIC' St n t e's ,.;chool finance ~~·~t rm and ha:-; filrd nn 






2 SAN Mi'TO:NIO SCHOOL DISTinCT v. RODRIGUEZ 
of Education, the ~tatr Attorney GC'nC'ral, ancl th0 Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in the summer of Hl68 and a three-judge court 
was impaneled in .January 1060." ln Decelllber 1971" 
the panel rcnclercd its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas f'chool finance system unconstitutional 
uncler the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. '' The State appealed and we noted prob-
able jurisdiction to consider the far~reaching constitu-
tional questions presented, 406 U. S. 966 ( 1\)72). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into the Union 'in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools.n Early in its history, 
:<A three-j11(lgr court was proprrly convrnrd and thrrc arc no 
quest ionl:l as to the Dist riet Court's .i urisdict ion or i hr direct ~ppeal­
ability ol' its judgment. 28 U. 8. C. §§ 22R1, 1253. 
'The trial was drla.Yed for two year::; to prrrnit extrnsin• pretrial 
cli:::rovery and to allow completion of :t pending Texns ](•gislativc 
investigation ronc·erning the nc•ecl for rel'orm of it~> public school 
finance s~·stcm. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 
F. Supp. 2f,O, 285 11. 11 CWD Tex. 1971). 
"3:37 F. Rupp. 280. The Distriet Court stn~·(•d its mand:1te for 
two ~·ears io pro1·ide Texas ~n opportunit.1· to rcmed)· the inequitie:; 
found in ii~ finanC'ing program. The court, howe1·er, rPtainecl juri~­
diction io fa:-;hion it~ own n•mcdial order if the State failed to offer 
an ncceptablc plan. I d., at 286. 
G Tex. Const., Art. X, § 1: 
"A general diffusion of knowledge hPing; C'>'~Pnti:ll io thr preservation 
of tlw right,.; nnd libertip,; of the people it ~hall be ihe duty of ihe 
Legi~latme of thi~ State• to make suitable provi~ion for the ~>UpporL 
nnd lll:lintenance of public );Choo]:;." 
!d., Ari. X, §2: 
"The Lcgi~l:li me :,;hall a~ early a:,; pract icahlr estnhlish frer schools 
throughout the Stair, and :::hall fumi~h mean~ for their ~upport, by 
taxation on property." 
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Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
schools. relying on mutual participation by the local 
school diRt.rids and tlw Rtntr. As early as lF\8~ the state 
constitution "·as amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empo\\"erecl to levy ad valorem 
taxes vvith the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school builcliJJgs" ancl for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were 
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.' The Prrmanent School Fund, established in 
1854," was endowed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued Rource of income for 
school support."' The A vailablr School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent Fund as well as 
from state property taxes, served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this ce11tury. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
the State.' t 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property v\·ealth were spread 
r.elatively evenly across the State.•t Sizable differences 
7 Tex. ConHt. 1876, Art. 7, § 8, as amrndrd, Aug. 14, 1883. 
8 TPx. Con~t., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4, 5. 
9 Gammd's Lam; of Trxas, p. 1178. Srr Trx. Canst., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 
(intrrprrt il'(' ('OllllTIC'lltarirs); I RP[)Ol't or Go,·ernor's Committrr on 
Public Sehool Education, Tlw Clwllrngr nnd the Clwnee 27 (196!)) 
(hereinal'lc•r Govrrnor':-; Committrr Rrport). 
10 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § ,) (~rc abo lhr intrrpretive eomnwntary); 
· V Govrrnor's Committrr Rrport, at 11-12. 
11 Trx. Const. , Art. 7, § 3, as amendrd, Nov. 5, 1918 (;;re inter-
JHPtivr eomnwntar~' ). 
12 I Governor's Committ<'c Rrport, ai 35; .T. Coons, W. Clunr, 
S. Sugarmun , Pri\'ate Wraith and l'ublir Education 40 (1970); 
E. Cubbcrley, School Funds and Thrir Apportionmrnt 21-27 (1905). 
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in tho value of assessable propor·ty between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronou need.' " The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. Those growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
wore responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
f<3rences in levels of local expenditure for education.14 
In clue time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund wore not sufficient to ame-
liOI·ate those disparities.' " Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per schoolage child.'n Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,' 7 
the Fund \\'as providing only $46 per student by 1946.' 8 
Recognizing tho need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in tho late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
bf educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
n By 1!)40 one-half of the Stntr'H populntion wn~ elu~terrd in it s 
inet ropolitan renter~. 1 Go\'ernor'H Commit tee Rrport, at 35. 
14 Gilmer-,\iken Commit tre, To IIa 1'0 What vVr l\J IIHt (19~8). 
' " R. Still, Tho GilmN-Aikrn Bill:; 11- 12 (1950) ; Trxas Bd. of 
Eclur., Thr Texas Statewiclr School Adc•qunt'y Smvcy (1938). 
1(; R . Still, sup1'a. n. 15, at 12. 
17 1 General Law,.; of TrxaH, 46th Lc~i R., Rrg. se~;,:. 1939, :II 274 
($22.50 prr HI mlrnt) ; Genrrnl & Sprc. Law~ of Trxns, -18 th LrgiH., 
Reg. s{'~S . 194:3, (', 161 , at 262 (825.00 prr ;; t uclrnt) . 
1 R GrnN:tl & Spec. Law:; of Tcxa;;, 49th Legis., Rrg. Srs:;. 1945, 
c. 53, a t 75. 
. .... 
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alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
state funding scheine that would guarantee a minimum 
or basic educational offering to each child anrl that would 
help overcome .lnterdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.1 " It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas. ~0 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 80~ of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible- as a unit- for providing the remaining 
:207r . The districts ' share- known as the Local Fund 
Assign men t- is apportioned alnong the school districts 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and , to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
1° For a complete hi~tory of the adoption in T r xas of a found a-
tion program , ::;ee R. Still ~, supra, n. 15. Ser abo V Governor 's 
Commit ter Report , at 14; Trxa:-; Hr~carrh Lragur, Public School 
.Finance Problrm~ in Trxas 9 (Interim Rrport 1972) . 
~ ° For thc l9i0- 1971 school yrnr thi~ ,; tatr aiel program accountcd 
for -1 8.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation rontributrd 
41.1% and 10.9% wa ,; provided in federal funds. Texa~ Rr~rarch 
League, supra, n. 19, at 9. 
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in the State."' Each county's as~iglimcnt is then clividec.l 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county."" The 
district then financ<:>s its shar<' of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The dC'sign of this compkx formulation was t,,·o-folcl. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying'. 
Second, the Program's an·hitects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children "a 
but that would 110t b itself exhaust any district's re-
sources."1 Today virtuall. every sc wol c istnct ~ 
.--- --I-Jl-1.!-)0- s .... ~ a property tax rom which it derives locally 
expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary to 
satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation 
Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education-from state as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
and 1967 expenditures increased by approxin1ately 
500;1< ."" In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion "n and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently nsmg per 
n V Governor'::; Committrr Rrport, nt 44-..J-8. 
22 At prc~cnt there arc 1,161 school cli~trict ~ in Texn ~. Tcxa~ Re-
search Lcn~uc , sup1'a, n. 19, at 12. 
2:1 In 19-1-8 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that some school 
clitilriets werr not Jev~·in~ nn~· local tax to ~upporl education. 
Gilmcr-Aikrn Commit tee, supra, n. 14, at 16. 
2 '1 Gilmer-Aiken Committer, supra. n. l..J-, :tt 15. 
2 " I Go\'Crnor'::; Committee Report , :tl 51-53. 
~a Texas Rcl:icarch League, supra, n. 19, at 2. 
' . 
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pupil expenditures throughout the State.27 Minimum 
·teacher salat;ies-by far the largest single item in any 
.school's burlget-'have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years.2 q 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with a11other more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood I nclependent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in thr mrtropol-
itan area. Approximately 22.000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elcmrntary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. rrhe residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 907r of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6o/c 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5.960- the lo\Yest. in the metropolitan area- and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area- the district con-
tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1968 school yrar above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
~ 7 In thr year;,; between 1949 and 19G7 1he a\·erap;r JlC'r pupil 
expend it me for all rmrrnt opera I ing cxpcnHr~ inrrcaH('(I from S206 
to S-HJ.'3. In that ~ame period rapital exprnditures inrrca~Pd from 
$4-l to 8102 pC'r pupil. I Govrrnor'H Committrc RPport, at 53-54. 
28 III Gon•mor'~ Commillrr HPport , :11 113-146; Brrkr, Carna-
valr , Morgan & White, Thr Texa" Srhool Finance CnHr: A Wrong 
i"n Scnrrh of a Hrmcdy, 1 .T. of L. & Edur. G59, 681- 6 2 (1972). 
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total of $248."" Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil."0 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
trasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six C'hools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgrwood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly white. having only 18% Mexican-Americans 
and less than 1% Negroes. The asses!"ecl property value 
per pupil exceeds $40.00cMnd the median family income 
is $8.001. ltt H)G7- 10()8 thr local tax rate of $.8.3 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $:333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $22.5 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $3G per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $504 per pupil. 
Although the 1967--1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aiel,"' more recent partial statistics indicate that 
~" Tlw Al-:lilablr School Fund, trchnic:dl~-, pro1·idr:-: n ~rrond 
~()\II'('(' or ~I :1 t r 111011('~-. That Fund ha~ COil t illltf'd :1;-: in ~·ra r;-: paRt 
(~rr trxt :lf'f'Oillp:tnying nn. lfi-J , , 811/)ra) to di;-:trihutr unil'orm 
rwr pupil grants to r1·rr~· di;-:trirt in thr Rtatr. Tn lOilS thi:-; Fund 
rdlottrd !':OR prr pupil. HmYr1·rr, hr<-au~r thr Antil:lhie 8C'hool 
Fund contribution i~ alw:1~·s ~uhtr:H't<'d !'rom n cli"trict':-; rntitlc-
mont undrr tht' Foundation Progrnm, it play:-; no ~ignifir:111t role 
in rcluea t ional fin:1 ncr t oclnr. 
:~o Whilr i'Pd<'l':tl ~~s~i~t:111cr h:1s nn amrlioratin!J; rfTrrt on the difTrr-
rnrr in school bucl!J;rt s bet wrrn m•:tl tit~· and poor d i~t rirt s, t hr 
Di~trirt Comt rr_irctrd an argurnrnt maclr b~- thr Stntr in that 
romt that it "hould ron~idt'l' t hr rffpet of t hr frdrrnl gm nt in 
n~srssing thr di~niminntion dnim. 3a7 F. Supp., at 284. The Stair 
has not rrnrwrd th:1t rontrntion hrrr. 
:n Thr figurr:-; quotrd ahovr l':tr~· "light)~- from thosr utilizrd in 
tho Dist rirt Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., ni 782. Thr:-;e trivial 
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the pr~viously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62 lJ increase over 
the three-year period since 1967- 1968. Indeed , state· 
aiel alone in 1970- 1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget-- from local, state. and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program. netting $491 per pupil. These 
recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, becausE' of its relative property wealth, 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil. or about 20 % 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $R.46 per pupil. which is about 2.4 '/i- of its 
grant. '1 ~ It docs appear then that. at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment docs reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potentiai 
of each.'"1 
, Despite these recent increases. substantial interclistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
differencrs are nppnrrntl~· n product of that rourt'H reli:tnrr on 
slip;lttl~· din·rrent stntiHtiral data than we hn1·e relied upon. 
' 1 ~ Tex:tH Rrsearrh Le:tgur, supra, n. 19, at 13. 
'1'1 Tlw Eronomir Index, which detrnninr~ rarh eount~· 's sh:tr(' of 
the total Local Fund Assignmrnt , i~ ba~rd on a complex formula 
ronrriYrd in 19-1-9 whrn thr Founclat ion Prop; nun was inst ii uted. 
It has frequrntl\' hE'rn suggrsted bY Texas rC'~enrchers thnt the 
formula br nltrr~d in seYNnl rrspeet~ to pro1·ide a morr ;H'curate 
rdlert ion of lora! t nxpa~·ing ahil it~- . rsprri:dl~· of urban schools. 
V Ciowrnor's C'ommittrr Rr]Jort , nt 4R; Brrke, Cnrnavnlc , l\Iorg;an & 
White>, supra, n. 28, at 680-681. 
LM...,-:-
-1..4 J. ...... l'\ool 
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degree throughout the State,1 ' still exist. And it was· 
these disparities. largely attributable to difkrences in the· 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas,. 
dual sy<c;tem of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protect\on Clause. The District Court held that the· 
·) . 
:l l The Di~trict Comt rclicd on thc fi11din!!::-:: pres~'ntcd in an 
affidn vit submit t cd by Profc~~or Dc•rkP of S~Tartt~c. Hi~ ~nmpl'ing 
of , llO Tcxa~ ~chool di~t ril'ts dcl)lon:;t ratcd' a dircct correlation 
bet wccn t hc a mount of a clist riel'::;'. taxa blc propC'l't y and it:s IP\' C'l 
of prr pupil c•xpc11dit mc. Hi~ ~~ u(J'~· afso found a direct eonrlat ion 
bd wccn a district'::; mcdian family i1H•ome and per pupil cxpcndi-
turc:; n~ wcll as an invcr~c eorrclatwn bctwcen p~rccntagc of minori-
tic::;' and cxpendit urcs. ' 
Catcgorir.ed b~ · Equnlizcd Propert~· Valuc~, 
l\1cdi:Ul Family Inromc, nnd State-Lora\ Rcvcnuc 
Market Value Median 
of 'I'a.rablc Family Per Cent 
Prop<'riy Income Minorit.11 
PN Pupil From 1DGO Pupils 
AboYc ::;100,000 85,900 8% 
(10 Di,.:t rirt,.;) 
S 1 00, 0()( 1-S.'>O; 000 S-±,425 32% 
(2(i District:;) 
S5fJ ,ooo-s:m ,oi)o S-±,900 23% 
(:30 Di,.;triris) 
S30,000-SIO,OOO $5,050 31 % 
(40 Distrit'!s) 











Although thr l'Orrelations with rr~pc•ct to farnil~ · inromr and racr 
appear on!~· to rxist at thr rxtrrmr,.;, and :tit hough thr :\friant 'H 
mrt hodolng~· h:\s brrn qnrstionrd (~<·r Gold~tr·in, T lltNclist rict 
Inrqualit ie~ 111 :;;chool Fin:t nr·ing: a Crit ir:tl /l.nnl.n;i~ of 8t•n·mw v. 
Priesi and its Pro(JI'11!f, 120 0. J>a. L. Tie\'. 50-l .. '):2:~ -525 nn. G7 and 
71 (197:2)) , tn~of:\1' as any of thrsc thrcc• rorrclatio11~ i~ rdrvnnt 
to thC' ron~titutional tlw~i~ prrscntrd in this rn~c \YC' may ar•crpt 
it~ bnsif' thru~t. ]<'or a drfrn~r of thr rdiahilit.\· of the• aflid:tYit, sec 
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effect of the Texas system was to discriminate on the· 
basis of wealth in the manner in which education was· 
provided for its people. 337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding 
that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that cduca· 
tion is a "fu nclamental" interest, the District Court held 
that the Texas system coulcibe sustained only if the State 
could shO\\' that it \\'aS premised upon some compelling 
state interest. I d. , at 282-284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "r n lot only arc defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for those classifications.11 
Id., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the close judicial ~crutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter· 
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights'"; or that 
involve suspect classifications."" If, as ~c have fre-
quently held, close scrutiny means that the State's system 
is not entitlecl to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its eel ucational system has been struc. 
turod \\'ith "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,"' the Texas 
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every 
other Stato--\Yill not paRs muster. The State candidly 
admits that "I n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
""E. (!., Police Drpt. of the City of C'hicaao v. Mosle!f. 408 U. S. 
92 (Hl7:2): Dunn v. B/umstPin, -l05 U. S. :3:30 (1972) ; Shapi1'o v. 
Thompson. ;:;94 U.S. ()J!) (1969). 
:wE. (f., Uraham v. Richard~on, 40:3 U. S. 365 (1971); Lovin(! v. 
Virainia, :3RS F. S. 1 (1967). 
:n Rce Dunn \'. Blumstein, 405 U. S. :3:30, :3-1:3 (1972), and the 
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would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." '18 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" "" and "imperfections," 40 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
tlle Di~?trict Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable· 
basis." 
.·This, then, establi~hes the framework for our analysis. 
We must' decide, first , · whether the Texas system of 
fiuancing ·public ed~(mtion must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny. If so, the juclgmelit of the District 
Court ~houlcl be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational . 
basis must be considered. 
II 
The Dif"trict Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty · 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and' 
appellate processes/ 1 and on ca~es disapproving wealth 
barriers impof:ed on the right to vote.<" Those cases, 
the Di trict Court concluded, established wealth as a 
suspect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undelliable importance of education/' that there is a 
:1R Apprllnnt::;' 13ricf, at 11. 
~D Ibid. 
10 Tr. of Ornl A rg., at 3. 
11 E. (!. , Griffin v. 1/linois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douolas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U. 8. 35:3 (1963). 
1"llarper '· Bd. of Elections, 3, !3 U.S. 663 (196..J.); McDonald v. 
Bd. of Elections, 3D..J. U.S. 802 (1DG9); Bullock v. Carier, 405 U.S. 
134 (1972). 
1 '1 Scr ca,;rs citrcl in text, at -,infra. 
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fundamental right to education and that. absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We arc unabl<> to agr<><> that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed. for the 
several reasons that follow. we find neitlwr the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court is quit<> unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this C'ourt. Since 
all childrrn in any given Rchool district receive the same 
public education. irrespective of family wealth. the Dis- \ 
trict Court found the operative class to be all citizens 
in "poor school rlif'tricts." 337 F. Aupp .. at 282. The 
Stat<>'s dependrnc<> on local property taxation to pay a 
portion of thr total cost of education \vas found to con-
stitute de facto discrimination against those school dis-
tricts that hav<>. vis a vis othrr school districts, 
relatively lef's propNty to tax p<>r pupil. Because higher 
rates of taxation failrcl to compensate for disparities in 
property value. the class \Yas found to be exprnding 
relatively less in its schools and. therefore, providing a 
lower quality education for its children. 
In one sense this di!'crimination is geographical rather 
than financial. But thr C'ourt has never questioned the 
State's power to draw rrasonable distinctions between 
its political subdivisions. G1iffin v. County School Board 
of Prince Edward County, 377 U. A. 218, 230-231 (1964); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420. 427 (1961); Sals-
burg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 ( 1954). Recognizing 
the force of those eases. appellees have focused instead 
on the individuals who reside in the relatively disad-
71-1332-0PINION 
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vantaged districts. Yet, for two related reasons, th~· /7 n ~./ P, 
status of these individuals is simply not comparable to (l~ 
that of the individual complainants who have hereto- ~ tf 
fore successfully challenged state laws as invidiously~ f 
discriminatory against the poor. ·-
1. In riffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. _ 12 (1956), and 
Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), and their 
prog'eny," '1 the Court invalidated state laws that denied 
a fair and adequate criminal appeal to indigents. Sim· 
ilarly, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and 
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down crimin::tl 
penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply 
because they were unable to pay fines. In each of those 
:cases the Court was not deaLing with relative impecunity 
but with some level of absolute poverty, i.e., because of 
their indigency. each complainant was totally unable to 
pay for the state-proffered benefit. Those cases did not 
deal with the plight of those on whom state laws impose 
a weighty but not insurmountable burden. The mere 






than other to purchase a transcript or to hire an attor-
ney on appeal would not alone have been enough to 1 
compel judicial invalidation of those barriers. The Court I 
I has never questioned that the nonindigent citizen must 
pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have never 
held that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's 
ability to pay in order to avoid the unequal burdens 
created by a system of absolute fines. 
In the instant case, appel lees have endeavored to show 
only that children from relatively poorer families tend 
'
14 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Britt v. North 
Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Vi'illiams v. Oklahoma City, 395 
U. S. 458 (19(\9); Gardner v. Calijon1ia. 390 U. S. ;~()7 (1969); 
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court of 
jowa, 385 U. S, 192 (1966); Dmper v. Washington. 372 U. R. 487 





to reside in relatively poorer districts. Jo effort wa~ 
made to prove, however, that the financ· 1g system op-
erated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more· 
clearly definable class of imlig('nts. Indeed, there is rea-
son to believe that the )OOrest familiC's are ~~~M"!oMoJtr-0! 
c ustcq;~cl in the jJOorest distric ?!]A recent and exhaus-
tive study of school diStricts in Connecticut co11cluded 
that "r i H is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 'poor1 
l!ve in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major factual 
assumption of Serrano-that the educational finance sys-
tem eli criminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in 
·connecticut." w Defining "poor" families as those be-
low the BurC'aU of the Census "poverty level," 17 the 
Connecticut study found. not surprisingly, that the poor 
arc clustered arou ncl commercial and incl ustrial areas-
those same areas that provide the most n,ttractive sources 
of property tax income for school districts:" 
Thus, we are asked in this case to extend for the first 
time the Court's most exacting equal protection standard 
to a large, cliYerse and amorphous class. And, unlike 
racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it is not a class 
4
" A:s inctiratrd in n. 33, supra, there is rr:tson to (]Ur:stion 
whrt hrr-rvrn in Trxa~-therr i:s a dirrrt roiTPlat ion brt wrrn family 
wraith mr:t~urrd by in('omr and di~trirt wealth mrasurrcl h~· n~,.;r:;,.;rcl 
proprrt~· nduation;;. Studie~ in othN Rtatr:-; havr found rvcn le,.;:; 
corrrlat ion. H idt•nour & Hidrnonr, Serrano v. Priest: Wralt h and 
Kan,.;a,.; 8rhool Finanrr, 20 Kan. L. 21:3, 22,') (1972) ("it ran be 
argurcl that thrrr rxist;; in Knn~as :tlmo:st an itn-rr:-;r rorrrlntion: 
distrirt,.; with highrst incomr prr pupil ha,·r low m:~r,.,~rd ,·nlur per 
pupil, and di,.;trirt,.; with high as,.;r",.;rd ndur prr pupil hnvr low 
inromr prr pupil"): D;wic:>, Thr Challrngr of Change in School 
Finanrr, in Xnt'l Edu<·atiomtl Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School 
Finnnrr {1967). 
40 Notr, A Stati,.;tiral Analy~iH of tbr School Fimmrr DrciHionH: On 
\Yinning Bat tlr~ and Losing \Yar:s, 81 Yale L. Tirv. 1:30:3, 1:32R-1329 
( 1972) 0 
17 !d., at 1:32-+, n. 102. 
4 8 I d. , at 1328. 
Rider A, p. 16 Rodriguez 12/26/72 
There is no absolute deprivation of education and no showing that 
the quality of education provided is not reasonably adequate. The 
application of conventional equal protection analysis to this situation 
presents ~ unique problems, first, in identifying the alleged 
invidious discrimination and, second, if such is found to exist, 
in devising an appropriate constitutional remedy. 
! 
, 
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saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such l:t 
position of political powerlessness, or subjected to such 
a history of unequal treatment as to command extraor~ 
dinary judicial protection from the majoritarian political 
process. It has never been within the constitutional 
prerogative of this Court to nullify state action simply 
because its burdens fall more heavily on those of lower 
than average income. 
2. ~,"lhe nature of the injury alleged · e ¥"""11lfte"""""~-, 
provides another significant 
_.....o- diffePentiatillg the present case from those relied upon 
by the District Court. The disadvantaged class iden-
tified by appdlees if+ -this ease has sustained only a rela-
tive deprivation, i. e., the poorer districts in terms of 
assessable property per pupil tend to devote relatively 
-------..;le..:.:s.:..:..s to education T us CTiffercncepose~udtions of con] 
Sl era e complexity in terms, first, of determining 
whethe.r equal ~)rotc~tion has been .c.lenied and, second, . 
o t h1w and 1m )Osmg an a :>pro )ria~ 
In Gri.f!in v':-r([i?IO~s, supra, t 1e inJury was app~-
denial of a transcript on appeal- and the remedy could 
be easily and effectively secured. What v,:as required 
was some means of assuring an "adequate appellate 
review." 351 U. S., at 18. The Court did not hold that 
Illinois was required to provide a full stenographic tran-
script in every case . . Broad leeway has been permitted 
for the States to select their own means of meeting their 
constitutional obligation. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 
404 U.S. 189 (1971), Brilt v. No1·th Carolina, 404 U.S. 
226 (1971). And, where an "adequate substitute," 
Gardner v. Cal?:fornia, 393 U. S. 367, 370 (1969), is pro-
vided, the Court will approve its use. Sec Britt v. 
North Carolina, supm; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 
487 (19,63); Erskine v. Washington J>n:son Board, 357 
U. S. 214 (1058). Likevvise, in Douglas v. California, 
supra, the Court, while requiring counsel for indigents 
-
71-1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 11 
perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained 
from mandating "absolute equality." 372 U. S., at 357. 
No attempt has yet been made to guarantee as a consti-
tutional requirement that all citizens, regardless of 
relative wealth , receive the same quality of legal 
representation.~ 9 
In analogizing from those cases in which tho depriva-
tion was absolute to the present case in which such 
deprivation as exists is relative, must the thre~ 
ing of unconstitutional discrimination depend on whether 
Texas is presently providing an "adequate" education to 
children in poorer districts? The founders of the Mini-
mum Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that. 
By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and o )Crating 
funds, the Texas Legislature hope o 'guarantee, for 1e 
welfare of the Rtatc as a whole, that all people shall have 
at least an adequate program of education. This is 
what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of 
Education. '" r.o Must we decide \vhether, in fact, Texas 
has fulfilled its promise and that, as tho State repeatedly 
asserts in its briefs in this Court, "the state has assured 
every child in every school district an adequate 
education?" 51 
1-Even assuming that the Court possessed the tools an 
~expertise to conclude that the present system is inade 
S£~tc l ow ar \ye to imp.lcment. the rcmedz__?j Appellees 
d have steadfastly asscr~hat they do not demand equal 
"'n Cf. Boddie v. Connrcticut, 401 U. R. :371 (1971) , in which an 
indigent';,; dur procr,;,; right of acce;,;~ to a di,·orcr tribunal wa~ 
found not to rrquirr morr than a " meaningful opportunity" to 
obtain a divorcr. !d., nt :379- :380. Thr Court did not command 
that the procedure~ availablr for rich and poor hr rqual: it only 
required that the~· br :ld<•quatr and rfTectivc. !d .. at :382. 
r.o C:ilmCJ'-Aikrn Commit tee, supra , n. 14, at 13 (rmpha:;iH added). 
'" Appellant~ · Bri<•f, n t :35; Rep]~· Brirf, nt 1. But Her V Gov-
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expenditures. Rather, they pr fess to endorse almost 
l ahy system of ~xpenclitures t at is not limited by the 
local district's lack of relativ taxable wealth. Yet any 
alternative sl1ort of equal ex enditures is to result, 
~w--~~JM;;ca"3ttl'tltll"l"t¥ , in wer expenditures in schools 
3:ttenclcd by children of )OOrer families. In each such 
case, our prior wealth discrimination cases would indi-
cate that the Court must decide whether the amount 
spent in the disadvantaged schools is sufficient to guar-
antee those children as adequate an education as is 
afforded other ch ildr·en in the State. That is a function 
for which we are quite obviously ill equipped. 
here arc, then, these two demonstrable difference's 
between the present case am! those relied on by the 
District Court: (1) the claimed disadvantaged class is 
significantly larger as well as more ubiquitous and diverse; 
and (2) the injury alleged is in no sense a_n absolute 
deprivatio~1 of t~e clesirccl benefit An edu~ation .finance ~ 
system 1mght 6c Jiypothes1zec, however, 1n whwh the ) 
analogy tb the wealth discrimination cases would be 
considerably closer. If elementary and secondary educa-
tion were made available by the State only to those who 
are able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, 
there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people-
definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed 
sum-who would be absolutely precluded from receiving 
an adequate education. 'rhat case would present a far 
more compclliug set of circumstances for judicial assist-
ance than the case before us today. After all, Texas 
has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide an 
education to those who can afford it. It has provided 
what it considers to be an adequate base education for all 
children and has drawn no explicit lines designed to 
.. separate out the poor for disfavored treatment. 
In any evctYt, as appellees virtually concede, a finding 
of wealth discrimination alone has never been held to 
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constitute a sufficient basis for subjecting state legisla-
. tion to rigorous judicial scrutiny."" Before such clu~loi.4e~_,7J .... ~ 
review is required, a State's laws must be found to 
interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" right. 
It is this question-whether education should be counted 
among the small circle of rights that heretofore have 
been found to be "funclamental"-which has so con-
sumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent 
years. 53 
B 
In Br-own v. Boar-d of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments." !d., at 493. What was said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
52 For this reason appellee~ were nble to drnw little precrdentinl 
:>ustenmwe from the Court's caseR dealinp; with wealth cln~~iflca­
tiom; touchinp; on the right to Yote. Jlm·per v. Virainia Bd. of 
Elations, 383 U. S. 66:3 (196G); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 1:34 
(1972); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, :l94 U.S. 802 (1969) 
(dictum). Enrh of tho~r ra;;e;.; ill\·olvrd the rip;ht to vote on nn 
equal bn~is with thr rr~t of thr elcrtoratc-n right rrpeatrdly held 
to be ron~titutionnlly fundamcntnl. E. (!.,Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. :330, :3:3G-:337 (1972). 
5 :1 Sec Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cnl. 3d. 5R4, 4.S7 P. 2d 12-1-1 (1971); 
Van Dusactz v. Ilat/irld, 3-1-4 F. Supp. F.70 (l\Iinn. 1971); Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N . .J. Suprr. 223, 2F.7 A. 2d 1F:7 (1972); J. Coons, 
W. Clune, and S. Sup;armnn, supra, n. 12, nt :339-394; Gold-
Htrin, supra, n. :3:3, nt 534-5-11; Note, Edurnt ional Finanrinp; & Equal 
Protrction of thr Laws, and thr Rupreme Court, 70 l\rirh. L. Rev. 
1:32-.t, Ja:35-1:3..J2 (1972); Xot<', Thr Public S<'hool Financing CaHes: 
lnterdistri<'t Inequnlitir~ and Wealth Di~erimination, 14 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972). 
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democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, ·even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of' 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably bC" expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opgortunity of education. Such an 
opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro-
vide it, is a right '"hich must be made available to 
all on equal terms." Ibid. 
rrhis theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this C'ourt writing 
both before and after Broton was clcciclecl. ·wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JuSTICE), 237, 
238-239 (MR. Jt'S'l'lCE WHI'l'IB) (1072); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 37.4 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. 
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 ( Hl25); Meyer v. A'e-
braska, 262 U. S. 390 (1023); lnlerstale R. Co. v. 
M assachuseLLs, 207 F. S. 79 ( 1907). 
Nothing this Comt holds today in any 'vay detracts 
from our historic dcclication to public education. We 
arc in complete agreement with the conclnsion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave sig11ificance 
of education both to the individual and to our society" 
cannot be doubted ..... , But the importance of a service 
performed by the State docs not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a la'" illlpinging upon the right of interstate 
"'' 337 F. Supp., at 283. 
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travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U. S. 618, GG3, 661 (1960). in his view, if the degree· 
'of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
.pending on a majority's view of the importance of the· 
interest affected, we would have gone "far to"·ard 
"making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. WfJ 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
one for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
petency. But lVIR. JusTICE STEWAHT's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the narrow limits of the "fundamental rights" 
rationale of the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today docs not 'pick out particular 
human activities, character1ze them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection .... ' To 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and give 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
lVIR. JusTLCE STEWAHT's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to clos~ judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year clurational 
t··esiclency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion vvhich serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental i11terest, is unconstitu-
tional." ld., at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
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as a right of cottstitutional l'!ignificance,"" and the Court's 
decision therefore clicl not rrquire an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importancC' of that right."u 
L1'ndsey v. J\"ormC'L, 405 U. S. 56 (1072), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates the Court's view that social 
importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting 
state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants 
in that case, involving a challenge to the procedural 
limitations imposed on tenants in suits brollght by land~ 
lords under Oregon's Forcible Entry ancl Wrongful De-
tainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation 
of the statute unc!C'r "a more stringent standard than 
mere rationality." !d., at 73. The tenants argued that 
the statutory limitations implicated "fundamental inter-
ests which arc of particular importance to the poor," 
such as the "ncC'd for decent shelter" and the "right to 
retain peaceful poflscs:-ion of one's home." Ibid. The 
Court's analysis is instructi vc: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
docs not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. vVe arc unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutiotial guarantee to access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
""E. (!. , ['nited Stales \'. Gursl, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oreoon v. 
Mitchell, -WO F. 8. lU, 2:lR (1970). 
r.u AftC'l' Dnndriduc \'. William~. :397 U. R. 471 (1970), there could 
be no linp:C'rinp; quC'~tion about the constitutional foundation for 
the Comt',; holrlin,g in 0hnpiro. In Da11dridoe the Court applied 
the rat ionaJ ba;;i"' te;;t in re\·irll'ing ::\Iaryland ',.; maximum family 
grnnt provision under ih AFDC progrnm. A fedt'r:d diHtriri court 
held the pro\·ision IIIH'OHstitutional, applying a ;;tricter standard 
of rel'iew. fn I he rom,.;e of re1·C'rsinp; the lower court I hE' Court 
di~tingui"'hed Shapiro proper!~· on the ground that in thni rao;e 
"the Comt found state inl<'rferencE' with the <·on,.;litutionaJJ.I' pro-
tected frredom of inter::;tatc tra1·el." Id., at 484 n. 16. 
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property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and tho definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships arc logislativo. not judicial, functions.' 1 
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridr;e v. ·williams, 307 U. S. 471 
(1970), the C'ourt1s oxplicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
volves the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," ;; 7 providocl no basis for departing from 
the settled modo of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the ca::e of houf'ing, the central importance 
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justify its la'v by 
showing some compelling state interest. Sec also Jef]er-
son v. llackncy, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court is plain. The key to discovering 
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found 
iil comparisons of the relative societal significance of 
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is 
it to be found by weighing whether education is as im-
portant as · travel. Rather, the answer lies 
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, 
the right to oducation is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 5' Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
5 7 The Comt rcfusrd to apply the ~t rirt srrutin~· tr:; t clrspitr it ::; 
rontrmpor::mrou~ rrcog;nition in Goldberg v. Kellu , 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970) , that ·'wrlfarc pro,·ides thr mean:> to obtain rs::;ential 
food, clothing, houl:'ing and mrdiral rare." 
58 In Eisenstadt thr Conrt ~truck dmm n :\1nssnchusrtt;: "tntute 
J!fOhibit inf?; t hr distribution of cant rarrpt ive drvicrs, finding that 
the law failed "to ~atisf\ rvrn thr morr Jrnient equal proter1ion 
standard." !d., at 4-!7 n. 7. Nrvcrthde~s, in dirtwn , the Court 
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U. S. 330 (1972); "" Mosley v. Police Department o/ 
the City of Chicngo, 408 lT. S. 02 ( 1972); nn Skinne1· v.· 
Oklalwmn, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). n• 
Anticipating that the unclisputecl importance of eclu-= 
cation would not alone callse the C'ourt to depart from 
the usual standard' of reviewing a State's social and. 
~conomic legislation. appellees contend that education 
is distinguishable from other services ancl benefits pro-. \ 
vided by the Stat~· Mcallse it bears , a prculiarly clo1s~ 
relationship to oth6'r rights accorded protection under 
rl'rited the pmper form of rqual protrrtion annl~ · ::;i ,..;: ·'if \\'<' wNr 
to roncluclr thnt thr ~Lt~~nrbu~rtt~ statutP imping:es upon funda-
mrntnl frrrdom~ undrr Gri8wold fv. Counecticu't, :381 U. S. +79 
(J965),J thr stntutor~· ehs~ification would ha1·e to br not nl('rrly 
rctlionally related to a Y:llid public purpo::;r hut 1Jecc8.''0I'.lJ to thr 
nehir1·rmrnt of a compelling state interest.". Ibid. (rmpha,.;i~ in 
original). 
'•!I Dunn fully rall\'l\Hs'r., thi.H Court's equ:d' prot ret ion voting: rig:ht::; 
CaHP~ and (";plninH that "this Court ha:-< m:tdr elear that a ri.tizen 
has a ('oiiRtilutiona/ly ]irolectNi rir;ht to p:trtieipatr in PIN·ti.onH on 
an Pqttnl ba~i,.; with other citizrns in thP .iuri~clif'tiPtt." !d .. at :~86 
(emph:t~i~ sttppliPd). ThP ron~tittttional undNpinning:-< of tlw right 
to rqual treutment in the· 1·oting proer~s ran no Iong:rr he dnuhtrci 
r,·en though, :1~ the Court notrd in llarper v. Virginia !3d. of Elec-
ti'ons, :~R:~ U. R. !36:~. (l(l.J (19GG), " the rip;ht to ,·otr in stair Plrrtions 
is nowlwrr rxpre~~~~- ment iom•cl." Rer Bullock v. Cnrter, 405 U. S. 
i:~4 (1972): Krmner v. Union Free Srhoo/ District , :395 U. S. G21 
(1969); Reynolris v. S!ms, 877 U.S. 583 (1964). 
nnrn Mosleu thr Court stnu•k down a Chic·ago antipirketing 
ordinanrr whic·h rxemptrd labor ]1ickrtin!); from it:-; 11rohihitiomt 
The onlinnnrr wns hrld inntlid unclPr thr Equal Protrrtion Clau~r 
nftrr ~ubjPcting it to l'arcful srntlin~· and finding that thr ordinanre 
was not 11a rro\1·]~· drawn. Thr st rieter ;,;t :md:nd of re\'irw wns n ppro-
priatel~· applird sinc·r t lw ordinance wa~ one "nffrrt ing: Fir:-;t Anwncl-
ment intrre:-;ts." Id .. at 101. 
n• Skinner applic·d thr standard of rlo~r srrutin~· to n st·nte law 
permitting forl'rd stcrilizntion of "habit unl criminals." Implicit in 
tlw Comt':-; opinion is thr rero!);nition that thr right of proc•rc•:ttion 
is among thr right,.; of JWrsonal priYac-~· protectrd under thr Consti-
tution. See Roe v. TVade,- U. S. -,- (1973). 
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the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that educa-
tion is a fundamental personal right because it is essen-
tial to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In 
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees 
·urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the 
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelli-
gently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" 
·is an empty forum for tho~e lacking basic communicative 
tobls . . 'Likewise, the corollary right to receive informa-
tion n~. becomes little more than a hollow privilege when 
the ;.ecipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and 
utilize available 'knowledge. 
A siniila:r line oi reafloning is pursued with respect 
to tlw right to vote. Exercisr of the franchise. it is con-
tended, can not · be di vorccd from the eel ucational foun-
·dation of the voter. ' The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the clemocratic ideal' depends on an in-
formed electorate: a voter can not cast his ballot intelli-
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not clispu te any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against un-
justifiable governmental interference with the inclivid-
·ual's constitutional rights to speak and to vote. Yet 
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or 
· the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most 
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. 
That these may be desirable goals of a system of free-
dom of expression and of a representative form of gov-
ernment is not to be cloubted.n" These are indeed goals 
"~ Rrr, 1'. g .. Red Lion Broadrasting Co. v. FCC, 3\1,1 U. S. 367, 
:390 (1!)()9); Stanley v. Georoia. :394 U. R. 557, 564 (1960); Lamont 
v. Postmaster General. :181 U.S. 301 (190.5). 
r;"Thr Stntr~ hn,·r oftrn purRuNI thrir rntirrl~· lrgitimatr intrre,.;t 
in as;;uring " intrlligent exNei~r of the franchi~r , " Katzenbarh v. 
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs 
are freed from governmental interference. But they are 
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into 
otherwise legitimate state activities. 
Even if it were conceded that some quantum of edu-
cation is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication 
that the present levels of educational expenditure provide 
an education that in Texas falls f'hort. Whatever merit 
·appellees' argument might have if a State's financing 
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational op'" 
portunities to any of its children, that argument provides 
n'o basis for finding an in tcrferenc~ with fundamental 
rights where only relative differences in spending levels 
arc involved ai1cl where-as is true in the present case-
n'O charge fairly could be -\nade that the system fails to 
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the 
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of 
the rights of sp'eech and of full participation in the 
political process: 
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus H 
theory arc difficult to perceive. ~ow, for 'instance, is 
'education to be distinguished from the significant per" 
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-feel, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (IOGG), through ~uch drl'ier::; as 
litoraey tr~t~ and :1gr rr~trictionH on thr right to vote. Rrr ibid.; 
Oregon v. llfitche/1, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). And , \Yhrrc tho~r rc~tric­
tion~ han~ bern found to promotE' intrliigc·nt u~r of the b·dlot without 
di~c·riminating again,;( tho~r racial and rthnic minoritirH hrrrtoforc 
drpri\'C'd of an equal rducH I ional opport unit~·. I hi~ Comt hn;.; upheld 
their UHC. Comprtrl' Las8itr1' \'.Northampton JiJlecLim1 /3d., :~GO U.S. 
45 (1950) , with Oreoon v. Mitchell, -WO U. R., nt 1:~:3 (:\fr .. 1uHtier 
Blark) , 14+-1-1-7 (MH. .TUH1'ICJ, Douc;I.~H), 216-217 (:\ fr. .Tu~t icc 
Ila rl:tn), 2:31-2:)6 (:\In. J u:;TTCE BnEN N 1 ' ), 2R2-2~+ (\ fn . .f u~'I'ICE 
S'l'BWAn'I'), and Gaston Countu v. United States, 395 U.S. 2.S5 (lOGO). 
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the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment.';.( If so, under ap-
pellees' thesis. Dandridge Y. Williams, supra, and T..~indsey 
v. N ormet, supra, would no longer be good constitu-
tional ·law. 
We have carefully considrred each of the argum.ents 
supportivP of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion· is a fundamental r1~ht and have found those argu-
ments unpersuasive in the present context. In one 
further respect WC' find this a particularly inappropriate 
ca"e in which to subject state action to close judicial 
scrutiny. The present case, in one most b;;c sense, is 
significantly different from any of the cases in which 
the Court has applied close scrutiny to state or federal 
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of 
our prior cases !nvolved legislation which "deprived," 
"infringed," or "in"terferred" with the free exercise of 
_some fundamental personal right. See Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. R. 535. 536 (1042); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618. G34 (1060); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 
330, 338-343 (1972). The critical distinction between 
those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas 
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. 
JusTICE BRENN AN, writing for the Court in Katzen bach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient 
point: ar. 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
1
;
1 Srr Srhorttlr, Thr Equal Protrrtion Clnu::;(' in Public Edma-
tion, 71 Col. L. Hrv. 1:31)5, 1389-1390 (1971); Comment, Trnant 
Intrrr:st Hrprr;;rntation: Propo:-:nl for a National Trnant:;' AHsocia-
tion, 47 Trx. L. Hrv. 1160, 1172-1173 n. 61 (1969). 
Hr. Katzenbarh v. II! orr;an im·ohwl a challrngr b~· rrgi"trrrd Yotrrs 
in Nrw York Cit.1· to a provi~ion of thr Votinf(" Rif("h1H Act of 1965 
t hnt prohibitrd enforcement of a statr law c:1lling for Engli~h 
7 
i .; -~ 
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.. ,
vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti..: 
tution by 110t extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] .... 
"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by. 
state law. . .. . We need decide oniy whether the 
challenged limitati.on on the relief effected ... was 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-· 
Ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc._. 
tions in laws denying fundament?-] rights . . . is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap..: 
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding· 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a refor~1l measl.1re we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all 
evils at the same time.' and that 'reforms may take 
one step at a ti~ne1 addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
tive mind ... .'" Id., at 656- 65V. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation illvolvecl in Kalzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
literacy tr:;tH for voting. The lnw was su~pcndc•d as io residents 
from Puerto Riro who had cornpleted at lenst ~ix ~·cnr~ of ed11ca-
tion at an "American-flag" Hchool in 1 hn 1 cotm1 ry evrn thongh 
tho lan!l;uagc of in::;t rudion wn:,; other than Engli;.;h. Thi:-> Court 
upheld the quedtioned provi:;ion over the claim that it discrimin:~ted 
ngainst those with a sixth gmclc ocluea1 ion obtained in non-English 
speaking Hchools other than the ones de:;igna1 eel by 1 he federal 
log isla tion. 
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Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding statr aid-"·as implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality.Gn Of course, every reform that benefits some 
lTiorc than others may be condemned for what its fails 
to accomplish. But \Ve think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative aud re-
formatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles stmsitive to the nature of the State's 
efforts.67 
c 
It should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated 
above, that this is an inappropriate case in ·which to 
subject state action to the sort of searching scrutiny 
reserved for laws that involve suspect classifications or 
fundamental rights. 
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the 
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A 
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal 
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application 
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case 
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the 
way in which '"texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We arc asked to condemn 
the· State's judgment in conferring on political sub"' 
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi"' 
G(; cr. Meyer\', Nebraska. 262 U.S. :mo (1923); Pierce V, Society 
of Sisters, 26R U. S. 510 (192.1); Hargrave v. Kick, ;31;~ F. Supp. 
94-1- (l\fD Fla. 1970), \'arntrd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971). 
c; Srr Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971); McDonald v. 
Board of Election Commissioners, :394 U. S. 802 (19()9). 
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tionally deferred to state logislaturos.ns Mr. Justice' 
Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 
311 U. S. 435 (1040), against interference with the 
State's fisral policies is worth repeating: 
"[t I he responsibility for devising just and produc-
tive sources of revenue challenges tho w its o C'gis-
fatures. Nothing cm1 be less helpful than for courts 
to ... inject themselves in a rn:eroly negative way 
i1Jto the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making." 
Id., at 445. 
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution, 
tho J usticos of this Court lack both the expertise and 
the familiarity with local p1·oblems so necessary to the 
making of wise decisions 'A1th respect to tho raising 
and disposition of public revenues. Yet wo are urged 
to direct the States either to alter drastically the present 
system or to throw tho property tax out altogether in 
favor of some other form of taxation. Are wo, for 
example, to counsel tho f-ltatos that an income or sales 
tax would operate· less cliscriminatorily against the rela-
tively impecunious clements of society'? G!) 
nH Srr, e. g .. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pe11nsylva11ia, 1:~ f U.S. 232 (1R90); 
Ca.nnichal'l \'. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. R. 49.5, .'iOR-.509 (19:37); 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Rou•(·rs, 3SR U.S. 522 (19.59). 
no Tho~r who urge that thr pn•spnt systc•1n br invalidated of'frr 
littlr · guida!H'C' a~ to what t.1·pr of ~rhool financing ,.;houlcl rrplaer 
it. The altllo,.;t inrvit:1hlr rr~ult of rr,ieetion of thr rxisting "·'·strm, 
howrvrr; \\'Oulcl br st :I trwidr flnaming of all pu bl i(' rcluea t ion with 
funds clrri1·('([' from t nxat ion of property or from t hr adopt ion or 
C'xpnnsion or Hairs :tnd inc·omC' taxC's. Thr l\\Jthor~ of Pri\·:ltr Vi'ralth 
and Public Education, supra. n. 12, at 201 - 2-1-2, ~uggrst an altrma-
tii'C' srlwmr, known as ''dist riet ]JO\\'C'I' rquali;~,inp;." In simplest 
trrlnH, the Stutt' \\'Ollld guamnter that at an~' pnrticul:tr rate of 
property taxation thr district would l'C'C'C'i\'C' a statrd numbrr ol' 
dollar,.; rrgnrdlr~s of thr distric·t's tax ba~r. To fin:mcr thr ,.;uh~idir,; 
to "poorrr" district~, l'unds would br tnkrn awa~' from thr "wralthiC'I'" 
di:;trict,; that collect more than the :;tatrd nmount at any given 
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Nor is this Court-indeed any court-competent to' 
make informed judgments on the cr1t1cal issues con"' 
fronting those who must determine educational policy· 
at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even 
l'nOre· than public welfare assistance programs, presents 
a myriad of "intractable economic, social and even phil-
osophical problems." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., 
at 487. Tho very complexity of the problems of financ-
ing and managing a statewide public school system sug-
gest that "there will be more than one constitutionally 
permissible method of solving them," and that, within 
the limits of rationality, "tho legislature's efforts to 
tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jef-
ferson v. Hackney, 406 U. R. 53t5, 546- 547 (1972). On 
even the most basic quest.ions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of 
the hottest sources of controversy conoerns tho extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenclitures and the quality of education 70-
rate. Thi~ is not the place to weigh the RrgumcntR for and ngain~t 
"cli>'t rict power cqualir.ing," bc:-·ond noting that comnwntator~ are 
.. in di~ngrccment a~ to whet her it i" fC'asiblc , how it would work, and 
indeed whPt her it would not violate tlw equal prot crt ion theory 
undcrl:-·ing nppcllccH' c:1"c. Prc,ic!Pnt's Comm'n on School Finance, 
School~, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown , Rome 
Reflection::; on SNrano v. Priest, 49 T. Urban L. 701, 700- 708 
(1972); Brc"t , Book TIP\'icw, 23 Stan. L. nc\'. 591 , .594--.590 (1971); 
Wi~r. School Finance Equnlizahon Lnw~uits: A l\Jodf'l Lc·gi,lntivc 
nc"pon~r, 2 Yale HPv. of L. & Soc. Action 123 , 12.5 (1971); 
Silflrcl & White, lntra~tatc Tncqualitics in Public Education: The 
Cnsc for .Judicial HcliPf Under the Equal Protection Clau~c , 1970 
Wis. L. He,·. 7, 29-30. 
70 The qu:tlit ~·-co~t cont rovcr~y hnR received con~idcmblc nt ten-
t ion. Among t hr notu blc aut horit ic~ on both side's nrc the follow-
...._ __ __ 
ing C . .Tcnck~ . Tnequnlit:-· (1972); C. Silbcnmn, Cri~is in the 
' Classroom (1970); Office of Education , Equalit~· of Educational 
Opportunit~· (1906) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of EcluC'a-
tional Opport unit~· (1972) (l\foynihan & l\To::;tcllcr eel~.); .T. Gut hric, 
. " 
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an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually every legal COllclu8ion drawn by the District 
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relation-
ship between cost and quality. is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
cducation. 71 And the questio11 of the proper relation-
ship between f'tate boards of education and local school 
boards. in terms of their respective responsibility and 
degree of control. is now unc!C'rgoing searching re-exami-
nation. It hardly need be said that none of these ques-
tions is amenable to intelligent resolution through the # ~ +o 
judicial JWOce8s. T ndeed. the ultimate wisdom c1f these 
and like problems of education is not likely to be devined 
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly 
debate the issues. At the very least, the judiciary should 
not rircmm:cribe or handicap-by interposing inflexible 
constitutional constraints-the continued research and 
experimentation so vital even to partial solutions and 
to keeping abreast of changing conditions. 
It must be rem0n1bered also that every rase arising 
under the Rqual Protection Clause hns implications for 
the relationship hebYC'en national and ~tate power under 
our f0deral system. Questions of federalism arc in-
herent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws arC' to be subjected to the rompelling interest or 
the rational basis test. While "rt lhe maintenanre of 
the principlC's of federalism is a foremost ronsideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions u11der 
G. T<lrindorkn, H. Lr,·in, & T. Slonl, Schoo]:-; :~nd Tnrcpmlity 
(1071); Prr~idl•nl':-; Conun'n on School Fin:1nrr, wpra. n. 69; Swan-
son, Thr C'o:-;1-Qnalil~· Tirlation:-<hip, in lOih Nnt'l Conf. on Srhool 
Finnncr, lhr Ch:1 llrngr of C'hnngr in School Fin:ltH'r 151 (1!)67). 
7
' Srr thr rr:-<ult s of lhr Trxns Govrrnor':-< C'onlmillr<''" "1:1trwidr 
~un·ry on lhr ~oalH of rducalion in lhal Stal<'. I C:o,·cmor'~; 
Commillrc Ticporl, nt 50-68. Srr nlso C:olcbtrin, supm. n. 2R, 
rtl 519-522; Srhoctllr, ~uwa, n. 6:3; aulhorilir~ ritrd inn. 69, suwa. 
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which this Court examines state action/~ it would be 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our ferkrnl sy:-:t('m thnn the one now b('fore 
us, in which we are urged to abrogate the systems of 
financing public education presently in existence in 
virtually ev('ry State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' Pyskm of public school finance is an inap- ---()' /3--~ 
propriak candidate for ~udiciai scrutii1y. Tfiese 
same considerations arC' relevant to the determination 
whethN that system, with its conceded imperfections, is 
supportC'd by a reasonable or rational basis. It is to this 
question that we next turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the issue of 
rationality. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from ('ach source. 7:l The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstatrcl at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students. 7 '' Each school district's other 
7 ~ Allied Storrs of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 532 (1959) 
(l\1'H . .TusTrc8 BHBNNAN, ronc•utTing); Katzeubach v. Morgan , 384 
U .. S. G-n, 661 (19G5) (1\rr . Justice Harlan , di:-;~ellting). 
7a In H)70 Texas expended approximate]~· 2.1 billion dollars for 
education and a little o\·er one billion came from the l\rinimum 
Fonndation Program. Texas Re,.;earrh League, supra, n. 19, at 2. 
7 1 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13. 
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supportive personnel arc provirlcd for: one principal for 
every 20 teachers; 70 one "special service" teacher-
librarian , nurse, doctor, etc.- for every 20 teachers; 76 
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children are also provided." Additional funds 
are earmarked· for current operating expenses and for 
student transportation."' The State also provides free· 
textbooks. 79 
The program is admi nil'ltcrccl by the State Board of' 
Education ancl by the Texas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation"' and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
ards.' ' As rcfiectccl by the 62'/c increase in funds allotted 
to tho Edgewood School District over the last three 
years/ " the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of' ·Texas' school district$, how-
ever, has been content to rely : alone on funds from the 
Foundation · Pi·ogram. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on pror>erty 'located within its bordeTs. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
:assure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.'a Every 
'district supplements its fotl!lclation grant in this manner. 
In some districts tho local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in HJ67. In other districts the 
7
" Tex. Edur .. Code § 16.18. 
70 Tex. Eclur. Code § 16.15. 
7 7 Tex. Eclur. Code §§ 1G.l6, 16.17, 16.W. 
78 Tex. Edur. Code §§ Hi.45, 16.51. 
7 " Tex. Edur. Code § 12.01. 
RQTex. Eclur. Code§ 11.26 (5). 
Rl Tex. ] ~clue. Code § 16.301 !'i . seq. 
82 Sec autr , nt -. 
83 Gilmer-Aiken Commit tee, supra . n. 14·, at. 15. 
• 
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local share may far exceed even ti1e total Fou ndati01i 
grant. In part local differences arc attributable to dif..: 
fcrences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the markrt value for any category of property varies from 
its assessed value.' '' The greatest intcrclistrict disparities, 
however, are attributed to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
, districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability of supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher teachet' salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri .. 
butes of schools i11 more affluent districts arc lower pupil .. 
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.s" 
R4 There i~ no uniform sfafe\\'ide a~:<e:<i"ment practice in Tex:1s. 
Commercial pr·oprrf~·, for examplr, might be faxed at ;{Q% ol' 
market value in onr rount~r and at 50% in anothrr. V Oovrrnor's 
Commiftrr Tirport, at 25-26; Berke, Cnrna,·ale, ]\forgan & White, 
SUJn·a, n. 2R, at 666-667 n. 16. 
hr. Texas nrsearch Lrngue, Sltp1'a, ll. 19, at 18. As previou~ly 
notrd, text aceom]xm~·ing n. 69, supra, the extent to which the 
(]llalif~· of rdueation \'aries with expenditure per pupil is debated 
inconrlu"i'·el~· by f he mo~t t houghtl'ul "t udents of public edueat ion. 
While all would n!);rre t hnt then' is a rorrelat ion up to the point 
of providing the recognized es~o;cntials, the i~sueR of grcafl'H! dis-
agreemrnt includr the dfrct on qunlity of pupil-trarhrr ratios and 
·of (fri!3 hhJ;liP'i2snlary sehrclulcs. Thr stntr funding in Texa,; 
iR clrsignrd to asRurr, on the average, onr te:1rhN for rvC'l'y 25 
Ht uclrnt~o;, which is ronsic!C'l'rd to be a 1':1 ,·ornblr ratio by most .~t:md­
nrds. Whcthrr thr minimum Halnry of S6,000 prr yr:1r is sufllccnt 
in Texn~ to f1 t t n1ct qu:1lified trarhN~ may br more dcbatablr, cle-
pcncling in major part upon thr !oration of the school di~trirf. But 
jherc apprar,.; to be little rmpirieal data which supports the advan-
tage> of an~· partiC'nl:u· pupil-traehcr ratio or which doeumcnts the 
yirw that rvN highrr salarir8 rrsulf in 
An intractablr problem in dealing with trnrhrn;' s:1lnrirs i::; the 
ab~cncc, up to this time, of ::;ati,;factory tcchniqur;:; for judf!;ing 
their ability or performance. Tlw rrsult i:-; that rrlntiwly few 
Hehool ,;y:;tems have merit plan;-; ol' any kind, with teacher~' salarics 
bci11g increa::;cd "by rotc" and acros~ the board in a wny which 
. . 
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This. then, is the basic outli11c of the Texas finance' 
structure. Bccauf'c of differences in expenditure levels' 
occasioned by dispari tics in property tax income, ap-· 
pellces claim that children in lesf: affluent di!"tricts have' 
. -been made the f:ub.iC'ct of invidious discrimination. The' 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
e.stablish a rcMonablC' basis'' for a syE"tC'm 
in cliffC'rent lcvC'ls of J1C'r pupil expenditure. 
at 284. \Vc clisa~?/CC'. 
which results 
337 F. Supp.,. 
The 'texas syEtem. ii1 its reliance on statC' as wC'll as 
local resource's, is comparable to the systems employed' 
in · virtually every other Rtate."n The power to tax local 
reward~ the lrn~t de:.:ei'I'ing 011 the sn me basis n~ the mo~t dr~erv­
ing. Snlnries are u~u:dl~· l'ili~<·d automaticnll~· on the basis of 
predetermined "step~." extPncli11p; ovrr 10-to-12 ~·e:1r pNiod~. 
In making these observn t ions, we int<·nd no rrit ieism of existing 
]1mctires r~nd crrtainl~· we imp!~· no opi11ion th:il tenchrrs' snl:uies 
grnrrall~· are :Hlrqunte. AR romp:11wl with othe1·s of rompnrahle 
edurat ion there is r\·er~· rea~on to helie\·r that tenchrrs' Aal:uie8 
grnerali~·, starting from an undul~· low hnse, hnvr failrd rwn to 
kel'p nbrrast of inflation. Wr hnvr included this commrntnr~· on 
pupil-tenchN rnt ios and ~: dar~· le\·elR not to exprrss nn~· opinion 
with r<'sprct to the ndequ:H'\' of thm'r in Trxns or rbr\\'hNr, but 
mrrrl~· to indi<':ttr that thr two pri11r·ipnl far·tors di~tinguishi11g the 
schools in thr morr nfTinrnt di ~ trirt ~ from thos<' rb<'whrr<' do not-
in thr opinion of man\· rxperts-demon~t mhl~· :1nd necr~sarily nffrri 
the qualit~· of the tr•:1ching. 
>-G President':.: Cmmn'n 011 Srhool Finnnrr, SU]H'a , 11. oR, :1 t 9. Until 
rercntl~· ITnwnii w:1~ thr onl\' Rtntr thnt m:1intainrd a purr]~· ~tatr­
fundrd rdmational progr:nn. Tn J!)flR. ho\Yr\·er, thnt Stntr nmrndrcl 
it~ rdu('ationnl flnnncr Ntatntr to prrmit rountirs to rollrct :ldcli-
tionnl fund~ lorniiY and :.:pend tho~r amounts on it s srhook The 
rationale for th nt rrr·c•nt legisl:iliw' choice i~ inRtl'll('tiw on the 
quest ion before t hr Comt t ocln~·: 
·'UndN rxisting law, rountirK nrr prr('ludrd from doing nn.\'thing 
in this :nrn, <:'\'011 to ~pr ncl their own funds if they so drsire. This 
ronwti\·r lrgi~lation i:-: urgrntl~ · ncedl'd in order to allo\\' <'Ollnties 
to go aho\·r and he.\·ond the Rtate's stn ndnrd:.: :md pro\·idr rduca-
tionnl facilities as good rrs the rwoplr of thr countirs wnnt :mel 
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property for educational purposes has been recognized 
ir'l Texas at least since 1883."7 When shifts in the clis-
t~ibution of population, accompanied by changes in local 
property wealth oeeasioned by the growth of eommercial 
and industr.i~l centers, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investmel1t of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
edueators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
of the pioneering ,,·ork of t"·o New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.~' Their efforts were devoted to establishing a 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital clement of local 
participation. The Stra.ycr-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these t\vo competing forces. As 
articulated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual trugglc between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children , and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for 
its child." su 
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality 
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring 
are willin~ to pn)' for. Allowin~ local rommunitie:; to ~o above 
and be)·oncl e~tabli~hed minimums proYiclrcl for their prople encour-
ages thr br:;t frat me:; of drmoC"ratic government." Iln~r . Se:;:;, Laws, 
Art. 38, § 1 (19()8). 
87 Scr tPxt acromp:myin~ n. 7, $Upra. 
'R G. Str,l)·rr & H. Hnil!; , l<'inancing of Education in the State of 
New York (1923) . For a thorough nnal)·~i:-; of 1he con1ribution 
of the:;e reformrrs and of t hr prior and sub:-;rqucnt hi::;tor)· of cclu-
cat ionnl finn ncr, :;ee J. Coon:;, ViT. Clune & S. Sugarman, ~upra, n. 12, 
at' :30-95. 
' 0 .T. Coons , W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 12, Forcwnrd by 
.Tamr;; S. Colrm::m, at vii. 
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a basic eel ucation for every child in the State, it permits 
and encouragrs a largo meaF>ure of participation and 
control of each district's schools at the local level. In 
an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward 
centrali11ation of the functions of government, local shar-
Ing' of responsibility for public education has survived. 
The merit of local control was rcrogni11ed last Term in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. 
Counc·il of Cily o/ Emporia, 407 U. 8. 451 ( 1972). MR.: 
JusTICE 8'l' I~WART stated there that "[cllirect control , 
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's 
children is a neecl that is strongly felt in our society. 1' . 
!d., at 469. THE. C'Hm·F JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed 
that "[ljocal control is not only vital to continued public 
support of tlw schools, but it is of overriding importance 
from an educational standpoint as well. " /d., at 478. 
The·· persistence of this attachment to government at 
the lowest level where education is concemecl reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supportC'rs. In part, 
local control means. as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the clC'cisio1Jnaki ng proc-
ess that cletorm incs how those local tax ~ollm·s will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
iocal needs. Pluralism alf'b affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, invocation , and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in ow· federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." uo No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
00 N ew State I ce Co. v. Leibmann, 2 5 U. S. 262, 280, .'311 (1932). 
H o 
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i~~icity of vicwpoi,1ts and from a diversity of approaches 
than docs public education. 
'" Appellees do not seriously question the validity of 
Texas' dedication to local control of erlucation. They 
focus their attack on the school financing system on the 
ground that it debases the concept of local control be-
cause it docs not provide the same fiscal flexibility to 
poor districts as it affords the rich. It is no doubt true 
that reliance on local property taxation for school reve-
nues provides less freedom of choice with respect to 
l')Xpenditures for some districts than for others. Local 
control, however, connotes more than the power to make 
an autonomous decision on how rn uch to spend. It also 
contemplates freedom to decide how available fu nels will 
be allocated and is an essential clement in local partici-
pation in the operation of the schools. 
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability 
of local taxable rcf"ourccs to turn on "happenstance." 
They sec no justification for a system that allows, as 
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
·local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable 
·local governmental units- requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. 
It is equally inevitable that some localities arc going 
.to be blesf"ccl ''"ith more taxable af"Rcts than others. Nor 
is local wealth a ~tatic quantity. Arc boundary lines to 
be redrawn with every shift in population or with every 
discovery of valuable minerals or with the completion 
of every new industrial park? :Moreover, if local taxa-
'tion for local expenditure is an unconstitutional method 
·of providing for education then it must be equally im-
J·~· 
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permissible in providing . other necessary servic~,..----- ~ 
currently financed from locnl property taxrs, inclnding 
local police and firr protection. public health and hos-
pitals. and public utility facilities of various kinds. We 
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of 
' ·-local property taxation and control as would follow from 
appellees' contentions. 
In sum. to the extent that the Texas system of sch,ool 
finance results ill discriminatory treatment of children 
who happen to reside in certain districts. we cannot say 
that such discrimination is the product of a system that 
is without rational bash<. Its shortcomings have been 
acknowledged by Texas, which has persistently endeav-
ored-not without success-to ameliorate the differences 
in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowl- . 
edged benefits of local participation. The continued 
persistence of "some inequality" is not alone a satisfactory 
basis upon which to conclude that the Texas system 
lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. 8. 420, 
425-426 (Hl61). Nor may it be condemned simp_Iy 
because it imperfectly c.ffectua,tes the State's goals. 
Dandridge v. W·ill£ams, 897 U. 8., at 485. 
The Texas plani is not the result of some hurried, 
ill-conceived legislation. It is certainly not the 11roduct 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and rlsewherc. and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
.substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. 8. 61, 78 (Hl11), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. 8. 
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ing the issue of rationality, that the system here chal-
lengecl is not pcculinr to TcxaR or to any other State. 
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for financ-
ing public education rcficcts what many educators for 
a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proarh to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We arc unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and edu-
cational authorities in 40 States, especially where the 
alternative proposed is only rcecntly conceived and no-
where yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether 
there is a rational basis for the challenged state action. 
We hold that the Texas plan abun'dantly meets this test. 
IV 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on 
the District Court opinion"' in this case and on its Cali-
fornia prcclcccssor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 
P. 2d 1241 (1071). a cautionary postscript seems appro-
priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as pro-
viding a constitutional rnandatc for major state legislative 
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as 
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have 
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban 
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
the result desired by all , some advocates of "fiscal neu-
trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have over claimod.n 
Vt "Fisralneutr::tlity" is tho nnme p;iven by Profe~sors Coons, Clune, 
nne! Sugarman to their thesis thnt. " the quality of p11blir edur:tl'ion 
mny not ben funetion of wcnlth other than the wonlth of the ,;tale 
as a whole." .J. Coon.-;, vV. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 12, at 2. 
Their thoup;htful and imnp;inative work paved the wn~· for the 
suit;;, imluding the present one, attn eking the school finnnre "~·stem. 
Indeed, the Di~lrirt Court approved the author~' the~i;; yerbatim. 
337 F. Supp., aL 285. The :1uthor~ have often cautioned their sup-
'· 
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The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
i1eutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to emerge from some commentators. Tt is begin-
ning to be recogni7.ecl tha~ the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and th~ implementation of "fisca.lly 
neutral" alternatives .could have consequences ~Esquiet­
ingly different from those initially assumed. 02 There iii, 
porter~ , however, ngainst sprruhting that "fiscal nrut rnl it y" would 
J;c · n JXmncra for t.he poor or for rncial minorit ie~. lb'id. ; Coons, 
Clune & Sugarmnn, A First Apprni::Jal of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of 
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (197-1): 
n~ An initinl problrm, morr obvious to rlrcted officials than to 
those of ~~~ who write opinions fur t.he comt s or essay~ for the law 
reviewH, is the critirnl one or money. Whatever rormuh mny be 
omplo~·ed , there are esse ntially only two wnys to assure equal per 
p11pil expenditmc•s (even approximate!~' ) in rvrry school district: 
(i) expenditmeH could .be e(]unlizcd by taking: rcvrnues away from 
some cl i ~t riet s a ncl a]lpl~·ing; t hrm to t hr benrfit or others, a process 
of lewling down to some common denominator; or (ii) vast addi-
tional l'l1x revenurs would .have to be raisrd ' to rle\·atr per pupil 
expendih1re to 1 hr high est levrl now obt ainiug in thr diHt ri~t s which 
providr the grent rst snpplrment:1 tion of .::;tate: fu11ds. Nri\hrr of 
1 hese :1lt ern at ives seems rrnl ist ir.' The re~iclrnt s of a di~t ri ct which, 
with good fortune nnd dedirnt.ion t.o public education, h:wr a high 
lcvrl of expencliturr nre not Jikrl.\' to be 1olernn.t or a levelinp; plan 
ihnt rcclurr~ funding for ihrir di~ triet to incrrnse it rbrwhrre. Wonld 
trar·hrr:-;' snhrie.-; in that district br reduced eorrrspondingly? If 
pnpil-t.r·nclJcr rr1tios wcrr ineren .~ecl , whnt wonlcl happen to the 
tearhrrs no longrr emplo~ 'rd? vVhnt , imlrrd , would h:tpprn to-
school bond >: issurd pur~unnt t 0 [I vote or citizen1fii-oud of thmr 
school s nncl willing to pRy more? 
The oihrr nlternntivr, the raising of sulllcirn t aclllitional tax money 
statewide, is no more palntflblc politi ca iJ~ · . It has been ralc·ulatrd 
that $2.4 billion ol' additional school funds would be required to 
bring all Trxct~ dist rirt s np io the preHont level of expenditure in all 
but tho weal1 biesl di~t ricts-an amount more than double thai, 
... ··~ . ,. 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the Coons 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
·ftS to the lowest income families who tend to reside in 
·urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the 
District Court.n" has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance. 0'' That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
·.to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.u" 
lt~ 1@8:1"1U,Il4' r;lctajled cmpiri,Qiil!J iitUQY lillilQ QQ,.'3 concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools."u Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
·clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
curTently bcinp; spent in Texas on public education (Texns Resea rcl1 
.League, supm, n. 19, ::tt 16-18. At a time when ever~· State and 
locality is sufFering from fi sca l nndernnurishmrnt, and with demands 
for services of nil kinds burgeoning and with wear~r taxpa~·rrs already 
resisting t::lx increases, only those who live in a dream world could 
believe that n derision of this Court nullif~· ing present stnte taxing 
systems would result in doubling public funds committed to educa-
tion. "Rather, thr result in terms of confusion and disruption would 
be profound, nne! in the rnd the leveling process could well mean a 
lowrr quality of education for all. 
ua Sec n. 33, supm.. 
u-1 Select Cornm. on Eqnnl Eclucntionnl Opportunity , Inrquitics 
in School Finnncr (1972) (l\Innograph prepared by ProfeHsor Berke). 
uu Sec abo U. S. Office of Educntion, Finance::; of Lnrgr City School 
Systems: A Comparntive Annl~·~ is (1972) (HEW Publicntion). 
'w See Note, A Stah~tic:1l Analysis of the Srhool Finn nee Deci-
;;ions: On Winning Battles nne! Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. Rev. 1303 
( 1972); see text. nccompnnying n. 45, supra. 
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assessable property."7 In view of these uncertainties, if 
this Court were sitting as a policy tribunal, we would 
hesitate to embrace-at least at this time-the ultimate 
efficacy of the appealing egalitarian concept which 
launched this case. 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu~ 
tional function restrain us from embarking upon any 
such political or philosophical undertaking. That role 
is reserved for Congress and for the state legislative 
bodies and ':·0 do no violence to the .values of feder;li~~~ ~ 
and separatwn of pmYers by staymg our hand. ·
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to 
be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status 
quo. The need is apparent for reform in a tax system 
which may have relied too heavily on the local property 
tax. and for reform in public education to assure both a 
higher level of quality and greater uniformity. They 
merit the con tin uecl attention of the scholars \vho already 
have contributed much by their challenges. But the 
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and 
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them. 
n7 Sre Gold~trin, SU]Jra. n. 33, at 526; J. CoonH, W. Clune & 
S. Sugarman, supra. n. 12, at :356-:357 n. 47, km? notrd that in 
California, for example, "59 % of minority ::;tudrnt;; !il'r in district s 
abovr t hr mrd inn a 1·cragr vnl un t ion JWr pupil." In H('xar County 
by far thr large::;! di;;trirt-thc San Antonio Indrpcnclcnt School 
Di;;trict-i;; abo1·r thr local ~wcragr in both the amount of taxable 
wraith per pupil and in mrdian fatnil)· income. Yrt 72% of its 
;;tudent::< arc ::\[('Xican-AmNican". And, in 1967- 1968 it sprnt only 
a vrry f('W doll ars l"ss per pupil l han the 1\ orl h Ea;;t n nd 1\ ort h 
Side Jndrprndrnt School District ;;, which ha1·c onl~· 7% and 18% 
Mexicnn-Antcrican en rollmrnt rcsprct j,·rly. Berke, CarnaYale, 
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assessable property.!); In view of these uncertainties, if 
this Court were sitting as a policy tribunal, we would 
hesitate to embrace-at least at this time-the ultimate 
efficacy of the appealing egalitarian concept which 
launched thi:s case. 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu.:. 
tional functio1i restrain us from embarking upon any 
such political or philosophical undertaking. That role 
is reserved for . Congress and for the state legislative' 
bodies and we Clo no violence to the values of federalism 
and separation of powers by staying our hand. We 
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not to 
be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status 
quo. The need is. apparent for reform in a tax system 
which 111ay have relied too heavily on the local property 
tax, and for reform in public education to assure both a 
higher level of quality and greater uniformity. They 
merit the continued .attention of the scholars who already 
have contributed much by their challenges. But the 
ultimate solutioi{~ must come from the lawmakers and 
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them; 
n; Ser Gold~trin, supta, n. 33, at 526 ; .T. Coom;, W. Clunr .& 
S. Suf!;arman , supra, n. 12, nt :35G-:357 n. 47, h:wc notre! that in 
California , for rxnmple, "59% of minorit~· studrnts Ji,·r in di~trirt s 
abovr thr mrclian a1·rragr ,·aluation prr pupil. " In Brxar County 
by far thr lnrgr~t cli~trkt-the San Antonio Indrprmknt School 
Di~trirt-iH aboYr thr local :wrrag;r in both thr amount of tnxnble 
wrnlth per pupil and in mrdian famil.1· incomr. Yrt 72 % of ils 
~tudent:; arc l\frxican-Amerir·ans. And, in 1967-19GR it spqnt only 
a \ ' Cr~r frw dollars I"~" prr pupil than tlw North East and North 
Side Tnd<-p<-ndrnt School Districts, which havr onlx 7% and 18% 
frxican-.\mNiran , rnrollmrnt rrsprcl ivrlv. Berke, Carnavalr 
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This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents "·hose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood I ndepenclent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who arc members of minority 
groups or who arc poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax ba~e. Named as defendants" 
were the State Board of Eel ucation, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of thr rhildrrn of thrsr romplninants attrnd publir school. 
Onr family'~ childrrn arr rnroll<'d in print<' ~rhool "brcnu~r of the 
condition of th<' schoob in t hr Eclp;<'wood Indrprndrnt School Di~­
trict." Third Am<'uclrd Complaint, App., at H. 
~ Thr San Antonio Tnclrp<'ndrnt School District, \Yho~r namr thi~ 
ca:-;e still l)('ars, wa~ onr of ~r1•rn :-;chool cli:-;trict~ in thr San Antonio 
metropolitan arra which wrrr originally n:unecl ns part)· ddrnclnnt:-;. 
Aftrr a prrt rial confNrn<·<', the Di~t rict C()\11'( i:-;sued an ord<'l' dis-
mis:-;ing; thr school di~tricts from the ra~r. Rub~rqurnt l )·, the San 
Antonio Tnclrprnclrnt School Di~trict hn:-; joinrd in thr plaintiffi:i' 
challrngr to thr Stair'~ school finanrr sy:-;trm and hn:-; filrcl an 
amicus curiae brirf in i:illj)port of that po~it ion in I hi~ Court. 
.. -
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of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in Lhe summer of 1068 and a three-judge court 
was impaneled i11 January HJIJO." In December 1071 ·I 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas Pchool finance system unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted prob-
able jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu-
tional questions presentee!, 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools}' Early in its hist6ry, 
3 A three-judgr com1 was proprrly convrnrd and thrre arc no 
qur:stiom; as to the Di:striet Court'H juri~diction or thr direct appral-
abilit.y of its judgment. 28 U. S. C. §§ 22Sl, 1253. 
1 The trial w:tH delayrd for two yr:tr;; to ])E'rmit rxtrnsive prrtrial 
discover~· and to allow c-ompletion of a IJl't1CI in~~; Texas legisln t ive 
investigation concerning the nerd for reform of its public ;;chool 
financ-e systrm. Rodriouez v. San Antonio f11d. School Dist., :337 
F. Supp. 2SO, 2S5 n. 11 (WD Trx. 1971). 
";3:37 F. 8upp. 2SO. The Distric-t Court sta~·rd its mandatr for 
two ~·cars to pro1·iclc Trxas nn opportunit~· to rrnwd.1· thr inequitie::; 
found in its financing program. The court, howrvrr, retainrd juric;-
dietion to fa~hio11 ils own n'ml•dinl order if the Statr failed to offc'r 
an aeerptablr plan. ld., at 286. 
G'fcx. Const., Art. X,§ 1: 
''A grll('l'al diffusion of knowledgr he inn; r~~rnl i:ll to t hr presen'at ion 
of thr right~ and libl'rtirs of the proplr it :-;hall be thr dutr of ihe 
LrgiHlalure of thi~ State• lo mnkr :-;uilable provision for the :;upport 
and nwintc'natH'C' of publir srbool~." 
!d., Art. X,§ 2: 
"The Lrgi~laturc> shall as rarly as prarticahlr rstahli:-;h frer schools 
throughout lhc Slate, and »hall furnish means for iheir ;;upporl, by 
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Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
schools. relying on mutual participation by the locai 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amencled to proviclc for the creation or 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school builclit1gs" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were 
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funcls.8 The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854,n was endowed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.1(' The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent':Funa as well as 
ll~lc p1 opel'tiy-tax~~served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
the State.11 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.' 2 Sizable differences 
7 Tex. Con~!. 1R76, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug. 14, 1883. 
8 Tex. Con~t ., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4, 5. 
n Garnmd'H Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 
(interpretive commentari0:-:); T Hcport of GoYcrnor'~ Committcc on 
Public School Education, The Clwllenge and the Chance 27 (1969) 
(hereinaft0r Govcrnor'g Committee Report). 
10 Tex. Const., Art. 7, §5 (~00 al~o tlw interpretive commentary); 
V Governor'~ Committce Hcport, at 11-12. 
~~ Tex. Const. , Art. 7, § 3, a;,; amended, Nov. 5, 1918 (sre inter-
/ prctive commrnt"r~·). ________ _..
1 
~ 
12 I Govrrnor'::; Com mitt rr Report, at .'35 Ji CoonH, W. Clune, ~ 
S. Sugarman, Privat0 Wcalth !lnd Public Education 49 (1970); """ 
E. Cubberley, School Fund~ and Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905) . 
1 
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.n The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.1 ·J 
In due time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities.' " Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per schoo];ge child.'n Although the 
amount \vas increased severaf'times in the early 1940's,17 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.' 8 
Recognizing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
'" B~· 1940 one-half of the State';; popnlation \\'::Iii rln~trrrd in its 
metropolitnn crnters. I GO\·ernor's Committer RPport , at 35. 
1'1 Gilmcr-.'\ikrn Committee, To Ha,·e What We l\Ju~t (19-J.R). 
'" R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950) ; Texn;; Bel. of 
Educ., '.IJJ.c,. 1:€-:-m -Sif\t{)widc cll dPqutwy Surve~· (W38 
tu R. Still, supra, n. 15, Gt 12. 
17 1 General Lnws of Trxns, 46th Leg;is., Rrg. Sr~"'· 1939, nt 274 
(S22.50 per studrnt); Grneral & Sprc. Lnm; of Trxa~ , 48th Lrgis., 
Rrg. SP~s. 1943, ('. 161, at 262 (S25.00 per student). 
l R Geneml & Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Lcgi~., Reg. Sess. 1945, 
c. 53, at 75. 
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alternative systems in other S~ates and to propose a 
state funding scheme that would . gu~rantee . a minimum 
or basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen. establishing the .Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.'u It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas.~0 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 80/i- of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment- is apportioned among the school districts 
pursuant to n. formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. Jt also considers each county's relative 
'share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
1u For a complrtr history of the adopt ion in Trxas of a founda-
tion program , ~re H. Still~, supra, n. 15. See also V C:o,·C'l'nor's 
Commit ter Hrport, at 14; Texas Hr~<rarrh Lrag;ur, Public School 
Finance Problems in Tcxa::; 9 (Interim Report 1972). 
"° For thr 1970-19il school ~·e:1r this ~tatr aid prog;rnm arcountrd 
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Loc·al taxation rontributrci 
41.1% and 10.9% waH provided itt federal funds. Texn~ Rr~rarrii 
League, supra, n. 19, at 9. 
71-1332-0PINION 
6 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
in the State. 21 Each county's assignment is theu divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county."" The 
district then finances itf' share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to asRure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing inflU<mce 011 expendi-
ture levels bet\\'cCn school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that \\'ould force every school 
district t0 contribute to the education of its children 23 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources."·' Today virtually every school district does 
impose a property tax from which it derives locally 
expendable funds in excess of the amount necessary to 
satisfy its Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation 
Program .. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1040, expenditures for education-from state as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
and 1067 expellCiitures increased by approximately 
500jln.":; In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion "" and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently nsmg per 
21 V Go,·emor'::; Committee Report , at 44-4R. 
22 At jlrc8cnt then· arc 1,161 ~chool cli ~ trict ~ in Trxn s. Tcxn:-; Rc-
~:>ea reh Lraf?:uc, suwa. n. 19, at 12. 
"" In 19-1-8 tlw Gilmcr-Aikrn Committee found that somr ::;chool 
district s wNe not lrYying any local tax to support education. 
Gilmcr-Aikrn Commit tcr, su pra, n. 14, at 16. 
2 1 Gilmrr-Aikrn Commit tee, suwa. n. 1-J., at 15. 
"" I Go,·crnor'~:> Committee Hcport, :1t 51-53. 
2" Texas Rc~:~rn reh Lcagur, supra, n. 19, at 2. 
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pupil expenditures throughout tho Stato.27 Minimum 
teacher salaries-by far tho largest single item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years. 28 
To illustrate the manner in which tho dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to ,whi<th substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-
itan area. Approximately 22.000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city scetor of 8an Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 9o r(l of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6r(l 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
tho highest in the metropolitan area- the district con-
tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Mi11imum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
27 Tn the yc:us between 1949 and 19137 the n vcrngP pN pupil 
expend it me for all Cl ltTcnt opcrat ing cxpPnSP~ innea~cd from $2013 
to S-Hn. In that same pcriocl capita l cxpcnclitmc:> increased from 
$44 to Sl02 per pupil. I Go,·crnor'~ Committee Report, nt 5:3-54. 
2~ III CO\·crnor's Committee Heport , :~t 113-1-113; BPrkc, Carnn-
vale, l\Jorg:1n & 'White, Thr Texa~ School Finnnce Ca~e: .'\ Wrong 
In Scarc·h of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Eclur. 659, 5Rl-G82 (1972). 
., 
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total of $248."" Frderal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil.'' 0 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
trasted with thr Alamo Heights Inclepenclcnt School 
District, the most affluent school district in an Antonio .. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a rrsiclcntial community quite unlike· 
tho Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly @ :-having onl:v 187r Mexican-Americans 
ancl'loss than 1 <y,- X rgroes. Tho assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $40.000 and the median family income 
is $8,001. In H>G7- 1068 tho local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 proviclrcl from that Program, the clistrict 
was able to supply $558 prr student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1067- 10(:)8 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aiel ,'' ' more recent partial statistics indicate that 
~v ThC' i\1-nilahli:' Rchool Fund, trchnicnll~· . ])l'OI'idr:-: a ~C'cond 
f'OUI'C'e or state' !ll()J1('~'· That Fund ha~ ('Oiltinurd :1~ in ~· c·nr·~ past 
(:;C'e trxt accompan~· ing nn. 15- l.S , SUJH'a) to di~ trihutC' nniforrn 
per pupil gmnt~ to ewr.\· distri ct in the Statr. Tn HHl.S thiH Fund 
n!JottC'd S9.S pC'r pupil. IImn•,·C'r, becnu~C' thC' AYailablr Rchoul 
Fund euntrlbution i~ nlw~1y~ subtracted from n di~trict 's rntitle-
ment undc•r the Founcln t ion Program, it play~ no ~ignifirant rolo 
in eclucationnl finance todny. 
30 '\Vhile l'c•dNal nsHi~tanrc• haH an nmeliorating effC'ct on thC' diffC'r-
eneC' in ~chool budget s bC't wrC'n WC'~dth~· and poor di~t riC't H, t be. 
DIHtriet Court rrjrrted an :n·gunwnt muciC' b.1· the St:lte in thnL 
eourt that it should eon~ idC'T' the dTect of thC' fC'drrnl grant in 
as~C'~~ing the di:;rrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., nt 28-1-. ThC' State 
ha:; not rr nc·wC'cl that contC'ntion herC'. 
:n The figure'~ quotC'd above' vary Hlightl~· from tho,;r utilizC'd in 
the Distriet Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782, ThC':;e trivial 
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the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970- 1971 school year the Foun-
dation 8chool Program allotment for Edgewood was· 
$356 per 11upil. This constituted a 62 o/c increase over 
the three-year period since 1967- 1968. Indeed , state' 
aiel alone in 1070- 1971 equaled Edge\\'ood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget---from local. state. and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights en.loyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $401 per pupil. These 
recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth , 
\Vas required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil. or about 20 % 
of its Foundation grant. Eclge\YOOd, on the other hand , 
paid only $8.46 per pupil. which is about 2.4% of its 
grant."" It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.3 '1 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
, disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
diffrrenrrs [)!'<' npparpnt]~, n product of that court's reliance on 
~lightly diffNrnt statistical data than we have rdied upon. 
a2 Texa~ Rr~mrrh LengtH', supra, n. 19, at 13. 
3 '1 The Economic IndPx, which determines each count~·'s sh:Hr of 
the total Lor[)] Fund Assignment, is based on a complex formula 
conceived in 1940 when the Foundation Program was instituted. 
It has frrqurntly been ;.;uggestcd by Texas researcher~ that the 
formula bE' altPrrd in spveral respects to provide a more accurate 
reAection of local taxpa~·ing ability, especial!~· of urban schoob. 
V Govemor'~ Committee Report, at 48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & 
WhitP, supra, n. 28, at. 680-681. 
. 'v 
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degree throughout the State."' still exist. And it was' 
these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the' 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the Distriet Court to conclude that Texas'· 
dual system of public school nnance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that tl1C' 
"' Thr District Court relied on the fimli"ngs presrntcd in an 
nffi&n·it submit ted b~· l)rofrs~or Berke of ~~T:H·u~e. Hi~ ~ampling · 
of ll 0 Tcxm.; school cliKt ricts drmon;-;t rated a din'c t corrdat ion 
between the amount of a cliKtriet',.; taxable propnty and it~ lew! 
of pc·r pupil expend it me. His stud\· :d::;o I' on nd a d i reel correl:it ion 
bt't \\'N' ll a di::;t rict '::; lllC'd ian fam il~y income and per pupil expendi-
lurC'::; as well as an iin·rrKe correlation brt ween percentage of minori-
tir:; nf1d cxprmht nrc". 
Categoriz<'d l.J.,. Equalized Propert~· Value", 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 
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Although thr corrd:ltim1s with rc~])('rt to fnmil~ ' inromr and rare 
appeal' onfr to cxi:.;t ni the rxtrcmcs, and nllhough the nflian!',; 
met hodolng~· ha,; he<'n qul'~t ionrd (~cc Gold.-:trin, Tnt Prclist riel 
Tnequnlit ir:< in School Finnn<'ing: a Crit i(·:tl J\ n:d)·si" of Serrano v. 
Priest and il~ PI'O(Jl'IIIJ, 120 U. Pa. L. Re,·. 50..J, .')2:3-525 1111. 67 and 
71 (1972)) , m~ofnr as an~· of the;,;e three ronclations iK rclcYnn! 
to the co11stitu!io11:1l thesis prc~ented in this ra~r \\'P mn~· arrrpt 
it~ ba;;ic thru~t. For a dcfrn~c of thr rclinhilit~· of the afTiclnvit, ~cC" 
Bcrkr, Canw,·nlr, l\Iorgan & ·white, supra, n. 2 . 
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effect of the Texas system was to discriminate on the· 
basis of wealth in the manner in which education was 
provided for its people. 337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding 
that wealth is a "suspect" classification and that educa~ 
tion is a "fundamental" interest, the District Court held 
that the Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it \\·as premised upon some compelling 
~tate interest.. !d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court 
9onclucled that "In lot only are defendants unable to 
().emonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.'' 
ld., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual syl"tem of financing education could not \\'ithstancl 
the close juclicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
~;~.ppropriate in revie\Yi ng legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights''" or that 
involve suspect classifications."(; If. as we have fre-
quently held, close scrutiny means that the State's system 
is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate Qbjectives, ancl that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,"7 the Texas 
financing syst<•m- ancl its counterparts in virtually every 
other State--will not pass muster. The State candidly 
a9mits that "[nJo one familiar with the Texas system 
:~<; E. (! .. Police DC'pt. of Lite City of Chicaoo Y. Mosle!J, 40R U. S. 
92. (1972) ; Dunn v. Blumstriu. 405 U. S. 330 (1972) ; Sha]Jiro v. 
7'hompsou, 39-J- U. R. 619 (1969). 
:wE. fl., Graham v. Rithard~on, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Lovin{! v. 
'(i?'Qinia, :3RS U.S. 1 (1967) . 
"'Sec Dwm \'. Blumstei,l , 405 U. S. 330, 3..J:3 (1972), and the 
Q (L~c~ rollcC'tcd 1 herein. 
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would contend that it has yet achievc'd perfection.'' 38 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" "' and "imperfections," ''0 the State 
d~fends the system's rationalitY with vigor anci dis!)utes 
the ' District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable' 
basis.'; · 
. . 
This, then , establishes the framework for our analysis .. 
\:Ve must decide; · first, whether the Texas system of 
:fi..nancing· public edl.wation must be stibjdcted' to strict· 
judicial scru~iny. If so, the' fudgment of the Distri~t 
Court should be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational 
basis must be considered. 
If 
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
'appellees' challe11ge' to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the- rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and 
appellate proccsses," 1 and on cases disapproving wealth 
barriers imposed on the right to vote.' ~ Those cases, 
the District Court concluded , established wealth as a 
suspect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned, based on decisiotis of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education,J:j that there is a 
:Js Appelhnt;,;' Brief, at 11. 
:w Ibid. 
40 Tr. of Ornl Arg., at 3. 
11 E. rJ., Griffin v. llhnu'is, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) ; Douglas v. Cali-
fonu:a, 372 U.S. 358 (1963). 
"~ 1/m']JCI' v. Bel. of Elections, 883 U.S. 663 (1964); McDonald v, 
Bel. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969) ; Bullock v. Cm·ter, 405 U. S. 
134 (1972). 
43 Sec ca;,;cs cltrd in text, at-, infra . 
.. 
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case. which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
iJ1to the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
under the Rqual Protection Clause. Indeed. for the 
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Since 
all children in any givrn school district receive the same 
pllblic rducation. irrrsprctive of family wealth. the Dis-
trict Court found the operative class to be all citizens 
in "poor school districts." 337 F. Rupp., at 282. The 
Statr's rlependence on local property taxation to pay a 
portion of the totRl cost of rducation vvas found to con-
stitutr de facto discrimination against those school dis-
tricts that have, vis a vis other school rlistricts, 
relatively less proprrty to tax per pupil. Because higher 
rates of taxation failrd to comprnsate for disparities in 
property valqe. the class was found to be rxpending 
relatively less in its schools and. therefore, providing a 
lower quality education for its children. 
In one sensr this rliscrimination is geographical rather 
than financial. But thr Court hns never questioned the 
Statr's power to draw reasonablr distinctions between 
its political subdivisions. Gnffin v. County School Board 
of Prince Edtcard County, 377 LT. S. 218. 230-2iH (1964); 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420. 427 (1961); Sals-
burg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 54.") (1954). Recognizing 
the force of those cases. appellees have focused instead 
on the "inclivicl uals who reside in the relatively disad-
71-1332-0PINION 
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vantaged districts. Y ct, for two related reasons, the' 
status of those individuals is simply not comparable to 
that of the individual complainants who have hereto-
fore successfully challenged state laws as invidiously 
discriminatory against the poor. 
1. In Griffin v, Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956), and 
Douglas v. California, 372 U, S. 353 (1963), and their 
p'rogeny,·•·• the Court invalidated state laws that denied 
a fair and adequate crim'ina.l appeal to indig-ents. Sim.-
1larly, Williams v. Illi·nois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970) , and 
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S .. 395 (1971), struck down criminal 
penalties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply 
betausc they were unable to pay fines. In each of those· 
cases th~ Court was not clealing' witl1 relative impecunity 
but with some level of absolute poverty, i.e., because of 
their incligency, each complainant was totally unable to 
pay for the state-proffered benefit. Those cases did not 
deal witl~ the plight of those on whom state laws impose' 
a weighty but not insurmountable burden. The mere 
fact that if may have been more difficult for one citizen 
than other to purchase a trauscript or to hire an attor-
ney on appeal would not alone have been enough td 
cbmpel judicial invalidation of those barriers. The Court 
has never questioned that the nonindigent citizen must 
pay for those benefits himself. Likewise we have never 
lield that criminal fines must be tied to the defendant's 
ability to pay .in order to avoid the unequal burdens 
'created by a system of absolute fines. 
In the instant case, appellees have endeavored to show 
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to reside in relatively poorer districts.4 " No effort was 
made to prove, however, that the financing system op-
erated to the peculiar disadvantage of the smaller more 
clearly definable class of indigents. Incleccl, there is rea-
son to believe that the poorest families arc not invariably 
clustered in the poorest districts. A recent and exhaus-
tive study of school districts in Connecticut concluded 
that "r i lt is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 'poor' 
llvc in 'poor' districts. . . . Thus, the major factual 
assumption of Serrano-that the educational finance sys-
tem discriminates against the 'poor'-is simply false in 
Connecticut." w Defining "poor" families as those be-
low the Bur<'au of the Census "poverty level," '7 the 
Connecticut study found. not surprisingly, that the poor 
are clustered around commercial and industrial areas-
those same areas that provide tht' most attractive sources 
of property tax income for school clistricts!8 
Thus. we arc asked in this case to extend for the first 
time the Court's most exacting equal protection standard 
to a large. diverse and amorphous class. And, unlike 
racial minorities, or aliens, or indigents, it is not a class 
4
" A~ indira I rei in n . :3:3, supra, thrrr is rrn~on to (]llrstion 
whrt hcr-r,·rn in Trxas-t hrrr i~ a dirrct corrrlal ion brt wPrn fa mil~· 
wen it h mea:>mNl b~· income and district wralt h measmrd h~ · n~~e~~rd 
propPrl y valu:t t ion~ . St udir;; in other Sl ale,.: haw found e,·pn Jp"~ 
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saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness. or subjected to such 
a history of unequal treatment as to command extraor-
dinary judicial protection from the rnajoritarian political 
process. It has never been 'vithin the constitutional 
IJrerogative of this C'ourt to nullify state action simply 
because its burdens fall more heavily on those of lower . 
than average income. 
2~' Moreover, the nature of the injury alleged ·by the·, . 
disadvantaged \~lass ~6rovides another significant factor 
differentiating the present case from those relied upon 
by the District Court. The disadvantaged class iden .. , __ 
tiified by appellees in this case has sustained only a rela-· _ 
tive deprivation, i. e., the poorer districts in terms of 
assessable property per pupil tend to devote relatively 
less to education. This difference poses questions of con-
siderable complexity in terms, first , of determining 
whether equal protection has been denied and, second, 
of finding and imposing an appropriate remedy. 
In Griffin v. Illinois, supra, the injury was apparent-
d-enial of a transcript on appeal- and the remedy could 
be easily and effectively secured. What was required 
was some means of assuring an "adequate appellate· 
review." 351 U. S., at 18. The Court did not hold that 
!llinois was required to provide a full stenographic tran-
script in every case. Broad leeway has been permitted 
for the States to select their own means of meeting their 
constitutional obligation. Sec Mayer v. City of Chicago, 
404 U.S. 189 (1971) , Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 
226 (1971). And, where an "adequate substitute," 
Gardner v. Calijor11ia, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969), is pro-
vided, the Court will approve its use. See Britt v, 
N orlh Carolina, supra; Draper v. ·washington, 372 U. S. 
487 (19,63); Erski:ne v. Washington Prison Board, 357 
U. S. 214 (1958). Likewise, in Douglas v. Califor·nia, 
supra, the Court, while requiring counsel for indigents 
. '
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perfecting direct appeals of felony convictions, refrained 
from mandating "absolute equality." 372 U. S., at 357. 
No attempt has yet been made to guarantee as a consti-
tutional requirement that all citizens, regardless of 
relative wealth, receive the same quality of legal 
representation .'1!) 
In analogizing from those cases in which the depriva-
tion was absolute to the present case in which such 
deprivation as exists is relative, must the threshold find-
ing of unconstitutional discrimination depend on whether 
Texas is presently providing an "adequate" education to 
children in poorer districts? The founders of the Mini-
mum. Foundation Program undertook to do exactly that . 
. By assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating 
funds, the ~~exas Legislature hope to "guarantee, for the 
welfare of the State as a whole, that all people shall have 
at least an adequate program of education. This is 
what is meant by 'A Minimum Foundation Program of 
.Education.'" r.o Must we decide whether, in fact, Texas 
has fulfilled its promise and that, as the 'State repeatedly 
asserts in its briefs in this Court, "the state has assured 
every child m . every school district an adequate 
education?" 51 
Even assuming that the Court possessed the tools and 
expertise to conclude that the present system is inade-
quate, how are we to irnplement the remedy'? Appellees 
have steadfastly asserted that they do not demand equal 
tu Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), in which an 
indigent':; due proccs;; right of acceHR to a divorce tribunal wa:; 
found noi. to rcquirr more than a "meaningful opportunity" to 
obtain a divorce. !d., nt 379-380. The Court did not command 
that 1 he procrdure:s a,·nilablr for rich and poor br equal: it only 
reqnirrd that the~· be aclrquate and effrctive. !d., at 382. 
5''Gilmrr-Aiken Commit!rr, supra, n. 14, at 13 (empha:si~> addrd). 
51 ApprllantH' Briel', at :15; 'Reply Brief, at 1. But :sec V Gov-
ernor':; Committee Report, at 32. 
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expenditures.. Rather, they profess to endorse almost 
any system of expenditures that is not limited by the 
local district 's lack of relative taxable wealth. Yet any 
alternative short of equal expenditures is bound to result, 
at least occasionally, in lower expenditures in schools 
attended by children of poorer families . In each such 
case, our prior wealth discrimination cases would indi-
cate that the Court must decide wl1ether the amount 
spent in the disadvantaged schools is sufficient to guar-
antee those children as adequate an education as is 
afforded other children in the State. That is a function 
for which we are quite obviously ill equipped .. 
There are, theu, these two demonstrable differences 
bet>veen the present case and those relied o'n . by the ' 
District Court: ( 1) the claimed disadvantaged class is 
significantly larger as well as more ubiquitous and diverse; 
and (2) the injury alleged is in no sense an absolutE! 
deprivation of the desired benefit. An education finance 
system might be hypothesized , however, in which the 
analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would be 
considerably closer. If elementary and secondary educa-
tion were made available by the State only to those who 
are able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, 
there would be a clearly defined class of "poor" people-
definable in terms of their inability to pay the prescribed 
sum- who would be absolutely precluded from receiving 
an adequate education. That case would present a far 
more compelling set of circumstances for judicial al';lsist-
ance than the case before us today. After all, Texas 
has undertaken to do a good deal more than provide a1 
education to those who can afford it. It has provided 
what it considers to be an adequate base education for all 
children and has drawn no explicit lines designed to 
separate out the poor for disfavq_retf' treatment. 
In any event, as appellees virtually concede, a finding 
of ~1 discrimination ~lone has never been held to 
~ ( ..... ( 4.-t..- l..vv-.t. '- tl._ 
{? e_ 
,... ll:¥-" ~ ti·~ 
~~-···t "'.:r...;.. 
~J_;{ l. 
~ (4\-t.. ._(_ ll ~ 0}2-
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constitute a sufficient basis for subjecting state lcgisla~ 
tion to rigorous judicial scrutiny. fi ~ Before such close 
i·eview is required, a ~tate's laws must be found to 
interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" right. 
It is this question- \\'hether education should be counted 
among the small circle of rights that heretofore have 
been found to be "funciamental"- which has so con-
sumed the attention of courts and commentators in recent 
years."3 / 
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "eel ucation is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments.'' !d., at 493. What \vas said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
r. ~ For !hi~ rra ::;on npprllC'rH wrrC' abk to draw Ii!tlr prrrC'clrn!ial 
HUK!rnancc from thr Comt 'il raHPS drallng with wralt h clailHifica-
tion~ touching on thr right to ,·otc. lldrper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Electious, :3R:3 U. S. 66:3 (1966); Bullock v. CartC'1', 405 U. S. 1:34 
(1972) ; JlfcDonald \'. Bd. of Election Comm'rs , :39..J U.S. 802 (1959) 
. (dictum). Earh of tho~(' railr~ involHd thr right to voir on an 
C'qunl bailis with thr rr:-<1 of tbr r!C'etora!r- n right rC'prntedl~ · hdcl 
to br co nil! it ut ionnlly funclamrntal. E. g. , Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. :3:30, 33G- 3:37 ( 1072) . 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic cleclication to public education. We 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the 
three- j uclge panel below that "the grave significance 
of eel ucation both to tho in eli vicl ual and to our society" 
cannot be doubted:' ' But the importance of a service 
performed by the E-Jtato docs not clotcrminc whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice 
Harlan , dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging upon tho right of interstate 
"' :3:37 H. Supp., at 283. 
.. 
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travel, admonished that "[v]irtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree' 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority;s view of the importance of the 
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. Wf3 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
one for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
petency. But MR. JusTICE Sn;wAR'r's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the narrow limits of the "fundamental rights'' 
rationale of the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today docs not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda- t,.\ 
mental," and give them added protection .... ' To h 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and give~' 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
MR. JusTICE STE"\VART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
r·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling gover11mental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." !d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
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eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
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as a right of constitutional f:ignificancc,''" and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importance of that right."11 
Lindsey v. JYonnet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only 
last Tenn, firmly reiterates the Court's vic·w that social 
importance is not the critical determinant for subjecting 
state legislation to strict scrutiny. The complainants 
in that case, involving a challenge to the procedural 
llmitations imposed on tenants in suits brought by land-
lords under Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful De-
tainer Law, urged the Court to examine the operation 
of the statute under "a more stringent standard than 
mere rationality." !d., at 73. tho tenants argued that 
the statutory limitatioHs implicated "fundamental inter-
ests which arc of particular importance to the poor," 
such as the "need for decent shelter" and the "right to 
retain peaceful possession of one's home." Ibid.' The 
C~urt's analysis is instructive: 
"We clo not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
docs not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic m. We are unable to perceive in 
that document a.ny constitutional guarantee to access 
to dwelling·s of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
"" E. fl., L'nitfd SLates \'. Guest, :383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v. 
Mitchel/, 400 U. R. 112, 2:{~ (1970). 
" 11 Aftrr Dandrid(Jf' , .. Williams, :m7 U. 8. 471 (1970), th<'l'r could 
be no lingPring qur,.;tion about thr con~titutional foundation for 
thr Court'~ holding in Shapiro. ln Dandridoe the Court applied 
t hr rat iunal baHi,.: t p,.:f in n·1· ir\Ying :!\far~·land ',.; maximum family 
grant pro,·iHion undrr it,.: AFDC program. A frc!Pral di~triet court 
hrld thr provi~ion UII<'Oll~t it ut ional , appl~·ing a ~t rietpr ;;tnndard 
of rr,·i<'\\'. In t IH' ro\ll·~r of rr1 ·rr~ing t hr lowrr eomt t lw Court 
di,.;tingui~hPd Shapiro proprrl~· on thr ground thnt in that rase 
"tlH' Court found l'tatP intrrfrrpner with thr eon,.;titutionally pro-
lected freedom of inter~tatr t l'<l\ el." Id., at 484 11. 16. 
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property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional m.andal:e, the asrourance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
Id., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
volv.es the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," '' 7 provided no basis for departing from 
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by 
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jeffer-
son v. Hackn ey, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question 
11ow before the Court is plain. The key to discovering 
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found 
rn comparisons of the relative societal significance of 
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is 
it to be found by weighing whether education is as im-
portant as interstate travel. Rather, the answer lies 
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, 
the right to education is fundarnental. E·isenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 ( 1972); !\R Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
57 The Conrt refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its 
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. K elly, 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970), that " welfare provide~ the means to obtain e8sential 
food, clothing, housing and medical care." 
58 In Eisenstadt the Court strmk clown a Massachusetts statute 
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that 
the law failed "to sati~f~· even the more lenient equal protection 
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U.S. 330 (1972); ""Mosley v. Police Department o{ 
the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); "" Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535' (1942). 01 
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of eclu-
catioll would not alo'ne cause the Court to depart from 
the usual standard of reviewing a State's social and 
economic legislation, appellees contend that education 
is distinguishable from other services a1KI benefits pro-
vided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close 
I"Clationship to other rigf1ts accorded protecti.on under 
rreitC'd thr propC'r form of C'CJII:ll protrrt ion nnal.1·~i~: '' if 1\'E' wNr 
to conclude t hn t the ::\1a;;sn rhn,.;rt t ~ ;;tat ut P imptll!J:P~> upon fundn-
mrntnl frrrdom~ undrr Gri~wold fv. C'onnerticut, as1 U. S. 4'79 
(l96.'i) ,j tlw Hlatutor.1· dn;;~ificntion would han· to br not ntrrclr 
rationally related to a Ynlid puhlir purpoHC' hut 11ecessm·y to thr 
arhicvrmC'nt of a compellinQ ~tate intcn~~t. " Ibid. (etnpha;;is in 
original). 
'·" Dwm fully rnnvnHscs thi,.; Court~~ rf]ual prot Pet ion vot inp; rights 
ra~P:s nnd rxpl:tinH that '' thi'R Court h:t~ mndr rlrar that a citizen 
hn,.: n ron.,titulionalty wotected rioht to part ir·ipat <' in drrt ion~ on 
an PCJU:t! ha~is with other <'itizrn,.; in thr .iuri ~di<'ti o n." frl .. nl :3:36 
(rmpha~i.-< ~upplird). Thr eon"tilnlion:tl undc• rpi11rtinp:~ of thr rip;ht 
to rqu:1l trP:l tmrnt in thr 1·oting; proc•r,;,; c:ttt 110 long;rr lw cloublrd 
r\ rn though, a.-< tlll' Comt 11otrd in Jlarper \'. T'iroinia l3rl . of Elec-
tions, ~R:~ D. R. 66:~. 665 (106o) , ''llw riQ;ht to YOtr in ,.;lal<' rl<•c·lion,; 
j,; nowhrrr rxprr~~~~· mrnt ionrd." Srr l3ullotk \'. Cartel'. -+05 U. S. 
1:3..J. (197:2): Kram er v. ['nion F1'ee Sthool f)i;~i ritl , :)f.).') U. R. 621 
(19G9) : Reynolds "· Si111s. 377 U.S . .')~3 (l9G..J.). 
'"'In Mosleu thr Comt ,;lrul'k down n Chic·ap:o :tntipirkrting; 
ordinnnl'r whirh rxrmptrd l:t bor pirkrt ing from it ::< prohibition ~. 
Thr ordin:t ncc• wa H hrl'd im·a lid ttndrr I hr Equnl Prot c•c·t ion Clnn8r 
aftrr suh.ir<'linp: il to c·arpful ~c· ntti11~· and findirtg; thnl tlw ordi11nnc-r 
\Yas not narro11'1 .' · drawn. Thr ~ lrictrr ,;Ianda rei nf rrl'i<'ll' 1\'H"' nppro-
priatrl~· :tpplircl ;;inc-r t hr onlinfUH'C' w:1s OI1P "a ffrrt ing Fir~t Amencl-
mrnt intrrr,;t ::; ." Jd. , at 101. 
'" Ski11ner appli(·d lhr ,; t:mcl:ml of c·lo~r srrutin~· to :1 ~tatr lnw 
prrmit t inp: forl'rd ,;(C'rilizat ion of "hnbit unl crimina b." Tmplieil in 
the Coml's opinion i~ tlw rrrop:nition thai tlw rig;hl of prot·n·ation 
i,; among; thr right ,; of pN,;onnl pri,·nr~ · protrctrd undrr the Consti-
tution. Srr Roe v. Wade,- U.S.-,- (19n). 
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the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that educa-
tion is a fundamental personal right because it is essen-
tial to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
·and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In 
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees 
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the 
·speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intclli-
. gently and pcrf'uasively. The "marketplace of ideas" 
· is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative 
tools. Likewise, the corollary right to receive informa-
. tion ';~ becomes little more than a hollow privilege when 
the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and 
utilize available knowledge. 
A si1 · line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to th righ to vote. Exercise of the franchise, it is con-
tendec , an not be divorcod from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-
formed electorate: a. voter cannot cast his ballot intelli-
gently unl0ss his reading skills and thought processes 
· have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against un-
justifiable governmental interference with the individ-
. ual's constitutional rights to speak ~to vote. . . · et 
we have never presumed to posf'ess eitnertlie ability or 
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most 
effective speech or th0 most informed electoral choice. 
That these may be desirable goals of a system of free-
dom of expression and of a reprcscn tativc form of gov-
ernment is not to be doubtecl.';'1 These arc inclccc.l goals 
"~ Rrr. e. a .. Red Lion Rroadcastina ro. v. FCC. :30-'i U. R. 367, 
· :mo (1069): Stanley v. Groraia. :m-1 1T. R .. 'i.'i7, 56-1 (19HO); La111ont 
v. Postmas~er General. :~S1 U. 8. 301 (1905). 
"'
1 Thr Rtai<'S hnn• oftrn pm~urd thrir rntirel~· lrg;itirnntr intrrc•Ht 
· m ns::;uring ''intelligent rxer<'i~e of thr franrhise," Kalzen bach v. 
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs 
are freed from governmental interference. But they are 
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into 
othenvise legitimate statr activities. 
Even if it were conccdrd that some quantum of edu-
cation is a constitutiona 1~rotected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise o eitber right. "\YO have no indication 
that the present levels of educational expenditure provide' 
an education that in Texas falls short. Whatever merit 
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing: 
system occasioned an absolute clenial of educational op.:" 
portunitics to any of its children, that argument provides. 
ho basis for finding an interference with fundamental 
rights where only relative differences in spending levels 
are involved and where-as is true in the present case-
no charge fairly could be inade that the system fails to 
j)rovido each child with an opportunity to acquire the 
basic minimal skills necessary for tho enjoyment .of 
the rights of speech and of full participat~.irf ·the 
political process, ?.__ 
Furthermore. the logicallimitati~ort appellees' nexus 
theory arc difficult to perceive. ~w, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed. ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
1 
ilfoman, 3R+ U. S. G-11, 6.'54-655 (HlGG), tl mgh ~uch d01·ieP~ as 7 
litC'l'a(',\' tr~t~ and :IIJ:C' rrst rit·t ion~ on the ·ight o 1·ot0. Srr ibid.; 
'Oregon\', Mitchell, -100 U.S. ll2 (19i0). _ <. 11hrrr thosr rrstrir-
tion:; h:l\'0 brrn found to promote intellig<·nt u,.;p of th(' b·tllot without 
di,.:f'l'illlin:t t ing a~J;nin,;t t hosr rnrial nnd l't hni(' minorit i<',.; lwrPtofore 
clepri1·0d of nn C'(JU:11 C'dll<':ltion:tl opportunity, thi~:; Comt ba~ uplwlcl 
th0ir lli<C' . Comp:ll'<' Lassiter v. Northampton Election !3d .. :360 U.S. 
45 (195!)), \\'ith Oregon v. Mitchel! . .J-00 0. S., nt 133 (;\Jr. Justirr 
Blark) , l.J-cl- 1+7 (::\IH. J Ul'i'l'lC(,; Dou<:L ·\I'i) , 216-21 i (:\ [r. Just icc 
Harlan) , 2:H-2:3G (l\In. Ju,;'t'lm BneNNAN), 21'2- 21'-l (:\In .. 1 Cl'Tlcg 
RTBWAH'l'), aucl Gaston County v. United Slates, 3!)5 U.S. 285 (1969). 
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'the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
·benefits of the First Amendment.04 lf so. under ap-
pellees' thPsis. Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey 
v. Normet, supra, would no longer be good constitu-
tional law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right and have found those argu-
ments unpersuasive in the present context. In one 
further respect \\"e find this a particularly inappropriate 
case in which to subject state action to close judicial 
scrutiny. The present case, in one most basic sense, is 
significantly different from any of the cases in which 
the Court has applied close scrutiny to state or federal 
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," 
"infringed." or "interfcrrecl" with the free exercise of 
some fundamental prrsonal right. See Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. R. 535. 536 (1942); Sha7Jiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 
330. 338-343 (1972). The critical distinction bet\\"een 
those cases and thr one now before us lies in what Texas 
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. 
JusTrCE BRJmNAN , writing for the Court in Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient 
point: ar. 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or dilute-d anyone's right to 
,.., Src Srhorttlr, Tlw Equal Protrrtion Clnu;;C' in Publir Educa-
tion , 71 Col. L. HC'v. 1:355, 13R9-1:mo (1971); Comnwnt, Trnant 
IntrrC'st RrprC'~rntation: Propo~nl for n i\ation;d TC'nnnt:,; ' As~ocia­
tion, -+7 TC'x. L. Hr\'. IHiO, 1172- lln n. 61 (1969). 
"" Kal zrn b!l("h , .. Morgan im·olwd n challrnf!:r b~· rrgi-:trrrd ,·ot rr;; 
in NPw York Cit_,. to a provi~ion of tlw Voting Rights Art of 1965 
that prohibitrd enforcrmrnt of a ~tntr J:m calling for Engli~h 
71-1332-0PINION 
28 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v . RODnTGUEZ 
vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti~ 
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] .... 
"[The federal law in question l does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was 
permissible. In ciecicling that question, the prini 
Ciple that cails for the closest scrutiny of distinc~· 
tions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap" 
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 1statilte is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a. legislature need not 1strike at all 
evils at the same time,' and that 1reforms may take 
one step at a. time, addressing it.self to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla:. 
tive mind ... .' ,; Id., at 656- 657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
literacy lests for voting. The lnw wns suspended a;:; to residents 
from Puerto Rico who hnd completed at lea~l six ~·en rH of educa-
tion at an "Americnn-nap;" school in that. c:ountr~r oven though 
the language of inst ruction was other than English. Thi~ Court 
upheld the quc~tioned provision over tho clnim th:1t it disrritninated 
against those with a sixth grade education obtainrd in non-English 
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' 
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting· ,(., 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and ~-.( ~c. j-1 
continuously expandin!l: state aiel-was implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
qualj.ty..0 ? Of course, every reform that benefits s~ 
more .than others may be @ <;lemuet.l"'for what it.{fails 
to accomplish. BLLt we think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
'fonnatory and, therefore. should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's 
efforts.67 
c 
·· · it should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated 
above, that this is an inappropriate case in which to 
subj ect · state action to the sort of searching scrutiny 
reserved for laws that involve suspect classifications or 
fundamental rights. 
We need not rest our decision, ho",:ever, solely on the 
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A 
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal 
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application 
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case 
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn 
the State's judgment in conferring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve· 
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi· 
66 Cf. Meue1' v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ; Pie1'ce v. Society 
of Siste1's, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Ila1'grave v. Kick, 31:3 F. Supp. 
V44 (MD Fla. 1970) , v::tcat cd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) . 
c7 Src Schilb v. KuebeL, 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; McDonaLd v. 
Boa1'd of ELection Commissione1's, 394 U. S. 802 (1969). 
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tionally deferred to state legislatures.nR Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter 's admonition , in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 
311 U. S. 435 (1940), against interference '"ith the 
State's fiscal policies is worth repeating: 
"[t]hc responsibility for devising just and produc-
tive sources of revrnue challenges the ®t of legis~ 
laturcs. Nothing can be less helpful thn,n for courts 
to ... inject themselves in a n1erely negative way 
into the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making." 
Id., at 445. 
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution, 
the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and 
the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the 
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising 
and disposition of public revenues. Y ct we are urged 
to direct tho States either to alter drastically the present 
system or to throw the property tax out altogether in 
favor of some other form of taxation. Are vve, for 
example. to counsel the States that an income or sales 
'tax would operate less dif'criminatorily against the rela-
tively impecunious clements of society? o !J 
r: ~ Srr , e. g. , Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pemu;yl1•ania, 1:3,~ U.S. 2.'32 (1890) ; 
·Carmichael \'. South er// Coal Co .. 301 (J. R. -~95 , .'iOI\- 509 ( 1 9:)7) ; 
;Wied SLores of Ohio v. Bowe1·s, 358 U.S. 52:2 (19.19). 
u!> Tho,.;r \\'ho ur~J:C' that thr prr~rnt ~) ·::~ !<'m hr im·alid:rtrcl ofTcr 
littlr guitlanrr a,; to what t)·pr of "<'hool finnrwing ~hould rrplncc 
lt. Thr almo~t im'l' itablr rr~ult of rr.irction of thr rxi~ting ~~·~trm, 
howcvrr, \\'ould he ~tntrwidr finanrin~J: of all public rduC':I!iou with 
fund~ dnivrd fronr i:rxHt ion of proprrty or from t lrr :HI opt ion or 
rxpnnHi 1m of ~air,; nnd inronlC' taw~ . Thr author~ of Pri1·:rtr \Vr:rlth 
nnd Public Ed11cation , supra. n. 1:2 , at 201 - 2-1-2, ~uggr~t nn a\icma-
til'<' 8chrmr, know11 n~ '' di~t rirt powrr rq11:dizing." Tn ~implrs t 
(C'I'rn ~, thr S!:ttr would guar:11rtrr that at nn~· particul:ll' mtr of 
proprrt~· t:rxation thr di,.;trirt \\'OIIld rc•c•riw n :-;tntrd nunrbrr of 
Qfoll:rr~ rrg:rrdlr~~ of ibr cli~trid ';; i:rx bn ~r. To fin:rncr thr ""h~idir::; 
to "poorer" cli~trirt:-; , funcb wo11ld bl' t:rkrn nwny from thr "wralthirr" 
cdi~ t rict:-; thnt collect more than thr ~tatrd nmount at any given 
\ 
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Nor is this Court-indeed any court-competent td 
make informed judgments on the cr1tical issues con-
fronting those who must determine educational policy 
at the state and local levels. Edueation, perhaps even 
more than public welfare assistance programs, presents 
a myriad of "intractable economic, social and even phil-
osophical problems." Dandridge v. ·williams, 397 U. S., 
at 487. The very complexity of the problems of financ-
ing and managing a statevvide public school system sug-
gest that "there \\'ill be more than one constitutionally 
permissible method of solving them," and that, within 
the limits of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to 
tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jef-
ferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On 
even the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts arc divided. Indeed, one of 
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenditures and the quality of education 70-
ratr . This is not thr pbrr to weigh the arguments for nnd against 
"di~trirt JlOIYCr rqualizinp:," hr)·oncl noting that rommrntator:; nre 
in disngrrrmrnt as to whrtlwr it iH frasiblr, how it would work, and 
i'nc!rrcl whrthrr it would not Yiolat<' th<' <'qnal prot<'rtion theory 
undrrlying apprllr<'H' (':tHe. PrcHidrnt's Comm'n on School Finnnrr, 
Srhools, Proplr & :\fonr~ · :3:3 (1972); Batcmnn & Brown, Somr 
l~rflrctions on Serrano v. Priest, 49 T. Urban L. 701 , 706-708 
(1972); Brr~t. Book Hr1·irw, 2:3 Stan. L. Rrl'. 591. .')94-596 (1971); 
Wi~r , Sehool Fin:1 nrr Equalir.ntion Lawsuits: A :.\Iodrl Lrp;iHiativc 
RrsponHr, 2 Yair Tl<'v. of L. & Sor. Art ion 12:), 125 (1971); 
Silard & Whitr. Tntmstatr Inrqualitirs in Public Edur11tion: The 
CnRr for Judicial Rrlid Undrr thr Equal Protretion Cl:lll~<', 1970 
Wis. L. RrY. 7, 29-:30. 
70 The qualit~·-ro~ t rontrol'<'rsy ha~ recrivrd ron,idNnhlC' at trn-
tion. Among thr notabl<' nuthoritie' on both side' nrr the follow-
ing. C .. Jrnrks, Tn<'qunlit~· (1972): C. Silbrrm:1n, Cri::;i' in the 
CIHsHroom (1970): Oillr<' of Ecl\\l·ation, Equalit_1· of Edu('ational 
Opportunit)· (19(i()) (Tiw Coleman Heport): On Equ:dit~· of Educa-
tional Opportunit~· (1972) (l\Ioynih:1n & 1\fost<'llrr ('(!~.): .J. C:uthrir, 
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an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District 
Court in this case. TI.C'latecl to the quC'stionecl relation-
ship between coF:t and quality. is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the propC'r goal s of a system of public 
~clucation." And the qtH'F:tioll of the proper relation-
ship between F:tate hoards of education and local school 
'boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and 
degree of control. is now unclrrgoing searching rf'-exami-
nation. It hardly need bC' said that non<' of these ques-
tions is amenable to inte-lligent resolution through the 
judicial procws. TndeC'd. thC' ultimate wisdom of these 
and like problems of C'clucation is not likely to be clevined 
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly 
debate the issue's. At thC' very leaF:t, the judiciary should 
not circumscribe m· handicap- by interposing inflexible 
constitutional con~traints-the continued research and 
exprrimcntation so vital cvrn to partial solutions and 
to keeping abreast of changing conditions. 
It must be remember0d also that every ~ase arising 
under thr Rqual Protection C'lauRe haR implications for 
the relationRhip behwen national and Ptatr power under 
onr federal system. QuC'Rtions of federalism are in-
herent in the procrss of cletrrmining whether a State's \ 
laws are to br F:uhjC'ctC'cl to thr compelling interest or 
the rational baRis tcF:t. While II r t lhe maintenance of 
the prinriples of federaliF:m is a foremost consideration 
m intC'rprcting any of the pertinent provisions under 
G. Klrinclorkrr, H. LrYin, & T. Stout , Srhools :1ncl Tnrqwtlity 
(197 J) ; Pre~ icl< • nt 's Comm 'n on Rrhool Finanrr, SU]Jra. n. 60; Swnn-
::;ou, The Cost-Quality· Rrl:ltionship, in lOth :Nnt 'l Conf. on Rrhool 
Fin:tnrr , th<' Ch:tllrngr or Chanf!:r in Rchool Fin:1nrr 151 (1007) . 
7 1 See thf' re~ults or the Tf'x:l ~ GO\'C'l'll01'1S Committf'f'1S statr\\'idc 
i>UJ'\'ry on thr p;oals or <'duration in that Rtatf'. I Govrrnor's 
Commit tf'o Rrport, at 59- 68. Sf'f' al~o GoldstPin , supra, n. 28, 
at 510-522; Schoct tlr , supra, n. 63 ; :111thorit ir~ (·itrd in n. 69, supra. 
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which this Court examines state action,72 it would be 
difficult to imagi nc a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before 
us, in which wC' are urged to abrogate the systems of 
financing publir. education presently in existence in 
virtually every Rtate. ~~ 
, Th~ forC'going considerations buttress our concluaion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap~ 
propriate candidate for JosC' judicial scrutiny. These 
same. consickrations arc rC'lcvant to the dC'termination 
whet]wr that system. "·ith its concC'clecl in•perfections, is 
supported by a rC'asonable or rational basis. It is to this 
question that we next turn our attention. 
III 
' 
The basic contoms of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more c!C'tail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the issue of 
rationality. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from each source."1 The 
$tate's contribution. under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
arc distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstatecl at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.7 ·' Each school district's other 
7 ~ Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 858 U. S .. 522, 582 (1959) 
(Mn . .Tm:-~'l'ICI" BHENNAN, ronrutTing); Katzcnbach v. Morgan, 384 
U, S. 0+1 , 6G1 (1965) (1\Ir . .Tu~tiee Harlan, di~;;enting). 
73 In 1070 Te'.::1H expetHkd approximat<'ly 2.1 billion dollars for 
education and a littl<' O\'Pr one billion eamc from the l\Tinimum 
Foundation Program. Texas Re~<'arch League, supra, 11. 19, at 2. 
7 ' Tex. Educ. Code § 1 G.13. 
.. 
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supportive personnel arc provided for: one principal for · 
every 20 teachers; 7 " one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 76 
vocational instructors, ce>unselors, and educators for cx-
eeptional children arc also providcd. 77 Additional funds 
are' earmarked for current operating expenses and for 
student transportation. 7x The State also provides free 
te'xtbooks.70• 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the T6xas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation ~o and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
arcls.H1 As reflected by the 62.r;c increasE! in funds allotted 
to the Eclgev,:ood School District over the last three 
ye'ars, ' ~ the State's financial contribution to education i$ 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how-
ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
assure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more emiched educational program.' 'l Every 
district upplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
ii1substantial, as in Eclgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1067. In other districts the 
7
" Tex. Eclur. Code § 16.18. 
qo Tex. Edue. Codr § 16.15. 
'
7 Tex. Educ·. Codr §§ l().Jfl, 16.17, 16.19. 
' 78 Trx. Eclur. Code §~ 1 fl.45 , 16.51. 
70 Trx. Edu<'. Code ~ 12.01. 
140 Tex. Eclue. Code ~ 11.2G (5). 
8 1 Trx. Edur. Codr § 16.301 et. seq. 
82 Ser ante, at-. 
o~ Cilmer-Ai.ken Commit1ee, supra, n. 14, aL 15. 
71-1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 35 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
its assessed value.H' The greatest intcrdistrict disparities, 
however, arc attributed to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability of supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
arc devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attrl.= 
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupil-
teacher ratios and highor salary schedules.85 
~ · Thrrr i~ no uniform >< tatrwidr a~~r~smrnt prartirr in Trxns. 
Commrrri:d property, for rxnmplr, mi~J;ht br taxrd at aO% of 
markrt valur in one rount~· and fit 50% in anothrr. V C:o\·rrnor'~ 
Committrr Rrport , nt 2,5- 26; Berke, Carmwale, Morgnn & White, 
supra, n. 2R, at GGG-667 n. 16. 
Ho Trxas Rr~enrrh Leagur, supra, n. 19, nt 18. AH prrviously 
notre! , trxt IH'COillJXtn~·inp; n. GO, supra, tlw extrnl to which the 
,qunlity of rdurnl ion varirs with rxJwndit mr per pupil is drbated 
ineondu~ivrly h~· the mo~t thoughtful studrnt~ of publie education. 
Whil0 all would ngrrr thai thrrr i~ a rorrrlation up to thr point 
of JH'o\·iding thr rreognizrd rs:-:rnl inls, thr i:-:sues of grralr~ t dis-
;,grrrmrnl ineludr thr rfTrrt on qu:dity of pnpil-trarhrr ratios and 
of lraehrr hi~J;hrr salary srhrdulrs. Thr sl<ilr funding in T<•xa :-: 
is drsignrd to assurr, on thr a\·rrngr, onr trarhrr for r\·rr~· 25 
studrnts, whirh iR ronsidrrrd to bra fa\·orablr ratio by most stand-
ards. Whrl hrr the minimum sal a r~r of $6,000 prr ~·r:u is suflirrnl 
in Trxns to attmrt qualifi0cl traehrrs may br morr drbat:lblr, de-
prnding in major part upon thr lor:ttion of thr school di~triet. But 
there· npprar~ to be little rmpiriral datn whirh supports thr aclvnn-
tagr of any particular pupil-trarhrr ratio or whirh dorumrnt~ tho 
\·irw that rYN highrr salarir;; rr~ult in morr comprlent leaching. 
An intraetabl0 problem in dealing with trnrhrr~' ;;al:\rirs i~ tho 
absrncr, up to this limr, of Hali~fnrtor)· trrhniqu0,; for judging 
thrir ability or prrformanrr. Thr rrsult iR thai rrlatiwl~· frw 
~rhool s~ ·:strms havr merit plans of any kind, with trarhrr:-;' salnrir,; 
being incroa8ed ''by rotc" and acro::;s thr board in a wn~· which 
. -
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:w RAN .\"\'"TO?\'TO RC'HOOL DTRTHTC'T 11. TIODHTG1TEZ 
This, then. is tlw ha!"ir ontlinr of thr Trxas finance' 
strnrtnrc. BrcRni"r of diffrrenrrs in exprndihm> levels 
occasio11ed by dis pari tif's in propertv tax income, ap-· 
pelJPefl claim that children in lcsf' afflnent distrirts have· 
be_rn mack the f'llhjrrt of invidious discrimination. The 
District C'ot1rt found that the State had failed even "to· 
establish a reaf"onahlc basis" for a fl,Vi"tcm 
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 
at 284. \V e disap;ree. 
"·hich rrsnlts 
337 F. Supp., 
The Texas syi:'tem, in its reliance on state ai" well as 
· local resources. is comparable to the systems employed 
· in virtually every other Atate.Ro ·The power to tax local 
reward~ the least de~rrving on t hr K:tme hnsis ns t hr most drHrrv-
ing. Rni:Hir:-; arr usunll~· rni~rd automaticnll~· on thr ha~i:-; of 
prrdetrnninrd ''strp~." rxtrnding O\'N 10-to-12 ~·r:u pNiodH. 
Tn m:tking thrsr ohsrn·ntions, \\'<' intf·nd no rriti<"ism of rxisting; 
prnct icr" nnd rrrt:~inl~· \\'<' irnpl~· no opinion th:tl trn<"hNs' :-;alnrir:-; 
g;rnrr:dl~- nrr ndrq11:1tr. AH rompnrrd with othrrs of comp:1mblr 
rcluration thrre is r1·rry rr:1s011 to hrlir1·r that tr:1rhrr"' s:dnries 
gr11rralh·. stnrting from :111 undul~· low hnsr, hal'r fnilrd rwn to 
kerp nbrrn~t of innntion. Wr h:wr indudrd this commrnt:ll'~' on 
pupil-trnrhrr ratios and :-;al:ll'\' lr1·rl:-; not to rxprrs~ f\11\' opinion 
with rc~pr<'t to t hr :~drquar~· of t ho:-;r in Trxas OJ' rl~<'ll'herr, bui 
mrrrh· to indi<":ltr thnt thr two principal fnctor:-; distinguishing the 
school~ in thr more nfTlurnt di~trirt:-; from tho~e rl:-;rwhrrr do not-
in the opinion of m11n~· rxprrts--demon~t m bl~ · :llld nrcrssnril~· n fTrct 
thr qu:dit~· of thr tr:~rhing. 
Rl: Prrsidr·nt's C'onnn'n on Rf'hool Fin:1nrr, S?ITJI'a. n. fiR, nt 9. Until 
rrrcntl~· Hawaii ll·n:-; thr on]~- Rt:~tr thnt m~1intninrd a purrl~· stntr-
fundrd rdll<':ltionnl progrnm. Tn 19fl, , howrwr, thnt Rtatr nmrndrcl 
its rducntirm:ll fln:uwr stntutr to pNmit r'OilllfirH to collrrt nddi-
tional fund~ lor:1ll~· :\lid sprnd thosr nmounts on it~ ~chook Thr 
rationnlr for th:1t rrrrnt lrgi~Intil'r choler is in~tructiw on tho 
qurstion hrl'orr thr C'ourt todn~·: 
''Undr'r r'xi~ting Jnw, C'OIIntie~ arr prrr•lmlrd from doing an_,·thing 
in thi:-; nrrn, r1·rn to ~prnd thrir 0\\'11 fund~ if thr~· so dr~irr. Thi,., 
rorre<'t i1·r kgi-d:!f ion i~ ur_grntl~- nrrdrd in ordrr to nil ow rountirH 
to go :1 bow n nd hr~·ond t hr Rt :1 t e ·~ sf n ndnrcb and pml'idr rdncn-
t'ionnl f:wilitirs :1:-; good :1~ the peoplr of thr countir~ w:mt :~nd 
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property for educational purposes has been recognized 
in Texas at least since 1883.87 When shifts in the dis-
tribution of ponnlation, Rrrompaniecl b:v changes in local 
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial 
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.88 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital clement of local 
participation. The Straycr-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
articulated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shovYS a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for 
its child." 89 
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality 
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring 
are willing to pa,v for. Allmving local communitieR to go above 
and beyond C8tabli~hed minimum~ providrd for thrir people cmom-
ngct> the be::;t fentures of dcmoeratic government." Haw. Sri:i8. Law:,;, 
Art. :38, § 1 (1968). 
8 7 Sec text nrrompan:-·ing n. 7, supra. 
88 G. Str!l:-·rr & R . Il:iig, F'inancinQ; of Education in the State of 
New York (192:3). For a thorough analy::;iH of thr contribution 
of thc~c reformer,.; and of the prior and ~ub~cqucnt history of edu-
cational fin:l!lre , ~ee J. Coons, 'vV. Clune & S. Sugann:1n, supra, n. 12, 
at 39-95. 
8 0 .T. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 12, Foreward b:-r 
.Tames S. Coleman, at vii. 
71-13:32-0PINION 
38 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
a basic education for every child in the State, it permits 
and encourages a large meal'ure of participation and 
control of each district's schools at the local level. In 
an era that has witnessed a consil'tent trend toward 
centrali:mtion of the functions of government, local shar-
ing· of responsibility for public education has survived. 
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v·, 
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1072). M1t. 
JusTIClD 8TEWATI'l' E<tatecl there that "fdlirect control 
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's 
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society.'~· 
/d., at 460. THE C'HrEF Jus·rrcE, in his dissent, agreed 
that "fl]ocal control is not only vital to continued· public 
support of the schools. but it is of overriding importance 
from an educational standpoint as well. " !d., at 478. 
The persistence of this attachment to government at 
the lowest level "·here ed'ucation is concerned· reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote morE' money to the E'ducation of one's 
child. Equally important. however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the clecisionmaking proc-
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also L\_ffords some opportunity 
for experimentation, nvocation , nd n henlthy competi-
tion for eel ucatio11al excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis iclen tified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." 90 No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
" 0 New State lee Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932), 
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})licity of viewpoints and from a. diversity of approaches 
.than does pubiic education. 
Appellees do not seriously question the validity of 
· Texas' dedication to local control of education. They 
focus their attack on the school financing system on the 
ground that it debases the concept of local control be-
cause it docs not provide the same fiscal flexibility to 
poor districts as it affords the rich. It is no doubt true 
that reliance on local property taxation for school reve-
nues provides less freedom of choice with re!"pcct to 
expenditures for some districts than for others. Local 
control. ho\Yever, connotes more than the power to make 
an autonomous decision on how much to spend. It also 
, con~emplatcs freedom to decide how available funds will 
be allocated and is an c~sential clement in local partici-
pation in the operation of the schools. 
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability / 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 1 
They sec no .i ustification for a system that allows, as 
they contend. the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political suhclivi~ions and the location of valuable com-
. mercia] and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable 
. local governmental units- requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. 
It is equally inevitable that some localitirs arc going 
to br blrssecl \Yith more taxable assets than others. Nor 
is local wealth a static quantity. Arc boundary lines to 
be rrdrawn with every shift in population or with every 
discovery of valuable minerals or with the completion 
of every new industrial park? Moreover, if local taxa-
tion for local expenditurE' is an unconstitutional method 
of providing for education then it must be equally im-
,. ,, 
\ 
' { \ 
I /t, 
\ ' \.. 
tv '") 
t ~ /( 
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permissible in providing every other necessary service 
currently financed from local property taxes, including 
local police and fire protection. public health and hos-
pitals, and pnhlic utility facilities of various kinds. We 
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of 
local property taxa~ion and control as would follow from 
appelfees' contentions. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas systen1 of school 
finance results in c-Hset;iminutoJ¥ ~l1ildren 
who happen to reside in certain districts. we cannot say 
that such discrimination is tho product of a system that 
is without rational basis. Its shortc01uings have .been 
acknowledged by Texas, which has persistently endeav-
orecl-not without success- to ameliorate tho differences 
in levels of expemliture without destroying the acknowl-
edged benefits of local participation. The continued 
,persistence of "some ineqnality" is not alone a satisfactory 
basis upon \vhich to conclude that the Texas system 
lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
425- 426 (Hl61 ). Nor may it be condemnecl simply 
because it imperfectly effectuates the State's goals. 
Dandridue v. Wnliams, 397 U. S., at 485·. 
The Texas pl:=tns is not the result of some hurried, 
ill-conceived legislation. Tt is certainly not the product 
of pmposefu 1 discr'im ination against any group or class. 
On tho contrary. it 'is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elPcwhcro. and in major part is the product 
of responsible studios by qualified people. In giving 
,substance to tho presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled. L1:ndsey v. National Carbon·ic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69- 70 (1913). One also must remember, when weigh~ 
\'L-vV--./"/ 
--1,, \) ~-\ ~ 
\ 
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~ng the is ue of rationality, that the system here chal-
1!-:mgecl is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State. 
In its essential charactrristics thr Trxal' plan for financ-
ing public education ref:lects what many educators for 
a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
\visdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and edu-
cational authorities in 40 States, especially where the 
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no-
where yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether 
there is a rational baFis for the challenged state action. 
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly meets this test. 
IV 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on 
the District C'ourt opinion in this case ami on its Cali-
fornia predecessor, Setmno v. Ptiest, 5 C'al. 3d 584, 487 
P. 2cl 1241 (1071 ). a cautionary postscript seems appro-
priate. TheFr decisions have been widely hailed as pro-
viding a constitutional mandate for major state legislative 
reform. The derisions have been variously touted as 
the "ans"·er" to removing the ron.clblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have 
even vie\\'cd them as thr ultimate solution to the urban 
crisis in education. Indeed. in their enthusiasm for 
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neu-
trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.0 ' 
01 "FisrnlJH'Hirnlil~· " i~ 1hr nnmr ~i1 ·en b~ · Profr~sors CoonH, Clunr, 
and Su~arman lo lhrir lhr:-;i:-; lhal " lhc qunlit~· of puhli<' rdu<'alion 
mny nol bP a fun<·tion of II'P;dlh othrr 1han the wraith of lhr slnlr 
a~ a wholr." .T. Coon:-;, W. Ch1nr & 8. Sn~nnn:m , suwa. n. 12, :tt 2. 
Thrir I hough I ful nnd im:tginn ti 1·c ll'ork pa 1·ed tlw w:1~· for t lw 
suits, indudin~ thr prr~ent onr, ntlnc·king lhe ~rhool fin:mc·e ~~·~lrm. 
Indeed, t hr Di:-;lri<'l Coml approvrd the :lUI hor~' t hr,;is \'Prb:tt im. 
:337 F. Supp. , al 2ilt). The author~ haw often cautioned lhrir Kllp-
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The truth is that it is too 0arly, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
empirical study, to make consider0d judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or thP political frasibility of the "fiscal 
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to rmrrg0 from some commentators. It is begin-
ni.i1g to b0 r0cognizecl that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" altNnatives could have con~equences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumccf.n" There is, 
porter::;, ho\\'P\·rr, again::;! ::;prrulaling that "fi,.;cal nrulrali1~· " woulti 
br n pan:trl'a for lhl' poor or for racial minoriiirt->. lhid .' ; Coon~, 
Chtn<· & ~uganna n, A Fii·"l Appr:t i~:tl of' ~rrntno , :3 YaiP Rev. oi 
L. & Roc. Action 111,11-1-115 (Hli1). 
!!"An initial problem, more oh1·iou::; lo rkr!Pd offirinl~ than 1o 
lho~r of u,; who writ!' opinion" for thr c·oml" or r~,;ay~ for thr law 
rcvi!'w~. i~ I hl' eril i<':tl OJH' of mmu•u. \Vh:t1rn•r formula mny be 
<·mplo~·rd , thrrr arr r;;,;rnli:tll~· only two wn~· "' to a""urr rqual prr 
pupil Pxprndilun·~ (r1·rn :tpproximnlrl.l·) in el'f'r~· ~chool dil'l riel: 
(i') rx]wndilttrr,; ('OIIld hr rqn:tli~rd h.1· tal(ing rrYrmtr,; away from 
"omr di"t ri(·l..; :t nd nppl~·ing I hrm I o I he ll<'nrfil of ol hrr,;, a prorrss 
of lr1·eling do\\'11 to ~Otltr rommon drnontin:tlor; or (ii) Ynsl ncldi-
1i()llnl lax rr,·rtntr" would hn1·r lo hr rni,;rd ' to rl<'ntlr prr pupil 
exprndilmr lo lhr highe"l lr1·rl now obtaining in lhr di,; lric·l,; which 
pro1·ick tiH· grC':tl r,;l snpplc•mrnt a I ion of state fund,.;. :\ rit hrr of 
thr:-<r :tiiNnnli\'C's srrm,.; rrali,;lir. Thr rr,.;iclrnl" of n di,.;tri<'t whirh, 
with good fortnn<' and ' drdicntion lo pnblir rdiH':tlion, ha1·r 11 high 
lrYrl of rxprnditure :trr not likrl~· lo br loler:utl of n lr1·rlinp; plan 
lh:tl rrducp,.; funding; for lhrir di~tri<'l lo inrrrnsr it rl~riYhrrr. \Vould 
leadwr,; ' s:t!:trir:-< in that cli,.;lriC'I br rrdurrcl ronr"pondingl~, ? If 
pupil-trac·hcr rnt ios wrrr inrrr:t"ed, whnt would hnppen lo the 
IC'arhrr,.; no longrr emplo~wl? What, ill(l!'rd, would happrn 1o 
school bomb i~,.;ued ptn·,-uanl lo :t. \'OIC' of citizens proud of their 
schoob :tnd ll'illing to pn~· mor<'? 
The olhrr :t!IC'rnnli1·r. thr t·ni:-<ing of suffirirnt nclclitionnll:tx monry 
slalcwidr , is no morr p:tl:ttnblr politlc·:1ll~· . Tt h:ts br<'n c:tlr-ul:ltrd 
1hnl S2.-l billion nf additional "chool fumb would hP tWptirrd lo 
bring; nil Trxas di . ;lriet~ tip lo the prp,.;rnt lrvrl of exwmlitmr in :tll 
buL tho we nit hie:;t di,.;trict:;-nn amount morr 1 han double that 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the Coons' 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in 
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
~ndustrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the 
District Court. 9 " has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance. 91 That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
-lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.0 " 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation bet"'een the loca-
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools.911 Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
eurrrntl~- being spent in TPxns on public rdurntion (TexnR Hesrarch 
Lengur, su]n·a, n. 19, at 16- 1R. At n time whrn even· Sl-niC' nne! 
loralil y i:,; suffering from fi~cn 1 11 nclprnomishmrnt, and with c!Pmnncls 
for RC'rv icr~ of nll kindR bmgPoning nnd wi1h wcnr~' tnxpa,·p rs nlrrady 
rrsl:,;1 ing tax increases, on]~' those who li\'C' in n drenm world could 
bdicw 1hnt a cleei"ion of 1hi~ CollTt nullifving present Rtatc 1axing 
~~'si·rm~ would rcstdt in doubling public funds committed to cclura-
tion. RnlhPr, tlw result in terms of ron fu sion and cli~rupl ion wmtlcl 
be profound, and in thP end the lrwling proces;; could well menn a 
lower qwdil y of education for all. 
ua Sec n. 38, sv,pra. 
91 Select Comm_ on Eq\181 Eclncfltionnl Opportunity, lnrquitics 
in School FiHance (1972) (Monograph prepared by Profcs;;o r T::lC'l'kc). 
ac. Sec :1lso U.S. Offier of Eduea1ion, Finance~ of Large Cit~r School 
Sy~lems: A Comparative Anf\ly~i~ (1972) (HEW Publication). 
an Sre Note, A Stnti~tirnl Analy~i~ of the School Finn ncr Deri-
s ions: On Winning Batiks nnd LoRing Wars, 81 Yale L. r· 1303 
(1972); see 1cxt accompanying n. 45, supra. 
c ~ " ..,., · I ~~1:\. - ,_ t.c,...ue... ,__ 't... 




SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1332 
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the 
United States Dis-District et al., Appellants 
v. 
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al 
trict Court for the 
Western District of 
Texas; 
[January -, 1973] 
MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opuuon of the 
Court. 
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated l:Jy Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elerncntary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Tcxas. 1 
They brought a class action, on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who arc poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants" 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of thrse compbinant;,; allrnd public ;,;chool. 
One family';,; children arc enrolled in private school "becau::;c of the 
condition ol' the ::;chool10 in the Edgewood Indeprndcnt School Di::;-
trict." Third Amrndcd Com]>laint, App., at 14. 
"The San Antonio Independent Sclwol Di::;trict, whosr name I hi::; 
case still bears, was one of scyen school di~lrict~ in thr San Antonio 
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendant::;. 
Al'tcr a pretrial conference, the District Coml is;;ucd fill orclrr dis-
missing the school di~tricts from 1 he case. Snbsrqucntl)·, tho San 
Antonio Inclcpendrn t School Di::;t rict has .i oincd in the plnint iffs' 
challenge to the Slate'::; school finance sy::;tem and hns filed an 
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permissible in providing every other necessary service 
currently financed from local property taxes, including 
local police and fire protection, public health and hos-
pitals, and public utility facilities of various kinds. We 
perceive no justification for such a total abrogation of 
local property taxation and control as would follow from 
appellees' contentions. 
Tn sum, to the extrnt that the T0-xas system of school 
finance results in discriminatory tr<>atment of children 
~
who happen to reside in certain districts, we cannot say 
that such discrimination is the product of a system that 
is without rational baPis. Tts shortcomings have been 
acknowledged by Texas, "·hich has persistently endeav-
ored-not without success-to ameliorate the differences 
in levels of expenditure without destroying the acknowl-
edged benefits of local partieipation. The continued 
persistence of "some inequality" is not alone a satisfactory 
basis upon which to conclude that the Texas system 
lacks rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
425- 426 (1061). Nor may it bo condemned simply 
because it imperfectly effcetuatos the State's goals. 
Dandridge v. W1:Zl1'ams, 397 U. S., at 485·. 
The Texas plans is not the result of some hurried, 
ill-conceived legislation. Tt is certainly not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary. it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the. presumption of validity to which the 
Texas systmn is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropol1:s Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69- 70 (1013). One also must remember, when weigh-
,. 
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This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~ 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of thel:le complainants attend public l:lchool. 
One family's children arc enrolled in private school "bccau l:lc of the-
condition of the school. · in the Edgewood Independent School Di;;-
trict." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
~ The San Antonio Independent School District, who ·e name this 
('Hf<e still bear:>, wal:l one of seven school dist ricts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants. 
After a pretrial conference, the District Court is:;uecl an order di~:>­
mi;;;;ing the school districts from the case. Subsequent!~·, the San 
Antonio Independent School Di:;trict has joined in the plaintiffs' 
challenge to the State';; school finance system and has filed an 
amicus curiae brief in ~:;upport of that position in thi;; Comt. 
-------
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of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court 
\\"aS impaneled in January 1969.'1 In December 1971 • 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted prob-
able jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu-
tional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools." Early in its history, 
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
a A three-judge court was properly convened and there an· no 
que,.tions as to the District. Court's juri~diction or the direet appeal-
ability of its judgment. 28 U. S. C. §§ 22R1, 1253. 
'The trial was drlayed for two year~ to permit cxten~in• pretrial 
di~eo,·ery and to :tllow completion of a pending Texas lrgi~lative 
im·e~tigation concerning the need for reform of its public school 
finnnce ~.,·stern. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 3:37 
F. Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Tex. 1971). 
r. :~37 F. Supp. 2RO. The Di~trid Court sta~·ed its mandate for 
two year.• to pro,·ide Texas an opportunit~· to remcd~· the inequitie8 
found in it~ finaneing program. The court, howe,·e r, retained juris-
diction to fashion its own remedial order if the State failed to offer 
;,n accrpt:tble pbn. !d ., at 2R6. 
"Trx. Const., Art. X, § 1 : 
" A grnrral dilfu~ion ol· knO\I"lrdp;e lwinp; c~s<'nti:tl to thr pre~rtTalion 
of the rights nnd librrties of the proplc it sh:1ll be thr dut~· of the 
Lrg;i~lnture of this Statr to make ~uitable pro,· i~ion for thr support 
nnd maintenance of puhlie srhoob." 
!d .. Art. X,§ 2: 
'·Thr Lcgi~la t ure ~ hall us early n~ prnet icn hle establish frrr· sf'hool~ 
throughout the State, and shall furJti.~h means for thPir support , by 
taxation on property." 
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution ·was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildings" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were 
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.8 The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854,0 was endowed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.' 0 The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes,'' served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
the State.12 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.1 " Sizable differences 
7 Tex. Const.. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug. 14, 1R83. 
8 Tex. Const.., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5. 
0 Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 
(interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor';,; Committee on 
Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 (1969) 
(hereinafter GoYcrnor's Committee Report). 
10 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 5 (see also the interpretive commentary); 
·v Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12. 
11 The various sources of revenue for the Available School Fund 
nrc cataloged in Texas State Bd. of Educ., Texas Statewide School 
AdeCJuacy Survey 7-15 (1938). 
12 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Nov. 5, 1918 (sec inter-
pretive commentary). 
13 I Governor's Committee Report, at 35; Texas State Bel. of 
Educ., supra, n. 11, at 5-7; J. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, 
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in the value of assessable property bet\\"een local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.'' The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.'" 
In clue time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities. 1 G Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.' 7 Although the 
amount vvas increased several times in the early 1940's.'' 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.'" 
Priv:tte Wealth nnd Publie Education 49 (1970); E. Cubberley, 
Sl'hool Fund~ nne! Thrir Apportionment 21-27 (1905). 
11 B.1· 1940 one-hnlf of the Stnte\ population wa~ rlu~terecl in itf: 
metropolit:m renter~. I Govrrnor's Conunittee Report, at 35. 
'"Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Hnve "\Vhat We Mu~t (194R). 
1(; n. Still. The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950) ; Trxa~ Bel. of 
Edur. , supra, n. 11. 
17 n. Still, supra . n. 1G, nt 12. It should br notrd thn1 during this 
prriod thP rnrdinn prr pupil expenditure for all ~<'hool~ with nn 
rnrollmcnt of more 1 han 200 wn~ npproximat ely $50 per ~·c:tr. 
Dming t.hi~ snme period n sun·e.1· eoncluetecl by the StntP Bo:ncl 
of Education concluded that "in Texas the best educational ndnm-
1ng;r~ offrrecl by the Sta1e a1 prr~rnt ma~· br had for the median 
ro~t of 852.67 per year pC'I' pupil in avC'l"age clail~ · nttrndanre." 
Texa~ State Bel. of Ecluc., suwa. n. 11, nt 56. 
' ~ 1 Genrrnl Law~ of Trxas, 40th Legis., Rrg. Se~~. 1\):~9 , nt 274 
(822.50 ]WI' ~tudcnt); GrnNnl & Sprr. Law~ of Trxa~ . -l-Rt h Lrgi~., 
Rrg. Se~~. 194~ , c. lGl , at 262 ($25.00 prr Htudrnt). 
1" Grnernl & Spec. Ln11·s of Trxas, 49th Lrgi~ ., Tirg. Sr~s. 19-!5, 
c. 53, at. 75. 
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Recogniz:ing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In Hl47 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators. was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that "·ould guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program."0 It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas.~1 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses. and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 8051, of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
"° For a complrtc biRtor~· of thr ndop1ion in Trxa . ; of :1 founda-
tion program, sec R Stills, S111Jra, n. 16. Rro ah'o V C:o1·rrnor't< 
Committrc Rrport. n t 1-J.; Texas RrRr:lrch Lrng;ur, Public School 
Finance Problems in Trxn:; 9 (Int crim Report 1972). 
"'For the 1970-1971 school yrnr thi~ stn1r aid prog;ram ac·eountcd 
for 4S.O% of all public school fund~. Local taxation contributed 
·fl.l % nne! 10.9% was prol'iclccl in frdrrnl funds. Trxa~ Research 
Lrngur, supra, n. 20, at 9. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing. mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent. considers each county's share of all property 
in the State.~~ Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county.t" The 
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children 24 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.t5 Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well 
as local sources- have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor '~ Commit trr Report , at 44-48. 
t 3 At present there are 1,161 ~chool di~trict ~ in Texas. Texas Re-
sea rch League, supra, n. 20, at 12 . 
t ·• In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that some school 
di~tri et s were not lev~' ing ::my local tax to support rduration . 
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supm, n. 15, at 16. The Texas State 
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and 
indeprndent school districts wrre lrvying no local proprrty tax in 
1935-1936. Texas Sta te Bel. of Educ., sup1'a n. 11 , at 39- 42 . 
2 " Gilmer-Aikrn Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
5007( .26 In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 28 Minimum 
teacher salaries--by far the largest single item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years.2 " 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-· 
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 907o of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6% 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960--the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest."0 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
26 I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
27 Texn~ Research League, sup1'a, n. 20, at 2. 
28 In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupil 
expenditure for all current operating expcn~c~ increa~ed from 8206 
to 8493. In that same period capital expenditure~ incrca~ed from 
SH to S102 per pupil. I Govemor'~ Commit tee Report, at 53-54. 
2" III Governor's Committee Report, aL 113-146; Berke, Carna-
Yalc, l\Iorgan & White, The Texas School Finance ca~e: A Wrong 
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972). 
:w The family income figures are based on 1960 census stati~lics._ 
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248."' Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil."" 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
trasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 studellts, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edge,Yood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo. having only 18% Mexican-Americans 
and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49.000 '"'and the median family income 
"' Thr A\·ail:tble School Fund, trrhnicnll~· , pro\·idr~ a ~crond 
~ourcc of ~t n te monc~· · Thn t Fund ha~ continuPd n~ in ~ · r:l r~ pa~t 
(~cr trxt :lC'C'Otnpan.\·in~ nn. Jo-19, Str])l'a) to distributr uniform 
prr pupil grant~ to rwr~· district in thr Stair. In 196S thi~ Fum! 
allot trd ~9S prr pupil. liO\\'C\'N , bec·nusc thr .\ \·aibblP f't·hool 
Fund contribution i~ alwn~·s ~ubtractrd from a district'~ entitle-
ment under the Foundation Program, it pb~·~ no ~ignifirnnt rolr 
in rduentionnl finnncc toda~·. 
"" \Yhilr frdrral m;~istmwr ha~ nn nmrliorat ing; rffret on thP difTrr-
rncr. in ~rhool budg;ets bet ween wrnlt h~· and poor di~t riel~, the 
District Court rrjectrcl an nrgtunent mndr by the Statr in that 
court ih[lf it ~hould ron~idrr the rffrct of thr frdrr:d gr:tnt in 
as~t·~sin~ t hr discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., nt 2S4. Thr Rt a tc 
ha~ not rcnrwed that rontention here. 
"" A map of Brxar Count~· itwludrd in the record show,; that 
Edgrwood and .\lama Hrights nrr among thr ::;mallr~t di~trict~ in 
ihr ('Ollnty and Hl'l' or approximate!~· equnl size. Yet , a~ the figmc~ 
:d)o\·r indie:1te, Edgewood'~ ;;tmlrnt popul:~tion is morr than four 
t imr:-; t hal of Alamo Bright~. Thi~ Lt('for ob\· iou~J~· arf•otmt~ for 
a significant pererntngr or thr diffl'!'rJJC'r:> brtwern the two di~t ridH 
in prr pupil JlropC'rty \·:tlues :tnd rxprnditurr ' . H Alamo llright;; 
h:td as man~· ~tudenb to Pclw:ttr :1~ Edgr\\·ood dar~ (22.000) its per 
pupil :tR~r~srd proprrly vnlur would br Hpproxima!t'ly $11.100 rather 
than $40,000, nnd it:; prr ]Htpil rxpenditmes would there fore have 
brrn ronsiclrrnbly lo\\·er. 
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is $8.001. In 1967- 1068 the local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources. Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1067-1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid,"' more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has beE'n 
significant. For the 1070-1971 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62/{ increase ove1· 
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state 
aiel alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1068 school budget--from local, state. and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil."" These 
" 1 Thr figurrs quot rd a bo\"C' ,.:11"~' 81 ightl~· from tho~l' 11 t ilizrd in 
the Dio-:t rirt Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 7S2. Thrsr trivial 
diiTrrrucrs :ur npparrntl~· n product of th:1t rourt'~ r<'lianec on 
slight]~· dilirrrnt :;tatistir:d data than "·e ha\"C' rrli<'d upon. 
'1" Although thr Foundation Program has mndr ~ignifirantl~· grratrr 
contributions to both school di~tricts oYrr the lnst se1·eral year~ , it 
is apparrnt that Alamo llright~ hns rnjo~·rd a lnrgrr gain. Thr 
siz.1blr diffrrrncr brtwrrn t hr Alnmo Hril);hts and Edgrwood ~);rants 
is dur to thr emphasis in thr Statr's allocation formula on the 
g1mrantcrd minimum salarirs for tcarhrrs. Higher salnrirs nrc 
guaranteed to trnchcr~ h:11·ing more years of experienrr and pos-
sr.ssing more ad1·:mcrd clrgree~. Thrrcfore, Al::nno Hrights, which 
hns a grratcr prrcentngr of rxprrirmrcl prrsonncl with advanced 
drgree~, rrcri\"C's more Rt ate support. In this rrgnrd the Texas 
Prog:ram is not unlike thnt prcHrntly in existrnce in n numbrr of 
other State~. C. CoonH, ,V. Clune, 8. Sugarman, supra. n. 13. at 
63-125. Brcnusr more dollnr~ haYe been gi1·rn to di~trirts thnt 
alrr,1cl~· spend morr per pupil, ~uch Foundation formulas haYc been 
dr~cribcd as "anti-equalizing." Ibid. The formula, however, i · 
:111! i-cqunlizing only if Yiewed in absolute terms. The percentage 
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment .. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth , 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4 o/r· of its 
grant."6 It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio aud in varying 
degrees throughout the State,38 still exist. And it was 
disparity between the two Texas distri ctii iR diminished sub~ tnntially 
by State aid . Alamo Heights derived in 1967-1968 almo~ t 13 times 
ns mu ch money from local taxe~ as Edgewood did. The State aiel 
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approxi-
mately two to one, i . e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice 
:1 s much money to ~pend per pupil from its combied State and local 
resources. 
'
16 Texas Resea rch League, supra, n. 20, at 13 . 
'l 7 The Economic Index, which determines each county's shn re of 
the total Local Fund Assignment , is based on a complex formula 
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was in~tituted . 
Sec text at pp. --- supra. It has frequent!~· been suggeiitcd 
by T exas researchers that the formula be altered in several respects 
to provide a more accurate refl ection of local taxpaying ability, 
especially of urban school~ . V Governor's Committee Report, at 
48; Berke, Carnavale, l\forgrm & White, supra, n . 29 at 680-681. 
as The District Court relied on the findings pre:-'onted in an 
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His sa mpling 
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated n direct correlation 
between the amount of n district 's taxable property and its level 
of per pupil expenditure. His stud~' also found a direct correlation 
between n district's median family income and per pupil cxpendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun-
damental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it was premised upon some compelling· 
tun's as well as an inven;c correlation between percrntngc of minori-
ties and expenditures. 
Categorized by Equalized Property Valur:;, 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 
Market Value Median State & 
of Taxable Family Per Cent Local 
Property Income Minority Revenues 
Per Pupil F'rom 1960 Pupils Per Pupil 
Above $100,000 85,900 8% $815 
(10 Districts) 
5100,000-850,000 $4,425 32% $544 
(26 Districts) 
$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 23% $483 
(30 Districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 31% $462 
( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 79% S305 
( 4 Districts) 
Although the correlations with respect to family incomr and race· 
appear only to exist. at the extremes, and although the a!Iinnt's 
methodology has been questionrd (sec Goldstrin, Intrrdi,;t riet 
Inrqualitirs in School Financing; a Critical Analysis of Serrano v. 
Priest and its Progrny, 120 U. Pa. L. Hcv. 50-~, 52:3-525 nn. 67 and 
71 (1972) ), insofar as any of thrsr three corrrlation:; i:; rrlcvant 
to the constitutional thr;;is presrntcd in this ca~c we may accept 
it~ basic thruHt". For a defense of the rcliabilit~r of the affid:wit, see· 
Brrke, CarnnYalr, l\iorgnn & Whitr, supra, n. 29. 
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state interest. I d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "[n]ot only arc defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
Id., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not "·ithstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights :w or that 
involve suspect classifications. ''" If, as '· fre-
~ld, strict scrutiny means that the State's system 
is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,", the Texas 
financing system- and its counterparts in virtually every 
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that " [ n l o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." ··~ 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" •a and "imperfections," 14 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
"''E. (!. , Police Dept. of the City of Chica(!o v. ilfoslc!J. 40~ U. S. 
!)2 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. ;3:~0 (1972); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
·"'E. (!., Graham v. Richard~on, 403 U. S. 3G5 ( 1071) : Lovin(! v. 
\"irQinia, 388 U. S. 1 (19()7); JllfcLauQhlin \'. Florida. 379 1J . S. 184 
(1964). 
·" Sre Dunn v. Blu111stcin, 405 U. S. 330, 3-1-3 (1972), :lllcl the 
ca~rs collected therein. 
''"Appellants' Brirf, at 11. 
·"' Ibid. 
·•·• Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3. 
. ' 
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the District ( 'omt's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis." 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of 
financing public education must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. If not. Texas' claimed rational 
basis must be ronsiclerrcl. 
II 
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
Tn concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatn1ent in the criminal trial and 
appellate processes, 4 " and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote:'" Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established 'vealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system. discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming tho 
undeniable importance of education)' 7 that there is a 
fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
\Ve are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
40 E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, :n2 U. S. 35:-l ( 1963). 
"" llwper v. Bd. of Elections, 38:3 U. S. 66:3 (1964); McDonald v. 
Bd. of Elections, 39-! U.S. 802 (1969); Bulloc/,: v. Carter, 405 U.S. 
1;).f (1!)i2). 
·• 7 Sec rase::; ritrd in text., nt -,infra . 
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under the Equal ProtPction Clause. Indeed. for the 
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Comt in this case. and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing laws in other 
States,"8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. The ju-
clieial examination of any state law, challenged on the 
ground that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of 
any class of the State's citizens, requires at the outset 
delineation and description of the class alleged to be 
discriminated against. In each of this Court's equal 
protection decisions in which state laws were found to 
have occasioned de facto wealth discrimination, the dis-
advantaged class could be easily identified and described. 
The contours of the class in the present case have not 
been so identified. Indeed, appellees and the District 
Court have characterized the class in at least three dif-
ferent ways and have not settled on any particular defi-
nition. In their complaint, appellees purported to 
represent a class composed of persons who are "poor" 
and who reside in school districts having a "low value 
of property." "u Yet appellees have not defined the term 
"poor" with reference to any describable minority of 
@ 
persons whose incomes fall below any identifiable level 
"1 ~~ who might be characterized as "indigent." 5 0 Their 
proof at trial focused instead on comparative differences 
'. 
1 ~ Se1'rano v. Pl'iest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241. 5 Cal. 
3d 584 (1971); Van Dusal'tz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (l\Iinn. 
1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 
(1972). 
•r• Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
"
0 See Appellees' Brief, at 1, 3; Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20--21. 
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in family incomes between school districts. They en-
deavored, apparently, to show that, because median 
family incomes are higher in wealthier districts and lowe1 
in poorer districts, the Texas system discriminates 
against a class composed of all families residing in rela-
tively poor districts. The District Court may have been 
relying on this notion of relative discrimination based on 
am1 y Its opinion emphasizes that "those dis-
tricts most rich in property also have the highest median 
income ... while the poor property districts are poor in 
income .... " 337 F. Supp., at 282. A third possible 
delineation of the class is also suggested in the District 
Court's opinion. Since all children in any given district 
receive the same educational offering, the court apparently 
concluded that the individual wealth characteristics of 
the residents in the district were irrelevant. Thus the 
District Court might have determined that the Texas' 
:finance system occasions relative discrimination against 
districts based on their property wealth rather than on 
the personal wealth of ~ residents. This characteriza-
tion would account for the court's description of ap-
pellees' class as being composed of "all ... children 
throughout Texas who live in school districts with low 
property valuations." lbid. r' 1 The vagueness and im-
precision with which the classification scheme has been 
described may well suggest the absence of a discrete, 
identifiable class necessary for equal protection analysis. 
It is clear, in any event, that however described the class 
lacks the traditional indicia that have rendered other 
class.ifications suspect and is markedly dissimilar to 
"'At oral argument and in their brief, appellees ,;uggP~t that 
de;;crip1 ion of the personal status of the rei:>iclcnti:> in di :-:;1 rict !:i that 
i:>pend less on education is not critical to their rase. In their Yicw, 
the Tcxai:> system is impermissibly discriminatory even if relatively 
poor district s do not contain poor people. Appellees' Brief, nt 43-44; 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20-21. t 
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classes involved in the several precedents relied upon 
by appellees and the court below. 
The individuals or groups of individuals who have 
constituted the class discriminated against in prior cases 
have shared ~ distinguishing characteristics: ( 1) be-
cause of thei/\mpecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and (2) as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. 8. 12 (1956), and its progeny,"" the Court in-
validated state la\\·s that prevented indigent criminal 
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate 
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case "·ere found to occasion de facio discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigency, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. Aile!, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation 
would have been shown if the State had provided some 
"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. 
Britt v. A·orth Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner 
v. California, 303 U.S. 367 (1060); Draper v. Washing-
ton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison 
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay 
for counsel from their own resources and who had no 
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides 
"" Mayer v. City of Chirago, 40-J. U. S. 1~9 (1971); William s Y. 
01.-/ahoma Citu. :30.5 U. S. 458 (19()9) ; Gard11a v. California, :39:3 
U.S. :3oi (19G9); Roberts Y. LaVallee, 389 U.S . .J.O (19Gi) ; Lono v. 
District Court of lo11:a, 385 U. S. 192 (19GG); Draper , .. lrashinuton, 
:372 U. S. 4i:>i (19(i0); E'rskinc v. Washinutvn J>ri~on Roard, ;357 
U.S. 214 (1958) . 
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no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for 
a criminal defense arc, relatively speaking, great but not 
insunnountablr. Nor docs it deal with relative dif-
ferences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less 
wealthy. 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. 
Short, 401 r. S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal-
tics that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be-
cause of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the dis-
advantaged class \\"as composed only of persons who 
vverc totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those 
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively less money on 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fcc requirement for 
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts 
found in the previous cases were present he+if. 1e size 
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars, 
effectively singled out all potential candidates who were 
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" 
(I d., at -), inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
denial of a position on the primary ballot. 
In the present case neither of these two distinguishing 
characteristics of '"calth classifications can be found. 
First, although appellees have charged that the Texas 
system discriminates against the "poor," they have made 
no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clus-
' ' 
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tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "[i lt is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Sen·ano-that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Conuecticut." :>:J Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," 54 
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts."5 
Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas 
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people--defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impecunity- are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it, 5" a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
"" 1\ ote, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Deci~ionH: On 
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. J. 1303, 1328-1329 
( 1972). 
51 I d., at 1324, n. 102. 
r.r, !d., at 1328. 
""Each of appellees' po sible theories of wealth di;,;crin.1ination is 
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varie::; 
.. 
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ment is that the Equal Protection Clause does not re-
quire absolute or complete equality.';7 Nor, indeed, in 
view of the infinite variables affecting the educational 
process, can any system assure equal quality of educa-
tion except in the most relative sense. Texas asserts 
that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an 
"adequate" education for all children in the State. By 
assuring teachers, books, transportation and operating 
funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guar-
antee, for the welfare of the State as a whole, that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu-
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.' " 58 The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled 
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every 
school district an adequate education." 50 No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, there-
fore, the difference in quality betw en two schools can be de..!£!::--
mined), y looking at the difference in per pupil expen 1 ure~ . Thi::; 
i ~ a matter of considerable dispute among educators and com-
mentators. See nn. 86 and 101, infra. 
57 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); Mayer v. 
City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. lVashington, 
372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 
35:3, 357 ( 1963) 0 
' ''Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 1:3 (emplw~i~ ndd<'d) .. 
Indeed, even though local funding has lon~ been a ::;igniflcant a~peet 
of educational funding, the State alway::; ha::; Yicwed pro,·iding an 
acceptable education a::; one of its primary function::;. Sec Texas 
State Bel. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 1, 7. 
'"'Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1. 
., 
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class is not susceptible to identification in tradition a 1 
terms.r.o As suggested above, appellees and the District 
Court seem to have embraced a different approach, \\·bich 
might be characterized as a theory of relati \'e or com-
parative discrimination. Appellees sought to prove that 
there is a direct correlation between the personal \\·ealth 
of the citizens with in each district and the cxpencli tures 
therein for education. The principal evidence adduced 
in support of this comparative discrimination claim is 
an affidavit submitted hy Professor Joelc f3. Berke of 
Syracuse University's li;ducational Finance Policy In-
stitute. The District Court, rclying in major part upon 
this affidavit and apparently accepting th<' substa nee of 
appellees' theory, noted, first, a direct correlation between 
the wealth of school districts, measured in terms of 
assessable property per pupil, and their levels of per-
pupil expenditures. Second, the court found a direct 
correlation between district wealth and the personal 
wealth of its residents, measured in terms of median 
family income. 337 F. Rupp., at 282, n. 3. 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then 
it might be argued that expenditures on eclucation-
oquated by appellees to the quality of education-arc 
dependent on personal wealth. Appellecs1 comparative' 
r.o An rdurat ional finance :,;y;;trm might br h~·pothr~izrcl, how-
c.vcr, in which thr amdogy to the wc·allh di~('rimination rasrs would 
be con;;iderabl~· rlo::;er. If rlrmrntar~· and secondary rdueation were 
made twailablc by the Statr only to tho:sr who arr ablr to p:1y a 
tuition as;;r:sHrcl again"t raC'h pupil, thrrr wonld bra elr:1rly defined 
cia:;:; of "poor proplr-drfinablr in terms of their inability to pay 
tho prr~rribrcl snm-who would br ah~olutcl~· prreluded from re-
rriving an rducation. Thnt ra~r would prrsrnt a far morr com-
pPlling set of cirrum~t :1 nrcs for judicial a~~ist anrr than t hr rase 
bcforr us tOlby. Aftrr all, Trxnl' has unclNt:1kon to do a good 
dc>al morr than providr :~n rcllleat ion to tho~r who ('::tn aJTord it. 
It has pnn·iclrd what it ron~idcr~ to bran :Hl('quatc ba::;r education 
for all childrrn :111cl has nttcmptrd, thougl1 imprrfrctly, to amrlioratc 
by statr funding and h~· the local assr~smcnt progmm tho cli~parilie;; 
bot ween !oral tax rcsomcos. 
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discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered 
questions, including whrthrr a bare direct correlation or 
ome higher drgree of correlation nt is necessary to pro-
vide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-
signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the 
com.paratively poor,G" and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need 
not be addressed in this casr. however. since appellees' 
proof fails to support their allegations or the District 
Court's conclusions. 
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately 10~ of the school districts in Texas. His 
findings, set out in the margin,"" show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
"'Abo, it ~hould be recognizrcl that mrdinn inromr" ~tnli"tir:-; 
ma~· not define \\'ith an.'· prrei~ion the stntu~ of indi,·idual farnilir~ 
\\'it h in an~· gi,·en d i~t rirts. A morr drprnc\a blr ;;bowing of com-
para! iYc \\·calth clisrriminat ion \\'Ould rxnminr fartor;; Sll('h as the 
a\'crnge inromr, thr mode, and tht' conrPntrntion of poor fmnilir~ in 
au~· clistri('t in addition to the mrc\inn inromr. 
·n~cr. Jefferson\'. Ilarkuey, 406 U.S. 505,547-5-10 (1972). 
n:: ftJ Mket Value of Jlf edian Ji'amily Staie & [,otaf 
Ta.tab!e Property hlcomf' Expf'nditw·es 
Per f>'Upi! in 1.')(i0 Pel' Pupil 
Abow 8100,000 S5,900 SRI.') 
(10 districts) 
8100,000-.'50,000 $4,4:25 85-14 
(36 c\ist ri('ts) 
$50,000-830,000 $-1,900 $48:3 
(:30 cli~trictR) 
S00,000-Sl0,000 $;'),0.50 $463 
( 40 clist rirt s) 
Brlow $10,000 $:3,:33.5 $005 
(4 cli~trict;;) 
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to education. For the remainder of the districts-96 
districts comprising almost 907o of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most money on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest median 
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the con-
ceptual questions >vere answered favorably to appellees, 
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.64 
Since the only correlation indicated by the evidence 
is that between district property wealth and expenditures, 
it may be argued that the class could be defined, with-
out regard to the individual characteristics of their resi-
dents, to include all persons, or all chiklren, in every 
district in the State except the district or districts that 
have the most assessable wealth and spend the most on 
education.65 Assuming a perfect correlation from top 
to bottom, every child in the class would be disadvantaged 
r.l St1Hlirs in other State~ havr al~o que::;tionrd t hr rxi,lrt•rr of 
:my drprndablr correlation brtwrrn a di:>trict '::; \Y('~]t h J'l<'a~urNl 
in terms of assr~~able proprrty and thr coll~?ctivr wen! th of fn•nilirs 
re.:~iding in the cli~trict m~?nsured in t~?rm~ of mrdinn famil)' 
n1rom<'. Ridennur & Rid~?nour, S"rrano Y. PriPst: ·wPalth nne! 
Kansns s~hool Finnncr, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) (' 'it ran be 
nrgnrcl thnt thf?r(' rxists in Kansas almost an im·N,;r Porrelati •n: 
di~tricts with highest inromr ]Wr pupil havr low nsse~~rd Ynlur ]Jrr 
pupil, and di::;trirts with high assrssl?d valur prr pupil ha,·r low 
income> per pupil"); Davirs, Thr Ch:'tllrngr of Ch:tn;rr in School 
Finance, in Nnt'l Edurationnl Assn., lOth Annunl Coni'. on Srhool 
Finn ncr (1967). Note, Rl Yale L . .T., supra, n .. 53. Src nho Gnlcl-
strin, supra, n. 33, at 522-527. 
60 Indeed, this i~ prrci::;el~· how thr plnintiffs in Serra?lll Y. Priost. 
supra. cl~?finccl the cln~s thry purported to reprc,rnt: "Pininliff 
l'hildren claim to rcprrscnt a dnss consisting of nll public S('hool 
pupil~ in California, cxrcpt childrrn in thnt school di~trirt ... 
whieh ... afford~ the grcati•st cdmnl ional opportunil )' of :dJ ~chool 
distrirtH within California." 9fl Cnl. Rptr .. nt oO-L 487 P. 2cl. nt 
124-l, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. 8rr al~o Van Dusartz "· Hatfi eld. 334 F. 
Supp., at 873. 
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relative to all children in each of the wealthier districts. 
Viewed in this manner, appellees' suit asks the Court to 
extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a system 
that allegedly discriminates against virtually the entire 
population of the State. The class is as large, diverse, 
and amorphous as could be imagined, unified only by 
the common factor of residence in districts that happen 
to have less taxable wealth than the district or districts 
with the greatest such wealth.66 Nor would the class 
be significantly less ambiguous if defined more restric-
tively to include only districts below the median, or 
below the average, or below some other artificially defined 
level of expenditure. Whatever its contours, it is not a 
class saddled with such disabilities, or relegated to such 
a position of political powerlessness, or subjected to such 
a history of unequal treatment as to command extraor-
dinary protection from the majoritarian political process. 
Moreover, it has never been within the constitutional 
prerogative of this Court to nullify action of state legisla-
tive governments merely because the burdens or benefits 
thereof fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth 
of the political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In any event, appellees have not contended that a 
finding of wealth discrimination in this case would alone 
constitute a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's 
system to rigorous judicial scrutiny.67 Before such re-
<w Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texa~ s~ stem 
as one resulting merely in di~crimination between cli~tri cts ~incc this 
Court has never questioned the State's power to draw rea;;onable 
di~tinctions bPtwcC'n political subdivi~ion;:; within it s bordPrs. Griffin 
' '· County School Board of Prince Ed ward County, 377 U. S. 218, 
230-231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, -1-27 (1961); 
Salsburg v. Marylaad, 346 U. S. 545 (1954). 
·G< The Court hai:l never heretofore hdcl that the exi~teucC' of 
de facto wealth discrimination alone provide~ an adequate ground 
for invoking strict scrutinr. Sec, e. g., Ilarper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Blections, 31l3 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kms, - U. S. 
-- (1972). 
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view is required, the State's system must be found to 
interfere with the exercise of some "fundamental" right. 
And, it is this question-whether education should be 
counted among the s1nall circle of rights that heretofore 
have been found to be "fundamental"-which has so 
consumed the attention of courts am! commentators in 
recent years.as 
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognir.ecl that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments.'' !d., at 493. 'What \\'as said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality \Yith the passage of time: 
"Compulsory chool attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, ·even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citir.enship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training. and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days. it is doubtful that any child 
m.ay reasonably be expected to succeed in lif.e if he 
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an 
'"Srr S!'rrano \'.Priest, 5 Cal. :3d. 5SJ, -JB7 P. 2d 12-n (1971); 
1'an Dtt8actz \'. Hatfield, 3-!-! F. Supp. t-170 (l\finn. 1971): llobin-
soll Y. Cahill, llR ::.r . .T. Suprr. 22:3, 2R7 .\. 2d 1S7 U972); .J. Coon,.:, 
W. Clu11r, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. n, nt 339-:~9-!; Gold-
strin, Sli]JI'a, n. :3S, nt 5:3-1--5-!1; ~ore, Ed11rat icnall<"innn('ing & l·:qual 
Protc·riion of tltr Lnw:s, nnd thr Suprrmr Comt, 70 Mich. L. H<'Y. 
1:32-!, J:l:3.5-1:)-J-2 ( 1972) : X ote, The Puhlir Srhool Financing Ca~r~: 
Intrrdistri('( , TnPqnalitir~ and 'Yrnlth Di~crin1inaiioll, 1·1· Ari7.. L .. 
HeY. 88, 120-124 (1972). 
71-1:):):2-0PII\lON 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTHJCT v. HODRIGUJ<;z 25 
opportunity \Yhcre the State has undertaken to pro-
vide it, is a right "·hirh must be made available to 
all 011 equal terms." Ibid. 
This theme. expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing 
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205. 213 (THE CHIEF Jus'riCE), 237, 
238-239 (MR. J1.'STICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. 
Rd. of Education, 333 F S. 203 ( 1948); Pierce v. 
Soc·iety of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
bm.ska, 262 U. S. 390 ( 1923); Interstate R. Co. v. 
Massachusells, 207 L. S. 79 (1907). 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
of education both to the individual and to our society" 
cannot be doubted."'' But the importance of a service 
performed by the State docs not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a la\Y impinging upon the right of interstate 
travel, admonished that "I vJirtually C'very state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. 'l.'hompson, 394 
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his vie\\', if the degree 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority's view of the importance of the 
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
one for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
nu 337 F. Supjl., :tt 28:3. 
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petence. But MR. JuS'riCE STEWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr . .Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the limits of the "fundamental rights" rationale -of 
the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection ... .' To 
the contrary. the Court simply recogni11es, as it 
must, an established comtitutional right, and gives 
to that right no Jess protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 304 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
MR. JusTICE SrEWAR'r's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to clo~e judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
r·esiclency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion which serves to penali11e the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional.'' I d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long beeu recognized 
as a right of constitutional significance,70 and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importance of that right. 71 
70 E. g., United States Y. Gue~t, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970). 
71 Afler Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), there could 
be no lingering fJUe::;tion about the constitutional foundation for 
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Court applied 
the ral ional ba::; i~ test in reviewing Maryland':; maximum family 
grant provi~ion under its AFDC program. A frdcral di::;trict comL 
hrld lhc provitiion mlconstitutional, applying a stricter ::;tandard 
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Lindsey v. 1\" ormet, 405 U. S. 56 ( 1972) , decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is 
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, 
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im-
posed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
Id. , at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita-
tions implicated "fundamental interests which are of par-
ticular importance to the poor," such as the "need for 
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful pos-
session of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is 
instructive: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee to access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any r-ecogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
Id., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
( 1970) , the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
volv-es the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
of reYicw. In the cour~r of reYer:sing the lower court the CourL 
distingui:shed Shapiro properly on the ground that in that ea~e 
.. the Court found staLe interference with the con::;titutionnlly pro-
tected freedom of interstate travel." ld. , at 484 n. Hl. 
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human beings," 7" provided no basis for departing from 
tho settled modo of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring tho State to justify its law by 
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 40G U. S. 535 (1072); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of those cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court is plain. Tho key to discovering 
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found 
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of 
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is 
it to be found by weighing whether education is as im-
portant as the right to travel. Rather, tho answer lies 
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, 
tho right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 73 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 (1!)72); •• Mosley v. Police Department of 
7"Thr Court rduRrcl to nppl,1· thl' strict Rrrutin~· tl'~t clr,;pitr its 
contrmpor:mrou,; rrrop;nition in Gnldberq Y. Krlly. :397 lT. S. 2.54, 
10-l (1970), that "welf:1n• proYide:-; the mrnn~ to obtain r,;~rntial 
food, clothing, houRing and mt'clieal enre." 
•~ In Eiscnsladl t hr Comt ~truek down a 1\I:I"~:lrhu,;rt ts :-;talute 
1 1rohihiting the distribution of ront r:1rrpt in• dr1·iees, finding that 
t hr 1:111· f:l ilrd "to sn t i,;f~· c1·en the more lenirnt equal prot ertion 
:-;tandard." !d .. :1t 447 n. 7. Xr\·rrthf'le,;,;, in dithnn. thr C'omt 
r<·(·itrd the ]li'O])CI' form of rqu:d protection nn:d.1·.•i,;: ' ' if wr wrrr 
to Poncludr th:ll thr J\Tn~,;aehn~rttR ~tatutr im])ingr~ upon fumb-
lll('lltal fn·rclmns llllclN Orif<1 I'O{r1 r\'. C'mmectirul. 3S1 F 8. 4i!) 
(J!)(\.5),] tiH' statutor.1· <·la~,;ifiC'ntion would hn1·r to be not mrrd~· 
rationaUtt related to n nlid puhlir purpo~r hut nctC-'·''(11'!/ to thc-
:1rhie1·rmrrlt of :1 rompeffing ~tate intNe~t." Ibid. (rmph:1~i" in 
orirdnal). 
71 Dunn full~· r:ITll'fl~~r~ thi~ Court',; C' fl\1:11 protection 1·ot ing rig:hts 
r:t~es :1nd rxpl:Jins th:1t "thi:; Comt ha . ., m:"1dr rlrar that n citizen 
h:1s n constitutionally wotected right to p:wtirip:lte in eleetion.• 011 
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the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); 7 " Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 7 n 
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of edu-
cation "·oulcl not alone cause the Court to depart from 
the usual standard of reviewing a State's social and 
economic legislation, appellees contend that education 
is distinguishable from other services and benefits pro-
vided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close 
relationship to other rights accorded protection under 
the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that educa-
tion is a fundamental personal right because it is essen-
tial to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In 
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees 
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the 
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelli-
gently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" 
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative 
:111 rqnnl bn~is with othrr ('iti;r,Pn~ in thr juri~di<·tion." !d .. nt 0213 
(rmphnsis Rnpplircl). The constitutional und<'rpinnin~~ of the right 
1o rqu:ll 1rr:ltmC'nt in 1hr 1·oting prorr"s f':ln no lon~rr br donbtrd 
r1·rn though, as thr Court notrcl in llarper v. Virginia lld. of Eler-
tions. 0S0 U. S. 6!J:1, 66:) (1966), "thr right to Yotr .in st:ltr rlrrtion~ 
is nowhrrr rxprr~sl~· mrnt ionrd." Srr Bullock v. Cartrr. 40.') U. ~. 
18-1: (19i2): E.ramrr v. Union Free School Di.~tl'ict. 395 U. S. 621 
(1960); R e?Jnolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
7"ln Mosle)t til(' Court strnf'k dowJJ a Chir:lgo :mtipil'krting 
orclin:mrc whirh cxrmptrcl labor pirkrting from i1~ prohibitiom:. 
Thr ordinanrr \\':l~ hrld inv:llid limier 1hr Eq11al Protrrtion Clausr· 
:1ftrr sub.irrting it to ('!lrrful ::;rrutin~· nne! finding th:1t 1hr ordinnn('c 
11·as uot nnnowl~· drawn. Thr stricter Rtn nd:ncl of rr\'ic•w \\'fiR :l ppro-
pri:ltrl.'· applied sinrr thr ordinanrr wa~ onr "affrrting l'ir"t Amrncl-
mrnt intrrrst~." !d., at 101. 
7 " 8ki11nrr :lppliPd t hr ~tnndard of do~r srrut iny to a statr lnw 
JWrmitting forercl ::;trrilir.:ltion of ''hahitual rrimin:tlR." Implicit in 
thr Court':-: opinion i~ the rrrognition that thr right of prorrrntion 
is among thr rights of prr~onal privae~· protcrtrcl nndrr thr Con~ti­
tutinn. Srr Roc\'. ·wade,- U. S. -,- (1973). 
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tools. Likewise. the corollary right to receive informa-
tion 77 becomes little more than a hollow privilege when 
the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and 
utilize available knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to the right to vote.'s Exercise of the franchise. it is con-
tended, cannot be divorced from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-
formed electorate: n. voter cannot cast his ballot intelli-
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of those propositions. The 
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against un-
justifiable governmental interference v.·ith the individ-
ual's constitutional rights to speak and to vote. Yet 
we have never presumed to possess either the ability or 
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most 
effective speech or tho most informed electoral choice. 
That these may be desirable goals of a system of free-
dom of expression and of a representative form of gov-
ernment is not to be doubtecl.79 These are indeed goals 
77 See, r. g., Red Lion BroadcastinQ Co. '"· FCC. 3f)5 r. S. 367, 
390 (1!)69); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 5G..J. (196!)): Lamont 
Y. J>ostmaster Genrral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
7H Since the right to vote, per se, is not a con~tit utiollally pro-
tected right, we as~ume that appellerH' reference~ to that right are 
~imp!~· shorthand rrferrnces to the const itutionnll~· protected right 
to partiripatc on an equal basi:; whenrvrr the Sta tr ha.• adopted 
an elrct ive process for drtrnnining who will repre~r nt an~· srgmcnt 
or the Stnte's popubtion. Sec n . 74, supra. 
70 The States hn \'r often pur::;ued their cnt ircly Jrgit imatc interest 
in a::;suring ' 'intelligent exrrci~c of the franchi~r," Katze11 bar·h v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (1966), through ~u rh dc\· icr:;; as 
li terary tests and age re~ trirtionii on the right to vote. Sre ibid.; 
Oreqon v. Mitchell , 400 U. R. 112 (1970). And, where tho"r rr~trir­
tion~ have bern found to promote intclligc·nt uHc of the b:tllot without 
di,nimina ting agn in~t 1 ho~r racial and ct hn ic minorit i r~ pre\·iou~ly 
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs 
are freed from governmental interference. But they are 
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into 
otherwise legitimate state activities. 
Even if it were conceded that some quantum of edu-
cation is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication 
that the present levels of educational expenditurE}fproviae· 
an education that ia Texas falls short. Whatever merit 
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing 
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational op-
portunities to any of its children, that argument provides 
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental 
rights where only relative differences in spending levels 
are involved and where-as is true in the present case-
no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to 
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the 
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of 
the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process. 
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?· 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment.80 If so, under ap-
deprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld 
t hr ir usc. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Elel'tio11 Bd., :3GO U. S. 
45 (1959), with Oregon v. ll!itchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (l\fr . . Justi rc 
lll <ll'k), 144-147 (Mn. J uH'l'ICE DouGLAs ) , 216-217 C~Ir . .Ju ~ t irP 
Hnrlan ), 231-2:36 (l\fn . .Ju ,.;TICJ" BHENNAN ), 21-\2-2~-l (J\TH. J u~:;·rrc J ·; 
S TEW ,\H'l'), and Gaston County v. United Statrs, 395 U.S. 2S.'i (1969) . 
' "Sec Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clatt~c in J' ublic Educa-
t ion, 71 Col. L. HeY. 1:3.55, 1389- 1:390 (1971) : Comment , T c· nanl 
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pellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey 
v. Nonnel, SUJJra, ''"ould no longer be good constitu-
tional law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental ri~~:ht and hav0 found those argu-
ments unpersnasive in the pres0nt context. In one 
further rcsp0ct we find this a particularly inappropriate 
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial 
scrutiny. The present rase. in on0 most basic sense, is 
significantly different from any of the cases in '"hich 
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal 
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived." 
"infringed." or "interf0rr0cl" '"ith the free exercise of 
some fundamental personal right. Sec Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. R. 535. 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. R. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330. 338-343 (1972). The critical distinction botm'cn 
those rases and the one now before us lies in what Texas 
is endeavoring to do ,,·ith respect to education. MR. 
Jus1.'ICE BRENNAN. 'niting for the Court in Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, B84 lT. S. 641 (1966). expresses well the salient 
point: 81 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitu tionall:v denied or diluted anyone's right to 
Intrrr.-'t Hrprr~rnl:ttion: Propo~al for a Xational Trnanl~' .\,-,o<'i:t-
tion, -!7 Trx. L. HrY. llGO, 1172-ll/;) n. 61 (19G9). 
" Katzen bath "· M oroan inYolwd a ehallrngr b~· n•g-i~ll'rrd Yotrr:< 
in Xl'\\' York Cit.'· to a proyi,-ion of tlw Yotinp: Hight,; A<·t of lfl(i.') 
that prohibitrd enforcrmrnt of a 'tale l:m c·:dlinp: for Eng]i:-;h 
liiC'rnr~· tr:-;t:-< for YIJting-. Thr l:tw w:l" :-;u~prllfhl a~ to rr,;id t'llts 
from Puerto Hico \\'ho had <·omplrtrd at lra~t ,;i, Y<•;lr' of <•duca-
t ion at an ". \ mrrira n-Aa~" ~chool in that count r.'· C'\ ' <'11 I houg-h 
thr lan~uap;r of in~trurtion \\'as othrr th:1n Fng-li~h. Thi~ Court 
uphrld t11C' qur . :;lionrd prO\· i~ion O\ rr the claim thnt it di,nimin:ltrcl 
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relirf effected r to others 
similarly situated] .... 
"[The fcdcralJa,y in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. . . . \Ve need decide only \Yhether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... \Ya.s 
permissible. 1n deciding that question, the prin-
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we arc guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all 
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take 
one step at a time. addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem \Yhich seems most acute to the legisla-
tive mind ... .'" !d., a.t 656- 657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid-was implemented in 
an effort to e~rtend public education and to improve its 
ng:1inst t ho::<r with n Rixt h gradp rdnc·at ion obtninrd in JJon-En .gli~h 
~pr:1king l'rhoob ot hrr i han t]l(' onrs dr~ignatrd by the frc!Praf 
kgi~ln tion. 
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quality.82 Of course, every reform that benefits some 
more than others may be criticized for what it fails 
to accomplish. But " ·c think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
formatory and , therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles f:eneitivc to the nature of the State's 
efforts.83 
c 
It should be abundantly clea.r, for the reasons stated 
above. that this is an inappropriate case in which to 
subject state action to the sort of searching ecrutiny 
reserved for laws that involve suspect claesifications or 
fundamental rights. 
We need not rest our decision, however, eolely on the 
inappropriatenefls of the compelling interest test. A 
century of Suprerne Court adjudication under the Equal 
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application 
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case 
represents far more than a challenge to the manner in 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
vVe have here nothiug less than a direct attack on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn 
the State's judgment in conferring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures.81 Mr. Justice 
'" Cf. Meyer\'. ll'ebrasl.-a. 262 U.S. 390 (192:3); Pil'l'('(' \'. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Ilargmve Y. Kirk, 31:~ F. Supp. 
9-1·~ (MD Fla. 1970), Yarnlcd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971). 
"' Srr Schilb \'. Kuebel, 40-t U. S. 357 (1071); JlfcDonald \'. 
Board of Election Cormnissioners. 394 U. S. 802 (196D). 
HI Sec, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1:3-t U.S. 2:32 (1890); 
Crmnirhai'l v. Soutlu.'1'11 Coal Co., 301 U. S. 49:3, 5011-.500 (1D:l7); 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 ( 1959). 
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Frankfurter's admonition, in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 
311 U. S. 435 (1940), against interference with the 
State's fiscal policies is worth repeating: 
"[t]he responsibility for devising just and produc-
tive sources of revenue challenges the wits of legis-
latures. Nothing can be less helpful than for courts 
to ... inject themselves in a merely negative way 
into the delicate processes of fiscal policy-making.'r 
!d., at 445. 
Quite apart from our proper role under the Constitution, 
the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and 
the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the 
making of wise decisions with respect to the raising 
and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are urged 
to direct the States either to alter drastically the present 
system or to throw the property tax out altogether in 
favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.8 " 
~ " Those who urge that the present ~y~tem he invalidated otTer 
lit tlc guidance as to what t~·pe of school financing ~hould rt'pl::trc 
it. Tlw almost inevitable result of rejection of the exi~ting ~~·~tC'm ,_ 
however, would be stntewidt' financing of all public education with 
funds derin•d from taxation of property or from the adoptiou or 
exp[)nsion of sales and income taxe~. The author;; of Private \Yrall h 
and Public Education, S1L]!ra, n. 13, at 201-242, Ruggest an altcrna-
i in' scheme, known a;,; "diRtrict powrr equalizing." In ~im plest 
trrms, the State would guar:tntee that at an~· partieul:tr rate of 
property taxation thr di;;trict would rereivr a Htatecl nmnlwr of 
dollar8 regardk-<.,; of the di~trict';; tax ba~r. To fin~mcc· the ~~~h~idic:-; 
i o " poorer" districts, funds would br taken a\\·:1 ~· from the ''wrall hier" 
cli:-;t riels that collect more than the stated amount at nny gi1·eu 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy. this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy, another area in which this Court's-
incleed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience counsel~ against premature interference with 
'-J 
the informed judgments made at the state and local 
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public v>cl-
fare assistance programs, presents a myraicl of "intract-
able economic, social and even philosophical problems." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S .. at 487. The very 
complexity of the problems of financing and manag-
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there 
will be more than one constitutionally permissible 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits 
of rationality. "the legislature's efforts to tackle the 
problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On oven 
the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts are divided. lndeed. one of 
the hottest sources of rontroversy conc-erns the extent 
to '"hich there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenditures and the quality of education ~r._ 
r:tlr. Thi~ i~ not thr plncr to wril):h thr nrguuwnt~ for nnd ng:lill!'t 
"di-;1 riet powrr rqmdizin~J:," br~·ond noting that ronnnrntator~ nrP 
in di"ngrrrmrnt a~ to ll'hrther it i~ feasihlr , ho\\' it \\'ould work, and 
indeed whcthrr it would violatr thr rqual prolrf'tion 1lwor.1· 1111-
flc-rl~·ing n pprller~' ca~r. Prr~idrnt'~ Comm'n on Rrhool Fin:mcr, 
Rrh()(,[c', Peoplr & ::\fonr~· 3:-J (1972): lhtPman & Hro11·n. Romr 
Heflrrlion.< on Serrano "· Priest. 40 T. Urban L. 70J. 7f1fi- 70S 
(Hl72): Brf'~t. Hook Re1·irw, 2:-J St:m. L. Hr,·. ~391, .59-l-!i0o (1071): 
Wi~r. School Fin:111rr Equalization Lnw.<llil~: .\ Model Lrg-i.<latiw 
Hr~pom:r. 2 Ynlr Hr1·. of L. & Roc. Arlion 128. 12.1 (1971): 
Silard & \\'hitr. Tnt ra~ta tr Inequ:dit ie~ in Puhli" Edur·a1 inn: Thr-
C:ISe for .Tudiri:il Hrli<•f Umkr I he Ertu:il Prot ret ion C'l:lll"<'. 1970 
·wi~. L. Tk\'. 7, 20-:)0. 
M: Thr qunlit~·-ro~t contronr~~· hns rrrei1·cd ron~idrrablr :1llrn-
tion. Among thr notnhlc nulhoritir~ on both :;idr~ nrc tbr follm\'-
ing: C . .Jrnrk~, Inequ:1lity (1072): C. Rilbrrmnn. Cri~i~ in 1hr-
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an assumed correlation the validity of \Yhich underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District 
Court in this caf'e. Related to the questioned relation-
ship bet,Yeen cost and quality. is the equally unsettled 
controyersy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
education.~-7 And the question of the proper relatiolt-
ship between .::tate boards of education and local school 
boards, i11 terms of their re1'pective responsibility and 
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exami-
nation. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like 
problems of education is not likely to be devined for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States in-
flexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing 
conditions. 
It must be remembered also that every claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for 
tho relationship between national and state power under 
our federal system. Questions of federalism arc always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws are to be subjected to the compelling interest or 
the rational basis test. While "[t]he maintenance of 
Cln~~room (1970); Office of Edneation, Equalit~· of :Edttcational 
Opportunit~· (196fi) (The Colrman Ticport): On Equality of Educa-
tionnl Opportunit~· (1972) (\fo.vnill:m & l\Jostt•llcr cck): .T. Guthrie,. 
G. 1\:!Pindorkcr, TJ. Lc1·in, & T. Stout, Srhool~ and lncqu:dity 
(Hl71); Pre~iclcnt'~ Conun'n on Sdwol Finanrc, supra. n. S5: Swnn-
son, The Co~t-Qu::tlit~· Hclation~hip, in lOth Kat'! Conf. on School 
Finanrto, The Challenge of f'h:mgr in Sf·hool Finn nrc 151 ( 1967). 
M Sec the rc~ult~ of the Tcxn~ Gowrnor'H Committee's ~t:~tcwidc 
~un·p.1· on the gonls of rdur:1tion in that Stntc. I C:owrnor'~ 
Committee Report, at 59-6, . Sec al~o Golcl~tcin, supra, n. 38, 
nt 519-522: ~rhocttle, svpra, 11. 80; :1uthoritic~ ritccl inn. Sli, supra. 
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the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
which this Court examines state action,88 it '"ould be 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before 
us. in which "·c arc urged to abrogate the systems of 
financing public education presently in existence in 
virtually every State . x--
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap-
propriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These 
same considerations are relevant to the determination 
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, is 
supported by a reasonable or rational basis. It is to this 
question that we next turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates. as these facts bear directly upon the issue of 
rationality. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from each source.Ro The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
~" Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, .'):32 (1959) 
(:\IR. JusTICE BnEKNAN, concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384 
F. S. 641, 661 (1965) (Mr. ,Ju:; ticc Harlan, di~~cntinp;). 
'" In 1970 Texas expended approximate!~· 2.l billion dollar~ for 
education and a lit tic over one billion came from the l\finimum 
J<"ouudntion Program. Texas Rc:;carrh League, S1l]lra, 11. 20, at 2. 
'. 
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compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.90 Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 20 teachers ;!) 1 one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 92 
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children are also provided.93 Additional funds 
arc earmarked for current operating expenses and for 
student transportation °4 as well as for the free 
textbooks. 05 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation 96 and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
ards.97 As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted 
to the Edgewood School District over the last three 
years,08 the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how-
ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the· 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
assure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.99 Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
90 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13. 
n Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18. 
B2 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15. 
H:; Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.Hi, 16.17, 16.19. 
91 Trx. Educ. Code ~§ 16.45, 16.51. 
1'" Tex. Ecluc. Code § 12.01. 
on Trx. Ecluc. Code § 11.26 (5). 
"'Tex. Ecluc. Code § 16.301 et. seq. 
1
' ' Sec ante, at -. 
9 " Gilmrr-Aikrn Commit trc, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
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In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edge"·ood "·here the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share nmy far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rateR of taxation or in the degree to " ·hich 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
its assessed value.wo The greatest interdi:::trict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available with in any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. Tn large measure. these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore. the primary distinguishing attri-
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pU]1il-
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.' 0 ' 
100 Thrrr is no uniform st atrwidc ns~r~~mrnt prarl irr in TPX{IS. 
C'ommrrria! proprrl ~-, for rx:1mplr. might hr t :1 wd nt ::30~; of 
markPt Y:lhtP in OJH' rount~· and at 50)< in nnolhrr. Y Gon•rnM's 
Commitlrr Rrport, nt 25- 2G: Hrrkr, C:trna,·alP, 1\Iorg-:ln & Whitr, 
supra. n. 29. at 6fi6-(i67 n. 16. 
101 Trxn~ Rr."Pnrrh LPague, supra. n. 20, nl JS. A~ prr1· iou~l~· 
notrd, trxt :lrcomp~m~·ing n. 86. SU]lra. the rxtPnt to whirh I hf' 
qu:dit~· of rdur[ll ion Yarirs with rxprnditurP prr pupil i-< dPhatrd 
inronrlu~ i,·rl.'· h.1· thr mo~l thnngbt ful stmlrnls of puhlir rdncation. 
WhiiP [Ill would agn•r that thrrP i" a rorrrlalion up to thr point 
of proYiding thr rrcognizPd rssrntial~. t hr i~sur~ of grratpst di:o<-
agrrrmrnf. irwludr thr rffrrl on qualit~· of pupil-tr;1rlH'r r:1tios :n1d 
of higher trarll('r S[lbr~· ~ehrdulr~. The ~t[ltr funding in Trxns 
i . ; dr~igned to assurr. on thr fii'N[lgr, onr lrar·hrr for r1·rr.1· 2.'i 
~tudrnl~, whic·h i~ ronsidNPd to hr n f:t1·omhlr mlio b~· most .-tnml-
nrd~ . Whrthrr the minimum ~:dnr~· of $6,000 prr ~·rnr· i~ sufllrrnt 
in Trxas to nttr:tct qunlifird trnc·hrr~ lll[l~· br n1orr clPhatnhlt>. dr-
pending in !ll{ljor pari upon thr loc[ltion of thr ~C'lwol di~trict. Hnt 
thrrr [lj)JlPflr,.: to br little· rmpirical dnt:1 that ~upport~ thr aclnm-
tngr of any partiC'ulnr pupil-tParhcr mlio or that dorumrnts thC" 
rxistrnrr of a drprndablr rorrrlat ion hri wrrn 1 he l<' l·rl of pnblie 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees clairn that children in less affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
establish a reasOJmble basis" for a system 
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 
at 284. We disagree. 
\\·hich results 
337 F. Supp .. 
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as \\·ell as 
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed 
in virtually every other State.10" The povver to tax local 
~chool trachrr::;' ~nla rirs nnd thc qunlit~· of thcir rl:l'~room in~trur­
tion. An intr:wtnhlr prohlrm in drnling with tr:lrl}('r~' ~:ilnrir~ i~ thr 
:th~<'nrr. up to thi~ tinw. of i'i: tti~fnctor~· trchniqurs for .indging· 
thrir abilit~· or ])('rformnncr. Thr rr~ult i~ thnt rrl:lti1·rly frw 
~rhool ~~·strms hnYc mrrit pl:m~ of nn~· kind , with tr:1chrr~' >'nlnrirs 
bring inrrrnsrd acro~s thr bonrd in a w:1~· whirh rrwnrd~ thr lra;;t 
dr,rn·ing on thr ~amr bn~is ns thr most drsrn·ing. Rnlarirs nrr 
ll'ltnlll· raisrd :111tomnt ic:dl~· on thr bnsis of lrngth of ;;rrl"irr nne! 
ncrording to prrdrtrrminrd "~trps," rxtrnding m·rr 10-to-12 ~·rnr 
prrioc!:<. 
In making thr~r obsrn·ntions. wr inl('nd no rritiri;;m of rxisting 
pr:1rti('rs nnd crrtainl~· IH' imp!~· no opinion that trnrhrrs' ~nlnrir~ 
grnrrall~· nrr ndrquatr. As compnrrd with othrrs of compnmhlr 
rducat ion 1 hrrr i" rYrr~· rrnson to brlirvr thnt tr:trhrr~' .~:1lnrirs 
g;rnrr:lll~·, stnrting from an unduly low hflsr, hnvr fnilrd ewn to 
kerp :1brrast of inOntion. Wr h:we inrlnded this rommrntnr~· on 
pnpil-tearher ratio~ nnd sal:lr~r levels not to exprrss nn~· opinion 
with rr~prrt to thr ndrqu[lcy of those in Trx:1~ or ebrwhrrr, but 
mrrrl~· to indicatr that it i~ not nt all drar-in the 011inion of ~omc­
rxprrtf'-thnt thr 1 "-o principal fncton; di~tinl);uishing t hr schools in 
t hr more nfflurnt cli~trirts from thm'P cl~cwhrre docs dC'mon"trnbl~· 
nnd nrrrs~nril~' afTrrt thr qualit~· of thr traching. 
10 ~ Prr~ident';; Comm'n on Srhool Finnnrr, suwa, n. 8!i, at 9. Until 
rrrrntl~· Hnw:-tii IY:ts thr onl.1· St[ltr th:tf mnini[lined :1 pmrl~· Rfntr-
ftmdrd edurnt ionnl progmm. Tn 1961' , howrwr, thnt St:1fr mnrnclrd 
it~ rclnr[ltionnl finnncc Bi:li utP to prrmit countir:< to c0llert addi-
1 ioml fund~ lornlly and spend thosr amounts on it~ srhook The-
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property for educational purposes has been recognized 
in Texas at least since 1833.' 03 When shifts in the dis-
tribution of population, accompanied by changes in local 
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial 
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills. was a product 
of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of local 
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
articulated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
rationnlc for that recent legi~latiYe choice is in~t l'llet i\'(• on the 
(]\le~t ion before the Court toda~·: 
"Under exiRting law, counties are precluded from doing an~·t hing 
in this area, even to spend their own funds if the~· so de~ire. This 
rorrecti\·e legislation if< urgent!~· needed in order to allow counties 
1o go nbovc and beyond the State's standardR ancl pro\·idc edura-
1 ional facilities as good as the people of the countie~ \\·:lilt and 
arc willing to pa~· for. Allowing local communities to go nboYc 
and beyond estnblished minimums provided for their people rncour-
:lges the best features of democratic gowrnment." Haw. Se~~. Laws, 
Art. 38, § 1 (1968). 
10B See text accompanying n. 7, supra. 
101 G. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State of 
~cw York (192a). For a thorough analy~is of the contribution 
of these reformers and of the prior and f<Ub~equent history of edu-
cational finance , see J. Coon~ , \V. Clune & S. Snp:arman, su]n·a. n. 13, 
at :30-95. 
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opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for 
its child." 10G 
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality 
of the Texas system of school finance. ·while assuring 
a basic education for every child in the State, it permits 
and encourages a large measure of participation and 
control of each district's schools at the local level. In 
an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward 
centralization of the functions of government, local shar-
ing of responsibility for public education has survived. 
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. 
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Mn. 
JusTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]irect control 
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's 
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society." 
!d., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed 
that "fl]ocal control is not only vital to continued public 
support of the schools. but it is of overriding importance 
from an educational standpoint as well." !d., at 478. 
The persistence of attachment to government a.t 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the decisionmaking proc-
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be · 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
10" J. Coons, IY. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 1:) , Forcward by 
Jamc~ S. Colrman, at vii . 
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X ation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." •on No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of vie\\"points and from a diversity of approaches 
than does 1111blic education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the coutrary, 
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely 
because it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted under other financing systems that resulted in 
more equality in educational expenditures. ·while it is 
110 doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with 
respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, 
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
" ·hich the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. 
McGowan Y. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425- 426 (1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge '"· Williams, 397 
U. R., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interests. " ·hile occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only 
where state action impinges on the exercise of funda-
mental rights must it be found to have chosen the least 
restrictive altcrnative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330. 343 (1972). It is also " ·ell to remember that 
even thos0 districts that have reduced ability to make 
""' !1'r1c State lcr Co. v. Lribmmm , 2S.') F. S. 2()2, 21--0, :~ 11 (19:32). 
.. 
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free decisions with respect to how much they spend 
on education, still retain under the present system the 
prerogative to decide bO\\" available funds wj]l be allo-
cated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous 
other decisions 'Yith respect to the operation of the 
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be-
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place 
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the 
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired 
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along 
with increased control of the purse strings at the state 
level will go increased control over local policies. 
Appellres further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it alJO\YS the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They see no juc::tifiration for a system that allows, as 
they contend. the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political suhclivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation- indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that arc inevitably arbitrary. 
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going 
to be blessrcl with more taxable assets than others. Nor 
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable \Yealth within any district may result from 
any number of events, some of which local residents 
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and 
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within 
a district by various actions-public and private-of its 
residents. 
Moreover. if local taxation for local expenditure is an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then 
it must be equally impermissible in providing other nec-
essary services currently financed from local property 
71-l::l32-0PI\"IOX 
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taxes, including local police and fire protection, public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of vari-
ous kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total 
abrogation of local property taxation and control as 
"·oulcl follow from appellees' contentions. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures bet\.veen children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that 
is without rational basis. Its shortcon1ings have been 
acknowledged by Texas, and it has persistently en-
deavored-not 'vithout some success-to ameliorate the 
differences in levels of expenditure without destroy-
ing the acknowledged benefits of local participation. 
The Texas plan is not the result of wme hurried. ill-
conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary. it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69- 70 (1913). One also must remember, "·hen 'veigh-
ing the issue of rationality. that the system here chal-
lenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State. 
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for financ-
ing public education reflects "·hat many educators for 
a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
\Ve are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and eclu-
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cational authorities in 49 States, especially where the 
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no-
''"here yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether 
there is a rational basis for the challenged state action. 
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly meets this test. 
IV 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on 
the District Court opinion in this case and on its Cali-
fornia predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 
P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appro-
priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as pro-
viding a constitutional mandate for major state legislative 
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as 
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have 
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban 
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neu-
trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.107 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
107 ".Fi~cal neutrality" is tlw name givrn by Profe;;~or~ Coons, Clune, 
and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of public education 
mn,y not be a function of wraith othrr than the wraith of the ~tate 
as a wbolr." J. Coons, vV. Clune & S. Suganmm, supra, n. 13, at 2. 
Their thoughtful nnd imaginatiYr work pa,·ecl thr wa)· for the 
suits, including thr pre~rnt one, attacking the school fimmre ~)·:,;tC'm. 
Inclcrd, t lw District Comt appro\·C'd t hr :l1lt hor~' t hr~i~ Yerbat im. 
i337 F. Supp., at 28.5. The author:,; ha ,.r oft011 cant ionrd t brir ~up­
]!ortrr~, ho\\·r,·C'r , [tgainst Rpcculating that •·fi~cal nrutralit)·" would 
he a panacea for the poor or for racial minoritic,.;. Ibid.; Coon~, 
Clune & Sugarman, r\ Fir::;t Apprai:-;al of S0rrano, 3 Yair He,·. of 
L. & Soc. Aetion 111, 114-115 (1971). 
•' 
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neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts havE> 
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is begin-
ning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the:> 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumed. 108 There is, 
in particular, increasing concern as to whether the 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lm,·est income families who tend to reside in 
urban areas ''"here the assesf'ecl value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas '"ere relied on by the 
District Court.' 0~ has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
11" An~· nltrrnnti1·e th:1t providr~ signifi('antl1· morr monr~· for 
nn.1· major pNeentap;r of thr 8Uitr's ~<'hool s i~ crrtain to rtwotmtN 
pol it irnl btnriNH. An.1· ~ueh nr11' plan "·ould rrquirr add it ionnl 
rrsourcrs from ~omr ~ourcr: fund~ will ril hrr hnYr I o l>r ta krn 
awn~· from morr proHprrou~ dist rirts or nr11· rrYrnuC' ~Olll'P<'" will 
nrrcl lo br lnpprd. The former nltC'rnatiw i~ not JikC'l~· lo hr f'Up-
porlrd h~· lho~e di~trirt~ that hal'e ht'td the good fortunr to 
haYr de,·rloprd attrnrtiYr rducntion farilitirs and progmm". Thr 
l:lltrr nlternnti1·c, i. c., nrw tnxation , npprars to br no 
morr pnlatab!C' polilicnll~· . It lw" brrn calrulntrd thai S2.4 
billion of adclilionnl school funds would br rrquirrcl In bring 
:til Trxns di,.:tricts up to the prr~rnt lrvd of rxprnditurr in all 
hut the wrnlthirst di"trirt,.:-;m amount morr thnn douhlr thai 
<'IIITPntl~· bcinp; sprnt in Trx~ts on public rducat ion (TC'XflH Rr,.:r:11·rlt 
Lrnp;ur, supra. n. 20, at 16-18. i\t n tinw whC'n nr:1rl.1· rwr~· State 
:md Joralit~· j,.: ;.:uffNing from fii<c:ll undrmomi~hment, :1nd 1rit h dr-
mn nd,.: for ~C'ITicC';.: of nll kind,.: bml):roninl): and with \YC'fl r~· t nxjw~·rrH 
:tlrrncl~· rr~i~ting tnx incrC'a,.:r" , t hrrc i,.: con;.:idrrn blr rra~on to 
qurstion whethrr n rlrC'i~ion of thi,.: Court nullif~·ing prr~C'nt stntr 
l:txinp; s~·strms would rr,ult in doubling public fund .-; commillrd 
lo rdurntion. 
10H 8C'r 1111. 3S nnd 68 , supra. 
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of educational finance." 0 That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-cxpcnd.itures alternative 
to the present system. would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.11L 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools."~ Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chanc-e that racial minorities will be 
clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
assessable propcrty.1 '" 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu-
tional function res.train us from undertaking through the 
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state 
taxation a.ncl education-subjects of great complexity 
and vital concern to the States and localities. That 
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the vari-
ous States. and we do no violence to the values of feel-
110 Srlrct Comm. on Equal Edurntionnl Opportunit~·, Inrquitirs 
in School Finnnrr (1972) (1\Tonogrnph prrpnrrd b~· Profrs~or Brrkr). 
111 Srr nl~o U.S. Offirc of Education, Finanr·rs of L:trgr Cit~· Srhool 
S.,·~trms: A Comparatiw Anal~·~ i~ (197:2) (HEW Publi(·ntion). 
"~ Srr Notr, A Stati~tical Anal~·s is of thr School Fin:nlC'r Drri-
sions: On Winnin~ Battlrs nne! Losing 'N:trs, Rl Y:1lr L . .T. 1803 
(1972): ~rr irxt nrcompnn~·in::.; n. -1-.5, Hupra. 
11 ~ Srr Golclstrin, su7Jra, n. 3R, nt 52o; C . .Trnck,, supra, n. 
Sf\, at 27. .T. Coons, W. Clune & S. Su~arman. su]n·a. 11. 18 , 
nt 85o-:3.57 11. 47, hnw notre! that in Cnlifornia, for rxnmplr, 
"59% of minorit ~· ~tudrnt s l ivc in cl i~t rid~ :1 bo\'C the mrclinn 
a1·rra~r Y:lluation p<•r pupil." In Brxnr Coun1~· b: ' far ihr 
l:lr~r~t cli~trict-thr San Antonio Tndrprndrnt School Di~­
trirt-is nbovr thr local nwm~r in ho1h thr :-tmount of taxnblr 
\l'r:-tlth prr pupil nnd in mrdian fnmil~' inconw. YC't 72% of its 
stuclC'nts nrr Mrxiran-Amrricans. And , in 1967-1968 it spent on!~· 
a vrr~· frw dollnrs lrss prr pupil thnn thr North East and North 
Sidr Indrprndrnt School Di~trirt~, whirh hnw on]~· 7% nnd 1S% 
:\'Trxirnn-Amrricnn rnrollmrnt rrsprctiwl~·. Brrkr , Cnrnnvnlr, 
l\Tor~nn & Whitr, supm, n. 29, nt 67:l. 
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eralism and separation of po\\'ers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is 
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on 
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax 
systems which may well have relied too long and too 
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly inno-
vative new thinking as to public education IS necessary 
~-......._....:a:::.· =U::..:re both a higher level of quality and greater 
uniformity These matters merit the continued atten-
tion of the scholars who already have contributed much 
by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must 
come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pres-
sures of those who elect them. 
u V1 N~ ~'" • I t\ .To: The Chief Justice 
C,n,., Eu • J IIJ I~ l /JJ I I./-~ 'f C +~"1 'e.J./, 2.1 Mr • Justice Douglas 
'3'h~ \ ) Mr • Justice Brennan 
3'f-JSJJ) ~'1J 'iS. r~ 'It; 'II Jir. Justice Stewart 
) Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Kr. Justice Blaokmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnqui s t 
~~~ From: Powell, J. 
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This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants 2 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school. 
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the 
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
~ The San Antonio Independent School Di~trict, whose name this 
ca~e still brar::;, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area which were originally named as party drfendants. 
After a pretrial conference, the District Court iHsued an order dis-
mis~in~ the school districts from the case. Subsequently, thr San 
Antonio Independent School Di ·trict has joined in the plaintiffs' 
challenge to the State's school finance sy~tem and hns filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of thn t. position in thi~ Court. 
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of Education, the State Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court 
was intpaneled in January 1969.'1 In December 1971 • 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam, opinion 
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted prob-
able jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu-
tional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools.G Early in its history, 
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
a A thrre-judge court wa~ properly con\·encd and thrrc an• no 
qur><tions a~ to the Di~triet Court's juri~dirtion or the dirrct nppral-
ability of its judgment. 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 1253. 
'1 The trial wa~ drlaycd for two year~ to permit. extrn~i,·r pretrial 
di~ro\·Ny and to allow completion of a pending Texa~ lrgi~latiYe 
inw~tiga1ion concerning the need for reform of its public school 
finaner s.'·"trm. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 3::!7 
F. Supp. 280, 2il.5 11. 11 (WD Trx. 1971). 
r. 337 F. Supp. 280. The Distriet Court ~tn~·ed ii~ mnnd:il<' for 
two yrar~ to JH'O\·ide Texas an opportunit.'· io remedy the inequilirR 
found in its financing program. The court, howc,·er, retained juri~­
dic·t ion to fn~hion it;; own rrmrdial ordrr if the ::;tatr failrcl to offrr 
an ncceptnble plan. !d., at 286. 
"Trx. Con~t., Art. X,§ 1: 
.. . \ grnrral difl'u~ion ot' kno\\'lrdp:r being e~~c·nl i:il to t hr prr~Nn\1 ion 
of ibe rights and librrtie~ of the proplc it ~hall be the dut~· of the 
Lrgi~lnturr of lhi~ Statr to makr ~uitablr pro,·i~ion for thr ~upport 
and maintrnancr of public schools." 
!d. , Art. X, § 2: 
"The Legi~latme Hhall as rarly nH pmrl icahle rslnbli~h frrr s(·hool~ 
throughout thr Slate, and ~hall furnish mmn~ for thrir support, b~· 
taxation on property." 
r 
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorern 
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildillgs" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." ' Such local funds as were 
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.b The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854," was endo\\'ed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.10 The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorern property tax and 
other designated ta.xes, 11 served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
the State. 1 ~ 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.' 3 Sizable differences 
7 Tex. Const. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amended, Aug;. 14, 1883. 
8 Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5. 
D Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 1, 2 
(interpretive commentaries); I Report of Governor's Committre on 
Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 ( 1969) 
(hereinafter Go,·ernor's Committee Report). 
10 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 5 (sec al~o the interpretive commentary); 
V Governor's Committee Report, at 11-12. 
11 The various sources of rcvemte for the A vailablc School Fund 
are catalog;ed in Texas State Bd. of Edur., Texas Statewide School 
Adequacy Survey 7-15 ( 1938). 
1 ~ Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amrndcd, Nov. 5, 1918 (sec inter-
pretive commentary). 
13 I Governor's Committrc Report, at 35; Texas State Bd. of 
Ednr., supm, n. 11, at 5-7; .J. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, 
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.' 1 The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property bet\Yeen districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.' " 
In due time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities.'a Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.17 Although the 
amount \Yas increased several times in the early 1940's." 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.' r> 
Pri\·:tte Wraith aud Public Education 49 (1970): E. Cubberlry, 
School Fund~ and Thrir Apport ionmrnt 21-27 ( 1905). 
H H~· 1940 one-half of the Statr's population \\":t~ elu~trrrd in .itR 
metropolitan rrntrr~. I Go\·rrnor's Committrr Rrport , at 3.5. 
'" Gilmrr-Aikrn Committre, To HnYe '''hat We l\fu~t (194R). 
l G R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (19.50) ; Trxa ~ Bel. of 
Edur., wpra, n. 11. 
' 7 n. Still, supra. 11. 16, nt 12. It should lw noted that during this 
period the median prr pupil exprnditurr for all ~chools \\"ith all 
rnrollment of more than 200 waR approximatrly 1150 per ~·car . 
During thi~ ~ame period n sun·e~· eondurtrd b~ · thr Stntf' Board 
of Education concluded that "in Tcxns the brst f'clu<"ntional nclvnn-
1ngcs offered b~· the State at prr~rnt ma~· br lwei for the mcdinn 
cost of .';.52.67 per ~·enr rwr Jlupil in nvrrage dail.\· nttcndnncc ." 
Trxa ;; Stntr Bel. of Educ· .. supm, n. 11 , nt 56. 
" 1 Gcncr~1l Ln \1'~ of Trxns, 46th Legi~. , Hrg. Sr~s. 19:-!9. at 274 
(~22 .50 pr r ~tudrnt): Grnrral & Sprr. La\\'~ of Trxa~. -+~th L<'gi~ ., 
Reg. Se~~. 1948, c. Hil , nt 262 ($25.00 JlC'I' studrn1). 
"' Grnrml & Sprr. Ln ~rs of T rxas , 49th Lrgis ., Rrg. Sr~~. 1945, 
r. 5:3, nt 75. 
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Recogni1.ing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In Hl47 an 18-membcr committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome intcrdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.~" It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas."' 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 807c of the Program and the school districts 
arc responsible- as a unit- for providing the remaining 
20<;'o . The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
"° For n romplrtr hi~tor~ · of thr adoption in Trxa~ of n found:-~­
tion program , ~rr H. Stills, supra . n. Hi. Srr : tl~o Y Go,·rmor's 
Committ~~ Rrport , nt H; TrxaR Rr~rarch Lragur, Publir Srhool 
Finanrc Problrms in Trxns 9 (IniNim Rrport 1972) . 
2 1 For thr 1970-1971 ~choo.l ~·r:-~r thi~ ~t:-~tc aid pro~~:mm arrountcd 
for 4R.O% of all public S('hool fumk Local taxation rontributcd 
41.1 % :mel 10.9% was pro,· idee! in frd('rnl funds. Texas Rr~('arrh 
Lcnp;ur, supra, n. 20, :-~t 9. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing. mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
in the State.22 Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its sehool districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county.:!:l The 
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels bet>veen school districts by plaeing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children 24 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.2" Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor'~ Committee Report, at 44-48. 
2" At present there arc 1 .HH ~chool di~tricts in Texas. Texas Rc-
r:;rarrh League, supm, n. 20, at 12. 
"'' In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committre found that some school 
Ji~tricts were not levying any local tax to support education. 
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, nt 16. The Texas State 
Board of Education Sm'\'cy found 1 hat over 400 common and 
independent Rrhool districts were levying no local property tax in 
1935-1936. Texas State l3d. of Educ., supm n. 11, at 39-42. 
:Jr. Gilmer-Aikm Committee, supra. n. 15, at 15. 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
5009'o. 2n In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State.28 Minimum 
teacher salaries--by far the largest single item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years.2 " 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90o/o of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6o/o 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the· 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.30 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
26 I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
27 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
28 In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupil 
expenditure for all current operating expcn~e~ increa~;ed from $206 
to S-W3. In that ~-<arne period capital exprnditurc:; increased from 
84-l to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Committee ReporL, at 5:3-54. 
'2 " III Governor':; Committee Heport, at 113-146; Berke, Carmt-
Yale, l\Iorgan & White, The Texas Sc-hool .Finance Ca~e: A Wro11g 
in Search of a Remedy, 1 .T. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 ( 1972). 
:w The family income figures arc ba:;ed on 1960 cen:;us stati i:i lics_ 
.. 
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1068 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.~' Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil."2 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
trasted "·ith the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo, having only 18% Mexican-Americans 
and less thau 1% Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49,000 :'"and the median family income 
"
1 The Antilnble School Fnnd, trrhnicnll~·, providr~ a Hrrond 
~Ollt"('e of ~laic mom·~·. That Fund ha~ eonl"inuPd as in _,·rar~ past 
(~er tPxt nccompan.vin~ nn. 16-19, SU]Jra) to distribute nnifor.m 
per pupil grnnl;;: to c1·rr.\· di~trict in the StntP. ln 19GS !hi~ Fnnd 
allollrd $9S prr pupil. I-Iom:n·er, becau~e thP Antilablr Sehool 
Fund contribution iH alwn_, -~ ~uhtraetrd from rt di~tric•l's entitle-
ment under the Foundnlion Progr:un, it pla~·s no Ri~nificnnt role 
in rduralional finnncr toda~·. 
ll ~ \Vhilr frclerul as~i..;lamc has ::tn amrlior:rlin~ rffrrl on the cliffrr-
rn<'e in ~rhool budgets between "·rallhy ;mel poor di~trict~ , the 
Di~trict Court rc.iectrd an argument madr by thr Stair in that 
court, that il should con~idN the effect of the frdrral gnmt in 
assp~~ir1g tlw discrimination ela.im. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State 
ha~ not renewed that contention here. 
'"'A map of Bexar Connl.v inclnded in the rrrord ~how~ that 
Edgewood :mel Al::tmo Hright~ nrc among the Rtmllr~t cli~tric• ts in 
the rount~· and nrc of approximate!~· equal ~ir.c. Yet, as the figure~ 
a bo1·r indicate , Edgewood',; ~tnc!Pnt popul~ttion is more 1 han four· 
times that of Alamo Heights. Thi~ factor ob1·iou~ly accounts for 
a ~ignifirant prn·rntagc of the diffNrncPs brt\\'('rn tlw two cli~tricts 
in prr pupil pro]wrt ~' Y:tiup . .; :1 nd ('xpcnditmrs. If Alamo Heights 
had as mnn~· studrnt~ to Pclncatp n~ Edgewood dor~ (22,000) its per 
pupil :Jf'Scsscd property value wonlcl be npproximatcl~r $11,100 rnthcr 
than $49,000, and it" per pupil expenditures would therefore hav(' 
bern considerably lowrr. 
'. 
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is $8,001. In 1967-1068 the local tax rate of $.8:5 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1067- 1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakclo\\'n for each cate-
gory of aid,"' more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aiel has been 
significant. For the 1070-1071 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood \\'aS 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 627r increase over 
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state 
aiel alone in 1970-Hl71 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget-from local, state, and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil."" These 
'" Thr fi!l:nrrs qnotrd abo,·r Yflr.v ~light!.'· from tho~r utilizrd in 
the Di:<trict Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 7R2. Thrsc 1 ri,·inJ 
diffrrrttcrs nrr nppa rrntl~· n product of that ronrt '~ rrliance on 
;;light!~· diffrrrnt st:1tist ical dnta 1 han we hnw rrl ird upon. 
~r. Although t hr Foundation Program has mnde ~ignificantl~· grratrr 
contributions to both school di~tricts o\·er thr. b8t sc,·rrnl ye:us, it 
is npparrnt that Alamo Brights hns rn.ioyrd 11 lnrger !l:nin. Th<' 
;;:i?.:~ble diffrrrner brtwrrn thr Alamo Bright~ nnd Edgrwood grnnt~ 
is dur to the <'mphnsis in the Stnte's tdlocntion formula on the 
gunrantrrd minimum snl:uirs for trarhrrs. Higher salaries nrr 
gnarnntrrd to trachrr~ having more yenrs of rxperi!'n<'C and pos-
sessing more ad,·mwed dr!!:I'C'<''. ThC'rcfore, Alamo Brights , which 
hns n greater J)('rcentagr of CX]Writ'nrrd prr~onnel with ndYanced 
clrgr<'r<', recci,·rs more ~tat<' support. In this rrgnrd the Texns 
Program is not unlike that pre~rntl:v in existrnre in a number of 
ot.hrr StntrR. C. Coon~ , W. Clunr, R. Sugarman, su7n·a. n. 13, at 
68-12ii. Bt'cnu;;:r more dollnrs htl\·e brcn given to districts that 
[t]rr:td~· Rpencl morr per pupil, such Foundation formulas haYe been 
dt'srribcd ns "nnti-equalizing." Ibid. The formuln,, however, is 
nnti-rqualizing only if Yicwrd in absolute trrms. The percentage 
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights. because of its relative property wealth, 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
grant.~6 It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interclistrict 
disparities in school expenditures fom1d by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
degrees throughout the State,38 still exist. And it was 
disparity betwecn the two Texa~ districts is diminished sub:::tantially 
by State aid. Alamo Heights dcrived in 1967-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State aid 
!J;rants to each di~trict in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to llPJ1roxi-
mately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice 
as much money to spend pcr pupil from its combied State and local 
rcsources. 
'
10 Texas Research Leaguc. supra, n. 20, at 13. 
'17 The Economic Index, which determine~ each county's share of 
the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a romplrx formula 
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program wa~ in:-;titutcd. 
See text at pp. --- supra. It has frequently been suggested 
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered in several respects 
to provide a more accurate rrflection of local taxpaying ability, 
cRpecially of urban school~. V Governor's Committee Report, at 
48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, supm, n. 29 at 680-681. 
"'The Di~;trict Court relied Oil the findings pre;,<rntrd in an 
nffidavit submitted by Profesi>or Berke of Syracuse. IIis :-;ampling 
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct correlation 
betwren the amount of a district's taxable property and its level 
of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct correlation 
bctwccn a district's median family income and per pupil expendi-
-r:j 
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the· 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion , that led the District Court to conclude that Texas'· 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp. , at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun-· 
damental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it was premised upon some compelling-
tun'S as well as an inverse correlation between percentage of minori-
t ie;: and expenditures. 
Categorized by Equalized Property Value~, 
Median Family Income, and Stat e-Local Revenue 
Market Value Median 
of Taxable Family 
Property In come 
Per Pupil From 1960 
Above $100,000 S5,900 
( 10 Districts ) 
$100,000- S50,000 




( 40 Districts ) 
Below $10,000 






















Although the correlations with respect to family income and race 
appear onl~· to exist at the extremes, and although the affiant 's 
methodology has been ques tioned (Ree Golds tein , lntrrdistrir t 
Inequalities in School Financing ; a Critical Ana l ys i~ of Serrano v. 
Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rrv. 50-l, 523-525 nn . 67 :111d 
71 (1972)) , in::;ofar as any of thrse G- corrrlations is rrleYant 
to the constitutional thesis presented in this ea ~e we may arC' 
it ~ basic thrn~t. For a defen He of the reli abilit~r of the affid:wit , ~rc 
Berke, Carnantlc, Morgan & Whitr, supm, n. 29. 
·' 
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state interest. !d., at 282-284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
!d., at 284. 
Texas virtua.Uy concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not \\"ithstand 
the strict judicia1 scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights ~n or that 
- I),S -
1 "~" 1011.$ 
[jwolve suspect classifications.•'' If. as l.\"C have f~- f> >- 4- V\O ~ ~-uently-~Tefi, strict scrutiny means that the State's system h ,._v ~ 1 nd tca.+~cl 1 s not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives. and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives.' 1 the Texas 
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every 
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection.'''" 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" 4 " and "imperfections." 11 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
::"E. fl., l'olice Dept. of the City of Chicano 1". Mosley. -J.OS 1.'. R. 
92 (1972); Dunn Y. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 3:30 (1972); Sha]Jiro Y. 
'l'hompson, 39-t U.S. 619 (1969). 
"10 E. fl .. Graham 1". RichardMm, 40:3 U. R. 30.') (1971): Loz•ino Y. 
l"iroinia, 388 U. 8. 1 (1967); Mr-Lauohlin \". Florida. :~79 U. R. 184 A 
(1964). 
11 Srr Dunn 1". Blumstein. 405 ll. S. 3:30, 343 (1972), :1nd the 
ca~r~ collrclecl i herrin. 




1 Tr. of Oral Arl!:., at 3. 
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis." 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. 
\Ye must decide. first, whether the Texas system of 
financing public education must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny. lf so, the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational 
basis must be considered. 
II 
The District Court's opinion docs not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finanee. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and 
appellate processes,"" and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote.w Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned. based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education,'" that there is a 
fundamental right to education and that. absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional aualysis 
"·'E. (! .. Griffin \'. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (195G): Douolas v. Cali-
fornia. 372 U.S. 353 (19G3). 
''" Ilarwr v. Brl. of Elations, 383 U.S. GG3 (1964): M!"Donald v. 
Bd. of Elrctions. :39-l U.S. 802 (19G9); Bullock Y. Carter, -l05 U. S. 
1:3.J.(1972)) xJoo~I.Jv _ CI.L_ (1 '173) . 
"' Sec ra~es cited in text., at -,infra. 1 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and iby several other courts that have 
48/ 
recently struck down school financing laws in other States, 
is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth discrimination 
heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather than focusing 
on the unique features of the alleged discrimination, 
the courts in these cases have virtually assumed their 
a 
findings of/suspect classification through a simplistic 
two-step process of analysis• since, under the traditional 
schools, 
systems of financing public ld41iiidj some poorer 
c 
people releive less expensive educations than other more 
ill 
affluent people, these systems discrimiate on the basis 
of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
a-
threshold questions, including whether it makes aay 
A 
differencel for purposes of consideration under the 
0 
Constitution that the class of disadvantaged "pi'or" 
cannot be identified or def~~o~~ms, 
1\ 
ajnd 
whether the relative rather than absolute nature of the 
A ·~ 
asserted deprivation is of t~~quence. Before a 
A. 
State's laws and the justifications for the classifiiications 
they create are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, 
we think these threshold considerations must be analyzed 
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trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.
110 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is begin-
ning to be sus11ected that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumed.m There is, 
110 "Fisc:1llH'utrnlit)'" is the n:nne gi,·en bv Profe.~sor~ Coons, Clune, 
nnd Sugarman to their thesis that "the (]Unlit)· of puhlie education 
may not be a func·tion of \\'e:1lth other tlwn the wealth of the state 
as a whole." J. Coons, 'iV. CluJJC' & S. Sugnrman, supra., n. 13, :1t 2. 
Their tho11ghtful :1nd imagimti1·e work pa1·ed tlw W:t)' for the 
suits, inrluding tlw pre~ent one, :1tt:1rking the school fin:\llce ~~·stC'm. 
Tncleed, the Di~trirt Court npprovrd the :~ulhor,.;' t hrsi~ Yerhntim. 
337 F. Supp., at 2S5. The author~ haYe often raul ioncd tlwir sup-
portC'r . :;, hO\\'C'VC'r. against spC'rubting th:tt "fiscal neutralif~·" would 
h0 a panacea for the poor or for raci:1l minoril ic·~. !bid.: Coon~, 
C'lune & Sugarman, A .Fir~t Apprais:~l of Serrano, :3 Y:t!C' He'\'. of 
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971). 
111 
Any alternatin· thai 11rovidr~ ~ignifirantl)' more mom'~' for 
an~' major prrrent:1ge of tlw State's schools is rminin to C'ncmmtrr 
political barrier~. AnY such nrw plan would rC'CJUire ncldit ion a! 
resources from some 801li'CC': funds will cit h0r hn \'C i o lw takC'n 
nw:~y from more prospcron~ districts or nC'w rC'n•mtC' sourer~ will 
need to be tapped. The former altrrnati\"C' is not !ikC'IY to br ~up­
ported by those districts thnt haw h:~d th0 good fortnnc to 
haw developC'd at tr:1ctiw educ:~tion faeilitirs and programs. 'The 
latter altern:1ti1·e, i. c.. llC'"' tnxation, apprarR to lw no 
more palat::tble pol it ira II)'. It hns lwrn ralculated i hat S2.4 
billion of add it ionnl Rrhool fnnds wonld bC' required to bring 
nll Texas districts up to thr pr0~rnt lew! of expenditure in all 
hut. the wrnlthi0st cli~trict~-an amount more than clonhle 1hn.t 
eurrently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Rr~earrh 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lo\\'est income families v .. ·ho tend to reside in 
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke. whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas ''.:ere relied on by the 
District Court,112 has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance." " That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.114 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools.m Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
Lea!J:ue, supra, n. 20. :1t. 16-18. At a t imr whrn nrarl~· evrr:v flt:1tr 
and localit~· is snfTering from fi sc:1l undrrnonrishment , and with de-
mands for sen· ires of :til kindR burgroning :1nd with weary tnxpa~·cr~ 
already resisti ng t:1x increases, thrre is considerable reason to 
C(twstion whether a drci~ion of t hi;; Court. nullif~·ing present state 
taxing s:vstems would rr~ult in doubling publir· fund~ committed 
to cduc:ltion. An amir1ts rurial' hrirf filed on brhnlf of almost :m 
State~, focu~ing on these prac1ir:tl ronsef)ucnrcs, claims with some 
justification that "ench of the undcr,igned states ... would suffer 
~r1·ere finanrin l stringency." Brief of A min: Cu1'ine in Support. of 
Appellants, nl 2 (filed A1t. Gen. of l\fd., et nl.). 
112 See nn. 38 and 63, supra. 
113 Select. Corum. on ECJu:ll Edurat ional Opportunity, Incqnitie: 
in School Finance (1972) (~Tonograph preprrred bY Profe:::~or Berke). 
114 Sec al~o U.S. Offirc of 'Education, FinanreR of Lar~e City School 
f;y~tems: A Comparat iYe Anal~·~i~ (1972) (HEW Publif':tlion). 
nr. Sre Kotc, A Statistical Annl~·~i;: of the Srhool Finanre Deri-
sions : On Winning BattleH nne! Lo~ing Wars, 81 Yale L .• J. 1303 
(1072); see text aeromp:tn~·ing 11. 4.'5, supra. 
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clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
assessable property.110 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu-
tional function restrain us from undertaking through the 
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state 
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity 
and vital concern to the States and localities. That 
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the vari-
ous States, and we do no violence to the values of fed-
eralism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is 
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on 
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax 
systems which may well have relied too long and too 
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly inno-
vative new thinking as to public education, its methods 
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level 
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These 
matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who 
already have contributed much by their challenges. But 
the ultimate solutions much come from the lawmakers 
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect 
them. 
116 Sec Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 526; C. Jencks, supra, n. 
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugrmm.n, supra, n. 13, 
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example, 
"59% of minority students live in districts abo,•e the median 
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the 
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict-is above the !oral average in both the amount of taxable 
wealth per pupil and in median family imomc. Yet 72% of its 
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only 
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North Eust and North 
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18% 
Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke, Carnrrvale, 
Morgrrn & White, supra, n. 29, at 673. 
PRINTER: 
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substantially revised, although you will be 
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the end of the section. 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1332 
San Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the 
District et al., Appellants, United States Dis-
trict Court for the 
Western District of 
v. 
Texas. Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al 
[February -, 1973] 
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE PowELL. 
This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing-
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~ 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner· 
1 Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school. 
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the 
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
2 The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name this 
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants. 
After a pretrial conference, the District Court is~ued an order dis-
missing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San 
Antonio Independent School District has joined in the plaintiffs' 
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of that position in this Court. 
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of Education, the State Attorney General. and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court 
\\·as impaneled in January 1969." In December 1971 4 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional 
under tho Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted prob-
able .i urisdiction to co11sider tho far-reaching constitu-
tional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into tho Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools.6 Early in its history, 
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
"A thrre-judgr court wa~ proprrl)· con1·rnrd and tlwrr arr no 
qur;;tion.-; a~ to thr Di~triet Court'~ juri~diction or thr dirr('( ap]>l'al-
ability of ih .iuclgmrnt. 28 F. R. C. §§ 2281, 1253. 
'Thr trial was drla~·pc[ for two yrars to pNmit exten~ i1· l' prrtrial 
di~rovrr~· and to i~llow complrt ion of a prnding Tex.L> l('gi~lat i1·p 
illi'C'~ti:wtion ronrrrning the nerd for rrforrn of its public school 
finanrr ::;~·~trm. Rodriouez Y. San A11tonio Ind. Sl'hool Dist .. :~37 
V Rupp. 2RO, 2R.'i 11. 11 (WD Trx. 1971). 
" :3:37 F. Supp. 2SO. The DiHtrict Court st:1~·ed itK nmnd:IIP for 
two ~·<':HH to providP TPxa~ an opportunit ~· to remedy the i1wqnit i<•s 
found in it~ financing program. The court, howci·('J', rC'taincd .imi~­
dict ion to fa:-;hion it..: own rrmcdial ordrr if the Rt :ll c failrd to offer 
:tn n<•cppt:1blr plan. Id .. :11 2~o. 
(;Tex. Con~t ., Art. X, § 1: 
' ' ,\ g;cnrral difl'u~ion ol knowlrdgc bring e~"<·nti:1l to thr prc~<·n·at ion 
of thr right~ and lilwrtic" of the proplr it "hall br the clut~· of the 
Legislature of this Statr to make suitable JH'OI'i"ion for thr support 
:1nd maintrnancc of public schoob." 
!d., Art. X, § 2: 
' 'The Lcgi . :lature shall as carl~· as pract irablc r~t[1bli"h frrr S<"hooh' 
throughout the State, and shall furnish means for their support, by 
taxation on proprrty." 
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schools. relying on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and tlw State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
taxes '"ith the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school builclittgs" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were 
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds. ' The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854." 'ms enclo\\Wl with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to a:;:;ure a continued source of income for 
school support."' The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes.'' served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
the State.1 " 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth \\'Pre spread 
relatively evenly across the State.'a Sizable differences 
7 Tex. Con~t. lR76, Art. 7, §a, ns :mtenclrcl, Aug. 14, 11-\, :~. 
'Trx. Con~i ., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4. 5. 
!! Canmld'~ L:1ws of T(·xa~. p. ll7R. Sre Trx. C011Rt., Art. 7, §§ 1, Z 
(intrrpreti1·r rmllmentarir~); T Heport of G01·ernor'~ Committee on 
l'uhlic School Education, The Chnllrnp;r and the Chanrr 27 (Hlf\9) 
(berri:naftN Go\'(~rnor'H Committee Report). 
10 TPx. Con~t ., Art. 7, § 5 (~PP nbo t hP int rrprrti1·e comment:n~·); 
'i' C:ow•n1or'i> Committee Report, nt 11-12. 
11 Thr vnriou~ ~omreR of rr1·rmtr for the AYailnblr School Fund 
:tre ratalop;ecl in Trxa~ Statr Brl. of Edur., Trxas Statewide Rrhool 
Adeqnnr.1' Run·r~r 7-15 ( 193R). 
12 Trx. Con~t., Art. 7, § 3, as :unrnclrcl, Nov. 5, 1918 (Her inter-
prrtivr commentar~·). 
": 1 Co\'C'rnor's Committee Re]Jort, at 35; Texns State Bel. of 
Edur., supm, n. 11, at 5-7; J. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sup;arman, 
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronouncecl.14 The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education!" 
In due time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities. 11; Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.17 Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's/8 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.10 
Private Wraith and Public Education 49 (1970); E. Cubbrrley, 
School Fundti and Their Apportionmrnt 21-27 (1905). 
11 By 1940 one-half of the State'~ populntion wa~ clu:>trrrd in its 
mrtropolitan renterti. I Governor's Committee Rrport, at 35. 
Jr. Gilmer-Aiken Committre, To Have What We l\Iust (1948). 
JG R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950); Texas Bd. of 
Educ., supra, n. 11. 
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. It should be noted that during this 
pNiod the mrdian per pupil expenditure for all schools with an 
enrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year. 
During this same period a survry conducted by 1hr f'tatr Board 
of Education concluded that "in Trxas the best educational advan-
tages offrred by the State al presrnt may be had for the median 
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average daily attendance." 
Texas State Bd. of Edur., supra, n. 11, at 56. 
tH 1 Gener:.tl Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sess. 19:39, at 274 
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Trxas, 48th Lrgis., 
Hrg. Srss. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per student). 
10 General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 49th Legis., Reg. Sr~~. 1.945, 
c. 53, at 75. 
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.20 It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas.21 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 805'(1 of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20<jc. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
2° For a complete hi~tory of the adoption in Texas of a founda-
tion program, ~ce R. Still~, supra, n. 16. Sec al~o V CoYernor's 
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research League, Public School 
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972). 
21 For the 1970-1971 school year this :;tate aid program accounted 
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation co11tribULed 
41.1% and 10.9% was provided in federal fund~. Texm; HPsParch 
League, supra, n. 20, at 9. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent. considers each county's share of all property 
in the State.t" Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county."a The 
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children 24 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources."5 Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well 
as local sources--have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor's Commit tC'r TIPport. nt 4.J.-4S. 
""At prc.~C'n( thC'rC' arr 1,Hil ~t'hool di~trirtl' in Tcxa!'. Tr.xa:; Re-· 
~-;mrrh LrnguC', s1tpm. n. 20. :1t 12. 
"
4 In 194S the GilmC'r-Aikt•n Cormnittrr found th:1t ~omc :;chool 
di~trirts wPrr not ley~·in)! an~· lora! t:1x to support rduc:\1 ion. 
Gilmcr-Aikrn Committrr. supm. n. 15, nt Hi. Thr Trxas State 
Bo:~rd of Education Sm\'l'~· found th:1t o1·C'r 400 common :1nd 
incleprndent, school di~t rirt~ ll'f'I'C' Ir,·ying no lor:ll proprrty tnx in 
1985-1981l. Toxao; St.1to Bel. of Eclnr., supra n. 11, at 39-42. 
:!5 Gilmcr-Aikrn Commiltrc, 81/pra, n. 15, at 15. 
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ami 19G7 expenditures increased by approximately 
500 ]'o .~r. In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion"' and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil e,.,xpenditures throughout the State."R Minimum 
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years."" 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains. the plaintiff school district 
may be compared "·ith another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elcmentnry and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are prcdominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90';0 of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6% 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,9GO-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.~0 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
20 I GoYcrnor's Committee Urport, at 51-53. 
2 7 TcxnH Rr~rnreh Lrflguc, supra. n. 20, nt 2. 
28 In the ~-m rs brtwren 19-1-0 nnd 19fi7 the n\·erngr prr pupil 
exprnditurr for nil cmrcnt oprrnting r:q)('n:-:r,.: inr:·rn:-:ed frnm 8206 
to $403. In that ~amc period rnpit:1.l CXJX'nditurr~ iucrra"Pd from 
S44 to $102 ])('r pupil. I Govrrnor',; Committrc Heport, at 5:~-54. 
20 III Governor's Committee Report, aL 113-146; Brrkc, Cnrm-
Yalt', Morgan & Whitr, Thr Tcx:\S SC'hool Finnnrc ca~r: A Wrong 
in SrarC'h of :1 Rrmccly, 1 .J. of L. & Educ. o59. 6Rl-6, 2 (19i2). 
""Tho fnmily income figurr.; arc bnsecl on 1960 census statistirR. 
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.~1 Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupiV~ 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
tr·asted with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo. having only 18% Mexican-Americans 
and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49,000 '1" and the median family income 
:n The Availablr School Fund, trcll!licall~·, providr~ rr H<'rond 
source of state monr:·. That Fund has continued as in ymrs past 
(src text accompan.\·ing llll. 16-19, supra) to distribute uniform 
prr pupil grant::: to e\"Pr~· district in the State. In 196.S this FH11d 
allotted $M prr pupil. Howrn'r, becausr the A Yailablr School 
Fund contribution is alwa~·s subt raclcd from a distrirt's entitlc-
mrnt. under the Foundation Program, it 11lays no significant role 
in edurat ional finance toda~·. 
~ 2 While fpdrral as~i;;tancr has an ameliorating effect on the di!Trr-
enre in school budget~ brtwern wealthy and poor di~tricts, the 
District Court rejrcted an ar.gument made by the Stn tc in that 
comt thflt it should consider the effect of the federal grant in 
as:;rssing tho discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State 
haH not renewed that contention here. 
~ 3 A map of Bexar Count:.' included in i hr record shows that 
EdgC'wood and Alamo HeighlH arr among the smallC'::;t cliHtrict~ in 
the county and are of approximately equal size. Y ct, aH thr figurcH 
above indicate, Edgewood'~ studrnt population is more than four 
timrs that of Alamo Heights. Thi::; factor obviom;l~, accounts for 
a significant percentage of the differences between the two diHtricts 
in per pupil property ya]ues and exjwnclitures. If Alamo Heights 
had as many students to cducatr ns Edgewood does (22,000) its per 
pupil assessed property value would be npproximately $11,100 rather 
than $49,000, and its per pupil expenditnrcs would therefore have 
been considerably lower. 
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1967- 1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid,a1 more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62o/o increase over 
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state 
aid aJone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget--from local, state, and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil.'15 These 
'1J Thr figurrs quoted above vary slightly from those utilized in 
the Di~trirt Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782. These trivial 
differenres arc apparently a product of that court's reliance on 
slightly different statistical data than we have rrlied upon. 
35 Although the Foundation Prcgram has mncle significantly greater 
coni rihutions to bo1 h school districts over the last several years, it 
is apparent that Alamo Heights has en,ioyed a larger gain. The 
sizable difference brtween the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants 
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the 
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Higher salaries are 
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and pos-
sessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Heights, which 
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced 
degrees, receive:> more State support. In this regard the Texas 
Program is not unlike that presently in existence in a number of 
other States. C. Coon:>, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to districts that 
already spend more per pUJlil, such Foundation formula~ have been 
described as "ant i-equalizing." Ibid. The formul:.L, however, is 
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms. The percentage 
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their om1 re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth, 
vvas required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% 
of its Foundation grant.. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
gra.nt."" It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
degrees throughout the State,aH still exist. And it was 
dispnrity hetweon thr two Te:ms districts is diminished substnntially 
by Rtnte aid. Alamo Heights dcriYed in 1967-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money from loeal iaxcs as Edgewood did. The State aid 
grants to c.'leh distriri in 1970-1971 lowrred thr ratio to approxi-
mately two to one , i. c., Alamo Hrip;hts had a little mow than t1Yice 
as mnrh mon.ry to sprnd per pnpil from its rombicd State and local 
rrsourc e.~. 
'"'Texas Resmrch Lcagur. su7n·a, 11. 20, at 18 . 
'11 The Econom ic Index, wllirh cleterminr" rach county'~ share of 
i he total Local Fn11d As.,;igmucni , is basrd on a rom]llex form11la 
eonreiYcd in 1949 when thr Foundation Program wa~ in"tit ntrd. 
Roc text at pp. --- supra. It hns frrqnrni 1~, horn sug~rc~i eel 
h~· Texas re~m.rrher~ i hat thr formnla hr alterrcl in l"rveral rrspeets 
to proYide :1 more arrurntc rrflrction of local taxpaying ability, 
l'Sperially of urban school:.:. V Govrrnor's Committee Report', nt 
48; Brrke, Carncm1.lr , ~forgan & iYhitr, supra, n. 29 nt 680-681. 
:;s The D iHtrirt Court relied on the finding:-; pre:.;ented in nn 
nffidrtv it submitted by Profr:.;:-;or Berke of R~Taru,r. HiH :.;amplillg 
of 110 Texas srhool cli"t ricts dcmonstraied a direct rorrclntion 
between 1hr amount of a cli<; trict's taxable Jlroprrt~' and its len! 
nf ]Jrr pupil rxprnditmr. His study also found n dirrrt rorrrl:ttion 
hetwcrn a district's median family income and per pnpil rxpcudi-
.. 
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun-
damental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it was premised upon some compelling 
turrs as wrll ns an inverse corrrlntion bet wrrn prrrentnp;c of minori-
i irs and rxprnd it 11 res. 
Catrgorized b.v Eqnnlized Propcrt~· Yalue~, 
Median Family Tncome, nnd State-Local Revenue 
M at'ket Y alve 111 edian 
of Taxable Family 
Property lnf'ornr 
Per Pupil fi'm111 I !1(,'0 
Abo\·r S100.000 M,900 
( 10 Districts) 
~ 100 ,ooo-s.'Jo ,oon 



























Although tlw correlations with resprrt to familY incomP nnd rnrc 
appen.r on!~· to exist nt 1 he extremes, and nlthongh the affinnt 's 
mt>thodolog~· hns been que~tioned (~ee Goldstein, Jnterdistrict 
Inrqualitirs in School Financing; a Critical Anah·si;.; of Srrrano v. 
Priest and its Progrny. 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 523-525 nn. 67 
and 71 (1972)), insofnr a~ nny of thrse rorrelntions is relevant 
to the constitut.ionnl tht>,;;i~ presentrd in this cnse we mny accept 
itR bn.sir thmHt. For a. dcfen~e of the reliabilit~, of the affidavit, sec 
Berke, Camayn.Je, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29. 
'< 
71-1~82-0PINION 
12 SAN A?\TONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. HODRTGUEZ 
state interef':t. I d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "[n]ot only arc defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
Id., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights :l9 or that 
involve suspect classifications.10 If, as previous decisions 
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's sys-
tem is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives.'11 the Texas 
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every 
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 12 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" 4 ~ and "imperfections," '' the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
30 E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
'10 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971): Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (19G7); McLaughlin v. Florida. ~79 U. S. 184 
(1964). 
41 Sec Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 34:3 (1972), and the 
cases collected therein. 
42 Appellants' Brief, at 11. 
"' Ibid. 
·1• Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3. 
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis." 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of 
financing public education must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District 
Court should be affirmed. If not, Texas' claimed rational 
basis must be considered. 
II 
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and 
appellate processes/" and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote:a Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education,47 that there is a 
fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
45 E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
4c Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1964); McDonald v. 
Bd. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 
134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser,- U. S.- (1973). 
41 See cases cited in text, at-, infra. 
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A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing Jaws in other 
States,18 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination ]wretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather 
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged dis-
crimination, the courts in these cases have virtually as-
sumed their findings of a suspect classification through 
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the 
traditional systems of financing public school~::. some 
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other 
more affluent people, these systems diecriminate on the 
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
thre~hold questions. including whether it makes a dif-
ference for purposes of consideration under the Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be 
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms. 
and vYhether the relative-rather than absolute-nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. 
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classi-
fications they create are subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must 
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court 
below. 
The case comes to us with no definitive description of 
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. 
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of ap-
pellees' complaint, briefs. and contentions at oral argu-
ment suggests, however, at least three ways in which 
the discrimination claimed here might be described. 
"8''1Ta?W Y. Priest. 96 Cal. Tiptr. ()01, 4~7 1'. 2d 1:2·1-1, 5 C'nl. 
:)d 1)~4 ( 1971) ; Von Dusarlz Y. II at field. ::;:N F. Supp. ~70 (]\[inn. 
1971); Robinson , .. Cahill. US ?\ . .T. Snpn 22:3, 2~7 A. 2d 1~7 
(1972); Mil/il,·en v. Green. No. 54,809 ("\fich. 8. C., .Tan.-, 197~:!). 
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The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as 
discriminatory (1) against "poor" persons ·whose incomes 
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who 
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 19 or 
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others,"0 
or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their per-
sonal incomes, happen to reside in rclati vely poore1· 
school districts."' Our task must be to ascertain whether, 
in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate 
on ~1J1Y of these possible bases and, if so, whether the 
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as sus-
'"In tbrir rompl:1int. appellrr~ purported to reprr~cnt a cla~s 
composed of prr~ons who are "poor" nnd who rc."iclr in l'rhool dis-
1 ricts having a " low Yn lur of prOJ1C'rt~• ." Third Amrnclrd Complaint, 
App., at 14. Yet apprllrrs h:tvr not clrfinrd thr term "poor" with 
rrfr rrnce to ::m.v ab~olutr or funetional lrvrl of imperunity. See 
text infra, at -. Sre a l ~o Appcllre~· Brief, at 1, 3; Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 20-21. 
r.o Appcllrrs' proof nt t ri:tl foru~rcl on romp:nntivr cliffrrrncrs in 
fnmil .v in co mrs hrl wern rr~idcnt~ of wr:dt h~· nnd poor di~t rirts. They 
rndr:wored, nppnrrntl~·. to show thnt ihNc rxist~ a dirrrt ron·elation 
hetwrcn prri'on:tl fmnily income and rdurntionn l C'XpC'nciitures . Sec 
tC'xt infm, nt - -. The Di~trict Court mn~· hnvC' been rel~·ing on 
this notion of rC'lati,·c cli~rriminntion ba~rd on family wealth. Citing 
npprllcr;;' s tnti~tical proof. tlw comt rmphnsizrd thnt "those dis-
riels most rich in propcrt~· also hnvr the hip;hrst median income ... 
while the j)Oor property districts nrr poor in income .... " 337 F .. 
Supp., at 282. 
"
1 At oral nrgumrnt and i11 their brid, :tpprl!C'r~ s ug;gr~t that 
drscription of the per~onnl status of the rrsidrnts in dic;tri<"ts that 
sprnd le~s on rducation is not critirnl to their rase. In their ,.iC'""• 
the Texas s~·;o;tem i~ imprrmi~sihly di~criminntor~· C'I"C'n if relativrly 
poor districts do not contain poor pcoplr. Amwll rrs' BriC'f , at 43-44; 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at. 20-21. Thrrc arr indications in the District 
Court opinion thnt it adopted this theory of district discrimination. 
The opinion repeatedly emphas izes the eomparntive financial ~t:ttuR 
of di~tricts and carl~' in the opinion it drscribrs appcllers' class as 
bring comJ10~rd of "all .. . childrrn throughout Trxas who live in 
school disi ricts with low properl~· valuation~." 337 F. Supp., at 282 .. 
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pect. It is, after all, the first function of courts. " ·hen 
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause, to examine 
the classifications drawn by state laws. 
The several precedents of this Court relied upon 
by appellees and the court below provide the proper 
starting point. The individuals or groups of individ-
uals who constitutC'd the class discriminated against in 
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny,"2 the Court in-
validated state la \YS that prevented indigent criminal 
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate 
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigcncy, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation 
would have been slwwn if the State had provided some 
"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. 
Britt v. Nort.h Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner 
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing-
ton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison 
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
5 ~ Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971); Williams v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 45R ( 1969); Gardner \'. Califomia, 393 
U. S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Lon(! v. 
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 
372 U. S. 487 (1DG3); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357 
U.S. 214 (1958). 
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Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay 
for counsel from their own resources and who had no 
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides 
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for 
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not 
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative dif-
ferences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less 
wealthy. 
·williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and Tale v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal-
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be-
cause of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the dis-
advantaged class was composed only of persons who 
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those 
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively Jess money on 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for 
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts 
found in the previous cases were present there. The size 
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars, 
effectively singled out all potential candidates who were 
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" 
(I d., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
denial of a position on the primary ballot. 
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the 
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance system-
discrimination against a class of definably "poor" per-
sons-might arguably meet the criteria established in 
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, 
demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishi11g char-
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acteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. 
First, in support of their charge that the system dis-
criminates against the "poor," appellees have made no 
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clus-
tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "rilt is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Connecticut.""" Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," G< 
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
al·eas-those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts." '' 
Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas 
.is not kno\vn but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
"" J'lote, A St~tti~ti<'nl An:d.1·~i~ of thr 8l'hool Finanr<' DPC'i~ions: On 
"~inning Battle~ and Losing \Yars, 81 Yale L . . J. 1308, 1:328- 1:)29 
( 1 972) . 
"
1 I d., nt 1324, n. 102. 
'"'I d. , al 1328. 
·• 
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assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather. it is that they are receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it."" a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
ment is that at least where wealth is involved the 
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute 
or complete equality."7 Nor, indeed, in view of the 
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except 
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the 
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequa.te" 
education for all children in the State. By assur-
ing teachers, books, transportation and operating funds, 
the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, 
for the welfare of the State as a whole, that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu-
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.' ""8 The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled 
r.G Earh of appellee~' po~~ible thcorir~ of wealth discrimination i:; 
founded on the a~sumption th:1t the qualit~· of eclur:11ion Y::trirs 
dirrrtl~· with the amount of fund~ rxprnclrd on it and 1 h:1i, thcrr-
forc, the difTrrcncc in quality brtwrrn 1wo schools cnn br detrr-
minecl simpli~t iralb• h~· looking at 1 hr clifferrnrc in J1Cr pupil expendi-
ture~. This is a. matter of ron~ickrnhlc di~putc among rducalors nnd 
commrnk1tor~. Src nn. 86 and 101 . infm. 
r- 7 E.(! .. Bullork v. CartPr, 405 U. R 13-!, 137, 149 (1972): ilfaycr v. 
City of Chi('a(!o, 40-l U.S. 18!), 19-t (1971): Drapc>.r "· Washinoton,. 
:)i2 U. R. -!R7, 495-496 (1963); Douglas "· California. 372 U. S. 
:).')3, 357 (1963). 
"' Cilmrr-Aikrn Committrc· , suwa. n. 15, at 1:3 (rmph:1~i~ added) . 
Indrrcl, C' \·rn though loen l funcling hns long brcn a, ~ignifiC'nnt n~prrl 
of rdurnt iln1:11 funding, thr Rtatr nlwn~·s has Yirwrrl ])I'O\'iding an 
:1r.rrptnblr rduration n~ onr of its primar~· fnmtions. Srr Trxns 
State Bel. of Ecluc. , supra, n. 11, at 1, 7. 
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this desire and that it no"· assures "every child in every 
school district an adequate education." w No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional 
terms. <w 
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court 
may have embraced a second or third approach, tho 
second of which might be characterized as a theory of 
relative or comparative discrimination based on family 
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla-
tion exists between the wealth of families within each 
district and the expenditures therein for education. That 
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower 
the dollar amount of education received by the family's 
children. 
The principal evidence adduced in support of this 
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub-
"
0 Apprllants' Brirf, at :35; Reply Brief, at 1. 
Go An educational fiuance syo;lom might be hypothesized, how-
ovPr, in which tho analogy to tlw wealth discrimination casE's would 
hP considerably closer. If olomontary and secondary 0dncation wore 
made available by tllP State only to those who arc able io pay a 
tuition assessed against ench pupil, there would be a clear]~· defined 
class of "poor" people--definable in terms of their inability to pay 
the prescribed s11m-who would be ab:;olutely precluded from ro-
cPiving an education. That case would present a far mon' rom-
]1C'IIing set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case 
bPfore us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good 
deal more than provide an education to those who cnn afford it. 
It has provided what it considers to be an adequatP bnso education 
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliornte 
b~· state fundin!l: and by the local asses~ment program the disparities 
bet ween local tax resources. 
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mitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer-
sity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The Dis-
trict Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and 
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, 
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of 
school districts, measured in terms of assessable prop-
erty per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. 
Second, the court found a direct correlation between dis-
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. 
Supp., at 282, n. 3. 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then 
it might be argued that expenditures on education-
equated by appellees to the quality of education-are 
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative· 
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered 
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or 
some higher degree of correlation °1 is necessary to pro-
vide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-
signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the· 
comparatively poor,62 and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need 
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' 
proof fails to support their allegations or the District 
Court's conclusions. 
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His 
61 Also, it should be recognized that median income statistics 
may not define with any precision the status of individual familie;; 
within any given districts. A more dependable showing of com-
parative wealth discrimination would examine factor;:; such as the 
average income, the mode, and the concentration of poor families in 
any district in addition to the median income. 
6 " Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-549 (1972). 
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findings, set out in the margin/:' show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96 
districts comprising almost 90% of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most money on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest median 
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the con-
ceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, 
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.G( 
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This brings us. then, to the third way in which the 
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth 
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by 
the evidence is between district property wealth and ex-
penditures, it ma.y be argued that discrimination might 
be found without regard to the individual income char-
acteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect corre-
lation between district property wealth and expenditures 
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district 
except the district that has the most assessable wealth 
and spends the most on education."" Alternatively, the 
class might be defined more restrictively to include chil-
dren in districts with assessable property which falls 
below the statewide average, or median , or below some 
other artificially defined level. 
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks 
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, 
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happC'n to have 
less taxable wealth than other districts.or. The system 
Finance (1967). Kotr, f\1 Yak L . .J ., S1tJI1'a, n. 5:3. Srr ;d ~o Gold-
~tein. wpra .. n . 3R. at 1>22-fi27. 
6 " Indeed, thi,; if; prrri~el:v how thr plnintiff~ in Serrano 1·. Priest. 
supra, defined the rla HH t hr~r purport eel to repre~eut: " Plnintiff 
rhilclrrn daim to reprr~ent a eln~s ronHi::;t ing of nll public ~rhool 
pupils in California, exrrpt rhilclren in that Rrhool di~tri rt .... 
which ... afTorc!R thr p;reate~t edurational opportunit~r of nll school 
di:::t ricts within Cnlifornia." 9fi Cnl. Tiptr., at 604. 487 P. 2d, at 
1244, 5 Cal. ~d, at 589. See nl~o Von Dusactz v. Ilatfield, 334 F . 
Rupp., at R73. 
(;G Appellee~, hm1·eyer , ha\'C' a1·oided clr~rribing thr TPxa ::; s~·Ftrm 
ns onr resulting merely in di~rrimination brtwecn distrif't s pe1' se 
sinre thi8 Court hns ne\ 'C'r qnr:o:tioned the Stntc's power to drnw 
re::1~o nable di~tinrt ions bet ll'rrn J10ii ticnl ~ubdivision:; within its 
borclrrs. GrijJin v. County School Board of P1'ince Edward County , 
:177 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGO'!ran v. Jlfaryland, 3GG U. S. 
420, 427 (1961) ; Solsbu1'g v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954) . 
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of alleged discrimination and the class is defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class 
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process. 
We thus conclude that the Texas system docs not 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect clas-
sification. But appellees have not relied solely on the 
contention that wealth discrimiuation would constitute 
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to 
rigorous judicial scrutiny.a• They also assert that the 
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise 
of a "fundamental" right and that accordiugly the prior 
decisions of this Court require the application of the 
strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richm·d-
son, 403 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1971); Kramer v. Union 
Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this question-
whether education should be counted among the small 
circle of rights that heretofore have been found to be 
"fundamental in a constitutional sense"-which has so 
consumed the attention of courts and commentators in 
recent years. 68 
07 The Court has never heretofore held that the exi~tc·nce of 
dr facto wealth di::;crimination alone pro1·ides an adNt1WiP gronnd 
for invoking ~<rict scrutiny. See, e. g., Ila1·per v. Virr;inia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, - U. S. 
- (1972). 
us See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 5,4, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971); 
1' an Dusactz v. II at field, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971) ; Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); .J. Coon::;, 
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 3:~9-394; Gold-
stein, supra., n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Ex-
penditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L. 
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note. Educational Financing & Equal 
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In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),. 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments." I d., at 493. What v,·as said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition 6f the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an 
opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro-
vide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms." Ibid. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing 
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF Jus'ricE), 237, 
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. 
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. 
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 l\lich. L. Hev. 
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School .Financing Ca~es: 
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Di~crimination, 14 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972). 
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Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (Hl07). 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We 
arc in cornpletc agreement with the conclusion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
of education both to the individual and to our society" 
cannot be doubted.nu But the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice 
Harbn, dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate 
travel, admonished that "[vhrtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U. S. 618, 665. 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority's view of the importance of the 
interest affected, "·e would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative rolr and 
one for ·which the Court lacks both authority and com-
potence. But 1\IIR. JrSTICE S'rEWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the limits of the "fundamental rights" rationale of 
the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities. charactori11e them as "funda-
mental," anrl give them added protection .... ' To 
the contrary, tho Court simply recognizes. as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and gives 
to that right no loss protection than the Consti-
nv 337 F. Supp., at 283. 
!-. 
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tution itself demands." 394 u. fi. , at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
MR. JPS'l'ICE STEWART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
residency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right. and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right. unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional.'' I d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
as a right of constitutional significance,70 and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importance of that right. 71 
Lindsey v. J.Yonnet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972). decided only 
last Term. firmly reiterates that social importance is 
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, 
involving a challenge to tho procedural limitations im-
70 E. g., Uuitl'd Statl's v. Gttest, 3R3 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v. 
Mitchell. 400 U. S. 112, 2aR (1970). 
71 Aftrr Dandridgl' v. Williams. 807 lT. S. +71 (Hl70), t hrrr ronld 
he no lingE'rinp; qurstion about the ron~titutionnl foundation for 
thr Court ',_ holding in Shapiro. In Dalldridrw the Court npplir.d 
the rn t imwl l>asi~ tr~t in r<'l·irwinp; :\Ia r~·l:i tHI ·~ maximum fnmiJ~· 
g;rClnt pro1·i~ion under its AFDC program. A f'rdrral di.-d rir·t court. 
hc·ld the proYi~ion llllCOJt~t it nt ional, Cl]lpl~·inp; 11 ~trictrr standard 
of re\iew. In ihc cour~c of rci'C'r,.:inp; thr lowN eomt the Comt 
dist inp;ui><lwd Shapiro proprrl~· on tho p;rou ncl 1 hat in that i'a~r 
"the Comt found :<tate int erfNrnrr with the con~t itution:dl~· pro-
tr.rtcd freedom of intNstatc in1wl." !d., ai 48-f. 11. 16. 
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posed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law. 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
I d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita-
tions im.plicated "fundamental interests which are of par-
ticular importance to the poor," such as the "need for 
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peacefu 1 pos-
session of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is 
instructive: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee to access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
volves the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from 
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
72 The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its 
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970), that "welfare provides the means to obin in c:; .. ,eni.inl 
food, clothing, housing and medical care." 
. -
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of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by 
showing some compelling state interest. See also J effer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court is plain. The key to discovering 
whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found 
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of 
education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is 
it to be found by weighing whether education is as im-
portant as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies 
in assessing whether, in terms of the Constitution itself, 
the right to education is fundamental. Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 73 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330 ( 1972); 74 Mosley v. Police Department of 
70 In Eisenstadt the Court struck clown a 11assachusetts statute 
!Jrohibit ing the clist ribution of contraceptive cle,·icc:s, fincli11p; that 
the law failed "to satisfy eYen the more lenient equal protection 
standard." !d., at 447 n. 7. Neverthclc>~s, in dictum, the Comt 
rc>citcd the proper form of c>qual protection analy::;it;: "if \\'P wc>re 
to conclude that the Massarlm~etts statute impinges upon fnnda-
mentnl frc>c>doms under Griswold rv. Connrcticut, 381 U. R. 479 
( 1965),] the> statutory classification would h:we to be not nwrely 
rational!!! related to a valid public purpo:.;e but necessary to tho 
achic,·ement of a compelling state interest." Ibid. (emphasis in 
ori!J;inal). 
74 Dunn fully canvasses this Court's equal protection Yoting rights 
cases and explains that "this Court has made clear that a citizen 
has a con8titutionally prot!'cted right to participate in electionR on 
an equal basis with other citizens in the jmi::;diction." !d., at 336 
(emphnfli~ Hupplied). The constitutionnl underpinning~ of the right 
to equal treatment in the voting proce~ · can no longer be doubted 
en·n though, as the Court noted in 1/m']Jel' v. VirQinia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 3R3 U.S. 663, 665 (1966), "the right to Yote in state cleclion~ 
i8 nowhere expressly mentioned." Sec Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 
1:34 (1972); Kramer v. Union F1·!'e School District, 395 U. S. 621 
(1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (196-l) . 
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the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); 70 Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942).7 " 
Anticipating that the undisputed importance of edu-
cation would not alone cause the Court to depart from 
the usual standard of reviewing a State's social and 
economic legislatiou. appellees contend that education 
is distinguishable from other services and benefits pro-
vided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close 
relationship to other rights accorded protection under 
the Constitution. Specifically, they insist that educa-
tion is a fundamental personal right because it is essen-
tial to effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms 
and to intelligent utilization of the right to vote. In 
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees 
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the 
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelli-
gently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" 
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative 
tools. Likewise, the corollary right to receive informa-
tion 77 becomes little more than a hollow privilege when 
the recipient has not been taught to read, assimilate and 
utilize available knowledge. 
7 " In Mosley the Court· ~trurk down a Chir;lp;o antipickr·ting 
ordinance which cxrmptcd labor pirkrt ing from its prohibitions. 
The ordinnnrr w:1 s hrlcl innlid under the ECJll:ll Protertion f'Ll11 se 
aftrr subjecting it to r·nrefnl srrutin~· and fmcling th;lt thr orrlinanrr· 
"·as not narrow]~· drnwn. Tbr strirtcr ~tambrd of rr,·ie"· wn~ appro-
priatelr :t.pplied sinrc tbe ordinnnre wn~ onr '':1fTertin!!: Fir~t .\mrncl-
ment interests." !d., at 101. 
"'Skinner applircl tlw ~tnnclnrd of rln~r srrutin~· to n st:t1r law 
prrmit ting forrccl ~tcriliz:1 tion of "h:1 bitnal rriminnl.-'." Implicit in 
t hr Court'f< opinion i.-; thl' n'r·u~rnition tlwt thr righ1 of prorr0:1tion 
i~ :Jmong the right~ of pPr~onal pri,::.~ r~· protrrtrcl undrr thr Con~ti­
tution. Sec Roc v. Wndr>.- TT. S. -.- (l(:Jn). 
77 Src, e. g .. R ed Lion Broadcasting Co. Y. Ji'CC, i~9t) F. S. :JG7. 
:190 (1969): Strwleu v. Georgia. 39-t n. S. 557, 5f\4 (l9f\D): Lamont 
Y. Postmaster General, 081 U.S. 301 (19fl.'i). 
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A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to the right to vote. 7 H Exercise of the franchise, it is con-
tended, cannot be divorced from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-
formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelli-
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against un-
justifiable governmental interference with the individ-
ual's constitutional rights to speak and to vote. Yet 
we have never presumed to pos. ess either the ability or 
the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most 
effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. 
That these may be desirable goals of a system of free-
dom of expression and of a representative form of gov-
ernment is not to be doubted.7 n These are indeed goals 
7
' ~incr the rig;ht to 1·otr, ]Jer se, i~ not a con~titutionnlly pro-
trrtrd right, wr n~~umc that apprllrrH' rrfrrC'ncrs to that right nrc 
~impl~· shorthand refrrC'nrrs to the con~titutionall~· protC'ctrd right 
to participatr on an equal basis whrnC'vrr the State has adopted 
:Ill rlrrtin• procr~~ for clrtrrmining who will rrprr~cnt an~· ~rgmrnt 
of thr State'~ popubtion. Srr n. 7+, R1t]n·a. 
7n Thr States hnw often pursurd thC'ir rntirrly lC'gitimatr intrrrst 
in n~sming ''intrlligrnt exrrei~r of thr frnnchi~r," Katzenbarh v. 
Morgan. 3R+ U. S. 641, 65+--65.") (1966), through ~urh dr1·irrs as 
litrrary ((•:-ts and age rrstrirtions on tho right to Yotr. See ibid.: 
Oregon Y. Mitchell, 400 U. R. 112 (1970). And , whrrr those rrstric-
Lion~ haw bern found to promote intrlligrnt u~r of tlw ballot without 
di~rriminating against thosr rarial and rthnir minoritir,.; prC\·iouRiy 
cl r priYrd of an equal rdurational opport unit~·, this Comt haR upheld 
t hrir u~r. Compnrr Lassiter \'. Northampton Election Brl .. 860 U. ~. 
45 (19.')9), with Or-er10n v. Mitchell. +00 U. S., at 133 (Mr . .Ju~tieP 
l3lark) , 14+--1+7 (Mn. .TuwrTC'E Don:JAk), 216-217 (Mr. .Jus tier 
Harlan), 2:H-28G (Mn. Ju,;Trcg BlllmNAN) , 282-284 (1\'fn . .TuwrrcE 
STJ·JWAHT), and Gaston County v. Un'it('d States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) . 
'• 
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs 
are freed from governmental interference. But they are 
not values to be implemented by judicial intrusion into 
otherwise legitimate state acti vi tics. 
Even if it were conceded that some quantum of edu-
cation is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication 
that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas 
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit 
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing 
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational op-
portunities to any of its children, that argument provides 
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental 
rights where only relative differences in spending levels 
are involved and where-as is true in the present case-
no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to 
provide each child ·with an opportunity to acquire the 
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of 
the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process. 
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment.80 If so, under ap-
pellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey 
Ro Sro Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Publir Educa-
tion, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, n. 68, 
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for 
a National Tenants' Association, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173 
n. 61 (1969). 
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v. N ormet, supra, would no longer be good constitu-
tional law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right and have found those argu-
ments unpersuasive in the present context. In one 
further respect we find this a particularly inappropriate 
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial 
scrutiny. The present case, in one most basic sense, is 
significantly different from any of the cases in which 
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal 
legislation touching upon fundamental rights. Each of 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," 
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of 
some fundamental personal right. See Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330, 338-343 ( 1972). The critical distinction between 
those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas. 
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. 
JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient 
point: 81 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
81 Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters 
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English 
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six year~ of educa-
tion at an "American-flag" school in that country even though 
the language of instruction was other than English. This Court 
upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it discriminated 
against those with a sixth grade educ-ation obtained in non-English 
speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal 
lc·gislation. 
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] .... 
"[The federulla w in question 1 docs not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons "·ho othenrisc would be denied it by 
state ]a"·· . . . \Ve need decide only whether the 
challenged limitati011 on the relief effected ... was 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strikr at an 
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take· 
one ste1) at a tinlC'. addressing itself to the phase· 
of the problem "·hich seems most acute to the lcgisla-. 
tive mind .... '" !d., at 656- 657. (Empha!"is from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the· 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally. and creating and 
continuom;ly expanding state aid-"·as implemented in 
an effort to extend public f'ducation and to improve its 
quality.8 ~ Of course. every reform that benefits some 
'" Cf. Me!Jer , .. 1\'fbraska. 262 U.S. 390 (192:-l): Piercf \'. Socifly 
of Sister8, 2(i, U. S. 510 (Hl2.'i): Ilarora?'(' \'. Kick, :n:~ F. 1:\Hpp. 
944 (1\TD Fla. 1970), Yaratrcl, 401 U.S. 476 (Hl71). 
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more than others may he criticiz:ed for what it fails 
to accomplish. But \\'e think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
formatory and. therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to thr nature of the State's 
efforts.s" 
c 
It should be abundantly clear, for the reasons stated 
above, that this is an inappropriate case in which to 
subject state action to the sort of searching scrutiny 
reserved for laws that involve suspect classifications or 
fundamental rights. 
\Ve need not rest our decision, however, solely on the 
inappropriateness of the compelling interest test. A 
century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal 
Protection Clause affirmatively supports the application 
here of the traditional rational basis test. This case· 
represe11ts far more than a challenge to the manner in 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothiJJg less than a direct attack on the 
\\·ay in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. vYe are asked to condemn 
the State's judgment in confrrring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures."' This Court has 
often admonished against such interferences with the 
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause: 
"The broad discretion as to classification possessed 
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long 
":: Rrr Schilb Y. Kuebd, 404 U. S. :~57 ( Hl71) : i1I cDonald ·-v. 
Board of Election Commissionprs. 89-J. U. 8. R01 (HHl9). 
M Srr, e.(!., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 13-! U.S. ~32 (1890); 
Cannitlwcl v. Southerll Coal Co .. :301 U. S. 40.1, 508-509 (l0:-l7) ~ 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 ( 1959). 
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been recogllized. . . . [T]he passage of time has 
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recogni-
tion of the large area of discretion which is needed 
by a legislature in formulating sound tax poli-
cies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in 
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since 
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a 
familiarity with local conditions which this Court 
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality 
can be overcome only by the most explicit demon-
stration that a classification is hostile and oppres-
sive discrimination against particular persons and 
classes .... " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 
87- 88 (1940). 
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., -
U. S. - (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 
u. s. 435, 445 (1940). 
Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to 
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the 
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are 
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the 
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether 
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.8" 
sr. ThoRo who urge thu1 the pre~cnt system be invalidated offer 
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy, another area in which this Court's-
indeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience counsel's against premature interference with 
the informed judgments made at the state and local 
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public wel-
fare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intract-
able economic, social and even philosophical problems." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very 
complexity of the problems of financing and manag-
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there 
will be more than one constitutionally permissible 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits 
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the 
it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing; ~)·stem, 
however, would be statewide financing of all public education \Yith 
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or 
expansion of Sillcs and income taxes. The author,; of Private Wealth 
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alterna-
tive schrme, known as "district power equalizing." In simplest 
trrms, the State would guarantee that at any particular rate of 
property taxation the district would receive a stated number of 
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the :-;ubsidies 
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier" ' 
districts that collrct more than the stated amount at any given 
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against 
"di~trict power equalizing," beyond noting that commcntntors arc 
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and 
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory un-
derlying appellres' case. President'~ Comm'n on School Finance, 
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some 
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 705-708 
(1972); Brest , Book ReYiew, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-595 (1971); 
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Lrgisbti\·e 
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971); 
Sibrd & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Eduention: The 
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Eqtml ProtPction Clnuse, 1970, 
Wi,;. L. Re\·. 7, 29-30. 
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problems" should be entitled to respect. J efjerson v. 
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even 
the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of 
the hottest sources of controversy conc-erns the extent 
to \vhich there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenditures and the quality of education 8"-
an assumed correlation the validity of "·hich underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District 
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relation-
ship between cost and quality, is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
education.87 And the question of the proper relation-
ship botv,·eon state boards of education and local school 
boards. in terms of their respective responsibility and 
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exarni-
nation. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like 
problems of education is not likely to be devined for 
all time eveu by the scholars who now so earnestly debate 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States in-
flexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
8 " The qualil y-co~ t ront ro\·rr,;~· ha . .; rrrrin•d ron~idrrablr :i l lrn-
tion. Among the notable authoritie~ on both ~idr~ arr t hr follow-
ing: C. Jrneks, Incqnalit~· (1972) ; C. Silhrnn:m, C'ri~i~ in thr 
Cla~.'lroom (1970) : Offir•e of Eclnration, Eqn:dit .\· of Ed>lc'niinnal 
Opportunity (HlGG) (Thr Colrm:m Report): On Eq\l:llity of Educ·a-
tional Opporlunit~· (1912) (:\1oynikln & l\To~lrllrr rck): .T. GuthriC', 
G. lClriuclorkrr, II. LrYin. & T. Stont , Sehool~ and ln r rll! ; llit~· 
(1071); Prr.-idrnt '~ Comm'11 on Srhool Financr , Stt)lra. 11. S!'i: Sw:lll-
~on , The Cost-Qnnlit~· nc:lation~hip, in lOth Nat '! Conf. on Sc·hool 
Fin:tncc, Thr Challc11gr of Changr in School Finanrr 151 (1967). 
R< Sre the rrsult~ of t!Jr 'Trxas Go\·rrnor 's Commit trr'~ statrwiclr 
Hun·r~' on thr goals of rclu ratinn in th:tt Statr. I Go1·rrnor's 
Committee Hrport, at 59-68. Sec alHo Golcb!C'in. supra. n. 3~ , 
:tt 519-522; Srhorltlr, supra, n. 80: nuthorities riled inn. 86, supra. 
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so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing 
conditions. 
It must be remembered also that every claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for 
the relationship between national and state power under 
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws arc to be subjected to the compelling interest or 
the rational basis teE:t. While "rtJhe maintenance of 
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
which this Court examines state action,88 it would be 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before 
us, in which "·e arc urged to abrogate the systems of 
financing public education presently in existence in 
virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap-
propriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These 
same considerations are relevant to the determination 
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, is 
supported by a reasonable or rational basis. It is to this 
question that we next turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the issue of 
rationality. 
""Allied Storrs of Ohio Y. Bowe1·s, 35R U. S. 522, 532 (1950) 
(Mn .• JusTicE BRENNAN, eonrurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384 
U. S. 641, 551 (1955) (Mr . .Tu~liC'C' Harlan, di~~cnting). 
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Apart from federal assistmJCe, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average. a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from each source.'0 The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum. Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.00 Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 20 teachers;'" one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 9~ 
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children arc also provided.93 Additional funds 
are earmarked for current operating expem:es and for 
student transportation ut as well as for free textbooks.9" 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation nn and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
ards.97 As reflected by the 627o increase in funds allotted 
to the Edgewood School District over the last three 
years,98 the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how-
so In 1970 Tex::tii expended approximately 2.1 billion dollars for 
ednration and a little over one billion came from the Minimum 
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
90 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13. 
91 Tex. Edur. Code § 16.1R. 
92 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15. 
n3 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19. 
04 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51. 
05 Tex. Edur. Code § 12.01. 
OG Tex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5). 
07 Tex. F.duc. Code § 16.301 et. seq. 
ns Sec ante, at -. 
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ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
assure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.on Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edge·wood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
its assessed value.100 The greatest interdistrict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri-
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupil-
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.101 
vo Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
100 There is no unifonn statewide assessment practice in Texas. 
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of 
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Go\·emor's 
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, l\lorgan & White, 
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16. 
101 Texas Rel:iearch League, supra, n. 20, at 18. As previou::;ly 
noted, text accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the 
quality of education varie:; with expenditure per pupil is debated 
inconclusively by the most thoughtful :; tudent :; of public cdueation. 
While all would agree that there ic a correlation up to the point 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasi.oned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees claim that children in loss affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results 
of pro1·iding the recognir.rd C'i'senliab, the i~sues of grratc•sl cli~­
:tgn'rmrnt inrlucle thr effect on quality of pctpil-trachrr ratios ~mel 
of higher lraclwr ~alary sehrdule~. The state funding in Texas 
i~ dr~ignrd I o assure, on the n ver:tgc, 011r trn chrr for r1·cr~· 2fi 
sl udrnt~. which ici considerrd to be a fnvornblc rntio b~· most ~~ nnd-
nrds. Whether the minimum srd:tr~· of SG,OOO per ~·rnr is sufficrnl 
in Trxn~ to ntlr;td qualifird tr:tchrrs ma~· hr morr drhat:tblr, dr-
pending in major part upon the locntion of thr school di~trict. Bul 
thrre appr:trs to br litllo rmpiricnl d:tta that mpports the ndvan-
tage of any particular pupil-tracher ratio or thai docmnrnts the 
cxistrnce of a dcprnclable correlation between the lrn·l of ]lUblic 
school teachers' sr1larirs atHl thr qunlit~· of thrir elns.'>room instruc-
tion. An intrartnblc problrm in dealing with tr:whrr.,' salarir" i~ the 
nhscncr, np to thi.· timr, of sntisfactorv trchniqnr::; for judging 
1hrir nbilitY or Tll'rformnnrr. Thr rrsnlt is 1hal rrln1i1·r]l· frw 
R<'hool s.l·fltrm~'< h:we mrrit plnn8 of nn~· kind, "·ith 1 P:whrr~' ~nh riPs 
bring inrrrascd n rro8s 1 hr board in n way which rc1v:ud~ 1 hr lcnst 
drsrn·ing on the snmc bn~is as thr most clesrn·ing. Salarirs ar0 
nsnnll~· rni~rd nntomaticnll~· on the b:1sis of lrng1h of srrvice nnd 
;wrording to prrdctrrmincd "steps," rxtending owr 10-t o-1::? ;.·car 
prriods. 
Tn mnking thc"r obsrn·n tions. wo intc·nd no cri1 iri~m of 0xi~t ing 
practicrs and crrtninh· '"c implv no opinim1 th:tt trnrhrr . ;' s:1lnri<'~ 
r.:<>nrrnll~· nre adequntr. .1\s rolll]lrtlw\ with othrr:-; of r·ompnrahlr 
rducatio11 there j,; r1'rr~· rra~on t0 brlirYr thnt 1rarhrrs' ~:t!:uirs 
gcncrnlly, starting from :111 11ndul~· low b~se, hnvr fnilrd rvrn to 
krrp abreast of inflation. ·we hr1w inf'lndrd this rommrrtlnr~· on 
Jmpil-trnchrr rntios and snlnry lr1·rls not to rxprcs" nn~· opinion 
with r•'spret to the :1clrq11:1rv of thosr in Tcxns or rlsr,Yhrrr. but 
mrrrl:; to indicate thnt it i~ not at nil clc::tr-in thr 0pinion of somr 
rxprrts-t hat t hr two principnl factors di~tinguisbi11g the 'rhoob in 
1 br more afflurnt districts from tho~e rlsewhcre docs demon~! r:. hly 
and necessarily nffcct tho qunlit~· of tho teaching. 
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in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. We disagree. 
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as well as 
local resources. is comparable to the systems employed 
in virtually every other State."'" The power to tax local 
property for educational purposes has been recognized 
in Texas at least since 1883.'"" When shifts in the dis-
tribution of population, accompanied by changes in local 
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial 
and industrial ceHters, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a 
1 0 2 Prr~irlrnt ':-; Comm'n on School Financr, supra. n. 85 , at 9. lTntil 
rrr<'ntl~· Hawaii was thr on]~· ~tatr that maint:tinrd a purr!~· ~t:ltr­
l'nndrd rclnrntiomtl prog-rnm. Tn 1958, howrwr, that 8tntr nmendccl 
it~ rrlurntionnl finnnrr statutr to prrmit conntirs to rollrrt :tclcli-
t ional funds lorn !I~· and sprnd t hosr :11nount~ on itR ~ehools . Thr 
r:ttionnle for t hal rrrcnt lrp;i~lnti,·e choicr is instrnrt iw on the 
question brforc t hr Court todn)· : 
" Unclrr rxi~tinp; bw, count irs are preclnclrd from cloinp; m1.\·t hinp; 
in this arra, rwn to sprnd thrir own fund .;; if thr~· RO dr~irr. This 
corrrctiw lr.gi~lation is urp;rntl~· ncrdrcl in ordrr to nllo"· rountirs 
to p;o abow :mel hr~·ond thr State'~ stand:trcls nnd pro,·iclr rdura-
t ionnl farilitir,; ns p;ood as the pcoplr of thr ronnt iPs wnnt and 
:tre willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to p;o aboYe 
allll br)·ond r~tnbliHhcd minimumR pro,·idcd for thrir proplc rneour-
ngr~ the br~t fraturcs of clrmocratie p;onrnmrnt." Hnw. Srs~. Lnws, 
Art. 3~. § 1 (195~). 
10'l See trxt nccompnn)·inp; n. 7. supra. 
104 G. Strayrr & R. Haip;, Financin!!; of Educntion in the Stntr of 
).Tow York (1923). For n thorough anal~'sis of thr contribution 
of these rrformrrs and of the 11rior nml Rubscqucnt hi~t .ory of cdu-
e:ltion:tl finauer, ser J. Coons. vV. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at :·>9-95. 
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means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of local 
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
articulated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for 
its child." 10" 
Herein lies the asserted reasonableness and rationality 
of the Texas system of school finance. While assuring 
a basic education for every child in the State. it permits 
and encourages a large measure of participation and 
control of each district's schools at the local level. In 
an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward 
centralization of the functions of government, local shar-
ing of responsibility for public education has survived. 
The merit of local control was recognized last Term in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. 
Coundl of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972). MR. 
JusTICE STEWART stated there that " [ d] irect control 
over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's 
children is a need that is strongly felt in our society." 
Id., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreed 
that "fl]ocal control is not only vital to continued public 
support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance 
from an educational standpoint as well." I d., at 478. 
The persistence of attachment to government a.t 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
10
" J. Coons, iV. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, .Forrwarcl by 
.Tames S. Coleman, at vii. 
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freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the clecisionmaking proc-
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." ' 0 G No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches 
than does public education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, 
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely 
because it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted under other financing systems that resulted in 
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is 
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-
spect to expenditures for some districts than for others/07 
106 New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,280,311 (1932). 
107 MR. Jus TICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that tho Texas 
system is irrationn l bern use the mrnns it has selected to effectuate 
it interest in locnl autonomy fail to guarantee complete freedom of 
choice to every district. He places special emphasis on the statu-
tory provision which establishes a maximum rate of $1.50 per $100 
valuation at which a local school district may tax for school main-
tenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The maintenance rate in 
Edgo\\'oocl when this case was litigated in the District Court was 
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the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. TVnliams, 397 
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interests, while occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only 
where state action impinges on the exercise of funda-
mental rights must it be found to have chosen the least 
restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330, 343 ( 1972). It is also well to remember that 
even those districts that have reduced ability to make 
free decisions with respect to how much they spend 
on education, still retain under the present system the 
prerogative to decide how available funds will be allo-
cated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous 
other decisions with respect to the operation of the 
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be-
lieving that other systems of school finance. which place 
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the 
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired 
local autonomy. That is. they may believe that along 
with increased control of the purse strings at the state 
level will go increased control over local policies. toR 
$.55 per $100, barrl.v onr-third of the nllownblr mtr. (Thr tnx 
rntr of $1.05 per S100, ~er p. 7. infra. is thE' rqualizrd r:1te for 
maintenance and for thr rrtirrmeni of bonds.) Apprllrr~ do not 
claim that tlw criling prr~rntly bar~ cle~irrd tax inrrrases in Edge-
wood or in any other Trxa~ cli8trirt. Therefore, the rons1i1 ul ionnlity 
of i bat ~tntuor~· pr01·i~ion i>' not bdorr u 8 and must await Iii iga1 ion 
in a rase in whirh it j,; properh· presented. ('f. Ilargravr v. Kir!.-, 
313 F. Supp. 944 (:\1D Fin. 1970) , nrated, 401 F. S. 476 (1971). 
10R This theme--that ~renter sintc control over funding will lend 
to ~renter state powrr \Yith rc~pcct to local educational programs 
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Appellees fnrther urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary brcause it allows the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They sec no justification for a system that allows, as 
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. 
It is eq ua.lly inevitable that some localities are going 
to be blessed \vith more taxable assets than othors.10" Nor 
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable wealth within any district ma.y result from 
and polirir~-is ::t rcrurrrnt onr in thr litrraturc on fin:mring public 
('([ur:-ttion. Sec, e. (!., Colemnn, Thr Rt ru~rgle for Control of Edur:-t-
tion. in Edurntion and Social .Policy: Lor:il Control of Educ:1tion 64, 
77-7/<. (BO\n.>rs rd. 1970); .T. Con:-tnt, Thr Child, The Parent, :md 
The State 26 (19fi9) ("Unlr~s n loc:1l community, throu~rh its school 
ho:-trd, has sonw ront rol o\·rr t hr purse, therr r:1n be lit t lr real frrl-
ing; in the romm1mit~· ihilt Rchool~ nrr in fad local schools .... "); 
Howe, Anatomy of n ReYolution, in Sat.. Hev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) 
("It iR an axiom of Amrrir:m politirs ilwt control :md power follow 
monr~· .... "); Hutrhin~on, Statc-Admini~tercd Locilll_v-Shared Taw,.;; 
21 (1931) ("rS]tilte admini~tration of taxation i~ the fir:'! strp to-
wards stnte rontrol of the functions supported by these tnxe.; .... "). 
IrrcRpertiw of ,,·hether one regnnb ~urh pro~prctR n~ drtrimentnl. 
or whether he agrrc8 that the ron~rfJucncr is ine,·itable, it rertainl.r 
crumot be donbt.rd that there i~ a mtionnl baRis for thi~ conrrrn on 
thr part. of pnrent~. educators, and legi~lator~. 
100 This Court hils nc,·rr doubt eel thr proprirt~· of maintaining 
political subdiYi~ions within the States and has never found in the 
bqunl Protection Clau~c any pe1· se rule of "territorial uniformit~r." 
l\Jr·G01can \'. i1Iaryland, 3(i6 U. R. 420, 427 (1961). See also G1·i!Jin 
v. County School Board of Pr-ince Edward Co·unty, 377 U. S. 218, 
230-231 (1964); Salsburo v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Cf. 
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any number of events, some of which local residents 
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and 
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within 
a district by various actions-public and private- of its 
residents. 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then 
it must be equally impermissible in providing other nec-
essary services currently financed from local property 
taxes, including local police and fire protection, public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of vari-
ous kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total 
abrogation of local property taxation and control as 
•vould follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply 
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this 
Court to nullify statewide schemes for financing public 
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof 
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures between children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that 
is without rational basis. Its shortcomings have been 
acknowledged by Texas, and it has persistently en-
deavored-not without some success-to ameliorate the 
differences in levels of expenditure without destroy-
ing the acknowledged benefits of local participation. 
The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, ill-
conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
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trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.
110 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is begin-
ning to be sus11ected that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumed.m There is, 
110 "Fisc:1llH'utrnlit)'" is the n:nne gi,·en bv Profe.~sor~ Coons, Clune, 
nnd Sugarman to their thesis that "the (]Unlit)· of puhlie education 
may not be a func·tion of \\'e:1lth other tlwn the wealth of the state 
as a whole." J. Coons, 'iV. CluJJC' & S. Sugnrman, supra., n. 13, :1t 2. 
Their tho11ghtful :1nd imagimti1·e work pa1·ed tlw W:t)' for the 
suits, inrluding tlw pre~ent one, :1tt:1rking the school fin:\llce ~~·stC'm. 
Tncleed, the Di~trirt Court npprovrd the :~ulhor,.;' t hrsi~ Yerhntim. 
337 F. Supp., at 2S5. The author~ haYe often raul ioncd tlwir sup-
portC'r . :;, hO\\'C'VC'r. against spC'rubting th:tt "fiscal neutralif~·" would 
h0 a panacea for the poor or for raci:1l minoril ic·~. !bid.: Coon~, 
C'lune & Sugarman, A .Fir~t Apprais:~l of Serrano, :3 Y:t!C' He'\'. of 
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971). 
111 
Any alternatin· thai 11rovidr~ ~ignifirantl)' more mom'~' for 
an~' major prrrent:1ge of tlw State's schools is rminin to C'ncmmtrr 
political barrier~. AnY such nrw plan would rC'CJUire ncldit ion a! 
resources from some 801li'CC': funds will cit h0r hn \'C i o lw takC'n 
nw:~y from more prospcron~ districts or nC'w rC'n•mtC' sourer~ will 
need to be tapped. The former altrrnati\"C' is not !ikC'IY to br ~up­
ported by those districts thnt haw h:~d th0 good fortnnc to 
haw developC'd at tr:1ctiw educ:~tion faeilitirs and programs. 'The 
latter altern:1ti1·e, i. c.. llC'"' tnxation, apprarR to lw no 
more palat::tble pol it ira II)'. It hns lwrn ralculated i hat S2.4 
billion of add it ionnl Rrhool fnnds wonld bC' required to bring 
nll Texas districts up to thr pr0~rnt lew! of expenditure in all 
hut. the wrnlthi0st cli~trict~-an amount more than clonhle 1hn.t 
eurrently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Rr~earrh 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lo\\'est income families v .. ·ho tend to reside in 
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke. whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas ''.:ere relied on by the 
District Court,112 has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance." " That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.114 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools.m Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
Lea!J:ue, supra, n. 20. :1t. 16-18. At a t imr whrn nrarl~· evrr:v flt:1tr 
and localit~· is snfTering from fi sc:1l undrrnonrishment , and with de-
mands for sen· ires of :til kindR burgroning :1nd with weary tnxpa~·cr~ 
already resisti ng t:1x increases, thrre is considerable reason to 
C(twstion whether a drci~ion of t hi;; Court. nullif~·ing present state 
taxing s:vstems would rr~ult in doubling publir· fund~ committed 
to cduc:ltion. An amir1ts rurial' hrirf filed on brhnlf of almost :m 
State~, focu~ing on these prac1ir:tl ronsef)ucnrcs, claims with some 
justification that "ench of the undcr,igned states ... would suffer 
~r1·ere finanrin l stringency." Brief of A min: Cu1'ine in Support. of 
Appellants, nl 2 (filed A1t. Gen. of l\fd., et nl.). 
112 See nn. 38 and 63, supra. 
113 Select. Corum. on ECJu:ll Edurat ional Opportunity, Incqnitie: 
in School Finance (1972) (~Tonograph preprrred bY Profe:::~or Berke). 
114 Sec al~o U.S. Offirc of 'Education, FinanreR of Lar~e City School 
f;y~tems: A Comparat iYe Anal~·~i~ (1972) (HEW Publif':tlion). 
nr. Sre Kotc, A Statistical Annl~·~i;: of the Srhool Finanre Deri-
sions : On Winning BattleH nne! Lo~ing Wars, 81 Yale L .• J. 1303 
(1072); see text aeromp:tn~·ing 11. 4.'5, supra. 
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clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
assessable property.110 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu-
tional function restrain us from undertaking through the 
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state 
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity 
and vital concern to the States and localities. That 
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the vari-
ous States, and we do no violence to the values of fed-
eralism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is 
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on 
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax 
systems which may well have relied too long and too 
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly inno-
vative new thinking as to public education, its methods 
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level 
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These 
matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who 
already have contributed much by their challenges. But 
the ultimate solutions much come from the lawmakers 
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect 
them. 
116 Sec Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 526; C. Jencks, supra, n. 
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugrmm.n, supra, n. 13, 
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example, 
"59% of minority students live in districts abo,•e the median 
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the 
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict-is above the !oral average in both the amount of taxable 
wealth per pupil and in median family imomc. Yet 72% of its 
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only 
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North Eust and North 
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18% 
Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke, Carnrrvale, 
Morgrrn & White, supra, n. 29, at 673. 
PRINTER: 
This op~n~on contains few changes, with 
one major exception. Pages 14-24 have been 
substantially revised, although you will be 
able to use well over half of the same 
type already set. Note that each footnote 
is attached to the bottom of the page 
except notes 48-51, which are clipped onto 
the end of the section. 
~··#· /.2, /.J-..21, ..3~ ,<'~A'S: ,?~J~ ~~ .. -~ .? 
~t ~, ~.<, ~ 1ft- ¥~ ~-/ , 5~ . 
JfJb 
4th DRAFT 
UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1332 
~an Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the 
Distnct et al., Appellants, United States Dis-
'L'. 
DemN.rio P. Rodriguez et al. 
trict Court for the 
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MH. JvRTICE PowELL delivered the opinio11 of thP 
Court. 
This smt, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-· 
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~ 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of these complamants attend public school. 
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the 
conditiOn of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School DiH-
t,nct.'' Th1rd Amended Complaint, App., at 14 
1 The San Antomo Independent School District, whose name tlus 
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants . 
After a pretnal conference, the District Court Issued an order dJs-
missmg the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San 
Antomo Independent School District has j omed m the plmnti/Ts' 
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an 
om1.r11~ r11.nae bnef m support of that position in tlus Conrt. 
~~ 
'--~ .· --1 "2.-
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of EJucat]on, the ~tate Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed iu the summer of 19(38 and a three-judge court 
was impaneled in January 196H.3 In December 1971 4 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas ·school finance system unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 5 The· State appealed and we noted prob-
able j'urisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu~ 
tional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of thE' District Court. 
T 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools. 6 Early in its history, 
'Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
' A three-judge court wa~ properly convenrd and thcrr arr 110 
questwns a:s to the Dt:sinct Court':; junwictwn or thr dtrrct appeal-
abihty of Its judgment :JH ll S. C. §§ 2281, 1253. 
' The t nal was delayPd for two yearH to permit extrm1vr prrtnal 
d1:scovery and to allow completiOn of a pendmg Texas Jrgi;;Jativr 
investigation concerning tb r nred for rrform of 1t;; public school 
finance system. Bodnguez \. Sau Antonio Ind. 8chool Dist ., 337 
F . Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Trx. 1971) 
'' 337 F . Supp. 280. The DI:stnct Court stayt•d Jts mandatr for 
two years to provide Texas an opportunity to rrmrcly the mr(!mtJes 
found in It ~ financmg program. Thr court, howrver, rctamcd juns-
diction to fashwn its own rrmrdml orc!rr 1f th<• Statr failrd to offrr 
an accrplablr plan . !d ., at :ZHR 
' 1 Tex. Con;;t., Art. X, § I 
•· A genrral dill.'u~10n of knowlt•dge belll!!; r~HrntJ:d to t hr prrHrrvatwn 
of thr ngbt s and libE'rties of tlw peoplr tt ::; hall br thr dut~· of tlw 
Lrgi::;lature of this Statr to makr ~ uital>IP proviHion for thr ::;upport 
und mamtenancr of public :;ehool :; ' 
!d., Art X,§ '2. 
" The Legislature> ~;hall a~; early m; pmctieablr PstabiiHh frr<' sc hool~ 
throughout the State, and ~;hall fnrm sh mean~ for their ::; upport, by 
1 axat JOn on rropPr1 v, 
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildiugs" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." 7 ~uch local funds as were 
r.aised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.8 The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854,0 was endowed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.10 The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes,11 served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providinp; free textbooks throup;hout 
the State. 1 ~ 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
Sta.te and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.13 Sizable differrncf's 
7 Tex. Canst. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amenrlrd. Au~ . 14, IHS3 
8 Tex. Con;:;t., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5. 
0 Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Cons!., Art. 7, §§ l, '2 
(interpretive commentaries); I Rrport of Ctovcrnor's Committer on 
Public School Education, Thr Challenge and the C'hance 27 ( l9n9) 
(hereinafter Governor's Committre Report) 
10 Tex. Canst., Art. 7, § 5 (see also the interpret tv<• commrntarv). 
V Governor's Committee Report, itt 11-12. 
, 11 The vanous ~:>ourcrs of revenue for the A v;ulnble School .FtuHI 
are cataloged m Texas State Bd. of Educ. Texa:; Statrwtde Srhool 
Adequacy Survey 7-15 (1938) 
12 Tex. Con8t., Art. 7, § 3, a~ amrndrd, Nov li, HJlS (srr tnter-
prctivr commentary) 
1 ~ I Governor's Comm1ttC'C' Rrport, at :~5; Texas State Bel. of 
Edur., 8Upra, n. 11, at .".--7. ,] . Coons, W ClmH', S. Su~nrman, 
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.' ·' The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.'r' 
In due time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities.' 6 Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,lb 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946."' 
Private Wealth and Public Education 49 (1970), E. Cubbcrley, 
School Funds and Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905). 
14 By 1940 one-half of the State's populatwn wai' rlusterecl in ItR 
metropolitan centers. I Governor's Committee He port, at 35. 
15 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Have What We Must (1948) . 
16 R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950); Texa~ Bel. of 
Educ., supra, n. 11. 
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. lt , should be noted that dunng thi::> 
period the median per pupil expenditure for all ~chools With an 
enrollment of more than 200 was approximatE'ly $50 per year 
During this same period a survey conducted by the State Board 
of Education concluded that "in Texas the beHt rducatwnal advan-
tages offered by the State at preRent may be• had for the medmn. 
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil m average daily attendanrc: .' ' 
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 56 
18 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Se::;s. 1Y39, at ~74 
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th Lrgis, 
Reg. Sess. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per student) 
19 General & Spec. Laws of Trxm;. 49th Legis ., Reg. Ses::.. 1Y45;· 
c. 53, a.t 7.'5. 
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua~ 
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.20 It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of thf' total educational 
expenditures in Texas.~' 
The Program calls for state and local contnbutions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salariet:, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 80% of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districtR 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment JS first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
2° For a complete history of the adoption in Texa~ ol a founda-
tion program, see R. Stills, supra, n. 16. See abo V Gon•rnor'H 
Committee Report, at 14, Texas Research Lea!-(UC', Public School 
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Intenm Report 1972) 
21 For the 1970-1971 school year this state tud program accounted 
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxatwn contributed 
41.1% and 10.9% was provided m federal fund~ . TPxtu,; HrHrarrh 
League, supra, u. 20, at 9. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
in the State."2 Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county. 2 ~ The 
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children 24 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.25 Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for educ'ation-from State as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor's Committee Report, at 44--48. 
23 At present there are 1,161 school dilltricts m Trxas. Texas Rr-
sea.rch League, supra, n. 20, at 12. 
24 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found that some school 
districts were not levying any local tax to ~upport education. 
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 16. The Texas State 
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and 
independent school dtstricts were levying no local property tax m 
1935-1936. Texas State Bd. of Edue., supra n. 11, at :39- 42 
25 Gilmer-Aiken Committee. supra, n. 15, nt 15 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
500o/a.26 In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 2g Minimum 
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years. zu 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6% 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960-the lowest. in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
26 I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
'2 7 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
2.8 In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pup1l 
expenditure for all current operating expenses mcr('ased from $206 
to $493. In that same period capital expenditures mcrea~('c[ from 
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Committee Report, at 53-54 
20 III Governor's Committee Report, at 113-146; Berkr, Carnn -
vale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Ca:;(': A Wrong 
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972) 
30 Thfl family income figures ar(' based on 1960 C('nsus Rtat1st irH. 
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967~ 
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.31 Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil. 32 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
trasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo, having only 18tfo Mexican-Americans 
and less than 1% Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49,000 aa and the median family incomP 
•11 The Available School Fund, techmcally, provideH a :srcond 
source of state money. That Fund has continued as in ~·rars pas1 
(see text accompanying nn. 16-19, supra) to distnbute uniform 
per pupil grants to every district in the State. In 1968 this Fund 
allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available 8chool 
Fund contribution is always subtracted from a d1stnct 's entitle-
ment under the Foundation Program. it plays no significant rolr 
in educational finance today. 
32 While federal assistance has an ameliorating effect on the differ-
ence in school budgets between wealthy and poor diHtriCtH, the 
District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that 
court that it should consider the effect of the federal grant m 
assessing the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. Thr Stat(' 
has not renewed that contention here. 
33 A map of Bexa.r County included m the record show8 tl1a1 
Edgewood and Alamo Heights are among the smallest districts m 
the county and are of approximately equal s1zr. Yet, a:; t hr figures 
above indicate, Edgewood's student populat wn Is more than four 
times that of Alamo Heights. This factor obviously account::; for 
a significant percentage of the differencrs bet ween the 1 wo di::;t net~ 
in per pupil property values and expenditure::;. If Alamo Height;; 
had as many students to educate as Edgewood dors (22,000) Its per 
pupil assessed property value would be approximately $11,100 ratht>r 
than $(9,000, and its per pupil expenditures would thert>fore havn· 
been considerably lowt>r. 
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures providE' 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid/4 more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62% increase over 
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, statE' 
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budgetr-from local, state, and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupil. 3 ~ ThE>sE' 
34 The figurc·s quoted above vary slightly from thosP uullzrd in 
the Drstrict Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782. Thrse tnvial 
differences are apparently a product of that court's rdiance on 
slightly different statistical data than we have rrlied upon 
3 ~ Although the Foundation Program has madr significantly greater• 
contributions to both school districts ovrr the last several years, n 
is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. Thr. 
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grant~ 
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the 
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. H1gher salanes are 
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and po, -· 
sessing more advanced degrees . Therefore, Alamo He1ghts, whrch 
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced 
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Texa;, 
Program is not unlike that presently in existence m a number of 
other States. C. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at, 
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to distncts that 
already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formulas have been 
described as "anti-equalizing.'' Ibid. The formula, however, lt-1 
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms The perrentagr-
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth. 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
grant.36 It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
degrees throughout the State,38 still exist. And it was 
disparity betwee,n the two Texas di trJCts is diminished sub~tanhally 
by State aid. Alamo Heights derived in 196'7-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State aid 
grants to ec'l.ch district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio lo approxi-
mately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than tw1ce 
as much money to spend per pupil from its combied State and local 
resources . 
36 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13. 
37 The Economic Index, which determines each county's share of 
the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a complex formula 
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was mHtitutrd. 
See text at pp. --- supra. It has frequently been suggested 
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered m several respects 
to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying abihty, 
especially of urban schools. V Governor's Committee Report, at 
48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29 at 680-681 
38 The District Court relied on the findings presented in an 
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. H1s sampling 
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct rorrela110n 
between the amount of a district's taxable property and its level 
of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct corrrlatioi) 
betwren a district's median family income and per pupil expendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the. 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun-
~amental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it was premised upon some compelling 
tures as well as an inverse correlation between percentage of mmon-
ties and expenditures. 
Categorized by Equalized Property V::tlues, 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 
Market Value Median 
of Taxable Family 
Property Income 
Per Pttpil From 1960 






























Although the correlations with respect to family mcomc and rare 
appear only to exist at the extremes, and although thr affiant's 
methodology has been questioned (sre Gold::;tein , Interdistnct 
Inequahties in School Financing; a Critical Analysis of Serrano v 
Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Hrv. 504, 523-525 nn . 67 
and 71 ( 1972)), insofar as any of t hesr correlations is rclrvant 
to the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may accrpt 
i~s basic thrust. For a defense of the reliability of the ailidavrt. srf> 
.Berke. Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra. n. 29 
)'. 
. . ( 
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state interest. I d., at 282- 284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
!d., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights ao or that 
involve suspect classifications.40 If, as previous decisions/ 
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's sys-
tem is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, '1 the Texas 
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every 
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 42 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
39 E. g., Police Dept . of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. 
Thompson) 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
40 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 
(1964). 
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and the 
cases collected therein. 
42 Appellants' Brief, at 11. 
43 Ibid . 
44 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3 . 
1 
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis." 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financ-
ing public education operates to the disadvantage of 
some suspect classification or impinges upon a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. 
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be af-
firmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined 
to determine whether it rationally furthers some legiti-
mate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not 
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and 
appellate processes/5 and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote.'' 6 Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education,'17 that there is a 
45 E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
46 Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1964); McDonald v. 
Bd. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 
134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser, - U. S. - (197a) . f 
47 See cases cited in text, at-, infra. 
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui gJneris, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the 
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuasivE'. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing laws in other 
Htates,4 8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather 
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged dis-
crimination, the courts in these cases have virtually as-
sumed their findings of a suspect classification through 
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the 
traditional systems of financing public schools, some 
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other 
more affiuent people, these systems discriminate on the 
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a dif-
ference for purposes of consideration under the Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be 
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, 
and whether the relative-rather than absolute- nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. 
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classi-
fications they create are subjected to strict judicial 
4 8 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241, 5 Cal. 
3d 584 ( 1971); Van Dusartz v. Hat field, 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 
1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 
(1972) , MiLliken v. Green, No. 54,809 (Mich. S C'. , .Jan. - , 197:3) . 
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scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must I 
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court 
below. 
The case comes to us with no definitive description of 
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. 
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of ap-
pellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argu-
ment suggests, however, at least three ways in which 
the discrimination claimed here might be described. 
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as 
discriminatory ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes 
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who 
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," ''9 or 
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, 50 
or ( 3) against all those who, irrespective of their per-
sona] .incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer 
school districts.51 Our task must be to ascertain whether. 
49 In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a clasi:i 
composed of persons who are "poor" and who reside in school dis-
tricts having a "low value of property." Third Amended Complaint. 
App., at 14. Yet appt>llees have not defined the term "poor" with 
reference to any absolute or functional level of impt>cunity. Set> 
text infra, at - . See also Appellt>es' Brief. at l, 3 ; Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 20-21. 
50 Appellees' proof at trial focused on comparative differt>nces in 
family incomes bt>tween residents of wt>althy and poor districts. Tht>y 
endeavored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct correlation 
between personal family income and educational expenditure . Sec 
text infra, at - . The District Court may have been relying ou 
this notion of n>lative discrimination based on family wt>altb. Citing 
appellees' statistical proof, the court emphasized that "those diH-
ricts mo ·t rich in property also have the highest median mcomP ... 
while the poor property districts are poor in incomp .... " :337 F'. 
Supp., at 282. 
51 At oral argument and in their brief, appellees suggrst that 
description of the personal status of the residents in districts that 
spend less on education is not critical to their case. In their vww, 
the Texas system is impermissibly discriminatory even if relativdy 
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Bnef, at 43-44; 
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in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discrimmate· 
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the 
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as sus-
pect. It is, after all, the first function of courts, when 
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause, to examiJW 
the classifications drawn by state laws. 
The several precedents of this Court relied upon I 
by appellees and the court below provide the proper 
starting point. The individuals or groups of individ-
uals who constituted the class discriminated against in 
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny,52 the Court in-
validated state laws that prevented indigent criminal 
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate 
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigency, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation 
would have been shown if the State had provided some 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20-21. There are mdicatJOos m the District 
Court opinion that it adoptE-d this theory of district discrimination. 
ThE' opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial statu~ 
of districts and early in the opinion it describes appellE-es' class a~; 
being composed of "all ... children throughout Texas who live in 
school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp., at 282 
52 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971); Williams v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Long v 
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357 
F. S. 214 (1958). 
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effectively singled out all potential candidates who were 
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" 
(!d., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
denial of a position on the primary ballot. 
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the 
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance system-
discrimination against a class of definably "poor'' per-
sons-might arguably meet the criteria established in 
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, 
demonstr~t-es that neither of the two distinguishing char-
acteristics ~ of wealth classifications can be found here. 
First, in support of their charge that the system dis-
criminates agaii1st the "poor," appellees have made no 
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clus-
tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Connecticut." 53 Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," 5J 
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts. 55 
53 Note, A .Statistical Analy;;is of the School FinanrP Dcci;;ions: On 
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YalP L .. T. 1303, 1a2R-1329 
(1972). 
s..J !d., at 1324, n. 102. 
55 !d., at 1328. 
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Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas 
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it,56 a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
ment is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal/ 
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages. 'n Nor, indeed, in view of the 
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except 
in the most relative sense. Texas assorts that the 
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" 
education for all children in the State. By assur-
ing teachers, books, transportation and operating funds. 
~6 Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth discrimination is 
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies 
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, there-
fore, the difference in quality between two schools can be deter-
mined simplistically by looking at thP difference m per pupil expendi- I 
tures. This is a matter of considerable di;;pute among educators and 
commentators. See nn. 86 and 101, infra. 
( 
~ 7 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137,149 (1972) ; Mayer v. 
c~ty of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington, 
372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963): Douglas v. CaLifornia, 372 (T S 
as:~, 357 (1963). 
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to 11guarantee, 
{or the welfare of the State a.s a whole, that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu-
cation. This is what is meant by 1A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.~" 58 The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court . that it has fulfilled 
this desire and that it now assures uevery child in every 
school district an adequate education." 59 No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional 
terms.60 
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court I 
may have embraced a se~ond or third approach, the 
58 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 13 (emphasis added) . 
Indeed, even though local funding has long been a significant aspect 
of educational funding, the State always has viewed providing an 
acceptable education as one of its primary functions. See Texas 
State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 1, 7. 
59 Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1. 
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, how-
ever, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would 
be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary educatiOn were 
made available by the State only to those who are able to pay a 
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined 
class of "poor" people-definable in ferms of their inability to pay 
the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from re-
ceiving an education. That case would present a far more com-
pelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case 
before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good 
deal more than provide a~ education to those who can afford it. 
It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base educatwn 
for all children and has attempted, though imperfecily, to ameliorate 
by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities 
between local tax resources. 
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second of which might be characterized as a theory of 
relative or comparative discrimination based on family 
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla-
tion exists between the wealth of families within each 
district and the expenditures therein for education. That 
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower 
the dollar amount of education received by the family's 
children . 
The principal evidence adduced in support of this 
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub-
mitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer-
sity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The Dis-
trict Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and 
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, 
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of 
school districts, measured in terms of assessable prop-
erty per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. 
Second, the court found a direct correlation between dis-
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. 
Supp., at 282, n. 3. 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then 
it might be argued that expenditures on education-
equated by appellees to the quality of education-are 
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative 
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered 
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or 
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro-
vide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-· 
"·
1
· Also, it should be recognized that median income ~tatistics 
may not define with any precision the status of individual familirs 
w1thm any given districts. A more dependable showing of com-
parative wealth discrimination would examine factors such as the 
average income, the mode, and the concentratwn of poor families m 
any riJ::;trirt m addition to the median incomP. 
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the 
comparatively poor,62 and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need 
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' 
proof fails to support their allegations or the District 
Court's conclusions, 
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately 101o of the school districts in Texas. His 
findings, set out in the margin,63 show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
to education. For the remainder of the districts- 96 
districts comprising almost 90 % of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most money on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest median 
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the con-
ceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, 
<()
2 Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 547-549 (1972). 
63 Market Value of Median Family State c~ Local 
Taxable Property Income Expenditures 
Per Pupil in 1960 Per Pupil 
Above $100,000 $5,900 $815 
( 10 districts ) 
$100,000--$50,000 $4,425 $544 
(26 districts ) 
$50,000--$30,000 $4,900 $483 
(30 districts) 
$30,000--$10,000 $5,050 $462 
( 40 districts ) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 $:305 
( 4 riistrict R) 
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no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.64 
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the 
classification scheme might be defined- district wealth 
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by 
the evidence is between district property wealth and ex-
penditures, it may be argued that discrimination might 
be found without regard to the individual income char-
acteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect corre-
lation between district property wealth and expenditures 
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might b 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district 
except the district that has the most assessable wealt 
and spends the most on education.6 ~ Alternatively, th 
class might be defined more restrictively to include chil 
dren in districts with assessable property which fall 
64 Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of 
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured 
in terms of assessable property and the collective we!llth of families 
residing in the district measured in terms of median family 
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and 
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be 
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation: 
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per 
pupil, and districts with high asses ed value per pupil have low 
income per pupil"); Davies, The Challenge of Change in School 
Finance, in Nat'! Educational Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School 
Finance (1967). Note, 81 Yale L. J ., supra, n. 53. See also Gold-
stein, supra, n. 38, at 522-527. 
6 ~ Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest, 
supra, defined the class they purported to represent: "Plaintiff 
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school 
pupils in California, except children in that school dist rict .. , 
which ... affords the greatest educational opportnnit y of all , chooJ 
districts within California." 96 Cal. Rptr., at 604, 487 P. 2d, at 
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. Sec also Van Dusactz v Hatfield, 334 F. 
Supp., at 873. 
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below the statewide average, or median, or below some· / 
other artificially defined level. 
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks 
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, 
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happen to have _!;. 
less taxable wealth than other districts. 66 The system _--- C{ 
of alleged discrimination and the class~ defines nave 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class 
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majorita.t;ian 
political process. 
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect clas-
sification. But appellees have not relied solely on the 
contention that wealth discrimination would constitute 
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to 
rigorous judicial scrutiny.67 They also assert that the 
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise 
of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior 
decisions of this Court require the application of the 
strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1971); Kramer v . (Inion 
66 Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texas system 
a~ one resulting merely m discrimination between distnrts per se 
smce this Court has never questioned the State's powt'r to draw 
reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions wit bin its 
bordprs. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Ed·ward County, 
:377 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGo1can v. Maryland, 366 U S, 
420, 427 ( 19Gl) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 ( 1954). 
67 The Court has never heretofore held that thP exJstt'nce of 
de facto wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate ~round 
for invoking strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, - U. S 
- (1972). 
71-1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 25 
Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this question-
whether education is a fundamental right, in the sense 
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by 
the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention 
of courts and commentators in recent years.68 
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments." !d., at 493. What was said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may oreasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an 
68 See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 584, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971); 
Van Dusactz v. Hat field, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971) ; Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons, 
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 339-394; Gold-
stein, supra, n. 38, at 534--541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Ex-
penditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L 
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note, Educatwnal Financing & Equal 
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: 
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth DiscriminatiOn, 14 Ariz. L. 
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opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro.: 
vide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.'' Ibid. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing 
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 2371 
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. 
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907). 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
bf education both to the individual and to our society'' 
cannot be doubted."0 But the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Claus.e. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging· upon the right of interstate 
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority's view of the importance of the 
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
bne for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
•w ::3il7 F . Supp , at. 28il. 
71-1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 21 
petence. But MR. JusTICE S·rEWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale of 
the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection ... .' To 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and gives. 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
MR. JusTICE SrEWART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
r,esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." I d,, at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
as a right of constitutional significance/ 0 and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importance of that right.71 
70 E. g. , United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,238 (1970) . 
71 After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), there could 
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for 
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Court applied 
the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family 
grant provision under its AFDC program. A frdcral district court 
71-1332-0PINION 
28 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is 
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla ... 
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, 
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im ... 
posed on tenants in f:lUits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita ... 
tions implicated "fundamental interests which are of par-
ticular importance to the poor," such as the "need for 
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful pos-
session of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is 
instructive: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee to access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
held the provision uncon~titutional, applying a stricter standard 
of review. In the course of reversing the lower court the Court 
distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that in that case 
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of interstate travel." Jd., at 484 n. 16. 
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volv-es the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from 
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by 
showing some compelling state interest. See also J effer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of th-ese cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court is plain. It is not the province 
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights 
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence 
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether 
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, 
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guarjiteed by the Con~ 
stitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 7 :l 
72 The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despitr its 
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970) , that "welfare provides the means to obtain rssential 
food, clothing, housing and medical care." 
73 In Eisenstadt the Court struck down a Massachusel ts statute 
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that 
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection 
~tandard." !d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, thr Court 
recited the proper form of equal protection analysis: "if wr wrre 
io conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon funda-
mental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 
(1965),] the statutory classification would have to be not mrrely 
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the 



















Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 ( 1972); 71 M osley .y. 
Police Department of the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 
('1972); '" Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942)..''; 
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded 
~~~M , 
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution . .t'1~El-:-t- ~c::;; 
as we have said, the undisputed importance of education 
~ill not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual 
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legis-
lation. It is appellees' contention, however, that educa-
tion is distinguishable from other services and benefits 
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close 
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded pro~ 
tection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist 
71 Dunn fully canvasses this Court's voting rights ca::;es and ex-
plains that ''this Court has made clear that a citizen ha~ a con-
stitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal 
basis with other citizens in the jurisdictwn." Jd., at 336 (emphasis 
supplied). The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal 
treatment. in the voting process can no longer be doubted evrn 
though, as the Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in state elections is 
nowhere expressly mentioned." Src Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. 8.1 
112, 138-144 (MR. JusTICE DouGLAs), 241-242 (MR . .Ju~:-~TTCE BREN-
NAN); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 140-144 (1972); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 625-630 (1969); 
Rey1wlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554--562 (196-±); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 368, 379-381 (1963). 
75 In Mosley the Court struck down a Chicago antipicketing 
ordinance which exempted labor picketing from its prohibitions. 
The ordinance was held invalid under lhe Equal Protection Clause 
after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance 
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of review was appro-
priately applied since the ordinance was one "affecting First Amend-
ment interests." I d., at 101. 
76 Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a state law 
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals." Implicit in 
the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation 
is among the rights of personal privacy protectrd under the Consti-
tution. See Roe v. Wade,- U. S. ·-,- (1973). 
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that education is itself a fundamental personal right be-I 
cause it is essential to the effective exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and 
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-
ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his 
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "market-
place of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic 
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the / 
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little 
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not 
been taught to read, assimilate and utilize available 
knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to the right to vote.78 Exercise of the franchise, it is con-
tended, cannot be divorced from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-
formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelli-
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded vigoroH~ protection agamst un-
justifiable governmental interference with the individ-
ual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never I 
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority 
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or 
77 See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont 
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) . , . 
78 Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally pro- ~
tccted right, we assume that appellers' references to that right are ./ 1 
simply shorthand references to the C9fHiltitB1igmJly protcctrd righV, ~ Cru--v-
to participate on an equal basis with other qualified voter8 whrnever I A IJ /1 I n 
the State haH adopted an electiw procr~s for drtermining who will 
represent any segment of the State'::; population. Ser n. 74, supra . 
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the most informed electoral choice. That these may be 
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and 
of a representative form of government is not to be 
doubted. 70 These are indeed goals to be pursued by a 
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from govern-
mental interference. But they are not values to be 
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legiti-
mate state activities. 
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan- / 
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequi-
site to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no 
indication that the present levels of educational expendi-
ture in Texas provide an education that falls short. 
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a 
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of 
educational opportunities to any of its children, that 
argument provides no basis for finding an interference 
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in 
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the 
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity 
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process. 
79 The States have often pursued their entirely legitimate interest 
in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise," Katzenbarh v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (1966), through such dcYicrs as 
literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to vote. See ibid.; 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970). And, where those rrst ric-
tions havebeen found to promote intelligent use of tlw ballot without 
discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previously 
deprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld 
their use. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S, 
45 (1959), with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (Mr . .Justice 
Black), 144-147 (MR. JusTICE DouGL ... s), 216-217 (Mr. Justice 
Harlan), 231-236 (MR. Ju;:;TICE BRENNAN), 282-284 (MR. Jusncr~ 
S1'EWART), and Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1069) , 
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Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so, under ap-. 
pellees' thesis, Bandridge v .. Williams, supra, and Lindsey 
v. N ormet, suj:mi, would no longer be g~od constitu-
tional law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right or liberty and have found I 
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect 
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which 
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The 
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly dif- I 
ferent from any of the cases in which the Court has 
applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation 
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of I 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived;'' 
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of 
some such fundamental personal right or liberty. Sec 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 ( 1942); Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U. S. 330, 338- 343 (1972). A critical distinc-
tion between those cases and the one now before us lies 
in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to edu-
cation. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court 
80 See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Educa-
tion, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 13 9-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, n. 68, 
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interc~:~t Representation : Proposal for 
a National Tenants' A~sociation, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173 
n. 61 (1969). 
,. 
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in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses 
well the salient point: 81 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] .... 
"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all 
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
81 Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters 
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rigl1ts Act of 1965 
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English 
literncy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of educa-
tion at an "American-flag" school in that country even though 
the language of instruction was other than English. Th1s Court 
upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it discriminated 
against those with a sixth grade education obtained m non-English 
speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal 
legislation. 
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tive mind .... '" Id., at 656-657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes to.day-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid- was implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality.82 Of course, every reform that benefits some 
more than others may be criticized for what it fails 
to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
~ormatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's 
efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the J 
Constitution.83 
c 
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in ...--~ 
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, c§]fthat 
this is not a case in which the challenged state action 
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny re-
served for laws that create suspect classifications or 
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. 
we need not rest our decision: however' solely on the 
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century 
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause affirmatively supports the application of 
the traditional standard of review, which requires only 
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This casf" 
02 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society 
vf Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kick, 313 F. S11pp. 
944 (MD Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) . 
83 See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; McDonald v, 
Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U. S. 802 (1969) . 
.. 
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represents far more than a challenge to the manner in: 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn 
the State's judgment in conferring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures.s' This Court has 
often admonished against such interferences with the 
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause: 
"The broad discretion as to .classification possessed 
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long 
been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has 
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recogni-
tion of the large area of discretion which is needed 
by a legislature in formulating sound tax poli-
cies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in 
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since 
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a 
familiarity with local conditions which this Court 
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality 
can be overcome only by the most explicit demon-
stration that a classification is hostile and oppres-
sive discrimination against particular persons and 
classes .... " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 
87- 88 (1940) . 
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., -
U. S. - (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 
U. S. 435, 445 (1940). 
84 See, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890) ; 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 508- 509 (1937) ; 
.A.llied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959) . 
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Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to J 
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the 
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are 
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the 
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether 
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.85 
85 Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer 
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace 
it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing system, 
however, would be statewide financing of all public education with 
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or 
expansion of sales and income taxes. The authors of Private Wealth 
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alterna~ 
tive scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In sunplest 
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particular rate of 
property taxation the district would receive a stated number of 
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies 
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier" 
districts that collect more than the stated amount at any given 
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against 
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators arc 
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and 
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory un-
derlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance. 
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some 
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701., 706-708 
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-596 (1971); 
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative 
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971) ; 
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The 
·' 
I)\.. 
,, cL-t~a 7 
<t~~· 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of · 
educational policy, another area in which this Court's-
indeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience counsel's against premature interference with 
the informed judgments made at the state and local 
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public wel- · 
fare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intract-
able economic, social and even philosophical problems." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. 8., at 487. The very . 
complexity of the problems of financing and manag- . 
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there 
will be more than one constitutionally permissible . 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits 
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the 
problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even 
the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of 
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenditures and the quality of education 86-
an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District 
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relation-
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30. 
86 The quality-cost controversy has received considerable atten-
tion. Among the notable authorities on both sides arc the follow-
ing: C. Jencks, Inequality ( 1972); C. Silberman, Crisi~ in the 
Classroom (1970); Office of Education, Equaliiy of Educntional 
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Educa-
tional Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller eds.); J. Guthrie, 
G. Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. Stout, Schools and Inequality 
(1971) ; President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swan-
80n, The Cost-Quality ·Relationship, in lOth Nat'! Conf. on School 
Finance, The Challenge of Change in School Finance 151 (1967) . 
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ship between cost and quality, is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
education.87 And the question of the proper relation~ 
ship between state boards of education and local school 
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and 
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exami-
nation. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like 
problems of education is not likely to be devined for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States in-
flexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing 
conditions. 
It must be remembered also that every claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for 
the relationship between national and state power under 
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of I 
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigor-
ous judicial scrutiny. While "[tlhe maintenance of 
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
which this Court examines state action~88 it would be 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before 
87 See the results of the Texas Governor's Commit tee's st atcwidc 
survry on the goals of education in that State. I Governor's 
Committee Report , at 59-68. See also Goldstein, supra, n. 38, 
at 519-522; Schoettle, supra, n. 80; authorities cited inn. 86, supra. 
88 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 532 (1959) 
(MR. JusTICE BnENNAN, concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U. S. 641, 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting) . 
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us, in which we are urged to abrogate the systems of 
financing public education presently in existence m 
virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap-
propriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These· 
same considerations are relevant to the determination 
whether that system, with, its conceded imperfections, 
nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legiti- I 
mate state purpose. It is to this question that we next 
turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands / 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from each source.89 The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.uo Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 20 teachers ;n one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 9 2' 
89 ln 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billion dollars for 
education and a little over one billion came from the Minimum 
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
vo Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13. 
91 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18. 
112 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15. 
11-1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 4i 
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children are also provided.93 Additional funds 
are earmarked for current operating expenses and for 
J 
student transportation 94 as well as for free textbooks.95 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation 96 and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
ards.97 As reflected by the 621o increase in funds allotted 
to the Edgewood School District over the last three 
years,08 the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how-
ever, has · been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
a~sure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.99 Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
98 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19. 
94 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51. 
95 Tex. Educ. Code § 12.01. 
us Tex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5) . 
97 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.301 et. seq. 
98 See ante, at -. 
qg Gilmf'r-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
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its assessed value.100 The greatest interdistrict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri-
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupil-
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.101 
100 There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texas. 
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of 
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's 
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, 
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16. 
101 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 18. As previously 
noted, te>.:t accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the 
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated 
inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education. 
While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point 
of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic op-1 
portunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include the effect on 
quality of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher salary o;chc.'du le::;. 
The state funding in Texas is designed to a::;sure, on the average, one 
teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable 
ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6,000 per 
year is sufficient in Texas to att ract qualified teachers may be more 
debatable, depending in major part upon the location of the school 
district. But there appears to be little empirical data that supports 
the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that document· 
the existence of a dependable correlation between the level of public 
school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruc-
tion. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the 
absence, up to this time, of s:.ttisfactory techniques for judging 
their ability or performance. Relatively few school system~ have I 
merit plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are 
usually mcreased across the board in a way which tends to reward the 
least deserving on the same basis as the most deserving. Salaries are 
usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and 
according to predetermined "steps,'/ extending over 10-to-12 year 
periods. 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees claim that children in less affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results 
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. We disagree. 
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as well as 
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed 
in virtually every other State.102 The power to tax local 
property for educational purposes has been recognized 
in Texas at least since 1883.103 When shifts in the dis-
tribution of population, accompanied by changes in local 
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial 
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
1Q 2 President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85, at 9. Until 
recently Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely state-
f\.lnded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amended 
its educational firwnce statute to permit counties to collect addi-
tional funds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The 
rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the 
question before the Court today: 
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything 
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This 
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties 
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educa-
tional facilities as good as the people of the counties want and 
are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above 
and beyond established minimums provided for their people encour-
ages the best features of democratic government ." Haw. Sess. Laws, 
Art. 38, § 1 (1968). 
1 03 See text accompanying n. 7, supra. 
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of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a. 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of local 
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
artic].llated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for 
its child." 105 
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these 
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every 
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large 
measure of participation in and control of each district's 
schools at the local leveL In an era that has witnessed a 
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of 
government, local sharing of responsibility for public edu-
cation has survived. The merit of local control was recog-
nized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 
(1972). MR. JusTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]i-
rect control over decisions vitally affecting the education 
of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our 
society." ld., at 469. THE C:s:IEF JusTICE, in his dis-
104 G. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State of 
New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution 
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of edu-
cational finance, see J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at 39-95. 
105 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by 
James S. Coleman, at vii. 
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sent, agreed that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to con-
tinued public support of the schools, but it is of over-
riding importance from an educational standpoint as 
well." !d., at 478. 
The persistence of attachment to government at 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the decisionfnaking proc-
ess that determines how those local tax tlollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory .. . 
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches 
than does public education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, 
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely 
because it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted under other financing systems that resulted in 
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is 
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-
.ton New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932), 
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spect to expenditures for some districts than for others/07 
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system, 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425·-426 (1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interest:s-, while occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. On 
where state action impinges on the exercise of fu a-
mental constitutional rights or liberties must it be ound 
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. C . Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972); S elton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is als well to 
remember that even those districts that ha e reduced 
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much 
they spend on education, still retain under th present sys-
tem t ow availa 1 fun s will be 
allocated. They further enjoy the~ 
s~/1 
107 MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas 
system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has 
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee 
complete freedom of choice to every district. He places special 
emphasis on the statutory provision which establishes a maximum 
rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local srhool district may 
tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The 
maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the 
District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable 
rate. (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100, seep. 7, infra, is the equalized 
rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellees do 
not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edge-
wood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality 
of that statuary provision is not before us and must await litigation 
in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk; 
313 F. Supp. 944 (MD FLa. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). 
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ous other decisions with respect to the operation of the 
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be"' 
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place 
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the 
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired 
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along 
with increased control of the purse strings at the state 
level will go increased control over local policies.108 
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They see no justification for a system that allows, as 
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation- indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. 
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going 
108 This theme--that greater state control over funding will lead 
to greater state power with respect to local educational programs 
and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public 
education. See, e. g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Educa-
tion, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64, 
77-78 (Bowers ed. 1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and 
The State 26 (1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school 
board, has some control over the purse, there can be little real feel-
ing in the community that schools are in fact local schools .... ") ; 
Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution, in Sat. Rev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) 
("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power follow 
money .... "); Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally-Shared Taxes 
21 (1931) (" [S]tate administration of taxation is the first step to-
wards state control of the functions supported by these taxes . .. . ") . 
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental. 
or whether he agrees that the consequence is inevitable, it certainly 
cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on 
the part of parents, educators, and legislators. 
'. 
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to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.100 Nor· 
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable wealth within any district may result from 
any number of events, some of which local residents 
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and 
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within 
a district by various actions-public and private-of it~ 
residents. 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then - · _,;--
it ~ilYiillPermisSilile in providing othe-; nec-
essary services currently financedjlrom local property 
taxes, including local police and 'ffre protection, public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of vari-
ous kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total 
abrogation of local property taxation and control as 
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply 
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this 
Court to nullify statewide for nancing public 
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof 
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures between children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that. 
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Its I 
shortcomings have been acknowledged by Texas, ~ 
has persistently endeavored-not without some success-
109 This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining 
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the 
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of "territorial uniformity'' 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 
230--231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Cf. 
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668 
(CAlO 1969). . 
Ji~· -
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to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditure with-
out destroying the acknowledged benefits of local partici~ 
pation. The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, 
ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69-70 (1913). One also must remember that the system 
here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other 
State. In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for 
financing public education reflects what many educators 
for a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and edu-
cational authorities in 49 States, especially where the 
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no-
where yet adopted. The constitutional test under the 
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state 
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or 
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-, - (1973). 
We hold that the Texas plain abundantly survives this 
test. 
IV 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on 
the District Court opinion in this case and on its Cali-
fornia predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 
P . 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appro-
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priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as pro-
viding a constitutional mandate for major state legislative 
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as 
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have 
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban 
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neu-
trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.110 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
,empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is begin-
ning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumed.111 There is, 
110 "Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors Coons, Clune, 
and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of public education 
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state 
as a whole." J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 2. 
Their thoughtful and imaginative work paved the way for the 
suits, including the present one, attacking the school finance system. 
lndeed, the District Court approved the authors' thesis verbatim. 
337 F. Supp., at 285. The authors have often cautioned their sup-
porters, however, against speculating that "fiscal neutrality" would 
be a panacea for the poor or for racial minorities. Ibid.; Coons, 
Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of 
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971). 
111 Any alternative that provides significantly more money for 
any major percentage of the State's schools is certain to encounter 
political barriers. Any such new plan would require additional 
resources from some source: funds will either have to be taken 
away from more prosperous districts or new revenue sources will 
need to be tapped. The former alternative is not likely to be sup-
·. 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in 
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the 
District Court, 112 has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance. 113 . That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.u4 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-
ported by those districts that have had the good fortune to 
have developed attractive education facilities and programs. The 
latter alternative, i. e., new taxation, appears to be no 
more palatable politically. It has been calculated that $2.4 
billion of additional school funds would be required to bring 
all Texas districts up to the present level of expenditure in all 
but the wealthiest districts-an amount more than double that 
currently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Research 
League, supra, n. 20, at 16-18. At a time when nearly every State 
and locality is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with de-
mands for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers 
already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to 
question whether a decision of this Court nullifying present state 
taxing systems would result in doubling public funds committed 
to education. An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of almost 30 I 
States, focusing on these practical consequences, claims with some 
justification that "each of the under~igned states ... would suffer 
severe financial stringency." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, at 2 (filed Att. Gen. of Md., et al.). 
112 See nn. 38 and 63, supra. 
1.13 Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, Inequities 
in School Finance (1972) (Monograph prepared by Professor Berke). 
114 See also U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City School 
Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW Publication). 
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tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools.115 Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
assessable property.116 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu-
tional function restrain us from undertaking through the 
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state 
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity 
and vital concern to the States and localities. That 
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the vari-
ous States, and we do no violence to the values of fed-
eralism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is 
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on 
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax: 
systems which may well have relied too long and too 
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly inno-
vative new thinking as to public education, its methods 
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level 
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These 
115 See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Deci-
sions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. J. 1303 
(1972); see text accompanying n. 45, supra. 
116 See Goldstein, supra, n. 38, al 526; C. Jencks, supra, n. 
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example, 
1'59% of minority students live in districts above the median 
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the 
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict-is above the local average in both the amount of taxable 
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72% of its 
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only 
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and North 
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18% 
Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke, Carnavale,. 
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 673. 
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matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who 
already have contributed much by their challenges. But 
the ultimate solutions mu&f come from the lawmakers 
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This suit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts. 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants 2 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school. 
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the 
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
2 The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name this 
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area which were originally named as party defendants. 
After a pretrial conference, the District Court issued an order dis-
missing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San 
Antonio Independent School District has joined in the plaintiff:/ 
challenge to the State's school finance system and ha;; filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of that position in this Court. 
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of Education. the State Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court 
was impa11cled in January 1969.~ In December 1971 4 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas school finance system unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The State appealed and we noted prob-
able jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu-
tional questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas' 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools.(; Early in its history, 
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
".\ three-judgr court \ra~ proper!)· convened and i here arr no· 
question.,; a~ to the Di~trict Court'::; juri~dirtion or the direct appeal-
abilit)' of it~ judgment. 2R U. S. C. §§ 2281, 125:3. 
'Thr trial w:t~ delayed for two yo:u~ to permit C.litcnoin• pretrial 
di~covcry and to allow completion of a prnding; Tcxa~ ]Pgi~lnti,·c 
inYc~iigntion concerning the nerd for rcform of its public school 
fin,tncp systt•m. Rodripuez v. San Antonio Ind. S!·hool Dist., 3:17 
V SnpJl. 280, 285 n. 11 (IVD Trx. 1971). 
":337 F. Rupp. 280. The Di.-trirt Court ;;ta.wd its mand:tlr for 
i wo yc:m; to pro,·idr Trxas an opportunit)· to n•mcdy thl' inrqui1 irs 
found in its financing program. The court. howrrer, rC'tninrd jHri~­
clirtion to fn~hion its own rrmrdial order if tbe St:nr failrd to ofTrr· 
un nccrptahlr plan. !d .. at 2~fi. 
n Trx. Con~t.. Art. X,§ 1: 
·'A )l:rnrrnl diA'u,..;ion of kno\\'ll·dgc being Pl'~(·nti:tl to the prP~<'tTation 
of the right~ :mel libN1ic~ of the pcoplt• it ~hall be iht' dut~· of 1hc 
Legi~luture of this Statr to makr ~uital.Jlr pro,·ision for thr ~ll]lport 
and mainten:mcr of public Rchoob." 
!d. , Art. X, § 2: 
"The LC'gi,..;Jaturr shall a;; rarl)· ns prartirahlr r~t:tbli~h frr<' schools 
throughout thr Statr, and shall furuish mcnns for their support, by 
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schools. relyillg on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
taxes 'vith the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildittgs" ancl for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools.'' ' Such local funds as were 
raised "·ere supplemented by funds distributed to each 
eli strict from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds." The Pennane11t School Fund, established in 
1854," "·as enclo\\'(:>d \\·ith millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.'" The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes.'' served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational fnncls throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this centur-y. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
the State.' ~ 
'Gntil recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.' 3 Sizable differences 
7 Tex. Ccm~t. 1~7G. Art. 7, § 3, n~ nmendrd , Aup;. 1~, 1~S3. 
·' Trx. Cons!., Art. 7, §§ :3, 4, 5. 
H Uammel 's Laws of Trxas, p. 117~. Srr Tex. ConHI. , Art. 7, §§ 1, Z 
(intrrpreti\·e rommrntnrie~); T Heporl of Go\·rrnor's Committee on 
l'uhlir School Education. ThP Challenge and the Cbnn<·e 27 (19fi9) 
(hereinafter Govrrnor'~ Committee Report). 
"'Tex. Con~t., Art. 7, § 5 (~rr all"o tlw interprrti\·e rommentaTT); 
\' Covrmor',.; Commit trr Hrporl, at 11-12. 
11 The ,·ariou~ somrr~ of rrvrnur for the Available Rrhool Fund 
arr ratalog<'d in Texns Sta1r Bel. ol' Edur. , Trxns Statrwide School 
Adeqttar~· Run·e~ · 7-15 ( 108S). 
'~Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, as amendrcl, ?fo\· .. 5. 1918 (~rr intrr-
prel i\·r commentar.\·). 
" ' T Cio\·rrnor's Comrnittrc Hrport, at 85; TexaR Stair Bel. of 
Edur., supra. n. 11, at 5-7; .T. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, . 
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State brcame 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.1 ' The location of com-
mercial and industrial proprrty began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
·were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.'" 
In due time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities."; Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.17 Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's,1 " 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946.") 
Private Wealth and Public Education 49 (1970); E. Cubberley, 
School Fund~ nnd Their Apportionment 21-27 (1905). 
1 1 B~· 1940 one-half of the State'l;l populntion wao; clu~tcred in itR 
metropolitnn crnten-;. I Governor's Commit tcc Report, at 35. 
15 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To llnvr What Wc l\Iust (1948). 
JG H. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950); Texa~ Brl. of 
Ecluc., supra, n. 11. 
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. It should be noted that riming this 
period the median per pupil exprncliture for all schools with an 
enrollment of more than 200 was approximately S50 per year. 
Dming thi~ same period a surve~· conducted by the Statr Board 
of Education concluded that "in Texas the best educational ad,·an-
tagrs ofTered by the State at present may be had for the mrdian 
cost of S52.67 per year per pupil in avrrage dail~· attrndance." 
Texas State Bel. of Educ., SU]Jra, n. 11, at 56. 
l H 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Sc::;~. 19:39, at. 274 
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Laws of Texas, 48th Lcgi~., 
Reg. ScK~. 1940, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per sludcnt). 
10 General & Spec. Laws of Texa~, 49th LcgiH., Reg. Sc~s. 1945, 
c. 53, at 75. 
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to· 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that ·would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interclistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.~" It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas."' 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 80% of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20% . The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
"° For a complete history of the adoption in Texas of a founda-
tion program, ~C'c R. Stills, supra, n. Hi. Sec nl~o V Go,·ernor's 
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research L0aguc, Public School 
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Interim Report 1972). 
~ 1 .For the 1970-1971 ~:>chool year this state aid program accounted 
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation contributed 
41.1% and 10.9% was provided in fecl0ral funds. Texas Researcil 
League, supra, n. 20, at 9. 
J 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent. considers <'ach county's share of all property 
in the State.~~ Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county."" The 
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children ~· 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.2" Today every school district docs impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in Hl49, expenditures for education-from State as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor's Commit trr Hrport , :1t 4-I-4R. 
""At prt:>,,rni ihrrr arc· l ,Hi1 school di~trict<:l in Tex:l ~. Trxa~ Re-
srnrrh Lragur, suprn. n. 20. at 12. 
2 '
1 In 194R the Gilmrr-.\ikrn Commit1 rr found th:1 t ~omr school 
di~trirts were not ley~ · in:r an)· local tax to suppo1i rdn<":lt ion. 
Gilmcr-Aikron Committcr. supra. n. 15, at Hl. Thr Trxns State 
Board of Eclucat ion Rurn~- found 1 hat o\·rr 400 rommon and 
inclrpcndcnt srhool cli~ t riri s wrrr lr\·ying 110 loeal proprrty tax in 
198.'i-193fl. Texas Stnto Bel. of Edur., supra n. 11, at 39-42. 
"" Gilmcr-Aikrn Committcr, suwa, n . 15, at 15. 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
500jo."" In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State."s Minimum 
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years."" 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with another more affluent rlistrict in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-America1l descent: approximately 907o of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 67o 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960-the lmYest. in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.30 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
~6 I Govrrnor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
27 Texas Rr,rnrrh Lra)l;ur, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
28 In the ~·r: m; brl wren 19-Hl and 1967 the an>r:q~;e ]lOr pupil 
rxpenditnrc for all rnrrcnl oprrating rxprnse~ irH·rea:·:rd from S206 
to S493. In that ~amr period ca]1iial rxprncliture~ inrreasrd from 
SH to $102 per pupil. I Govemor' . .; Committee Hcport, a1 .13-54. 
29 III Govrrnor's Committrc Heport, at 113-14(); Brrke, Carna-
valc, Mor~?:an & White, Thr Trx:lR School Finance Cn~r: A ·wrong 
in Search of a Hrmecl~·, 1 .J. of L. & Edur. 6.59, 6R1-Gi\2 (1972). 
30 The family imomc figurrs are ba~ed on 1960 census statistics. 
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tributed $26 to the education of earh child for the 1967-
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.'n Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil. ')" 
Throughout this litigation Edge>vood has been con-
trasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unl.ike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo. having only 18'}'o Mexican-Americans 
and less than 1 7o Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49,000 "" and the median family income 
"'The Avaibblr School Fund, tcclmicall~·, provide~ a ~rcond 
:.;ource of state mane~·. That Fund has continued as in ~·r:HH past 
(~ee text accompnn~·ing llll. 1f>-19, supra) to distribute uniform 
per pupil grants to e\·er~· district in the St:1te. In 19f>R thi~< Fund 
:>llotted $98 per pupil. However, because the A vnilablr School 
Fund contribution is nlwars subtracted from a district'~ rntitlc-
mrnt under the Foundation Program, it plays no significant role 
in rducational finance todn~·. 
'" While federal as~i~tanre ha:-; an ameliorating effect on the di!Trr-
ence in school budget::; between wealthy and poor di~trict;;, the 
District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that 
court that it should considrr the effect of t br frdrral grant in 
assrRsing the discrimination cl::lim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State 
has not renewed that contention here. 
33 A map of Bexar Count~· included in the record shows that 
Edgewood and Alamo Hrights are among the ~mallest dist ri cts in 
the county and arc of approximate!:-,; equal size. Yrt, as the figures 
above indicatr, Edgewood'~ student population is more than four 
timrs that of Alamo Heights. This factor obvious!~· aecounts for 
:t significant percentage of the clifTrrence~ between t hE' two districts 
in per pupil proprrty nlnrs and expenditures. If Alamo Heights 
had as many student;; to educate as Edgrwood docs (22 ,000) it::; per 
pupil assessed property valne would be approximately $11,100 rather 
than $49,000, and its per pupil expenditures would therefore have 
been considerably lower. 
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1967-Hl68 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid/' more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62% increase over 
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, state 
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget-from local, state, and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupiP5 These 
:u Thr figurrs quoted above var:;· slightly from those utilized in 
the Di~trict Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 782. These trivial 
differcncrs are apparently a product of that court's reliance on 
slightly different ·tatistical data than we have relied npon. 
35 Although the Foundation Program has mnde significantly greater 
contributions to both school districts over the last several years, it 
is apparent 1 hat Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The 
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants 
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the 
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Higher salaries aro 
guaranteed to teachers having more yenrs of experience and pos-
sessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Heights, which 
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced 
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Texas 
Program is not unlike that presently in existence in a number of 
other States. C. Coon~, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to districts that 
already spend more per IJUIJil, such Foundation formulas have been 
described as "anti-equa,lizing." Ibid. The formula, however, is 
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absoluto terms. The percentage 
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth, 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 207a 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
grant.~a It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial .interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
degrees throughout the State,3s still exist. And it was 
dispnrity between the two Tcxns districts is dimi.nished substantially 
by State aid. Alamo I-Iei~hts derived in 1967-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money from local tnxe8 as Ed~ewood did. The State aid 
gr:mts to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approxi-
mately two to onr, i. e., Alamo Hrights h:td a little morr than twice 
as mueh money to spend prr pupil from its combird Stnte nnd local 
resourcr.-J. 
:w Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13. 
'"The Economic Indrx, which determines rach county's share of 
i he total Local Fund Assigmnent , is basrd on n eomplrx formula 
('onrei\·ed in 1949 when the Foundation Progrnm was in,titutrd. 
See text at pp. --- supra. It has frequently been suggrsted 
by Texas resca,rrhrrs thnt the formul:t be nlterrd in s<:>vernl respects 
to pro\·ide a more arruratr rrflrrtion of lorn! tnxpaying ability, 
rspeeially of urban school>'. V Governor's Committee Report, nt 
48; Berke, Carnavale, l\1organ & White, supra, n . 29 nt 680-681. 
::R The Di~trict Court relied on the finding,.; pre~e nted in an 
nfficl:wit submitted by Profe~;;~or Berke of R)Taeu~e. Hi,.; iinmpling 
of 110 Texas school di~trirts demonstrated a direct r·orrelation 
between ihe amount of a di~triri ·~ taxablr propc·rty and its level 
of per pupil expenditure. His siucly also found n direct corrclni ion 
het ween a district's median family income and per pupil rxpendi-
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the 
anwunts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classification a.nd that education is a "fun-
damental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show tha.t it was premised upon some compelling 
turrs as well as n n im·erse correlation bet WC'Cil pcrc0n1 ngr of minori-
; ies and cxp0ndi1 mes. 
Ca1 rgorizecl b~· EC]u:-tlizrd PropNt~· Ynlue~, 
l\fedinn Family lnC'ome, and Sta1.e-Local Revenue 
M a.rket T' a(ue Median 
of Taxable Family 
PropPrty Income 
Per Pupil From 1000 
AbOI'C 8100.000 85.900 






( 40 Districts) 
B0low $10,000 83,325 
( 4 Districts) 
Per Cent 















Although tlw correlations with respect to fnmil~· income and r.1r·c 
appear on!~· to exi<:>t at the C'xtr0mcs, and although the affiant's 
met.hodolog~· hns been questioned (~C'e GoldstC'in, Interclistrict 
Inrqunlitirs in School Financing; n Criticnl Annl~·sis of Serrano v. 
P1"iest and it~ Progrny, 120 U. Pn. L. Rev. 504, 523-525 nn. 67 
and 71 (1972)), insofar ns any of these correlations is relevant 
to the constitutional thr~is pre~C'ntC'd in this cnse we mny accept 
its basic thru~L For a defrnHc of the relinbility of the affidavit, see 
Berke, Carna\·nlc, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29. 
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court 
concluded that " [ n] ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
!d., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights '19 or that 
involve suspect classifications.10 If, as previous decisions 
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's sys-
tem is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,'11 the Texas 
financing system-and its counterparts in virtually every 
other State-will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." '' 2 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" ·~~ and "imperfections," '11 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
39 E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. 
'l'hompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
40 E. g., Graham. Y. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 
(1964). 
11 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and the 
cases collected therein. 
42 Appellants' Brief, at 11. 
'"
1 Ibid . 
.,. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3. 
.s 
This, then, establishe~ the framework for our analysis. 
We must decideaJ first, whether the Texas system of financing 
public education operates to the disavdantage of some 
suspect classification or impinges upon a fundamental 
right 61#1tilii# explicitly or implicitly protected by 
the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial 
scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District Court 
should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still 
be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers 
some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore 
does not constitute an invideous discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed for the ~ ,_. 
s~ve~~l r~asons that follow, ""e find neither th~ suspect ~ 
c assi c~twn nor the fundamental interest analyRis 1':1. 
persuasive. " 
47 See cases cited in te:1.:t, at-, infra. 
~·· 
' ' 
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A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing Jaws in other 
States,4 8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crirnination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather 
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged dis-
crimination , the courts in these cases have virtually as-
sumed their findings of a suspect classification through 
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the 
traditional systems of financing public schools, some 
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other 
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the 
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a dif-
ference for purposes of consideration under the Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be 
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, 
and whether the relative- rather than absolute- nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. 
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classi-
fications they create are subjected to strict judicial_.......... 
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must 
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court 
below. 
The case comes to us with no definitive description of 
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. 
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of ap-
pellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argu-
ment suggests, however, at least three ways in which 
the discrimination claimed here might be described. 
'"8errano v. Priest. 96 C'nl. Rptr. IJ01 , ·l-1'7 P. 2d 124-1. 5 Cui. 
:)cl .'iS4 (1971) ; Van Dusartz "· llatfielrl. :3;34 F. Rupp . S70 (l\'finn. 
1971): Robinson v. Cahill. liS N . .T. RupPr. 22:3 , 2S7 J\. 2d uq 
(1972); Milliken v. Green. No. 54.809 (Mirh . S. C. , Jan.-, 1973). 
'. 
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The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as 
discriminatory (1) against "poor" persons whose incomes 
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who 
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," "n or 
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others,"0 
or (3) against all those who, irrespective of their per-
sonal incomes, happell to reside in relatively poorer 
school districts.r.' Our task must be to ascertain whether,/ 
in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate 
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the 
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as sus-
4 n In thrir complaint, appellres purported to reprr:-;ent a cla~s 
composrd of prr:-;ons who arc "poor" nne! who rr~idr in school dis-
tricts having n "low valur of proper!~·." Third Amrndrd Complaint, 
App., at 14. Yet apprllrrs havr not definrd the term "poor" with 
rrference to any ubr::olutr or functional IPvrl of impeeunity. See 
text infm, nt -. Srr also Appellee~' Brief, at 1, 3; Tr. of Oral 
Aq~., at 20-21. 
r.o Appcllres' proof at trial focu.~rd on compnrati1·e differences in 
famil~· incomes bel wC'rn resident~ of we; til h~- am! poor distrirts. They 
endcnvored, apparent!_,., to show thnt there e'-iRts a dirrrt rorrrlation 
bctwern ppr,.:on:ll famil~· income and rduentionnl exprnditurcs. Sec 
text, infra, at -. Thr Dir::triet Courl mny havP been relying on 
this notion of rdnti1·e di~criminntion bn~ed on family wraith. Citing 
apprllee . ..;' stal i~t ical proof. t hr t'Ourt rmJ1ha~izrcl thu I "those dis-
ricts moRt rich in propcrt~- al~o havr the highrst median income ... 
while the poor pmpcrty district~ arr poor in income .... " 337 F. 
Su11p. , at 282. 
"'At oral argument and in thrir brirf, appellrr~ ~uggr,.:( that 
drscription of the pcr::;onal statuH of the rrsidrnts in di~tricts thai 
Rprnd lr~s on rducation is not critiral to their rase. In thrir Yirw, 
the Trxa~ sy:>tcm is impermissibly di,.,rriminatoTT r1·rn if rrlativrly 
poor cli~trirts do not contain poor peoplr. Apprllees' Brirf, at -+3-44; 
Tr. of Oral Arg., ::t t. 20-21. There arr indication~ in the District 
Court opinion that it adopt rei thi~ t hrory of eli At rict disrrimina.lion. 
Tho opinion repeatedly emphasize~ the comparati1·e finnnrinl status 
of di~tricts and carl~· in tho opinion it de~rribe::; apprllees' class as 
bring romposrcl of "all ... children throughout Trxns who live in 
school districts with low property valuationR." 337 F. Supp., a.t 282. 
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pect. It is, after all, the first function of courts, w·hcn 
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause. to examine 
the classifications drawn by state laws. 
The several precedents of this Court relied upon 
by appellees and the court belov> provide the proper 
starting point. The individuals or groups of individ-
uals who constituted the class discriminated against in 
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a Ineaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny,"2 the Court in-
validated state laws that prevented indigent criminal 
defendants from acquiring a transcript. or an adequate 
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigency, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation 
would have been sho>VJJ if the State had provided som~ 
"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner 
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing-
ton, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison 
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
""Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971); Williams v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner "· California, 393 
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. 
District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. ·washington, 
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357 
U.S. 214 (1958). 
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Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay ----
, p --~ £1.l llll resonrf'=--n»rl ... J,~ 1-.-J 
Sentencing judges may, and often do, consider the 
defendant's ability tii to pay, but in such circumstances 
they are guilded by sound judicial discretion rather than 
by constitutional mandate. 
o1 -- ! _...., .. ..., .._.. ...... ..._. tt.L..LV 
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those 
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively less money on 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. ~ 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for 
primury elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts 
found in the previous cases were present there. The size 
of the fee, often running into the thousands of dollars, 
effectively singled out all potential candidates who wert' 
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" 
(Id., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
denial of a position on the primary ballot. 
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the 
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance system-
discrimination against a class of definably "poor" per-
sons-might arguably meet the criteria established in 
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, 
demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing char-
71- 1:332-0PINION 
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acteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. 
First, in support of their charge that the system dis-
criminates against the "poor," appellees have made no 
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families arc not necessarily clus-
tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "r i]t is clearly ill correct ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Connecticut." "" Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," r.4 
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts."'' 
Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas 
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases. 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
' ''1 X ote, A Sta ti~ tical Anal~·~ i s of tlw Sthool Finnncr Dl' r· i ~ i o n ,.;: On 
Winning Battl e:; a nd Lo~ing Wars, El l Yair L . .T . 130:3, 1:{2S-1:{29 
( 197:l). 
'' '!d. , at 1324, n . 102. 
"·' !d .. at 1328. 
[ 
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assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather. it is that they arc receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it;;n a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
~t is that at least where wealth is involved the 1 
Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute ~ e ~ v~kf/ 0 " p ... e.'";J 
or ~plete e~lia:lit)~ Nor, indeed, in view of the ~~vt<-1 ,.J ..,._,tfl.~4' 
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except 
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the 
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" 
education for all children in the State. By assur-
ing teachers, books, transportation and operating funds,/' 
the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, 
for the welfare of the State as a ·whole. that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu-
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.'" "8 The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled 
" 6 En,ch of apprl!rt•:;' po~~ible theories of wealth di~r·rirnination i~ 
founded on the m:sumption that the C)Ua!it~· of edul'ation ntriel:i 
directly with the nmonnt of fundR expended on it :111d th:1t, there-
fore, the difierence in quality brtween two schooll:i can be drter-
minecl simpli~ticnlly by looking n t t hr differenrr in J1E'r pupil expendi-
tures. Thi>; is n, mnttrr of ronf'idrrnble di:,:pute :unong educator~ and 
commentators. Ree nn . RG and 101. injm. 
" 7 E. g., Bullock Y. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (19n); Mayer v. 
Cit!! of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) ; DraperY. vVashinoton, 
:~72 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douolas v. California, 372 U. S. 
:35:3. 357 (1963). 
"' Gilmer-Aikrn Commitlre, SU]Jra. n. 1.5, at 1:3 (rmpkt~i~ mldrcl) . 
TnclePd. eYen though local funding has long bern a ~ignifif':mt asprct 
of edn('ational funding;, tltr Statr always hm: Yie~Yed pro,·icling an 
accrpt able education as one of its primary funr1 ions . Rre Trxas 
State Bel. of Eclnc., supra, 11. 11, at 1, 7. 
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this desire and that it 110\Y assures "every child in every 
school district an adequate education." an No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional 
terms.60 
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court 
may have embraced a second or third approach, the 
second of which might be characterized as a theory of 
relative or comparative discrimination based on family 
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla-
tion exists between the wealth of families within each 
district and the expenditures therein for education. That 
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower 
the dollar amount of education received by the family's 
children. 
The principal evidence adduced in support of this 
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub-
59 Appellants' Brief, at. 35; Reply Brief, at 1. 
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, how-
ever, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination ca::;rs would 
be considerably cloRN. If elementary and secondary education were 
made available b~· the State only to those who are able to pay a 
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a dearly defined 
class of "poor" people--definable in terms of their inability to pay 
the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from re-
ceiving an education. That case would prrsent a far more rom-
]1clling set of circumst:mces for judicial assistance than I hr case 
before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good 
deal more than provide an education to those who ran a!Tord it. 
H has provided what it considers to be an adequatr base education 
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to amrliorate 
by state funding and by the local a ·sessment program the dit'p:uities 
between local tax resources. 
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mitted by .Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer-
sity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The Dis-
trict Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and 
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, 
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of 
school districts, measured in terms of assessable prop-
erty per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. 
Second, the court found a direct correlation between dis-
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents,. 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. 
Supp., at 282, n. 3. 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then 
it might be argued that expenditures on education-
equated by appellees to the quality of education-are 
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative· 
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered 
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or 
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro-
vide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-..,...... 
signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the 
comparatively poor,62 and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need 
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' 
proof fails to support their allegations or the District 
Court's conclusions. 
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately lOtJo of the school districts in Texas. His 
G'l Also, it should be recognized that median income stati~tics 
may not define with any precision the status of individual familie:; 
within any given district~. A more dependable showing of com-
parative wealth discrimination would examine factor::; such as the 
average income, the mode, and the concentration of poor families in 
any district in addition to the median income. 
6 ~ Cf. Jefferson v. Ilaclcney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-549 (1972). 
y • 
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findings, set out in the margin,n:• show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96 
districts comprising almost 90% of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most money on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest median 
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the con-
ceptual questions were answered favorably to appelleesv 
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.64 
""Market Falue of Median Family State & Local 
Taxable Prupert!J Income E:rpc11d£tures 
Per Pupil in 1960 Per Pupil 
Abo,·e $100,000 $5,900 ~Sl5 
( 10 d i~trict~) 
$100,000-$50,000 S-+,425 $514 
(26 districts) 
$50,000-$aO,OOO $-+,000 $c[~:3 
( 80 di~trirtR) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 84()2 
( 40 di~t rict~) 
Below $10,000 $8,:~25 8305 
( 4 districts) 
(; 4 Studies in other State~ h:n·e al~o quc~t ionPd thr ('Xi-<tCII('(' or 
n n~' drpendablE' correlation betiYeen a dicit rirt ',; IYealt h mpasnrPd 
in trnn:< of as8cs8nble prop<•rt~· nnd thr collcctiYr wealth of fcnniliC's 
re~iding in the district mcasmecl in term~ of mC'di:1n fnmil~· 
ineonw. Ridrnour & Uidrnour, Sermno \'. Priest: 'vVrnlt h and 
Knnsas School Financr, 20 K::m. L. 213, 225 (1972) ('"it ran be 
argurcl that thrre rxist:,; in Knnsas ;~hno~t an iuvrr:::c rorrrbtion: 
distr•irts with highrE<t inromo prr pupil han· low :u;~cs~rcl Y:tlur per 
pupil, and cli~trirts with high n~sr~~rd Yalue prr pupil hnYr low 
income prr pupil"); Da l'irR, The Chnllrn11:e of Ch:111ge in School 
Finnme, in Nat'! Educational Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School 
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This brings us, then, to the third way in which the 
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth 
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by 
the evidence is between district property wealth and ex-
penditures. it may be argued that discrimination might 
be found without regard to the individual income char-
acteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect cor-re-
lation between district property wealth and expenditures 
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district 
except the district that has the most assessable wealth 
and spends the most on education. 6 " Alternatively, the 
class might be defined more restrictively to include chil-
dren in districts with assessable property 'vhich falls_...-.-
below the statewide average, or median, or below some 
other artificially defined level. 
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks 
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, 
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happen to have 
less taxable wealth than other districts. 66 The system 
Finance (19G7). Note, Sl Yak L .• T.. su]n-a. n. 53. 3el' nl~o Gold-
stein, supra, n. 3S. at 522-.'i27. 
6
" Indeed, thi~ is preci~cl)· how the plnint iff~ in Serrauo v. PTicst, 
sup1'a. defined i he rln;;s t hr~r purportrd i o rcprrse11i : "PlnintitT 
ehildren claim to repre~rni a rln~~ ron~isting of nil ]lllhlic school 
pupils in Cnlifornia, cxrrpt rhildrrn in thnt. srhool di~triet ... 
which ... afford~ the grcntest cducntionnl opportunit~· of all srhool 
districts within California." 96 Cnl. Rptr., at 604, 487 P. 2d, at 
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, nt 589. Sec nlso Vau Dv,sactz v. Hatfield. 334 F_ 
Supp. , nt Rn. 
" 6 Appeller~. howen~r, hn \ ' P :woidrd dr~rribing the Trxns s~·~tern 
as one rcsuliing mrrdy in di~rriminntion between districts peT se 
since this Comt h:1s nrvrr qur;;tionrd the State'::; power to draw 
reasonable di;;tinrtions bctwrcn politirnl subdiviRions within its 
borders. GTij]in v. County School Board of P1'ince Edward County, 
877 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGwan v. MaTyland, 366 U. S .. 
420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. MaTyland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). 
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of alleged discrimination and the class is defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class 
is hot saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process. 
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect clas-
sification. But appellees have not relied solely on the 
contention that wealth discrimination would constitute 
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to 
rigorous judicial scrutiny.67 They also assert that the 
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise 
~ whether education is a fundamental right, in the sense 
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by 
the Constitution 
.,., The Court haR nevrr herrtoforr held that the rxi::;tener of 
de facto wealth discrimTmttion alone providrs an adequate ground 
for invoking strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Ilarper v. Virginia Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v. Kras, - U. S. 
- (1972). 
nssce Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 584,487 P. 2d 1241 (1971); 
Van Dusactz v. II at field, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971) ; Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N .. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons, 
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 339-:394; Gold-
stein, supra, n. 3 , at 534-5-n; Virira., Unequal Educational Ex-
penditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L. 
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note, Educational Financing & Equal 
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B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments." Id., at 493. What "vas said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of education. Such ao/ 
opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro-
vide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms." Ibid. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing 
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237, 
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. 
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. 
Protoct,ion of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 l\Iich. L. Rev. 
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: 
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Di,;criminatiou, 14 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 88, 120--124 (1972). 
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Society of Histers, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v. 
Ma.ssachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907). 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
of education both to the individual and to our society" 
cannot be doubted.r.u But the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate 
travel. admonished that "r v l irtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority's view of the importallcc of the 
interest a.ffectecl, ,,.e would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
one for \vhich the Court lacks both authority and com~ 
petence. But MR. JusTICE S'l'EWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the limits of the lfundamental rights~ rationale of 
the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today docs not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection ... .' To 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and gives 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
rw :337 F. Supp., nt 28:3. 
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tution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
Mrt. JusTIClD STrDWART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to close .i udicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
r·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right. and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." !d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
as a right of constitutional significaJJCe,7 " and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importance of that right. 71 ./""" 
Lh1dsey v. 1\-onnet, 405 F. S. 56 ( 1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is 
Hot the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, 
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im-
70 E. (!., United States v. Guest. 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oreoon v. 
JIJitrhell, 400 U.S. 112,238 (1970). 
71 Aftrr Dandridoe v. Williams, 397 C :3. +71 (1970), therr could 
br no linp;cring que~tion nboul the ron~titut.ional fcnmdation for 
the Court':-; holding in Shapiro. In Dandrid(JI' the Coml :1pplied 
the rational basi:> tr::;t in re,·iewing :.I:t r~·ln nd ',; maximum family 
gr~mt proyi:-;ion under it~ AFDC program. A frdrl'<il di~trirt eourt . ....-
hrld thr proYioion uncon:;titutional, appl~·ing a 'tridrr ~tandard 
of review. In the cour~e of rewr~ing thr lower rom I t hr Court 
distinguished Shapiro proprrl~· on the ground ihat in thnt C'ase 
"the Court found state intrrfrrcnrc with thr con~titutionnll~· pro-
tcctrcl frreclom of inter:;tate trawl." Id., at 48-1: 11. 16. 
71-1332-0PINION 
28 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRTGUJ~Z 
posed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
I d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita-
tions implicated "fundamental interests which are of par-
ticular importance to the poor," such as the "need for 
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful pos-
session of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is 
instructive: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee to access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
Id., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
( 1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in:_.., 
volv·es the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from 
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
1 ~ Tho Court refused to apply tho strict scrutiny test despite its 
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970), that "welfare provides tho means to obtain cs~cutial 
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o doanofQ_ 
'® It is not the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional r1·ghts 1·n the name of 
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
in assessing whether~l;erltt~f the- te~n~l'Jtbttbwrr H~~­
~ right to education iwHml~ Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); 73 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 




:J In Eisenstadt the Court struck down it Massachusetts statute 
11rohibiting the distribution of contraceptive device~, finding that 
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection 
~landnrd." !d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court 
rrcitrd the proper form of rqual protect ion analy~i~: "if wr wrre 
to concludr that the Mas~achusetts statute impingrs upon funda-
mental frerdoms undrr Griswold l v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 
(1965),] the statutory classification would hitvc to be nol merely 
rationally related to it valid public purpose but necessary to the 
achievement of it compelling state interr~t." Ibid. (emphasis in 
orig;incd). 
.. ,,_,c.ltl'j " .. 
I ~ ? /1 '- I f- '1 
~ "Q. """"""' h f 
---rrnunn fully canva~ses this Court's W]J'Q] ]))"9t~eh¥ voting rights 
cases and explains that "this Court has made clear that a citizen 
has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on 
an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." ld. , at 336 
( cmphasi~ supplied). The constitutional underpinnings of the right 
to equal treatment in the voting process can no lon!];er be doubted 
even though, as the Court noted in Har]Jer v. Virginia Bel. of Elec-
tions, 383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), "the righL to vote in state cleetions ~;). S- ~ 3 0 
is nowhere expressly mentioned." Sec ullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. / 
~ 1:)4,'(1972); Kramer v. Union Free chool District, 395 U. S. 62-!, 
(1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U .. 53\(1964); ~'f. v, S'M-lJe"J~ 
$$ if·.S'J... 
c3 7 :;J. v, .s . J ' ) 
3 )9-Jg} (.ICJ~J). 
• 
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the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); 7 " Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942).76 _ 
catio would not alone cause the Court to depart fr m 
the usua tandard of reviewing a State's social and 
economic leg1 ion. appellees contend that education ® 
is distinguishable n other service~ a"nd benefits pr~~ I - . 
vided by the State bee "'e iJ bears a peculiarly clos~ 
relationship to other ri~ht corded protection under 
the Constitution. / Specifically. the 'nsist that educa-
tion is a fm1,.damental personal right because it is essen-
tial to effective exercise of First Amendment freed 
an to intelligent.. .utilization. of tho right-to Tin 
asserting a nexus between speech and education, appellees 1 
urge that the right to speak is meaningless unless the 
speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts intelli-
gently and persuasively. The "marketplace of ideas" 
is an empty forum for those lacking basic communicative ~ ~~ H...cJ-
tools. Likewise, ~the corollary rigllt to receive in forma- 0 
tion 77 becomes little more than a hollow privilege when 
the recipie11t has not been taught to read, assimilate and 
utilize available knowledge. -------.._ 
75 In Mosley the Comt ~trurk down a Chieal{o nntipirkrting 
ordinance whic·h rxempted labor picketin~ l'rom it,; prohibitions. 
The ordinance w~ts held im·alid under 1 he Equal Protee1 ion Clan~c 
aftrr subjec1inl{ it to enref11l ~crntiny and finding that 1he ordin:m!'e 
was not narrow]~· drawn. The ~trirtcr standard of l'f'\·irw wa~ nppro-
priately appliC'cl Hillr<' the orclinmH'(' \\'as one "afTrrt ing Fir~t An•<·ml-
rnC'nt intNc~t s." !d .. at 101. 
76 Skinner applird the ~tandard of rlo~c srrutin~· to a ~tntr law 
J1f'rmit ting forcrd stc•riliznt ion of "habitual criminal~." TmpliC'it in 
t hr Court's opinion iH t hr n•<·o~nition t h:1 t t hr right ol' Jll'O(·n•a t ion 
is among thr right~ of prr~onal priYar.\· prolrrtrd undPr 1hr Consti-
tution. Scr Roe\'. Wade.- U.S.-.- (197:~). -
•• SL'<', e. g .. Red Lion Broadm~tin(! Co. v. FCC'. 39.'i U. S. :367. 
390 (HJG9); Stanley \'. Georoia. 394 U. S. 557, 56-~ (1960); Lamont 
v. Postmaster General, 3Rl U.S. 301 (19G5). 
of course 
Education, i##IJJ#IIIII#II~IIdl, is not among the 
~~~~~~#jil#lijilitll#jll61did 
rights ana lien r·ss afforded explicit protection under 
our federal Constitution. And, as we have said, the undis-
puted importance of education wdill not alone cause this 
Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing 
a State's social and economic legislation. It is 
appellees' contention, however, that education is dis-
tinguishable from other services and benefits provided 
by the State because it bears a peculiarly close 
~~~ 
relationship to other rights ~~~~ accorded 
protection under the Constitution, Specifically, they 
insist that education is itself a fundamental personal 
right because it is essential to the effective exercise 
n 
of First AmetSdment freedoms and to intelligent utiliza-
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to be pursued by a people whose thoughts and beliefs 
are freed from governmental interference. But they are 
not values to be implement.ed by judicial intrusion into 
oth~rwise legitimate state activities. _ e. Yl f·, ~i11lo ( t 
Even if it were conceded that some lquantum of e u-
cation is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the 
meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication 
that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas 
provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit 
appellees' argument might have if a State's financing 
system occasioned an absolute denial of educational op-
portunities to any of its children, that argument provides 
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental 
rights where only relative differences in spending levels 
are involved and where-as is true in the present case-
no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to ,. 
provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the 
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of 
the rights of speech and of full participation in the 
political process. . ... __..-... 
Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees'i1exus 
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment.80 If so, under ap-
pellees' thesis, Dandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey 
8 0 Sec Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Educa-
tion, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971) ; Vieirn, supra, n. 68, 
at 622-623; Comment, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for 
a National Tenants' Association, 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173 
n. 61 (1969). 
. . 
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v. N ormet, supra, would no longer be good constitu-
tional law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-_ or 
tion is a fundamental rightrand have found those argu-
ments unpersuasive4 in tee f.)FQiJQ);)t QQJ~t~m\o. In one 
further respect \Ve find this a particularly inappropriate 
case in which to subject state action to strict judicial 
scrutiny. The present case, in ene most(basic sense, is 
significantly different from any of the cases in which 
6. }7 () t j, ~ ,_. 
the Court has applied strict scrutiny to state or federal 
legislation touching upon ~.mdanun~tat""hghts. Each or 
c,.un St1iiJ~ ICJrlll. l/ ~ 
p H.l +t:.r. 1-c:J 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," 
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of 
some; fundamental personal righ~ ~ee Skinner v. Okla-
7wma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S .. 
330, 338-343 ( 1972). ~ critical distinction between 
those cases and the one now before us lies in what Texas 
is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. 
JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses well the salient 
point: 81 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
81 Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge b~· registered voter::; 
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English 
literacy tests for voting . The law was suspended as 1 o rr ·idents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six ~·en r,; of ednra-
tion at an "American-flag" school in that countr~· even though 
thr language of inst ruction was other than Engli~h. This Court 
upheld the questioned proviHion ovrr the claim that it di~criminntcd 
ngainst those with a sixth grade education obt ainrd in 11011-English 
~;peaking schools other than the ones designatrd by the federal 
lrgislation. 
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vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] .... 
"[The federalla''" in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect -extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... wa.s 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all 
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take 
one step at a time. addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
tive mind .... '" Id., at 656-657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today-iucluding the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aiel-was implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality.82 Of course, every reform that benefits some 
8 2 Cf. Meyer Y. Nebraska. 263 U.S. il90 (1923): Picree \'.Society 
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (192.5): Har(Jrave v. Kicl.· , :n:~ F. Supp. 
944 (MD Fla. 1970), Yacntcd, 401 U. S. 476 (1971). 
® 
Rider A, p. 3;- Rodriguez 
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in 
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that this is not ® 
a case in which the challenged state action must be ~ubjected 
to the searching judicial scrutiny reserved for laws ~~~ ~(..~ i e... 
A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the 
Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports the 
applicatio~~i/traditional standarddof review, which 
requires only that the State's system be shown to bear 
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes . 
. 
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long 
•"' Sec Schi/b v. Kuebel, 404 U. 8. :357 (1971); McDonald -v. 
Board of Election Commissioners. :39-~ U. S. 802 (19()9). 
84 Srr, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Peunsylvania, 13-l U.S. 232 (1890); 
Cannicharl Y. Southem Coal Co., :301 U. S. 495, 50R-509 (1!);3i); 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959). 
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been recog11ized. . . . L T]he passage of time has 
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recogni-
tion of the large area of discretion which is 11eeded 
by a legislature in formulating sound tax poli-
cies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in 
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since 
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a 
familiarity with local conditions which this Court 
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality 
can be overcome only by the most explicit demon-
stration that a classification is hostile and oppres-
sive discrimination against particular persons and 
classes .... " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 
87-88 (1940). 
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,-
U. S. - (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 
U. S. 435, 445 (1940). 
Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to 
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the 
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are 
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the 
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether 
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.s" 
sG Those who urge that the pres0nt. system be invalidat0cl otfer 
liltle guidance as to what type of Rchool financing should r0place 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy, another area in which this Court's-
indeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience counsel's against premature interference with 
the informed judgments made at the state and local 
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public wel-
fare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intract-
able economic, social and even philosophical problems.'' 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very 
complexity of the problems of financing and manag-
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there 
will be more than one constitutionally permissible 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits 
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the 
it. The almost. inevitable result of rejection of the existing s~·stem,. 
however, would be statewide financing of all public education with 
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or 
expansion of sale's and income taxes. The authors of Private Wealth 
and Public Education, suwa, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alterna-
tive scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In simpleHt 
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particulnr rate of 
property taxation the district would receive a stated mnnbn of 
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies 
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier" 
districts that collect more than the stated amount, at any given 
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and again~t 
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators arc 
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and 
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory un-
derlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance, 
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some 
Refiections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 705-708 
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, .594-59() (1971); 
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A l\Iodel Legislative 
Rel:lponsc, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 ( 1971); 
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Ednration: The 
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Cbu~e, 1970 
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30. 
. .. 
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problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even 
the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts arc divided. Indeed. one of 
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenditures and the quality of education 811-
an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion dra,vn by the District 
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relation-,....... 
ship between cost and quality. is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
education.87 And the question of the proper relation-;. 
ship between state boards of education and local school 
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and 
degree of control, is now undergoing scarchi11g re-exami-
nation. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like 
problems of education is not likely to be devincd for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States in-
flexible COJJstitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
sn The qunlit~·-co~L ront ro\·crs~· has rcf'CiYcd eon.-<iclcr:ihlc a11cn-
1ion. Among the notable authoritiPs on both ~ide~ nrc thr follow-
ing: C. Jcnrks, Incqu:tlit~· (1972): C. Sillwrm:111. Cri~i~ in the 
Classroom (1970) : Ollirc of Educn tion, Equ:ilit r of Educa1 ion:d 
Opportunit~· (Hl6G) (The Colcmall Report): On Ecpwlit~· of Eduf'n-
t ional Opportnnit~· ( 1972) (}f oyJJihan & l\lo~tcllN Pck) : .1. (; u t ln·ic•, 
G. Klcindorkcr, H. LcYin. & T. Stout, School" and Incqu:ilit~· 
(1971); Prc"iclc·nt's Comm'u on Sc·hool FinancP, supra, n. S5: Sw:m-
son, The Cost-Qunlit)' Hrlation.,hip, in lOth N:11'l Conf. on School 
Finnncc, TIH' Ch:tllcngc of Change in School Finanf'c 151 (1967). 
~ 7 Src the rc~nlt~ of the TPx:ts Gowrnor'~ Commi1trc's ~in1P\Yidc 
~mw~· 011 tht> gonl~ of cdnc:1tion in that State. T Goycrnor's 
Committee Report, at li9-68. See nl~o Gold~tcin, suprn, n. :31' , 
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so vital to finding even part l solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping a reast of ever changing 
conditions. 
It must be remembered also t at every claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clau has implications for 
the relationship bet\Yeen national a 1cl state power under 
our federal system. Questions of f eralism are always 
inhercn t in the process of detcrminin 0 whether a State's _..-----.;a..:._ 
laws arc to be snhjccted to the-oomt ~H interest o 
~ r~~ While "[t]hc naintcnance of 
the principles of federalism is a foremo consideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent pr visions under 
which this Court examines state action,88 it would be 
difficult to imagine a case having a great r potential 
impact on our federal system than the one 1ow before 
us, in which we are urged to abrogate the stems of 
financing public education presently in exi tence in 
virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our co1 elusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is ar inap-
propriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. 1cse 
same considerations arc relevant to the determina 'on 
---..,.....;.;.;-._ 
whe er that system, with its conceded imperfections, ~ 
.supp.o.r:ted bra-reasom'tbl~&tio-Ral-~st It is to t 1is 
question that we next turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
<..v•·HI-,t~11wa~f,Ay I 
o~o- ~"e. 't-o /,~ 
Jv~ c.lc.c.i lh{feoJ. 
1-0 r•" Cll-lllt ' 1 v JC1'41~1~ 
Sr...~>uf,., 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the ~ of I IJ. 
~ 17\e--m~ 
-r.at.iona]ityto t-IM., (. ~ 1 t) .J I 
V".;\ I' rll f I! t hU1-, ·- flvre., 
~' Allied Stores of Ohio Y. Bott•ers, 35R U. S. 522, 532 (1959) 
(Mrc JuHTJCJo: BHEi'I'N'AN, concurring): Katzrnbarh Y. lllorgan, 3R+ 
U. S. 641, 661 (1965) (Mr. Ju~tiec Harlnn , di~dcnting). 
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Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from each source."0 The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.00 Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 20 teachers ;n one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 02../ 
vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children are also provided.9~ Additional funds 
are earmarked for current operating expenses and for 
student transportation"·' as well as for free textbooks.0 " 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation no and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
ards.07 As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted 
to the Edge,vood School District over the last three 
years,08 the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how-
•u In 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billion dollars for 
<'duration and a little over one billion came from the Miuimum 
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supm, n. 20, at 2. 
00 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13. 
n Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18. 
H2 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15. 
H ~ Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19. 
n4 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51. 
!J;; Tex. Educ. Code § 12.01. 
001'ex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5). 
07 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.301 et. seq. 
u~ See ante, at -. 
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ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
assure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.90 Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
tho market value for any category of property varies from 
its assessed value.100 The greatest interdistrict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri-
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupil-
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.' 01 
00 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
100 There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texas. 
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of 
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Gon·rnor'::; 
Committre Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, :Morgan & White, 
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16. 
101 Texas Re~earch League, supra, n. 20, at 18. A::; pre\·iolii;ly 
noted, text accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the 
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated 
inconclusively by the most thoughtful student::; of public education. 
While alL would agree that there is a correlation up to the point 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees claim that children in less affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results 
of pro1·iding the recognized e,-sent inb{iilC i~sue .. .; of greatrst dis-
agreement inelnde the effect on quality of pupil-tt'nchcr rnt io;; ancl 
of higher trachrr !'alar~· ;;chedulcs. The state funding in Texas 
is designrd to assure, on the avcrnge, one tead1er for e,·rr~· 2!'l 
student~. whic·h i~ considcrrd to be n favorable rntio b:-· most >;tnnd-
nrck Whether the minimum salar:-· of M,OOO per year is ~ufficent 
in Texa,- to attract qunlifiecl te:1elwr~ ma~· be more dehnt:1blc, de-
pending in major part upon the location of the >;ehool dis1Tict. Rut 
there appears to be little empiric:1l d:tta thnt i<nppnrti' the :1clvnn- / 
tngr of nn:v particular pnpil-trachrr ratio or that clocnmrnts the 
existence of n dependn ble correlnt ion betwern t hr lrvrl of pub 1{ 
oo teachrrs' sal:nies and the qnnlit)· of thrir rbi~"room in.· uc-
tion. An intractable problrrn in draling with trachrr~' i<nlari' i~ the 
abRc•nc·e. up to t hi.;; time, of s:Jtisf:lrt or~· terhniques fo .indgino· 
thrir abi[it~· or perfO!'ll'ance. ~hP I'Q>'lilt i.> 1J1.;rt nti1·rl\· few 
~ .. ~ .. ~·1~H "rhool ~.~·~tem1' ha 1·e rnrrit plan~ of fm~· kine!, with t nrhrr~' ~:darips 
~~ ~ incrensed ar'ross thr board in n "·n~· whirh cward/ the least 
deserving on the same bn~i~ as thr most clrsen·in;:!;. R:il:ll'irs nrr 
mnnlly rai~ecl automaticall~· on the basi~ of length of srryire ;lnd 
ncrording to predetermined "steps," extrncling owr 10-to-12 yc•ar 
prriocls. 
In making thr~e ohsrryations, we intrnd no criticism of existing ) 
prac t~ncl eNtninJ,· 1re im]lh· no opinion thnt tenrhrrs' F~nlnrif's I 
g<'nerall,· arc adeqnatr. A~ compared with other.~ of compnrahle l 
rclaeatiou there is r1·ery rrns011 to belirn; that terrrher~' 'alarirs 1--
genrmlly, stnrting from :111 undul~· low base, haw failed r1·en to 
kcrp abre;l~t of inAation. \Yr haw indudrd this commrntnr~· on 
pupil-tenrhrr ratio~ and snhlr~· lr1·els not to expres.o fm~· opinion 
with rpsprct to the Miequar~· of those in Texas ot· elsrwhrrr. lmt. 
mere!~· to indicatr that it i~ not at all clrar-in the opinion of some 
exprrts-t ha{ thr t ,,.o principal factors distingui~hing the schools in / 
the J)lorc affluent di::;tricts from those clsewhrrc does drmon~t rabl)· 
ncfnecessarily affect the qualit~· of the teaching. __..; 
) 
-rj I~ 
+h e ~es&~/f fh~-1-
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in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. We disagree. 
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as \Yell as 
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed 
in virtually every other State."'" The power to tax local 
property for educational purposes has been recognized 
in Texas at least since 1883.'":: When shifts in the dis-
tribution of population, accompanied by changes in local 
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial 
and industrial ce11ters, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
of the pioneering work of two New York educational re~ 
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a 
1 0 ~ Pre.;ideni 's Comm 'n on Srhool Finance, supra, n. S5, at 9. Fntil 
l'N'e ntl~· Hnw:1ii "·:1~ thC' onl~· Rt:1te th~1t m:tin1:JinC'd a plll'C'l~· stntC'-
I'nnckd eclur:liional pro~ram. In Hl0S, howC'YN, that StaiC' amended 
its C'cluration:d fimmr0 st:1t11t0 1o ])('rmit eountirs to coiiC'ct. !lcldi-
1 ional funds lornll~· and spend i ho . ;e nmounts on its srhook The 
rationale for thai rrrent legislnti1·e rhoieC' i ~ instrurti1·C' on the 
que~tion hd orC' thC' Court today: 
"Und0r C'Xistin~ Jaw, rotmties arC' prC'eluded fmm doing flnything 
in this ar0n, C'YC'll to spend thC'ir own fund~ if the~· so clC',;irC'. This 
rmTC'ctiw lC'gi,laiion is llt'~C'ntly nC'C'clC'd in order i0 nllnw ronnties 
1 o ~o a bow ~·nd bC'~'oncl the ~:Hate's st ancl:1rds flllCI proYiclC' C'clurn-
tion:ll fncilitiC',.; as good as 1hC' p00plr of ihr counti0s want :md 
arc willing to pny for. Allowing lora] communiti0s 1o ~o abo,·c 
and b0~·oncl C'stnblislwd minimums provic!C'cl for Owir pcopiC' rncour-
n~c~ the best l'ratnrC's of dC'moerntic go1·0rnmC'nt ." Hnw. SC'~s. Lnws, 
.\rt. 3S, § 1 (1908). 
HJ:. See tC'xt :trrompnn~·ing n. 7, S1t]JTa. 
10~ G. Stnt~'C'I' & R. Hni~, Financing of Bdu('ntion in the Stn1c of 
'\"cw York (1923). For a thoron~h nnalysiH of th0 ronirihution 
of thcsC' rdornwr~ nne! of thC' prior nne! suhsc!lliCnt history of edu-
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means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of local 
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
articulated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
.... .. ... .. ,. 1 
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these 
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every 
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large 
\ 
(...;vi... 
measure of participation and control Pf each district's 
1\ 
schools at the local level. 
Id. , at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dissent, agreea 
that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public 
support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance 
from an educational standpoint as well." Id., at ..=4..;..78;;;..;·--
The persistence of attachment to government at 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. Tn part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
1 0 " J . Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Fore\Y1rd by 
.James S. Coleman, at vii. 
' .,
71-1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 45 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the decisionmaking proc-
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches 
than does public education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, 
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely 
because it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted under other financing systems that resulted in 
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is 
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-,...... 
spect to expenditures for some districts than for others,107 
106 New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262,280, 311 (1932). 
__ 107 MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas 
syste1~ie-trratiumrl because the means it has selected to effectuate 
it interest in local aut.onomy fail to guarantee complete freedom of 
choice to every district. He places special emphasis on the statu-
tory 1wovision which e~tablislm; a maximum rate of $1.50 per $100 
valuation at which a local school district may tax for school main-
iemmce. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The maintenance rate in 
Edgewood when thit> case wa~ litigated in tho District Court was 
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the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 ( 1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge \'. Williams, 397 
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interests, while occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only 
where state action impin es on the exerci~ of fun~a.-_...J 
m~n~:lJrights must it be found to have chosen the least 
res nctive alternative. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U. S. 330, 343 (1972)' \It is also well to remember that 
even those districts t1lat have reduced ability to make 
free decisions with respect to how much they spend 
on education, still retain under the present system the 
prerogative to decide how available funds will be allo-
cated. They further enjoy the power to make numerous 
other decisions with respect to the operation of the 
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be-
lieving that other systems of school finance. which place 
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the 
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired 
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along 
with increased control of the purse strings at the state 
level will go increased control over local policies.' 08 
\j.5fi ])('f $100, h:m'l~' one-third of thr nllowahlr rntr. (Thr tr~x ato of $1.05 prr ~100. ~rr p. 7. infra. i~ thr CI'JURlizrd mtc for naintrna nco nnd for t hP rrt ir<'mPnt of bonds.) Apprll ers do not. 
nim that the rriling wr~!'nt !~ · bar~ d!',:irrd tftx incrmHrs in Edgr-
wood or in any other T rxns di~trirt. Tlwrefore. the eon~titution:tlity 
of thnt stntuor~r pro1·i~ion .i,: not hrforr u,: and mu~t nwait litigation 
in n rnse in which i1 i~ properl~· pre~rntecl. Cf. Ilargraur v. Kirk, 
313 F. Sn[Jp. 944 (l\1D Fl:t. 1970) , ntratcd, 401 F. S. 470 (1971). 
10 g This theme--that grrater ~tate rontrol ovrr funding will lead 
to greater state powrr with re.~pect to local educational progmms 
3 (,"+ (),~, "11~ 
I 
11 \( ~ (.1'16~) . 
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Appellees further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They see no justification for a system that allows, as 
they contend. the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. 
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going/ 
to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.10\) Nor 
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable wealth within any district may result from 
and policies-is a rcrmrcnt one in the literature on finnncing public 
cclucaiion. Sec. e. (1., Coleman, Thr Strugglr for Control of Educn-
tion, in Eduration nne! Social.Poliry: Lora! Control of Education 64, 
77-78 (Bowrrs rei. 1970); .J. Conant. Thr Child, The Pnrent, :mel 
The State 26 (1959) ("Unless a loc:1l community, through its school 
board, h[tS some control over the pur~c, there can be little real feel-
ing in the communit~r that Rrhools arc in fact local schools .... "); 
Ho\Yr, Anatomy of a Tievohtlion, in Sat. Rev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) 
("It is an axiom of Amcric:m politics that control and power follow 
money .... "); Hutchin~on, State-Administered Locally-Shrtred Taxes 
21 (1931) ("fS]tatc administration of taxation is the first step to-
w:ucls state control of the functions supported by these taxes .... "). 
IrrespectiYe of whether one regards such prospect s as dctrimentnl, 
or vrhcther he ngrers that the conscqucnec is inevitable, it certainly 
C[lnnot be doubted that there i~ a rational b::tsis for this concern on 
the p8rt. of parents, educalor::;, and !C'gislator;:;. 
109 This Court has never doubted the 11roprirty of maintaining 
politira 1 subdi1·isions within the Statrs :1ncl ha~ never found in the 
Equal Protcdion Clau~e any per se rule of "territorial uniformity." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 36(i U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 
230--231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954). Cf. 
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668 
(CAIO 1969). 
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any number of events, some of which loca1 residents 
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and 
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within 
a district by various actions-public and private- of its 
residents. 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then 
it must be equally impermissible in providing other nec-
essary services currently financed from local property 
taxes, including local police and fire protection , public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of vari-
ous kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total 
abrogation of local property taxation and control as 
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply 
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this 
Court to nullify statewide schemes for financing public 
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof 
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures between children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that 
::;)..witnont ratimHt1: basis. Its shortcomings have been 
,.. cknowledged by Texas, and it has persistently en-
~ 0 1 .. i" ~ 11 ~ ~1 M eavored-not without some success-to ameliorate the 
, ifferences in levels of expenditure without destroy-
+ Q he. r nvo Je..~...l 1 ing the acknowledged benefits of local participation. 
( The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, ill-
Qi t ~ (, 1-1171,.," fell·'/ 1 12,onceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
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Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69--70 (1913). One also must rememberr wneH w-eigh: 
ing- tfle- issl:le 6f f'~tti6nali~ that the system here chal-
lenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other State. 
In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for financ-
ing public education reflects what many educators for 
a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and edu-
cational authorities in 49 States, especially where the· 
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no- 1/V\ Jt.,.. 
O
here yet adopted. The constitutional test is whether p..,.. (J tl! c. 
here is a Fa.-tiruual baiilii f81" the challenged state action\ 
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly ~ this test.. \... - -. --\--f-:-v-L t 1 ",_, 
I . f-G.,IIW\0,. lv ... h~ r.., 
IV S vr-v, vc.s ( 1 
~ ~ I h 1'11 ,d (t c,/· C:. 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on 
the District Court opinion in this case and on its Cali-
fornia predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 
P. 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appro-
priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as pro-
viding a constitutional mandate for major state legislative 
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as 
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have 
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban 
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neu-
-nu,~~ 
v ' (?"'I ~ f f' ~ ----'--- \ -
v. s. -J - ( ,, 7.1) 
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trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.110 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is begin-
ning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumed.'" There is, 
110 "Fisrnl neutr:tlity" is thr name ~i1·en by Profe>'sors Coons, Clune, 
and Sug:mn:m to their the,:is that "thr CJUalit~· of public· rdueation 
may not be a function of 11·rnlth othrr than the wraith or thr ~tate 
as a whole." .T. Coons, \V. Clunr &. S. Sugarman, supra. n. 1:3, at 2. 
Thrir· thoughtful and imagin:divr work pavrcl tiH· wn~· for the 
>mits, including thr prrsent one, att:1cking the ~rhool fin:m<'c :-;~·~trm. 
Imleed, the Distri~'t Court approYed the :1ut hors' the"i~ yerbntim. 
;337 F. Supp., :1t 2~5. Thr author~ ha1·e oftrn cautioned thrir fmp-
]Jortcr.~, howrver. ngainst speculating thnt ' ·fisr:ll neutralit~ · " would 
hr a panacea for the poor or for rari:tl minorit ir~. Ibid.; Coons, 
C'lune & Sugnrman, A Fir,;t Apprai8al of Sernmo, 3 Y:d<' Hr,·. of 
L. & Roc. Action 111, 114-115 (Hl71). 
111 An~· alternntiYe that providf>!' ~ignific:tntly more money for 
an~· major percrntage of thr Stntr's srhools iR certnin to rn<•flunter 
political barrierR. An~· surh new plnn would rr(Juirr :1ddit ional 
re8ources from some ~ourre: fund:; will either h:l\r to lw taken 
awny from more pro~Jwrou~ diHtrirt~ or 11('\1' rrvrnuc .oourer~ will 
need to be tapped. ThP formrr altematin' is not likrl~· to br ~UP:-­
portrd by those districts thnt haYe had thr good fortune to 
havr drYcloprd attmrtiw rduration fnrilities and pro.grams. The 
l:ttter altrrnnti1·r, i. 1'.. nrw t:untion, nppr:m.; to he no 
more palatablr politirull~·. It has bern ral!'ulnted thnt $2.4 
billion of additional Rrhool fnnd.-; would br requirrd to bring 
all Trxas di:;trirts up to 1 hr prr~ent levrl of expenditure in all 
but the wrnlthiest di~trirt~-nn nmount morr than double 1 h:Lt 
C'urrently being Hpenl in Texns on public ednration (Tex<ls Rr:-enrrh 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in 
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, \vhose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educatioual expenditure in Texas were relied on by the 
District Court,1l:! has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance.''" That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.114 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-/ 
tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools.11 " Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
Lea~ue, supra, n. 20, nt 16-lR. At a tirnr wllC'n nrnr!Y m·erv State· 
and lo('ality is suffrrinp; from fiscal nnclrrnonrishment, aud with de-
mands for ~ervirr;:; of all kinds burgeoning and with wear~' taxpayers 
already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to 
f!Uestion whether a decision of this Court nullif~·ing present state 
taxing syRtems would result in doubling public fund~ committed 
to education. An amicus curiae brief filed on behnl f of a !most 30 
States, focusing on these practiral ronse(]nenres, claims with some 
justification that "cnch of the 11ndcr;:ignrd st11tes ... would suffer 
severe finanrinl stringency." Brief of Amir-i Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, at 2 (filed Att. Gen. of Mel. , et al.). 
ll 2 See nn. 38 and 63, supra. 
113 Select Comm. on Ef!ual Educational Opportunity, Inequities 
in School Finance (1972) (Monograph prep:urd b~· Profrssor Berke). 
114 Sec al8o U.S. Office of Eduration, Finanrrs of Large City School 
S)·stem;;: A Comparative Analy8i~ (1972) (HEvV Publie:tlion). 
11 " Sre Notr, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Deci-
sions: On Winning Battlr;:; and Lo~ing \Yar:;, 81 Yale L. J. 1303 
(1972); see text aecompan~·ing n. 45, wupm. 
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clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
assessable property.llG 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu-
tional function restrain us from undertaking through the 
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state 
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity 
and vital concern to the States and localities. That 
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the vari-
ous States, and we do no violence to the values of fed-
eralism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is 
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on 
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax 
systems which may well have relied too long and too 
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly inno-
vative new thinking as to public education, its methods 
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level 
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These 
matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who 
already have contributed much by their challenges. But 
the ultimate solutions much come from the lawmakers 
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect 
them. 
116 Sec Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 525; C. Jencks, supra, n. 
85, at 27. ,J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugnrmrm, supra, n. 13, 
at 355-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example, 
"59% of minority students liYe in districts aboYo the median 
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar Count~· b~' far the 
largest district-tho San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict-is above the local average in both thr amount of taxable 
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yrt 72% of its 
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1957-1958 it spent only 
a very few dollars lcsR per pupil than tho North Enst and North 
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% nnd 18% 
Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berko, Carnavale, 
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 573. 
~4-r~·. ,.,. /L., /.J.-,2~ ..z..;: .2Y:, _z~~ ..29-33, .3S"~.3? 
.;>?_ ~ #2, ¢~ ~t - ¥F 5'/, -.5~. 
~ I ; ~ 
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This sUit, attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education, was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec~ 
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school olistrict in San Antonio, Texas. L 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants 1 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of these complainants attend publtc school. 
.One family's children are enrolled in privale school "because of the 
condit10n of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
tmt.'' Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
1 The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name thJS 
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area whiCh were originally named as party defendants. 
After a pretnal conference, the District Court Issued an order dis-
Imssmg the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San 
Antomo Independent School District has joined m the plamtiffs' 
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an 
(Jm?ru.s r:unae bnef m support of that position in this Conrt .. 
2 f'A. ~ A."JT< >Nil> SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGlYEZ 
of Educatiou, the ~tate Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The case 
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court 
was jmpaneled in January 1969.3 In December 1971 4 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas ·school finance system unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 5 The·· State appealed and we noted prob-
able j'urisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu~ 
tiona] questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the decision 
of the District Court 
I 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas1 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools.6 Early in its history, 
Texas adopted a dual approach to the financing of its 
:< A three-judg<· court waH properly convenrd and there arr no 
till<'StlOns a:; to the Dt:-;tnct Court':; junsdiction or the dtrcrt appeaJ-
abiltty of tts judgment 2H U S. C. §§ 2281, 1253. 
~ Th<> tnal was drlayed for two yrars to permtt exteJJ~Ive prctnal 
discovery and to allow rompletton of a pcndmg; Texas Jrgislative 
investigation concerning the nerd for rrform of tls puhlic school 
finance system. Rodnguez \. 8an Antonio lnd. School Dist., 3:37 
F. Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Trx. 1971) 
"337 F. Supp. 280. Thr Dtstnct Court stayed tts mancbtr for 
two years to provide TPxas an opportunity to remedy the meqmties 
found in Its finanrmg program. Thr court, howeyer, rrtmncd junH-
diction to fasht.on its own remrdtal orrl.rr 1f thr State failrd to offer 
an acccptahlr plan. !d ., at :21\(i 
.; Trx. Consl., Art. X, § I 
'' A genrral diffu~wn of kllowledgC' l>elll!l; r~srntt:~l to the prrservatwn 
of the rights and liberties of the peoplr 1t shall be the duty of the 
LPgislature of thts State to makE> ~uitable prov1;;ion for the support 
1md mamtenance of pubhr Kehool ~ ' 
!d., Art. X,§~ . 
"The Legtslaturr shall a::, (•arly as prarttrablP C'stabltsh frer school~ 
throughout the State, and ;;hall fur111~h means for thrir support, by 
1 axat 1011 on propertv, 
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildiugs" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools.'' 7 Such local funds as were 
r,aised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.8 Tho Permanent School Fund, established i11 
1854,!! was endowed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.' 0 The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes," served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program proviclin12: frt'e textbooks throughout 
thE' State.'~ 
Until recent tunes Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.'~ Sizable differcncC's 
7 Tex. ConsL. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as nmE'nrlrd. Aug. 14. 1SS3 
x Tex. Const., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5. 
n Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. See Tex. Const., Ari. 7, §§ 1, '2 
(interpretive commentaries) ; I Report of Govrrnor's CommittE'e on 
Public School Education, The Challrnp;e and t hr C'hatlC'P 27 ( 19fi9) 
(herE'maftrr Governor's CommittE'e RE'port) 
10 TE'x. Const., Art. 7, § 5 (seE' also the mterprrt1vr commE'ntarv). 
V Governor'>; Committee Report, at 11- 1'2. 
, 11 The vanous sources of revenue for t lw Ava tlable School Fund 
are cataloged m Texas State Bd. of Educ. TexaR Statrwtdc School 
Adequacy Snrvry 7-15 (1938) 
12 Tex. Const., Art. 7, § 3, a~ amendrd, Nov f), 191S (srr inter-
pretivr commentary) 
13 I Govc•rnor's Comm1tter Report, at :~5; TrxaH State Bd. ol' 
Educ., :>u.pra, n. 11, at 5-7 . .T. Coon,;. W CltiiH', S. Sugarman, 
-
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
'shifts became more pronounced. 11 The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education. 1r' 
In due time it became apparent to those conccmed 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities. 1<l Prior to 1939 the A vallable 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child. 17 Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early Hl40's,'b 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1946. 1" 
Private Wealth and Public Educatwn 49 (1970) , E. Cubbcrley, 
School Funds and Their Apportwnment 21-27 (1905). 
14 By 1940 one-half of the State's populatwn was r!uHterecl in ns 
metropolitan centers. I Governor's Committee Report, at 35. 
15 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, To Have What Wr l\Iu~t (1948) . 
16 R. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Bills 11-12 (1950): Texas Bel . of 
Ecluc., supra, n. 11. 
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. lt should be noted that during this 
period the median per pupil expe~1dit ure for all schools w1t h an 
enrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year 
During this same period a survey conducted by the State Board 
of Education concluded that "in Texas the best educatwnal advan-
tages offered by the State at present may be· had for the mcdwn 
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average dmly attendance." 
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 56 
18 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Se;,;s. 1ml0, at :l74 
.($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Law::; of Texas, 41\th Lrgis, 
Reg. Sess. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per student) 
19 General & Spec. Laws of Trxns. 49th Lcg1s . Hf:'g. Sc~~ . 1045:· 
c. 153, at 7.5. 
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee'R 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program.20 It is this Program that accounts 
today for approximately half of the total educational 
expenditures in Texas!' 
The Program calls for state and local co11tnbutwns 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salariefl, 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The 8tate. 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 80o/o of the Program and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20%. The districts' share-known as the Local Fund 
Assignment-is apportioned among the school districts 
pursuant to a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment 1s first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a corn-
2° For a complete history of thr adoption in Tc·xas of a founda-
tion program, see R. Stills, supra, n. 16. SPr alHo V Go,·crnor',_, 
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research LPagur, Public School 
Finance Problems m Texas 9 (Intenm Report 1972) 
21 For the 1970-1971 school year tins state aid program accounted 
for 4 .0% of all public school funds. Local taxatwn contributru 
41.1% and 10.9% was provided 10 federal fund~ . TrxaH Rrsrarrh 
League, supra, n. 20, at 9. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
in the State.22 Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county. 2 " The 
district then finances its share of the Assignment out of 
its revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex formulation was two-fold. 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children 2 ' 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.25 Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for educ'ation-from State as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48. 
23 At present there are 1,161 school districts m Texas. Texas HE--
search League, supra, n. 20, at 12. 
24 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee fou!lcl that some Hehool 
districts were not levying any local tax to support rdneation. 
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 16 . The Texas State 
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and 
independPnt school districts were lrvying no local property tax Ill 
1935-1936. TPxas State Bd. of Educ., supra n. 11 , at 39-42 
25 Gilmer-Aiken CommitteE'. supra, n. 15, 11t 15 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
5007a .26 In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising pet 
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 2 H Minimum 
teacher salaries-by far the largest single item in any 
school's budget--have increased from $2,400 to $6,000 
over the last 20 years. 2 " 
To illustrate the manner in which the dual system of 
school finance operates, and to indicate fairly the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
may be compared with another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict is one of seven public school districts in the metropol-
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6% 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960--the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest.30 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
26 I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
~7 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at "2. 
~In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pup1l 
expenditure for all current operating expenses mcreased from $206 
to $493. In that same period capital expenditures mcreasrd from 
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Comm1lice Report, at 53-54 
'29 III Governor's Commiitec Report , at 113-146; Berkr, Carna-
vale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Case: A Wrong 
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972) 
30 Tho family income fi11:ures are based on 1960 census Rtat 1st irs. 
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tributed $26 to the education of each child for the 1967~ 
1968 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.:n Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil. 32 
Throughout this litigation Edgewood has been con-
trasted with the Alamo Heights Independent School 
District, the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo, having only 18% Mexican-Americans 
and less than 1 'fo Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49,000 33 and the median family incomP 
31 The Available School Fund, technically, provides a second 
source of state money. That Fund has continued as in ~·ears past 
(see text accompanying nn. 16-19, supra) to distnbute uniform 
per pupil grants to every district in the State. ln 1968 this Fund 
allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available ~chool 
Fund contribution is always subtracted from a distnct 's t'ntitlc-
ment under the Foundation Program, it plays no Significant rolt' 
in educational finance today. 
32 While federal assistance has an amelwrating efTect on the differ-
ence in school budgets between wealthy and poor dist nets, the 
District Court rejected an argument made by tht' State in that 
court that it should consider the effect of the federal grant m 
assessing the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. Tht> State 
has not renewed that contention here. 
sa A map of Bexar County included m the record shows that 
Edgewood and Alamo Heights arc among the smallest di;;tricts m 
the county and are of approximatt>ly equal s1ze. Yet, a;; the fip;nres 
above indicate, Edgewood's student populatiOn 1s mort> than four 
times that of Alamo Heights. This factor obviously accounts for 
a significant percentage of the differences bet ween the two diHt nctb 
in per pupil property values and expenditurrs. If Alnmo He1ght:-; 
had as many students to educate as Edgewood dot's (22 ,000) 1ts per 
pupil assessed property value would be approximately Sll,lOO rather 
than $(9,000, and its per pupil expenditures would therrfore havr, 
been considerably lowPr 
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
its contribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to spend $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid,34 more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. This constituted a 62% increase over 
the three-year period since 1967-1968. Indeed, statr 
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget-from local, state, and federal sources. 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupiP5 Tht>sf' 
34 The figurPs quoted above vary slightly from thosf' utiJrzrd rn 
the District Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., at 7 2. These tnviaf 
differences are apparently a product of that court's reliancr on 
slightly different statistical data than we have rclird upon 
35 Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greatrr' 
contributions to both school districts over the last. several years, rt. 
is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The 
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grant~ 
is due to the emphasis in the State's allocation formula on the 
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Hrgher salanes aw 
guaranteed to teachers having more years of experience and poR·· 
sessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo He1ghts, whJCh 
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with advanced 
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Trxa~ 
Program is not unlike that presently in existence m a number of 
other States. C. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at, 
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to distncts thar, 
already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formula~ have been 
described as "anti-equalizing.'' Ibid. The formula, however, H.i 
anti-equalizing only if viewed m absolute terms The perccntagf' 
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth, 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 209-'o 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
grant.36 It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
degrees throughout the State,38 still exist. And it was 
disparity betwee;n the two Texas distrJCts is diminished ub~tantially 
by State aid. Alamo Heights derived in 196'7-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State md 
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approxi-
mately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice 
as much money to spend per pupil from its combied State and local 
resources. 
36 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13. 
37 The Economic Index, which determines each county'~ share uf' 
the total Local Fund Assignment, is based on a romplrx formula 
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was JnRtituted. 
See text. at pp. --- supra. It has frequently been suggested 
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered m several respects 
to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying abihty, 
especially of urban schools. V Governor's Committee Report, at 
48; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, supra, n. 29 at 680-681 
38 The District Court relied on the findings ]Jresented in an 
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His l:lampling 
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a direct rorrelat 1011 
between the amount of a district's taxable property and its level 
of per pupil expenditure. His study also found a direct correlatiol') 
between a district's median family income and per pupil expendi~ 
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
!d., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter-
fere with constitutionally fundamental rights 39 or that 
involve suspect classifications.40 If, as previous decisions I 
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's sys-
tem is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives, and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, 41 the Texas 
financing system- and its counterparts in virtually every 
other State- will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 42 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
39 E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 
92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. 
Thompson) 394 U.S. 619 (1969). 
40 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 
(1964). 
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and the 
cases collected therein. 
42 Appellants' Brief, at 11. 
43 lbid. 
44 Tr. of Oral Arg., at 3. 
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis." 
This, then, establi~hes the framework for our analysis. 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financ-
ing public education operates to the disadvantage of 
some suspect classification or impinges upon a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. 
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be af-
firmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined 
to determine whether it rationally furthers some legiti-
mate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not 
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and 
appellate processes,45 and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote:w Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education/7 that there is a 
45 E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. CaLi-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
46 Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1964); McDonald v. 
Bd. of Elections, 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. / 
134 (1972); Goosby v. Osser,- U.S.- (197a) . 
47 See cases cited in text, at-, infra. 
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the 
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing laws in other 
States,' 8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather 
than focusing on the unique features of the alleged dis-
crimination, the courts in these cases have virtually as-
sumed their findings of a suspect classification through 
a simplistic two-step process of analysis: since, under the 
traditional systems of financing public schools, some 
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other 
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the 
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a dif-
ference for purposes of consideration under the Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be 
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, 
and whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. 
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classi-
fications they create are subjected to strict judicia 
' 8 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 , 5 Cal. 
ild 5 4 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield , 334 F. Supp. 870 (Minn . 
1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 
(1972), Milliken v. Green, No. 54,809 (Mich. S C., .Jan.-, 197:3) . 
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scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must 
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court 
below. 
The case comes to us with no definitive description of 
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. 
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of ap-
pellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argu-
ment suggests, however, at least three ways in which 
the discrimination claimed here might be described. 
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as 
discriminatory ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes 
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who 
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 40 or 
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others/0 
or ( 3) against all those who, irrespective of their per-
sonal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer 
school districts. 51 Our task must be to ascertain whether. 
49 In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a class 
composed of persons who are "poor" and who reside in school dis-
tricts having a "low value of property." Third Amrnded Complaint, 
App., at 14. Yet appellees have not drfined the term "poor" with 
rrference to any absolute or functional level of imprcunity. Ser 
text infr-a, at -. See also Appellees' Brief. at 1, 3: Tr. of Oral 
Arg., at 20-21. 
~0 Appellees' proof at trial focused on comparative differences in 
family incomes between residents of wealthy and poor districts. They 
endravored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct correlation 
between personal family income and educational expenditures. See 
text infra, at -. The District Court may have been relying on 
this notion of relative discrimination ba;;ed on family wealth. Citing 
appellees' statistical proof, thr court emphasized that "those dis-· 
ricts most rich in property also have the highest median income . . . 
while the poor property districts are poor in income .... " ~:37 F. 
Supp .. at 282 
5 ' At oral argument and in their brief, appellees sugge~t that 
description of the personal status of the residents in districts that 
spend less on education is not critical to their case. In their v1ew, 
the Texas system is 1mpermiss1bly discnminatory even if relatively 
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Bncf, at 43-44; 
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in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate 
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the 
resulting classification scheme may be regarded as sus-
pect. It is, after all, the first function of courts, when 
asked to invoke the Equal Protection Clause, to cxaminf' 
the classifications drawn by state laws. 
The several precedents of this Court relied upon I 
by appellees and the court below provide the proper 
starting point. The individuals or groups of individ-
uals who constituted the class discriminated against in 
those cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny,62 the Court in-
validated state laws that prevented indigent criminal 
defendants from acquiring a transcript, or an adequate 
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigency, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation 
would have been shown if the State had provided some 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20--21. There are mdicatwns m the District 
Court opinion that it adopted this theory of district discriminatiOn . 
The opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial status 
of districts and early in the opinion it describes appellees' class atl 
being composed of "all .. . children throughout Texas who live in 
school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp., at 2 2 
62 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971) ; Williams v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 
U. S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967); Long v 
J)istrict Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) ; Draper v. Washington, 
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357 
fl . s. 214 (1958). 
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"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner 
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing~ 
ton, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison 
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
( 1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay 
for counsel from their own resources and who had no 
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides 
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for 
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not 
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative dif-
ferences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less 
wealthy. 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal-
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be-
cause of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the dis-
advantaged class was composed only of persons who 
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those 
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively less money on 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and l 
often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in 
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial dis-
cretion rather than by constitutional mandate. 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for 
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying fact$ 
found in the previous cases were present there. The size 
of the fee , often running into the thousands of dollars. 
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effectively singled out all potential candidates who were 
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" 
(ld., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
denial of a position on the primary ballot. 
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the 
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance system-
discrimination against a class of definably "poor'' per-
sons-might arguably meet the criteria established in 
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, 
demonstr~~s that neither of the two distinguishing char-
acteristics ~ of wealth classifications can be found here. 
First, in support of their charge that the system dis-
criminates against the "poor," appellees have made no 
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clus-
tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Connecticut." "3 Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," 51 
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts. 5:; 
53 Note, A .Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Derision~: On 
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L . .J. 1303, 1:~28-1:~29 
(1972). 
51 /d ., at 1324, n. 102. 
55 !d., at 1328. 
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Whether the same findings would be discovered in Texas 
is not known but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it,56 a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
ment is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal J 
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages."7 Nor, indeed, in view of thE' 
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except 
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the 
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" 
education for all children in the State. By assur-
ing teachers, books, transportation and operating funds, 
56 Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth discriminatiOn is 
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies 
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, there-
fore, the difference in quality between two schools can be deter-
mined simplistically by looking at the difference in per pupil expcnd1- / 
ture::; . This is a matter of considerable dispute among educators and 
rommentators. See nn. 86 and 101 , infra. 
( 
~7 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); Mayer v. 
Ctty of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington, 
:172 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douglas v. C'alifurnia, 372 {T 8 
;~f,;{, :157 (196:~). 
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, 
~or the welfare of the State as a whole, that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu-
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.~" 58 The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled 
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every 
school district an adequate education." 59 No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional 
terms.60 
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court J 
may have embraced a seGond or third approach, the 
fiB Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 13 (emphasis added) . 
Indeed, even though local funding has long been a significant aspect 
of educational funding, the State always has viewed providing an 
acceptable education as one of its primary functions . See Texas 
State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 1, 7. 
59 Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1. 
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, how-
ever, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would 
be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary education were 
made available by the State only to those who are able to pay a 
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined 
class of "poor" people-definable in terms of their inability to pay 
the prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from re-
ceiving an education. That case would present a far more com-
pelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case 
before us today. After aU, Texas has undertaken to do a good 
deal more than provide a~ education to those who can afford it. 
It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base educatJOn 
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate 
by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities 
between local tax resources. 
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second of which might be characterized as a theory of 
relative or comparative discrimination based on family 
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla-
tion exists between the wealth of families within each 
district and the expenditures therein for education. That 
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower 
the dollar amount of education received by the family's 
children. 
The principal evidence adduced in support of this 
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub-
mitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer-
sity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The Dis-
trict Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and 
apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, 
noted, first, a direct correlation between the wealth of 
school districts, measured in terms of assessable prop-
erty per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. 
Second, the court found a direct correlation between dis-
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. 
Supp. , at 282, n. 3. 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then 
it might be argued that expenditures on education-
equated by appellees to the quality of education-are 
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative 
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered 
questions, including whether a bare direct correlation or 
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro-
vide a basis for concluding the financing system is de-
rn Also, it should be recognized that median income ~tatistic~ 
may not define with any precision the status of individual families 
w1thin any given districts. A more dependable showing of com-
parative wealth discrimination would examine factors such as th(' 
average income, the mode, and the concentratiOn of poor famil1es 1Il 
unv rlJ~trict tn addition to t.he med1an mcomr. 
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the 
comparatively poor,62 and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
accorded "suspect" classifications. These questions need 
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' 
proof fails to support their allegations or the District 
Court's conclusions, 
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His 
findings, set out in the margin, 63 show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96 
districts comprising almost 90<fo of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most money on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest median 
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the con-
ceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, 
'62 Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,547-549 (1972). 
63 Market Value of Median Family State & Local 
Taxable Property Income Expenditures 
Per Pupil in 1960 Per Pupil 
Above $100,000 $5,900 $815 
( 10 districts) 
$100,000-$50,000 $4,425 $544 
( 26 districts) 
$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 $483 
(30 districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 $462 
( 40 districts) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 $305 
( 4 clistnct~) 
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no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.64 
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the 
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth 
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by 
the evidence is between district property wealth and ex-
penditures, it may be argued that discrimination might 
be found without regard to the individual income char-
acteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect corre-
lation between district property wealth and expenditures 
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district 
except the district that has the most assessable wealth 
and spends the most on education. 6 ~ Alternatively, the 
class might be defined more restrictively to include chil-
dren in districts with assessable property which falls 
64 Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of 
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured 
in terms of assessable property and the collective wealth of families 
residing in the district measured in terms of median family 
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and 
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be 
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inver~e correlation: 
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per 
pupil, and districts with high as-·essed value per pupil have low 
income per pupil") ; Davies, The Challenge of Change in School 
Finance, in Nat'l Educational Assn., lOth Annual Conf. on School 
Finance (1967). Note, 81 Yale L. J. , supra, n. 53. Sec also Gold-
stein, supra, n. 38, at 522-527. 
6 ~ Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs in Serrano v. Priest, 
supra, defined the class they purported to represent: "Plaintiff 
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school 
pupils in California, except children in that school district . . , 
which ... affords the greatest educational opportunity of all Rchool 
district~ within California." 96 Cal. Rptr., at 604, 487 P. 2d, at 
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. See also Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 334 F . 
Supp., at R73 . 
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below the statewide averag~, or median, or below some· / 
other artificially . defined level. 
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks 
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, 
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happen to have 
less taxable wealth than other districts.66 The system 
of alleged discrimination and the class is defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class 
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majorita~;ian 
political process. 
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect clas-
sification. But appellees have not relied solely on the 
contention that wealth discrimination would constitute 
a sufficient basis for subjecting the State's system to 
rigorous judicial scrutiny.67 They also assert that the 
State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise 
of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior 
decisions of this Court require the application of the 
strict standard of judicial review. Graha·m v. Richard-
son, 403 U. S. 3135, 375-376 ( 1971) ; Kramer v . Union 
66 Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texns system 
as one resulting merely in discrimination between distncts per se 
since thiti Court has never questioned the State's power to draw 
reasonable distinctions between political subclivitiions within its 
borders. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
377 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S, 
420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). 
67 The Court has never heretofore held lhat the existence of 
de facto wealth discriminalion alone provides an adequate ground 
for invoking strict scrutiny. See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of 
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Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 ( 1969); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this question-
whether education is a fundamental right , in the sense 
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by 
the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention 
of courts and commentators in recent years.0 " 
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments." Id., at 493. What was said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may ·reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of education. Such an 
68 See Ser-rano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d. 5S4, 487 P. 2d 1241 {1971); 
Van Dusactz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp. 870 (Minn. 1971); Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J . Coons, 
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13 , at. 339-394; Gold-
stein, supra, n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Ex-
penditures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L, 
Rev. 617, 618-624 (1972); Note, Educational Financing & Equal 
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: 
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discriminatwn, 14 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972). 
·-
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opportunity where the State has undertaken to pro.:. 
vide it, is a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms." Ibid. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing 
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237, 
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); McCollum v. 
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate R. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907). 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
bf education both to the individual and to our society'' 
cannot be doubted.00 But the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Claus~. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting· from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging· upon the right of interstate 
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U. S. 618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority's view of the importance of the 
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
bne for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
69 807 F. Supp, at 280. 
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petence. But MR. JusTICE S·rEWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale of 
the Court's equal protection decisions: 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection ... .' To 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and gives. 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
MR. JusTICE STEWART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to close judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
r·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." I d,, at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
as a right of constitutional significance/0 and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc balancing of 
the relative importance of that right.71 
70 E. g., United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 (1966); Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,238 (1970) . 
71 After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), thPre could 
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for 
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Courl applied 
Lhe rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family 
grant provision under its AFDC program. A fpdrral district court 
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Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is 
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla .. 
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, 
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im-
posed on tenants in 1:1uits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita-
tions implicated "fundamental interests which are of par-
ticular importance to the poor," such as the "need for 
decent shelter" and the "right to retain peaceful pos-
session of one's home." Ibid. The Court's analysis is 
instructive : 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document a.ny constitutional guarantee to access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent. . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... m-
held the provision uncon;;titutional, applying a stricter standard 
of review. In the course of reversing the lower court the Court 
distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that in that rase 
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of interstate travel.'' Jd ., at 484 n. 16. 
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volv.es the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human beings," 72 provided no basis for departing from 
the settled mode of constitutional analysis of legislative 
classifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by 
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court is plain. It is not the province 
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights 
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence 
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether 
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, 
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guarnteed by the Con-· 
stitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); ·~ 
72 The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test despite its 
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970), that "welfare provides the means to obtain essential 
food, clothing, housing and medical care." 
73 In Eisenstadt the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute 
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that 
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection 
standard." !d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court 
recited thr proper form of rqual protection analysis: "if we were 
to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon funda-
mental freedoms under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 
(1965),] the statutory classification would have to be not merely 
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the 
achievement of a compelling state interest." Ibid . (emphasiS in 
original). 
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); 71 Mosley v. 
Police Department of the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 92 
('1972); 75 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942)/" 
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. And, 
as we have said, the undisputed importance of education 
will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual 
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legis-
lation. It is appellees' contention, however, that educa-
tion is distinguishable from other services and benefits 
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly closE' 
relationship to other rights ami liberties accorded pro-
tection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist 
74 Dunn fully canvasses this Court';; voting right~ case;; and ex-
plains that "this Court has made clear that a citizen ha;; a con-
stitutionally protected right to participate in elect ion;; on an equal 
basis with other citizens in thf' juri;;dictwn." lcl .. at 336 (rmpha~is 
supplied). Thr constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal 
treatment in the voting process can no longer br doubted evrn 
though, as thr Court noted in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U. S. 663 , 665 (1966), "the right to vote in ;;tate elections is 
nowhere expre~sly mentioned." See Oregon v. Mitchell , 400 U. S.l 
112, 138-144 (Mn. JusTICE DouoLAs), 241-242 (Mn . .JuwrrcE Bll.EN-
NAN); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 140-144 (1972); Kramer 
v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 625-630 (1969); 
Rey1wlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554-562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U. S. 368, 379-381 (1963). 
75 In Mosley the Court struck down a Chicago antipicketing 
ordinance which exempted labor picketing from its prohibitions. 
The ordinance was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause 
after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance 
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of review was appro-
priately applied since the ordinance was one "affecting First Amend-
ment interests." I d., at 101. 
76 Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a state law 
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminalR." Implic1t in 
the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation 
is among the rights of personal privacy protected under the Consti-
tution. See Roe v. Wade,- U. S. -,- (1973). 
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that education is itself a fundamental personal right be-~ 
cause it is essential to the effective exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and 
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-
ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his 
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "market-
place of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic 
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the 
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little 
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not 
been taught to read, assimilate and utilize available 
knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to the right to vote.78 Exercise of the franchise, it is con-
tended, cannot be divorced from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-
formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelli-
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded vigorous protection against un-
justifiable governmental interference with the individ-
ual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never 
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority 
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or 
77 See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont 
v. Postmaster General, 381 U~ S. 301 ( 1965) . 
78 Since the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally pro-
tected right, we assume that appellees' references to that right arr 
simply shorthand references to the constitutionally protectrd right 
to participatE' 011 an equal basis with other qualifird voters whenever 
the State has adopted an elective process for drtrrmming who will 
represent any segment of the State's population. Scr 11. 74, supra. 
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the most informed electoral choice. That these may be 
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and 
of a representative form of government is not to be 
doubted.79 These are indeed goals to be pursued by a 
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from govern-
mental interference. But they are not values to be 
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legiti-
mate state activities. 
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan- { 
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequi-
site to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no 
indication that the present levels of educational expendi-
ture in Texas provide an education that falls short. 
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a 
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of 
educational opportunities to any of its children, that 
argument provides no basis for finding an interference 
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in 
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the 
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity 
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process. 
79 The States have often pursued their entirely legitimat e mterrst 
in assuring "intelligent exercise of the franchise," Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 654-655 (1966), through such dm·iccs a;; 
literacy tests and age restrictions on the right to votr. Sre ibid.; 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). And, where those rr~ tri c­
tions have been found to promote intelligent use of thr ballot without 
discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previously 
deprived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has upheld 
their use. Compare Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 
45 (1959) , with 0Tegon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S., at 133 (Mr .. Just icC" 
Black), 144-147 (MR. JusTICE DouGLo\S), 216-217 (Mr. Justice 
Harlan) , 231-236 (MR. JusTICE BRENNAN), 282-284 (MR. Jusncg 
STEWART), and Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), 
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Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
· behefits of the First Amendment.80 If so, under ap-. 
pellees' thesis, FJandridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey 
v. N ormet, supri, would no longer be good constitu-
. tiona! law. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right or liberty and have found 
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect 
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which 
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The 
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly dif-
ferent from any of the cases in which the Court has 
applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation 
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," 
"infringed," or "interferred" with the free exercise of 
some such fundamental personal right or liberty. Sec 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 536 (1942); Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U. S. 330, 338-343 (1972). A critical distinc-
tion between those cases and the one now before us lies 
in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to edu-
cation. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, writing for the Court 
80 See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Educa-
tion, 72 Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389-1390 (1971); Vieira, supra, n. 68, 
at 622-623; Commrnt, Tenant Intere~t Represrnt at ion : Proposal for 
a National Tenants' A::;sociation, 47 Trx. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173 
n. 61 (1969) . 
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in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses 
well the salient point: 81 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] . ... 
"[Tho federal law in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights ... is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all 
evils at the same time,' and that 'reforms may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
81 Katzen bach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters 
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English 
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of educa-
tion at an "American-flag" school in that country even though 
the language of instruction was other than English. Th1s Court 
upheld the questioned provision over the claim that it discriminated 
agamst those with a si}..'th grade education obtained in non-English 
speaking schools other than the ones designated by the federal 
legislation. 
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tive mind .... ' " I d., at 656-657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid-was implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality.8 2 Of course, every reform that benefits some 
more than others may be criticized for what it fails 
to accomplish. .But we think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
~ormatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's 
efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the J 
Constitution.83 
c 
It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in 
accord with the prior decisions of this Court, and that 
this is not a case in which the challenged state action 
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny re-
served for laws that. create suspect classifications or 
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. 
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the 
jnappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century 
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Pro-
tection Qlause affirmatively supports the application of 
the traditional standard of review, which requires only 
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case 
~ 2 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society 
uf Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Kick , 313 F. Supp. 
944 (MD Fla. 1970) , vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) . 
. 83 See Schiib v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; McDonald v, 
Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U. S. 802 (1969) . 
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represents far more than a challenge to the manner in: 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn 
the State's judgment in conferring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures."' This Court has 
often admonished against such interferences with the 
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause: 
"The broad discretion as to .classification possessed 
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long 
been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has 
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recogni-
tion of the large area of discretion which is needed 
by a legislature in formulating sound tax poli-
cies. . . . It has ... been pointed out that in 
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since 
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a 
familiarity with local conditions which this Court 
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality 
can be overcome only by the most explicit demon-
stration that a classification is hostile and oppres-
sive discrimination against particular persons and 
classes .... " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 
87-88 (1940). 
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., -
U. S. - (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 
U. S. 435, 445 (1940). 
84 See, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1 90) ;, 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 508-509 (1937); 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959) . 
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Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to I 
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the 
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are 
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the 
present system or to throw the property tax out altogether 
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme o£ 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.8 5 
85 Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer 
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace 
it. The almost inevitable result of rejection of the existing system, 
however, would be statewide financing of all public education with 
funds derived from taxation of property or from the adoption or 
expansion of sales and income taxes. The authors of Private Wealth 
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alterna-
tive scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In sunplest 
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particular rate of 
property taxation the district would receive a stated number of 
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies 
to "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the' "wealthier" 
districts that collect more than the stated amount at any given 
rate. This is not the place to weigh the arguments for and against 
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators are 
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and 
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory un-
derlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance, 
Schools, People & Money 33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some 
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 J. Urban L. 701, 706-708 
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-596 (1971) ; 
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative 
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971) ; 
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of· 
educational policy, another area in which this Court's-
indeed any court's-lack of specialized knowledge and 
experience counsel's against premature interference with 
the informed judgments made at the state and local 
levels. Education, perhaps even more than public wel- · 
fare assistance programs, presents a myraid of "intract-
able economic, social and even philosophical problems." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very . 
complexity of the problems of financing and manag-. 
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there 
will be more than one constitutionally permissible . 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits 
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the 
problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even 
the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of 
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between 
educational expenditures and the quality of education 86-
an assumed correlation the validity of which underlies 
virtually every legal conclusion drawn by the District 
Court in this case. Related to the questioned relation-
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30. 
86 The quality-cost controversy has received conciiderable atten-
tion. Among the notable authorities on both sides are the follow-
ing: C. Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisis in tho 
Classroom (1970) ; Office of Education, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report) ; On Equality of Educa-
tional Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller ed~:>.); J. Guthrie, 
G. Kleindorker, H. Levin, & T. Stout, Schools and Ine(!uality 
(1971) ; President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swan-
son, The Cost-Quality Relationship, in lOth Nat'l Conf. on School 
Finance, The Challenge of Change in School Finance 151 (1967) . 
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ship between cost and quality, is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
education.87 And the question of the proper relation~ 
ship between state boards of education and local school 
boards, in terms of their respective responsibility and 
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exami-
nation. The ultimate wisdom as to these and like 
problems of education is not likely to be devined for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States in-
flexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing 
conditions. 
It must be remembered also that every claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for 
the relationship between national and state power under 
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of I 
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigor-
ous judicial scrutiny. While " [ flhe maintenance of 
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
which this Court examines state actiorf~ss it would be 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before 
87 See the results of the Texas Governor's Committee's statewide 
~urvry on the goals of education in that State. I Governor's 
Committee Report, at 59-68. See also Gold~trin, supra, n. 38, 
at 519- 522 ; Schoettle, supra, n. 80; authorities cited in n. 86, supr a. 
88 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 532 {1959) 
(Mn. J usTICE BHENNAN, concurring); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U. S. 641, 661 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting) . 
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us, in which we are urged to abrogate the systems of 
financing public education presently in existence m 
virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap-
propriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These 
same considerations are relevant to the determination 
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, 
nevertheless bears some rat.ional relationship to a legiti-J 
mate state purpose. It is to th.is question that we next 
turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands J 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparable 
amount of funds is derived from each source.89 The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.vo Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 20 teachers ;n one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 9z 
89 In 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billwn dollars for 
education and a little over one billion came from the Minimum 
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
no Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13. 
9 1 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.18. 
02 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.15. 
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vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children are also provided.93 Additional funds 
l:\-re earmarked for current operating expenses and for 
student transportation 9'' as well as for free textbooks. 95 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the Texas Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation °0 and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-
ards.97 As reflected by the 627'o increase in funds allotted 
to the Edgewood School District over the last three 
years,98 the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how-
ever, has · been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
a~sure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.90 Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
98 Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19. 
o• Tex. Educ. Code §§ 16.45, 16.51. 
as Tex. Educ. Code § 12.01. 
o6 Tex. Educ. Code § 11.26 (5). 
07 Tex. Educ. Code § 16.301 et. seq. 
08 See ante, at -. 
~9 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
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its assessed value.100 The greatest interdistrict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have the greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher teacher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri~ 
butes of schools in more affluent districts are lower pupil-
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.101 
100 There is no unifoljll statewide assessment practice in Texas. 
Commercial property, , for example, might be taxed at 30% of 
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's 
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnavale, Morgan & White, 
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16. 
101 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 18. As previously 
noted, teA"t accompanying n. 86, supra, the extent to which the 
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated 
inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education. 
While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point 
of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic op-~ 
portunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include the effect on 
quality of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher sa lary schedules. 
The state funding in Texas is designed to assure, on the average, one 
teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable 
ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6,000 per 
year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers may be more 
debatable, depending in major part upon the locat ion of the school 
district. But there appears to be little empirical data that supports 
the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that documents 
the existence of a dependable correlation between the level of public 
school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruc-
tion. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the 
absence, up to this time, of satisfactory techniques for judging 
their abi lity or performance. Relatively few school systems have 
merit plans of any kind , with the result that teachers' sa laries arc 
usually mcreased acros,; the board in a way which tends to reward the 
least deserving on the same basis as the most deserv ing. Salaries are 
usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees claim that children in less affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
establish a reasonable basis" for a system which results 
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. We disagree. 
The Texas system, in its reliance on state as well as 
local resources, is comparable to the systems employed 
in virtually every other State.102 The power to tax local 
property for educational purposes has been recognized 
in Texas at least since 1883.103 When shifts in the dis-
tribution of population, accompanied by changes in local 
property wealth occasioned by the growth of commercial 
and industrial centers, began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
educators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
102 President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85, at 9. Until 
recently Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely state-
fl,lnded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amended 
its educational fi:r~:;mce statute to permit counties to collect addi-
tional ft.1nds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The 
rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the 
question before the Court today: 
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything 
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This 
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties 
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educa-
tional facilities as good as the people of the counties want and 
are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above 
and beyond established minimums provided for their people encour-
ages the best features of democratic government." Haw. Sess. Laws, 
Art. 38, § 1 (1968). 
'J'03 See text accompanying n. 7, supra. 
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of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a. 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of local 
participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
artic]llated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for. 
its child." 105 
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these 
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every 
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large 
measure of participation in and control of each district's 
schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a 
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of 
government, local sharing of responsibility for public edu-
cation has survived. The merit of local control was recog-
nized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 
(1972). MR. JusTICE STEWART stated there that "[d]i-
rect control over decisions vitally affecting the education 
of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our 
society.'' ld., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dis-
104 G. Strayer & R. Haig, Financing of Education in the State of 
New York (1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution 
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of edu-
cational finance, see J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at 39-95. 
105 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by 
James S. Coleman, at vii. 
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sent, agreed that "[1] ocal control is not only vital to con~ 
tinued public support of the schools, but it is of over~ 
riding importance from an educational standpoint as 
well." !d., at 478. 
The persistence of attachment to government at 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
child. Equally important, however, is the opportunity 
it offers for participation in the decisionmaking proc-
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches 
than does public education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, 
they purport to attack the school finance system precisely 
because it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted under other financing systems that resulted in 
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is 
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-
1 06 N ew State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932) , 
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spect to expenditures for some districts than for others/07 
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system, 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interest~, while occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenqitures, might be conceived. Only 
where state action impinges on the exercise of funda-
mental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found 
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is also well to 
remember that even those districts that have reduced 
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much 
they spend on education, still retain under the present sys-
tem the prerogative to decide how available funds will be 
allocated. They further enjoy the power to make numer-
107 MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas 
system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has 
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee 
complete freedom of choice to every district. He places special 
emphasis on the statutory provision which establishes a maximum 
rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local school district may 
tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d). The 
maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the 
District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable 
rate. (The tax rate of $1.05 per $100, seep. 7, infra, is the equalized 
rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellee;; do 
not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edge-
wood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality 
of that statuary provision is not before us and must await litigation 
in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk; 
313 F. Supp. 944 (MD Fla. 1970), vacated , 401 U. S. 476 (1971). 
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ous other decisions with respect to the operation of the 
schools. The people in Texas may be justified in be"' 
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place 
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the 
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired 
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along 
with increased control of the purse strings at the state 
level will go increased control over local policies.108 
Appellees furt~er urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They see no justification for a system that allows, as 
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation- indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. 
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going 
108 This theme--that greater state control over funding will lead 
to greater state power with respect to local educational programs 
and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public 
education. See, e. g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Educa-
tion, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64, 
77-78 (Bowers ed. 1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and 
The State 26 (1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school 
board, has some control over the purse, there can be little real feel-
ing in the community that schools are in fact local schools .... ") ; 
Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution , in Sat. Rev. 84, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) 
("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power follow 
money .... "); Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally-Shared Taxe · 
21 (1931) (" [S]tate administration of taxation is the first step to-
wardtl state control of the functions supported by these taxes .... "). 
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental, 
or whether he agrees that the consrquence is inevitable, it certainly 
cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on 
the part of parents, educators, and legislators. 
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to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.109 Not 
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable wealth within any district may result from 
any number of events, some of which local residents 
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and 
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within 
a district by various actions-public and private-of itS: 
residents. 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then 
it must be equally impermissible in providing other nec-
essary services currently financed from local property 
taxes, including local police and fire protection, public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of vari-
ous kinds. We perceive no justification for such a total 
abrogation of local property taxation and control as 
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply 
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this 
Court to nullify statewide schemes for financing public 
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof 
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures between children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that. 
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. Its I 
shortcomings have been acknowledged by Texas, and it 
has persistently endeavored-not without some success-
Jon This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining 
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the 
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of "territorial uniformity." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 
230-231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954). Cf. 
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 668: 
(CAlO 1969). . 
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to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditure with-
out destroying the acknowledged benefits of local partici-
pation. The Texas plan is not the result of some hurried, 
ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any group or class, 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69-70 (1913). One also must remember that the system 
here challenged is not peculiar to Texa.s or to any other 
State. In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for 
financing public education reflects what many educators 
for a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars and edu-
cational authorities in 49 States, especially where the 
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no-
where yet adopted. The constitutional test under the 
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state 
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or 
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S.-, - (1973). 
We hold that the Texas plain abundantly survives this 
test. 
IV 
In light of the unprecedented attention focused on 
the District Court opinion in this case and on its Cali-
fornia predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 
P . 2d 1241 (1971), a cautionary postscript seems appro-
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priate. These decisions have been widely hailed as pro-
viding a constitutional mandate for major state legislative 
reform. The decisions have been variously touted as 
the "answer" to removing the roadblocks to higher quality 
education for the poor and racial minorities. Some have 
even viewed them as the ultimate solution to the urban 
crisis in education. Indeed, in their enthusiasm for 
the result desired by all, some advocates of "fiscal neu-
trality" have given it considerably more credit than its 
architects have ever claimed.110 
The truth is that it is too early, in view of the newness 
of the concept and the absence of a broader base of 
,empirical study, to make considered judgments as to the 
intrinsic merit or the political feasibility of the "fiscal 
neutrality" doctrine. Already, second thoughts have 
begun to emerge from some commentators. It is begin-
ning to be suspected that the abrupt eradication of the 
property tax basis and the implementation of "fiscally 
neutral" alternatives could have consequences disquiet-
ingly different from those initially assumed. 111 There is, 
110 "Fiscal neutrality" is the name given by Professors Coons, Clune, 
and Sugarman to their thesis that "the quality of public education 
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state 
as a whole." J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 2. 
Their thoughtful and imaginative work paved the way for the 
suits, including the present one, attacking the school finance system. 
Indeed, the District Court approved the authors' thesis verbatim. 
337 F. Supp., at 285. The authors have often cautioned their sup-
porters, however, against speculating that "fiscal neutrality" would 
be a panacea for the poor or for racial minorities. Ibid.; Coons, 
Clune & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 3 Yale Rev. of 
L. & Soc. Action 111, 114-115 (1971). 
111 Any alternative that provides significantly more money for 
any major percentage of the State's schools is certain to encounter 
political barriers. Any such new plan would require additional 
resources from some source: funds will either have to be taken 
.away from more prosperous districts or new revenue sources will 
need 1 o be tapped. The former alternative is not likely to be sup~ 
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in particular, increasing concern as to whether the 
plan would not in fact be counterproductive especially 
as to the lowest income families who tend to reside in 
urban areas where the assessed value of commercial and 
industrial property is high. Professor Berke, whose affi-
davits as to the relationship between poverty, race and 
educational expenditure in Texas were relied on by the 
District Court,m has since published a study of the pos-
sible effects of several alternatives to the present system 
of educational finance. 113 . That study indicates that it 
is entirely possible that an equal-expenditures alternative 
to the present system would lead to higher taxation and 
lower educational expenditures in the major urban areas.114 
At least one detailed empirical study also has concluded 
that there is no dependable correlation between the loca-
ported by those districts that have had the good fortune to 
have developed attractive education facilities and programs. The 
latter alternative, i. e., new taxation, appears to be no 
more palatable politically. It has been calculated that $2.4 
billion of additional school funds would be required to bring 
all Texas districts up to the present level of expenditure in all 
but the wealthiest districts-an amount more than double that 
currently being spent in Texas on public education (Texas Research 
League, supra, n. 20, at 16-18. At a time when nearly every State 
and locality is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with de-
mands for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary taxpayers 
already resisting tax increases, there is considerable reason to 
question whether a decision of this Court nullifying present state 
taxing systems would result in doubling public funds committed 
to education. An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of almost 30 
States, focusing on these practical consequences, claims with some 
justification that "each of the undersigned states ... would suffer 
severe financial stringency." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, at 2 (filed Att. Gen. of Md., et a!.) . 
112 See nn. 38 and 63, supra. 
1.13 Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, Inequities 
in School Finance (1972) (Monograph prepared by Professor Berke). 
u 4 See also U. S. Office of Education, Finances of Large City School 
Systems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) (HEW Publication). 
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tion of impoverished families and the presence of inferior 
schools.115 Nor does it appear that there is any more 
than a random chance that racial minorities will be 
clustered in school districts that have relatively less 
assessable property.m 
The traditional limitations on this Court's constitu-
tional function restrain us from undertaking through the 
judiciary the initiation of fundamental reforms in state 
taxation and education-subjects of great complexity 
and vital concern to the States and localities. That 
role is reserved for the legislative processes of the vari-
ous States, and we do no violence to the values of fed-
eralism and separation of powers by staying our hand. 
We hardly need add that this Court's action today is 
not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on 
the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax 
systems which may well have relied too long and too 
heavily on the local property tax. And certainly inno-
vative new thinking as to public education, its methods 
and its funding, is necesary to assure both a higher level 
of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity. These 
115 See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Deci-
sions : On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yale L. J . 1303 
(1972) ; see text accompanying n. 45, supra. 
116 See Goldstein , supra, n . 38, a t 526; C. Jencks, supra, n. 
86, at 27. J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example, 
1'59% of minority students live in districts above the median 
average valuation per pupil ." In Bexar County by far the 
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School Dis-
t rict-is above the local average in both the amount of taxable 
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72% of its 
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only 
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and North 
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18% 
Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke, Carnavale,. 
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 673. 
.. 
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matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who 
already have contributed m_~ by their challenges. But 
the ultimate solutions m~ come from the lawmakers 
and from the democratic pressures of those who elect 
them. 
jsr 
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lrnsed, as Is being do ue In co nnection with this case. at the time 
the opinion is issued. '!'he "y ll abus constit utes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but hus been prepared by t he ltP]IOrtcr or Decisions J'or 
the convenience of the J'eader. See United Stcrtes v. Detroit Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT ET AL. V . RODRIGUEZ ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNI1'J<JD STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
No. 71-1332. Argued October 12, 1972-Dcrided --- -, 1973 
The financing of publir ell'mentary and ~erondan' schoolH in Texas 
is a proclurt of ~tate and local participation. Almo~t half of the 
revenueH ar<' derived from a largdy Htate-funded program deHigned 
to provide a baHic minimum educational alTering in C\'C'rY school. 
Earh district SUJ1]Jlemcnts ~tate aid through an ad valorem tax on 
property within it~ jurisdiction. Appellees brought this class 
action on behalf of Hchool children said to be mcrnbcrH of poor 
families who rc~idc in school districtH having a low propcrt~r tax 
base, making the claim that the Texas sy::;tcm';; rcli:mcc on local 
property taxation favor~ the more afTlurnt and violates equal 
protect ion rrcruircmmts because of Huh~tantin l int rrcli~t rict di~­
paritics in per-pupil rxpenclitures rrHulting primarily from dif-
fcrcnc<'H in the value of aHses;.:ahlc property among thr districts. 
The District Court, finding that wralth i~ a "su,;pert" classification 
and that rducation is a "fundamental" right, concluded that the 
sy~tcm could br 11pheld onlv upon a showing, which appellants 
failed to make, that there was a comprlling ~tate intrrr~t for the 
system. The court n!Ro concluclrd that appellants fnilrcl even to 
demonstrate a reasonable or rational basis for the State's system. 
Held: 
1. This is not a proper rase in which to rxam inr n Stnte's laws 
unclrr staudarcb of ;;trict judicial scrutiny, since that trst is rc~rrvcd 
for rases involv ing Jaws that operate to t he disadvan tage of su~pcct 
classrs or interfere with the exerri~c of fund::unenta l rights and 
Iibert irs explicitly or implicitly protected by thr Constitution. 
Pp. 14-40. 
(a) Thr Texas system docs not disadvantage an~' ~u~pcct class. 
It has not been shown to discriminate ngainst nn)' clcfinablr class 
of "poor" 1)eople or to occasion discriminations depcn.c!ing on the 
I 
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Henry Putzel, Jr 
.lt.epwter ol DecioJons 
, -
. ' 
rr SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
Syllabus 
relative wealth of the families in any district. And, insofar as 
the financing system disadvantages those who, disregarding their 
individual income characteristics, reside in comparatively poor 
school districts, the resulting class cannot be said to be suspect. 
Pp. 14-24. 
(b) Nor does tho Texas school-financing system impermissibly 
interfere with tho exorcise of a "fundamental" right or liberty. 
Though education is one of the most important services performed 
by the State, it is not within the limited category of rights recog-
Iiizcd by tl1is Court as guaranteed. by the Constitution. Even 'if 
some identifiable qmmtum of education is arguably entitled to 
constitutional protection to make meaningful the exercise o[ other 
constitutional rights, here there is no showing that the Texas sys-
tem fails to provide the basic minimal skills necessary for that 
purpose. Pp. 25-35. ' 
(c) Moreover, this is an inappropriate case in which to ' in-
voke strict scmtiny sinre it involves tho most delicate and difficiilt 
·questions of local taxation, fiscal planning, educational policy, and 
fedc~·alism, considerations counseling a more restrained form of 
review. Pp. 35-40. 
2. The Texas system does not violate tho Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though concededly im-
perfect, the system bears a rational relationship to a legitimate 
state purpose. While assuring basic education ' for every child in 
tho State, it permits and encourages participation in and significant 
control of each district's schools at the local level. Pp. 40-49. 
337 F. Supp. 280, reversed. 
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER, 
C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUH>T, .J.J. , joined. 
STEWART, .J., filed a concurring opinion. BRENNAN, .T., filed a dis-
senting opinion. WHITE, .J., filed a di~~enting opinion, in which 
DouGLAS and BHENNAN, .J.J., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which DouGLAB, J., joined. 
~:~./,t,/..J,_,zJ,.,Z$,..2~.4>; ,2!-1~ J~ .. j? 
r/ 
~; 
jg ~ (/2, 4~ ~t .. ¥~ s-1, .5'.2. 
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UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-1332 
LSan Antonio Independent School On Appeal from the 
United States Dis-Distrwt et aL, Appellants, 
Derrwt.rio P. 
v. 
Rodriguez et al. 
m~ .,. t, 
[FebruatY -, 
trict Court for th e 
Western District of 
Texa1:1. 
1973] 
MR. JPSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of th(· 
Court. 
This smt.'C attacking the Texas system of financmg 
public education,. was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-· 
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District , an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas. L 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants ~ 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of these complainants attend public school. 
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the 
cond1tlon of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
rmt.'' Th1rd Amended Complaint, App. , at 14 
? The San Antonio Independent School District, whose name tlus 
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
metropolitan area Wfl!i:eh were originally named as party d('frndants . 
After a pretnal conference, the District Court Js:mccl an order dls-
rmssing the school districts from the case. Subsequently, the San 
Antomo Indcpend('nt School District has joined m the plamtiffs' 
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an 
(JmU'1J.~ nmae brwf m support of that position in this Court 
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of Education. the t;tate Attorney General, and the Bexar 
County (San Antonio) Board of Trustees. The %;S6., '-o'Wipl._,.,.,-t-
was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judge court 
was .impaneled in January 196V.3 In December 1971 4 
the panel rendered its judgment in a per curiam opinion 
holding the Texas ·school finance system unconstitutional 
under · the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." The· ::Jtate appealedl.\and we noted prob- /4 
able j'urisdiction to consider the f~r-reaching constitu~ 
tiona] questions presented. 406 U. S. 966 (1972). For 
the reasons stated iu this opimon we reverse the decision 
of the District Court. 
J 
The first Texas Constitution, promulgated upon Texas1 
entry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish-
ment of a system of free schools.6 Early in its history, 
Texas adopted a clual approach to the financing of its 
'A 1hree-judgf' court waH prorwrly convenrd and thrrr arC' no 
ljllC'StlOn::; as to the ou,tnrt Court's jun::;diction or the dir('('( appeal-
ability of 1ts judgment 2H U. S. C. §§ 2281, 1253. 
4 The tnal was delayrd for two yC'an; to perm1t extenHJV<' pretnal 
d1scovery and to allow completion of a pendmg Texas JrgiHiative 
investigation concerning the net>d for rC'form of 1ts public Rchool 
finance system. .£,efirtf}bl!li! '•, .~tm 74ntcmio b~d. 8ehBBl Di~ 337 
F . Supp. 280, 285 n. 11 (WD Tex. 1971) 
· , 7 F Supp. 2~0. Tlw D1strict Court sta~·ed Jts mand:-tte for 
two years to provide Texa~> an opport umty to remedy the meqmties 
found in its financmg program. ThC' court, howrver, retamed juns-
diction to fashton its own rrmt>tllal orrlrr 1f the State failrd to ofTC'r 
an acceptable plan. ld ., at 2Hn 
<l TE-x. Canst., Art . X,§ I ( I~ 11-.S); 
·A genc>ral diffu;-;wn of kuowlpdgt> hemg c~Hrntl:ll to the prrservatwn 
of tlw nghltl and librrtie:-; of thP p(•ople-1111 ;;hall br the dut~· of the 
Legislature of th1H i:3tatC' to make i:iuitable proviHton for thr :-;upporl 
und mamtrnance of pubhc ;;ehool;; ·· 
ld .. ~§2. 
"Til(' LegJi:ilaturC' shall a" par!y as prarttcablc rstabllsh frrr schoo l ~ 
throughout the State, and ;;hall furnJHh mrans for their support, by 
t axat ton on rropPt'tv.:Z: • 11 
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schools, relying on mutual participation by the local 
school districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
constitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorern 
taxes with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildi11gs" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools.'' 7 Such local funds as were 
r.aised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.R The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854,0 was endowed with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
school support.10 The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes, 11 served as the disbursing arm 
for most state educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, ill 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a program providing free textbooks throughout 
thf' State.1 " 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
Sta.te and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively f'venly across the Statr."j Sizable differrncf'R 
7 Tex. Canst. 1876, Art. 7, § 3, as amrnrlrcl. Auf?;. 14, ~~~3 
8 Tex. Canst., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5. 
n Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 1178. Srr Tex. Cons!., Art. 7, §§ 1,:2 
(interpretive commentaries); I Report of Covrrnor's Committer on 
Public School Edncatwn, The Challen~?:r and the C'hancr 27 (19o9) 
(hereinafter Governor's Committre Report) 
10 Tex. Con st., Art. 7, § 5 (see also t hr mterprrt Ive commrntarv) . 
\'Governor's Committee R<'port, at 11-12. 
; 11 The vanous sourcrs of r<'V<'llll<' for 1 hC' Av:ulabl<' School Fund 
are catalog<'d m Texas Statr Bel. of Educ, TPxa~ Statrw1dc Srhool 
Adequacy Survry 7-15 (1938) 
12 Tex. Canst., Art. 7, § 3, m; amrndrd, Nov 5, 191~ (sc•r mtrr-
prct ive commentary) 
1:1 I Governor's Committee Report, at ;)5, Trxns State Bd . of 
Edue., supra, n. 11, at 5-7 : .l . CoonH, W Clmw, 8. Sugarman, 
'ff(-; 
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in the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced. II The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
f1ble to each school district. These growing disparities 
in population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.' r' 
In due time it became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public educati011 that contributions from 
the Available School Funcl were not sufficient to am<'-
liorate these disparities.1 <> Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.' 7 Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's," 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by HJ4t_: 5 
l-1!?-
Private Wealth and Public Educat1on
1 
49 ( 1970) , E. Cubbrrlr.v, 
School Fnnd~ and Their Apport wnment 21-27 ( 1905) . 
11 By 1940 one-half of the Statr'~ population wa~ clu~tPrrd m 1t;; 
metropolitan centers. I Govrrnor'K Cornm it trP .R rport, at 35. 13 
15 Gilmrr-Aiken Comm1tter, To Have What We 1\lu::-;t I (194~) 
~- Still, Thr Gilmer-AikE-n Bills 11-12 (1950): Trxa~ \Bel. of r TCJ... te_ 
L~~~~:: supra, n. 11. 
,7 ·R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. lt .Hhould br uotrd that dmmg thi::; 
period t hr median per pupil rxpend it urr for all school;; w1t h an 
enrollment of more than 200 was approximatrly $50 prr year 
During thi::; same period a surve~· conducted hy thr Statr Board 
of Education concluded that "111 Trxas the br::;t rducatwnal advan-
tages offered by the State at preHrnt may be had for thr !11('(ban 
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil 111 avrrage dad~ nttrndaueP ·· 
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 5G 
1H 1 General Law~ of Texas, 4t)th Lrgis., Heg. 8r~~ . l\:J:3H , at :!74 
($22.50 per student) ; Geneml & SpP<·. Law:; of Trxa~ . ..J.i\th Legi::-;., 
Reg. Se;;s. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 prr student) 
'" Genrral & Spec. Laws of Trxn~. -l9tb Leg1s, H<'g. S<·H~ 194,'5;· 
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Recognizing the need for increased state funding to 
help offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee'R 
co-chairmen, establishing the Texas Minimum Founda-
[]
n School Program.20 ~this Program~ accounts 
~ for approximately half of th. f' total educational 
Penditures in Texas.~' 
~ 
The Program calls for state and local contnbutions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salarie1', 
operating expenses, and transportation costs. The i::ltate . 
supplying funds from its general revcn ues, finances ap-
proximately 80% of the Program..t\and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for p"roviding the remaining 
20%. The districts' sharei.\tknown as the Local Fund 
Assignment~is apportioned among the school districts 
-.,./ pu~;ia&PL t~ a formula designed to reflect each district'fl. 
/ relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment 1s first 
divided among Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
2° For a complete history of thr adoption in Trxas of n founda-
tion program, see R. Stills, supra, n. 16. Srr abo V Gowrnor'o; 
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research League•, Pnblic Rchool 
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (Intenm Report HJ72) 
21 For the 1970-1971 school year this state aid program acconntcd 
for 48.0% of all public school funds. Local taxation contribntcc.f 
41.1% and 10.9% was provided m federal fundH. Trxa::; Hrsrarch 
League, .supra, u. 20, at 9. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
in the State.22 Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county. 2a The 
aistricflle, finances its share of the Assignment out of 
-+t,. revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex fffl'l'llYl3tiQi,_..w_a_s~t-w-o----::-fo'":'l"'''d-. ~ 
First, it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation 
Program would have an equalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heav1es 
burden on the school districts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
district to contribute to the education of its children "' 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.25 Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for educ'ation-from State as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949 
22 V Governor's Committee Report, at 44-48. 
23 At present there are 1,161 school districts 1!1 Texas. Texa~ RC'-
search League, supra, n. 20, at 12. 
2'1 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Committee found. that some ::;chool 
districts were not levying any local tax to support education. 
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supm, n. 15, at lG. The Texas State 
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and 
independent school districts were levying no local property tax m 
1935-1936. Texa::; State Bd. of Educ., supra n. 11. at il9-42 
25 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, nt 15 
The school district in which appellees reside, the 
Edgewood Independent School District, has been compared 
throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights Independent 
least 
School District. This comparison between the ~~~~ and 
most affluent districts in the San Antonio area serves 
to illustrate the manner in which the dual system of finance 
operates and to indicate the extent to which substantial 
disparities exist despite the State's impressive progress 
in recent years. Edgewood 
RIDER A, PAGE SEVEN 
Teacher salaries, by far the largest 
item in any school's budget, have 
increased dramatically--the minimum 
teacher salary has risen from 
$2,400 to $6,000 over the last 
29 years. 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
500J'o.20 In the last decade alone the total public school 
budget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistcntly.J"or::.:i;.sl:;.n;.c..-=~ 
pupil expenditures throughout the State. 2H Minimum 
teacher wanes-by far the largest smgle item in any 
school's budget-have increased from $2,400 to $6 000 
over the last 20 ears 20 ..r-
o 1 us ra e man w 1c e ua system 
school finance operates, and to indicate ~the extent 
to which substantial interdistrict disparities persist de-
spite Texas' impressive gains, the plaintiff school district 
ma~r be comp11r~ with another more affluent district in 
San Antonio. The E od Independent School Di 
tric 1s one of seven public school 1stricts m t e mctropo - ~ 
itan area. Approximately 22,000 students are enrolled in 
its 25 elementary and secondary schools. The district is 
situated in the core-city sector of San Antonio in a resi-
dential neighborhood that has little commercial or indus-
trial property. The residents are predominatly of 
Mexican-American descent: approximately 90% of the 
student population is Mexican-American and over 6% 
is Negro. The average assessed property value per pupil 
is $5,960-the lowest in the metropolitan area-and the 
median family income ($4,686) is also the lowest. 30 At an 
equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-
the highest in the metropolitan area-the district con-
26 I Governor's Committee Report, at 51-53. 
'27 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2 
28 ln the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupil 
expenditure for all current operating expenses mcreased from $206 
1o $493. In that same period capital expenditures mcrea~rd from 
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Comm1t1ec Report, at 53-54 
29 III Governor's CommiHPe Report, at 113-146; Berkr, Carn~ e-
vale, Morgan & White, The Texas School Finance Ca~e: A Wrong 
in Search of a Remedy, 1 J. of L. & Educ. 659, 681-682 (1972) 
30 Thfl family income figures arc based on 1960 census Rtati8tirH. 
,... 
71-1332-0PINION 
8 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
J trihntod $26 to the education of each child for the 1967~ 
~chool year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.31 Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil.32 
Tluow~owl lloio lili~&lion . ~·~:~ !:a tt£"'S ~ 
,t.:~ uallt t¥ Alamo Heights ----P....l-~J ___ c_. __ 
I)istriet' the most affluent school district in San Antonio. 
Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 students, 
are situated in a residential community quite unlike 
the Edgewood District. The school population is pre-
dominantly Anglo, having only 18% Mexican-Americans I 
and less than 1 ~a Negroes. The assessed property value 
per pupil exceeds $49,000 a:l and the median family incomr / 
31 The Available School .Fund , techmcalty , provtdes a srcond 
source of state money. That Fund has continued as in years past. 
(see text accompanying nn . 16--19, supra) to distnbute uniform 
per pupil grants to every district in the State. In 1968 t hiH Fund 
allotted $98 per pupil. However, because the Available School 
Fund contribution is always subtracted from a distnct 's entJtle-
ment under the Foundation Program, it plays no stgmficant role 
in educational finance today. 
32 While federal assistance has an ameliorating efTrrt on the dd1Pr-
encc in school budgets between wealthy and poor dist n et;,;, t be 
District Court rejected an argument made by the State in that 
court that it should consider the effect of the federal !frant m 
assessiltg the discrimination claim. 337 F. Supp., at 284. The State· 
has not renewed that contention here. 
aa A map of Bexar County included m the rPcord ;,;bows thnt 
Edgewood and Alamo Heights arc among the smalle;,;t diHtrict;; m 
the county and are of approximately equal stze. Yet, as the fi!);ures 
above indicate, Edgewood's student populatwn 1s more than four 
tJIDes that of Alamo Height s. This factor obviou;,;ly accouu t;s for 
a :;ignificant percentage of the differences between the two dist n ct~ 
in per pupil property values and expenditures. If Alamo IIetghts 
had as many students to educate as Edgewood does (22 ,000) 1ts pey 
pupil assessed property value would be approximately $11,100 ralher 
than $(9,000, and its per pupil expenditures would t hercforf' hnvf' 
been considerably lowPr. 
1.$ 
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is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local ta.x rate of $.85 per 
$100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and above 
1..--rt~'l'l'iYintribution to the Foundation Program. Coupled 
with the $225 provided from that Program, the district 
was able to supply $558 per student. Supplemented by 
a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources, Alamo Heights 
was able to Bflet~ $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid/4 more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school yea~ the Foun-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupi~ ~his eeRs~~ a 62% increase over 
the 4J:uee yettt period-~ 1967-1968'-Indeed, state> 
aid alone in 1970-1971 equaled Edgewood's entire 1967-
1968 school budget,from local, state, and federal sources, 
Alamo Heights enjoyed a similar increase under the 
Foundation Program, netting $491 per pupile These 
34 The figures quoted above vary slightly from those ntrlrzed rn 
the District Court opinion. 337 F. Supp., atz"gs2. These lnviaJ 
differences are apparently a product of that court's reliancr on 
slightly different statistical data than we have rrJied upon 
35 Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greater' 
contributions to both school districts over the Jn st several years, n. 
is apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. Th<> 
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grant;, 
is due to the emphasis in the Stale's allocation formula on th<> 
guaranteed minimum salaries for teachers. Il1gher salancs are 
guaranteed to teachers having more yenrs of experience nnd pos-
sessing more advanced degrees. Therefore, Alamo Ile1ghts, wh1ch 
has a greater percentage of experienced personnel with arlvn need 
degrees, receives more State support. In this regard the Tcxa~> 
Program is not unlike that presently in existence rn a number of 
other States. C. Coons, W. Clune, S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at/ 
63-125. Because more dollars have been given to distncts that 
already spend more per pupil, such Foundation formulns have been 
described as "anti-equalizing.'' Ibid. The formula, however, Is 
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms The percentagE' 
~ 
l"l'\ l'fl0-197t . 
: 
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recent figures also reveal the extent to which these two 
districts' allotments were funded from their own re-
quired contributions to the Local Fund Assignment. 
Alamo Heights, because of its relative property wealth, 
was required to contribute out of its local property tax 
collections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 20% 
of its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
_,_p_a..,..id only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
grant.~6 It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevail in San Antonio and in varying 
Tj degrees throughout the State 38 still exist. And it was 
s- 6 / 
I J ,,H:.t ~ ·/_ 
§ 
disparity betweep. the two Texas districts is diminished substantially 
by State aid. Alamo Heights derived in 196'7-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money from local taxes as Edgewood did. The State aid 
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approxi-
mately two to one, i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twic!.' 
as much money to spend per pupil from its combi'Cd State and local 
resources. 
,. 
36 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 13. 
37 The Economic Index, which determinE's each county's share of 
the total Local Fund Assignment, is basrd on a romplrx formula 
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was mstit11ted. 
See text at pp .. £.:: . .fa...... supra. It has frequently been suggested } 
by Texas researchers that the formula be altered m several respects 
to provide a more accurate reflection of local taxpaying abihty. 
es11ecially of urban schoolJ. V Governor's Committee Report, at 
48; Bqte, Can~va~gan & White, sup1·a, n. 29 at 680-681 
· 8 The District Court relied on the findings presented in an 
affidavit submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His sampling 
of 110 Texas school districts demonstrated a dirrct rorrelatwn 
Getween the amount of a district's taxable property and its lcvd f per pupil expenditure. ~is study also found a dir!.'rtJ~orrelation ~en a district's median family income and prr pupil rxprndi-
!~ 
. 
L e.a.,Jue.; T..e.'/.~ Pe~lo/,c s c.h oo I 
.. 
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the. 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discriminates on the basis of wealth in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F. Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classification and that education is a "fun-
~amental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it was premised upon some compelling 
D--- { :::.""~........U~inverno '"relation between pmontago of mmo"-
. and expenditures. 
Categorized by Equalized Property Values, 
Median Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 
Market Value Median 
of Taxable Family 
Property Income 
Per Ptt,pil From 1960 







( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 






















Although the correlations with respect to family mcomr and rare 
appear only to exist at the e),'tremes, and although thf affiant's 
nethodology has been questioned (see Goldstein, Intcrdistnci ·/:; nequahtics in "'School mancin~ ~ Critical Analysis of SPrrano v. - Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 523-525 nn. !i7 n;--ll>fl1l: 71 (1972)) , insofar as any of these correlations is rclevam 
~, to the constitutional thesis presented in this case we may accrpt 
ej -
i~s basic thrust.:\'; a defense of the reliability of the ailidav1t. BPO 
Boeke. C"n~alo, (oogan & White, '"P'"· n. 29. 
(]ur '~<! pf · ~ /-..< 3 111 t.;.a- .. 
~I 
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court 
concluded that " [ n] ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications." 
!d., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative jud~ments that inter-
fere with constitutional fundamental rights :Jo or that 
involve suspect c ass1 cations.'' 0 If, as previous decisions I 
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's sys-
tem is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden of justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precision" and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
le_gitimate objectiv~and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives, 11 the Texas 
financing system and its counterpartt.in virtually every .a_., 
other Stat~will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." 42 
Apart from its concession that educational finance i~ 
Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
39 E. g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley , 408 U. S. 
92 (1972); Dunn v. BZwnstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. 
Thompson) 394 U.S. 61~1969). 
40 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 
(1964). 
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972), and 1he 
cases coli ected therein . 
42 Appellants' Brief, at 11. 
43 Ibid . 1 /J · f" cu-I- ;l. 
44 Tr. ofOralArg.,at3J' App~l /an+'' R4 f y rle 1 • 
~ J 
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the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis." 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financ-
i~ublic education 01wratcs to the disadvalltage of 
some suspect clasOOCQtioJ' or impinges upon a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the 
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. 
If so, the judgment of the District Court should be af-
firmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined 
to d termine whether it rationally furthers some legiti-
mate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not 
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
The District Court's opinion does not reflect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and 
appellate processes,45 and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote. 4n Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea~ 
soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education, 17 that there is a 
"15 E. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). ~ 
46 arper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (196i); McDonald v. 
Bd. o ElectWn', 394 U. S. 802 (1969); Bulloc/c v. Carter, 405 U. S. J 
34 (1972); oosby v. Osser,- U.S.- (197:3) . 
'17 See cases cited in text, at --c: infra. 
){,-).] 
(omrM 1 <rJ 
) 
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fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui g~neris, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the 
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuas1 ve. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing laws in other 
States, '8 is quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather 
than focusing on the unique features ofthe alleged dis-
crimination, the courts in these cases have virtually as-
sumed their findings of a suspect classification through 
(1S a simplistic tu~e~o" process of analysis: since, under e 
traditional systems of financing public schools, some 
poorer people receive less expensive educations than other 
more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the 
basis of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a clil'-
ference for purposes of consideration under the Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be 
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, 
and whether the relative-rather than absolute- nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. 
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classi-
fications they create are subjected to strict judicial 
' 8 Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241 , 5 Cal. 
3d 584 (1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 ~l\finn. 
1971) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 
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scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must I 
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court 
below. 
The case comes to us with no definitive description of 
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. 
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of ap-
pellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argu-
ment suggests, however, at least three ways in which 
the discrimination claimed here might be described. 
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as 
discriminat6~ ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes 
fall below· some identifiable level of poverty or who 
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 19 or 
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, 50 
or ( 3) against all those who, irrespective of their per-
sonal incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer 
school districts. 51 Our task must be to ascertain whether. 
49 In their complaint, appellees purported to represent a clas::; 
\.. composed of per ons who are "poor" and who reside in school dis-
' " '/ tricts havtn~ a "low value Of7property." Third Amended Complaint. s; App., at 1-t. Yet appellees have not defined the term "poor" with 
/1 reference to any absolute or functional level of impecunity. See 
text~}lt:_;f--· See also Appellee~;' Brief. at l , 3; Tr. of Oral 
~ Arg., at -=21. 
__./ r.o Appellees' proof al trial focused on comparative differences in 
/ <f ~ 11 1., f }-~ , family incomes between residents of wealt by and poor districts. They 1 endeavored, apparently, to show that there exists a direct rorrelation 
between personal family income and educational expenditures. See 
J rrxt-1~ at 4-. The District Court may have been relying ou 
t his1wtion of relative discrimination based on family wealth. Citing 
H),.~~ 
1 
;,.,,},~~J.. appelleco' statistical proof, the court emphasized that '' those di8-
~ mts mo~t rich in property also have the highest median incomr . . . 
while the poor property districts are poor in income . . .. " :337 F. 
Su ., at 282. 
51 At oral argument and in their brief, appellees suggrst thaL 
description of the personal status of the residents in district s that 
spend less on education is not critical to their case. In thrir v1ew, 
the Texas system is impermissibly discnminatory even if rrlatively 
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Brief, at 43-44; 
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in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate· 
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the 
~resulting classification -eehemt- may be regarded as sus-
pect. :r.t-i&,-a,f.teP-a,ll, the · fir~t fuootion of ~ourts, when ,;_-
asked to Hwelre--#te-&!ttal-Protection lam -extn1u-t 
·the classifioattion&-tiffiwn by state- laws. -
The veral precedents of this Court 
by app.e.ll~-and the- cour:t b low provide the proper 
starting point. The individuals or groups of individ-
uals who constituted the class discriminated against in J 
t~cases shared two distinguishing characteristi~-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12 (1956), and its progeny,52 the Court in-
validated state laws that prevented \ indigent criminal O."Yl 
defendant from acquiring a transcript, or an aaequate 
/lr substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigency, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation_........... 
would have been shown if the State had provided some 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 20-21. There arc mdicatwns m the District 
Court opinion that it adoptrd this theory of district discriminatiOn. 
The opinion repeatedly emphasizes the comparative financial status 
of dist ricts and early in the opinion it describes apprllccs' class as 
being composed of "all ... children throughout Texas who hve in 
school districts with low property valuations." 337 F. Supp., at~....,..-
52 Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 ( 1971) ; Williams v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 
U.S. 367 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v 
D istrict Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washington, 
372 U. S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison Board, 357 
F . S. 214 (1958). 
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"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript; 
( 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226\(1971); Gardner 
v. California, 393 U. S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing~ 
ton, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison 
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
1 
'Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
0.. - 1963), fle. decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
If~ to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay 
for counsel from their own resources and who had no 
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides 
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for 
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not 
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative dif-
ferences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less 
wealthy. 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal-· 
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be-
cause of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the dis-
advantaged class was composed only of persons who 
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. ThosE> 
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively less money on 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and I 
often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in 
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial dis-
cretion rather than by constitutional mandate. 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for 
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying fact$ 
found in the previous cases were present there. The siz~ 
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effectively .sinfiltd Otl.t all potential candidates who Were ) 
unable to pay the required fee. As the system provided 
"no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot" 
(!d., at 149), inability to pay occasioned an absolute 
denial of a position on the primary ballot. 
Only appellees' first possible basis for describing the 
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance system-
discrimination against a class of definably "poor' ' per-
sons- might arguably meet the criteria established in 
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, 
demonstr~~s that neither of the two distinguishing char-
acteristics ' of wealth classifications can be found here. 
First, in support of their charge that the system dis-
criminates against the "poor," appellees have made no 
effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families arc not necessarily clus-
tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "[i] t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Serrano-that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Connecticut." 5~ Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," "' 
the Connecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
areas-those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts. 5 ' ' 
53 Note, A .Statistical Analysis of the School Finanrr Drci~ions: On 
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 Yalr L .. J. 1:30:3, 1:{:28- 1:329 
(1972) . 
5 1 !d., at 132~. 102. 
5
" !d., at 1328. ------ ~ 
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o... s i -w~ ~ lc..r-~ - Whether t.b.Q ;TI3e · fiw;;liJa~ would be discovered in Texas, 
r o..-t-te. ~,-n / is not knownJmt there is no basis on the record in this 
1 case for assulning that the poorest people-defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impccunity-are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of tho foregoing cases, 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it,S6 a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
ment is that at least where wealth is involved tho Equal / 
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages."7 Nor, indeed, in view of thE:' 
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of education except 
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that thE:' 
1\:!inimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" 
~ducation for all children in the State. By_,rassur-
ing teachers, books, transportation and operating funds. 
56 Each of appellees' possible theories of wealth d1scriminat10n is 
founded on the assumption that the quality of education varies 
directly with the amount of funds expended on it and that, there-
fore, the difference in quality between two schools can be deter-
mined simplistically by looking at the difference m per pupil expencb- I 
tures. This is a matter of considerable dispute among educator~ and 
commentators. See nn. 86 and 101, infra. 
( 
5 7 E. g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 137, 149 (1972); Mayer v. 
C~ty of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971); Draper v. Washington, 
an U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U S 
3.5:{, a57 (1963), 
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the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, 
{or the welfare of the ~tate as a whole, that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu-
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.' " 58 The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled 
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every 
school district an adequate education.'' 59 No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
class is not susceptible to identification in traditional 
terms.60 
As suggested above, appellees and the District Court f 
may have embraced a se.cond or third approach, the r 58Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 131.\teml'hMi~ ttal'lea) .9 -
U.
ndeed, even though local fundin. g has long b. een a significant aspect 
of educational funding, the State always has viewrd providing an 
acceptable education as one of its primary functions. See Texas 
State Bd. of Educ,, supra, n. 11, at 1, 7. 
~pellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at 1. 
60 An educational finance system might be hypothesized, how-
ever, in which the analogy to the wealth discrimination cases would 
be considerably closer. If elementary and secondary educatwn were 
made available by the State only to those whe !tF(\_able to pay a 
tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined 
class of "poor" people-definable in ierms of thrir inability to pay 
e prescribed sum-who would be absolutely precluded from re-
ceiving an education. That case would presrnt a far more com-
pelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than lhe case 
before us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good 
deal more than provide a~ education to those who can afford it. 
It has provided what it considers to be an adequate base education 
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to ameliorate 
by state funding and by the local assessment program the disparities 
Gllti"I!Qft local tax resources. 
0 
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second of which might be characterized as a theory of 
relative or comparative discrimination based on family 
income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla-
tion exists between the wealth of families within each 
district and the expenditures therein for education. That 
is, along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower 
the dollar amount of education received by the family's 
children. 
The principal evidence adduced in support of this 
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub-
mitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer-
sity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The Dis-
trict Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and 
1 J- I apparently accepting the substance of appellees' theory, 
f 0 .\ 1 1 v" ! 1oted, first, a ii&eet correlation between the wealth of 
school districts, measured in terms of assessable prop-
erty per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. 
s ·, VY> •' I a:. """ .....- econd, the court founa ~t correlation between dis-
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. 
Supp., at 282, n. 3. 
~ ; 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustained, then 
it might be argued that expenditures on education-
equated by appellees to the quality of education-are 
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative 
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered I" <1) .r d- 1 ,1 e... 
questions, including whether a bare ~
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro-
vide a basis for concludingthe financing system is de-· +htA.t 
"
1 Also, it should be recognized that median income t; ( ati ~; tic~; 
may not define with any precision the status of individual families 
within any given districtf:.JvA. more dependable showin of com- tJ.).S () 
parative wealth discrimination would examme factors such as the 
average income, the mode, and the concentratiOn of poor fami!Jes in 
Hny d1stricA ~f.!H.~ifttrmeom~ . 
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivat~ion in Com-
® stitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1258-1259 (1970); Simon, The School Finance Decisions: Collective Bargaining 
and Future Finance Systems, 82 Yale L.J. 409, 439-440 
(1973). 
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the 
comparatively poor,62 and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
--a-cc-orded "suspect" classi~tiemt; These questions need 
not be addressed in this case, however, since appellees' 
proof fails to support their allegations or the District 
Court's conclusions, 
-Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately 10% of the school districts in Texas. His 
findings, set out in the margin,S3 show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
to education. For the remainder of the districts-96 
districts comprising almost 90 7'o of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most money on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest media~ 
family incomes. It is evident that, even if the con-
ceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, 
'62 Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547-549 {1972)j@ 
63 Market Value of Median Family State(~ Local 
Taxable Property Income Expenditures 
Per Pupil in 1960 Per Pupil 
Above $100,000 $5,900 $815 
( 10 districts) 
$100,000-$50,000 $4,425 $544 
(26 districts) 
$50,000-$30,000 $4,900 $4sa 
(30 districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 $5,050 $462 
( 40 districts) 
Below $10,000 $3,325 $305 
( 4 rlist rictR) 
3/ 
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no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.64 
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the 
classification scheme might be defined-district wealth 
discrimination. Since the only correlation indicated by 
the evidence is between district property wealth and ex-
penditures, it may be argued that discrimination might 
be found without regard to the individual income char-
acteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect corre-
lation between district property wealth and expenditures 
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district 
except the district that has the most assessable wealth 
aiid spends the most on education.05 Alternatively,,..,.,..~e_,_~ o. s tv~~ es + 
class might be defined more restrictively to include chil-
dren in districts with assessable property which falls 
64 Studies in other States have also questioned the existence of 
any dependable correlation between a district's wealth measured 
in terms of assessable property and the collective wealth of families 
residing in the district measured in terms of median family 
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and 
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) ("it can be 
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation: 
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per 
upil, and districts with high asscsse alu er upil have low 
income per pu il" · Davis, he Challenge of Change m c oo 
Finance, · Nat'! Educationa ssn.~ A1nm't Con f. on School 
Finance (1967). Note, 81 Yale L. J., supra, n. 53. See also Gold-
steu~. sup.ra, n. 38, at 522-527. 
66 Indeed, this is precisely how the plaintiffs m Serrano v. Priest 
~~~ defined the class they purported to repreRent: "Plaintiff 
children claim to represent a class consisting of all public school 
pupils in California, '-except children in that school di::;trict . . , 
which ... affords the greatest educational opportunity of all Rchool 
districts within California~" 96 Cal. Rptr., at 604, 487 P. 2d, at 
1244, 5 Cal. 3d, at 589. See also Van Dusa<J!: v . liatfield, 334 F . 
Supp., at 873. ~ 
-
T (A. 'I p ,, 1' )1 J f) 10 I , .. ty 
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I below the statewide average, or median, or below some { 
other a.rtificially defined level. 
However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks 
this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, 
diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happen to have 
less taxable wealth than other districts.66 The system 
of alleged discrimination and the class · defines ave 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class 
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritar;ian 
political process. 
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not 
~+ 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect -e+!~-+!f-fiil.. 
~ifieitian. But appellees have not relied solely on #- h .'.s 
con en 1011 
;;LJlJJfficieni asia ior ..auhjec.t.ing th& t~' ysteoi 
rigorous. judicial scrutiny. They also assert that 
"' State's system impermissibly interferes with the exercise 
J 
-:-- of a "fundamental" right and that accordingly the prior 
~ decisions of this Court require the application of the 
"'- -\ strict standard of judicial review. Graham v. Richard-
~ son, 403 U.S. 365,375-376 (1971); Kramer v . Union 
-... 
v 66 Appellees, however, have avoided describing the Texas s~·stem 
'4 
--4.. as one resulting merely in discrimination between distmt::; per se 
v, ::;mce this Court has never questioned the State's power to draw 
reasonable distinctions between political subdivi::;ion ::; w1thm its 
borders. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
:377 U. S. 218, 230-231 (1964); McGouan Y. Maryland, 366 U S. 
420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545J\~(1;.;:,9;:...54~) .:.... -..,.---
~ ~7 X~ll Cll'l.Ut SQ8 ;QQHQf b,g;r;Q.\,g,fg;r;Q eeld thttt tMB ll}'io;~ence £c 
~ -l de f!llltQ wcpl! h d,iscrjrgjpn1 jpp alone ~rovjdes OD nde't'lHQ [lP6tutd e, 
"~ for ~.Qer~ ~J. g., IIarper v. Vtrginia Bd. of 
\ 1 Elections, 383 U. S. 663 (1966); United States v Kras , - U. S . 
~ .:? - (1972). {l I 
" ..., ' • s ''· 
.;) ~ 
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Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 ( 1969); Shapiro v. 
1'hompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969). It is this question-
whether education is a fundamental right, in the sense 
that it is among the rights and liberties protected by 
the Constitution-which has so consumed the attention 
of courts and commentators in recent years.u 
B 
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments." Id., at 493. What was said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost none of its 
vitality with the passage of time: 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ.:;....... 
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in li if.ll.!L_ 
.is denied the opportunity of e ucation. Such an 
68 See Serrano v. Priest!(f-Cal. 3d. 584'\187 P. 2d 1241} (1971) ; 
Van Dusaftz v. Hatfield, 344 F. Supp. 870 (\Minn. 1971); Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); J. Coons, 
W. Clune, and S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, at 339-394 ; Gold-
o. 
stein, supra, n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira. Unequal Educational Ex-
penditures : Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest , 37 ~ ~ 
Rev. 61 , 618-624 ( ) ; Educational Financingi:\#Equal - ..11 
Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 Mich~ L. Rev. J · 
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financing Cases: 
Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discriminatwn, 14 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 88, 120-124 (1972) . 
1/V- -/ 
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opportunity~ where the ;State has undertaken to pro.: 
vide it, is aJ right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms. ' ' Ibid. 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found in 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing 
both before and afier Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF J u sTICE), 2371 
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) (1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203,.~ (196 ; McCo um v. 
Bd. of Education, 333 U. S. 2Q9..J (1948); Pierce v. ( M f?. Jvntc:.E 
f.f If liN 1\1 ;f)lf) j - Socwty of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); M eyer v. e-
:u .2. (tv1 ~ Ju~TI(..£ ~ask. a, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Interstate\!'· Q~ . v. 
J ~§achusetts, 207 U. S. 79 (1907) . J J 
Fro .. ~ f.<J 1- f<:.r-) Nothing this Court holds today in any way de tracts C CIYI ~ r/lt a fc 
from our historic dedication to public education . We .S t-J-c.e r ,r':/. , 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
bf education both to the individual and to our society' ' 
cannot be doubted."9 But the importance of a service 
performed by the State does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging· upon the right of interstate 
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute 
affects important rights." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
.5 - U. 8:618, 665, 661 (1969). In his view, if the degree 
of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de-
pending on a majority's view of the importance of the__.../ 
interest affected, we would have gone "far towarcf 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
bne for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
oo ~~7 F. Supp , at 28~ . 
~I 
~oc.ta....l fi+ 
f>-t: l•cen ,. j 
~
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petence. But MR. JusTICE STEWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu- J 
q es the limits of the fundamental rights rationale -ek VW> fllort e Court's equal protection decisions: ---::! 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda~ 
mental," and give them added protection ... .' To 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and gives. 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 394 U. S., at 642. (Em-
phasis from original.) 
MR. JusTICE SrEWART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to JU 1c1a scrutmy s ate welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
residency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained: 
"in moving from State to State ... appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." I d,, at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
as a right of constitutional significance/0 and the Court's 
decision therefore did not require an ad hoc&alanciDg 9k 
the · importance of that right.71 
fo 
7$1-757 
70 E. g., United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745 /(1966); Oregon v. J W ~ Ml4flHII4U\ 
Mitchell,400U.S.112238(1970)(o p, ... ., .. o-5- "J~t+ICIH i'3r?I!'NN/1N 1 HtTc 'J• 
71 After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), tlwre could 
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for 
the Court's holding in Shapiro. In Dandridge the Court applied 
the rational basi · test in reviewing Maryland 'H maximum family 
grant provision under Its AFDC program. A federal district court 
tt/ 
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Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is 
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla ... 
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that case, 
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im-
posed on tenants in EJUits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita- 0 _ 
tions implicated "fundamental interests which a~~ .G!f..-I-Ja_r __ ---'"'-/-'-4/ 
ticula~~ importanej to the :Jf.oor," such as the "need for 
decent sheltel" and tpe "right to retain peaceful pos-
session of one's homl." Ibid. ~~. 3 v s_r:J.:..!_ Ul),: t e ', -- -
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 1 • 
~nAI,trtJ,, 1n ntl.) . 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social rJ p , "~ •IM ~cH> t JJ 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogm-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond ~e term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent_ . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela~ 
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
!d., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Similarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
held the provision uncon?titutional, applying a stricter standard 
of review. In the course of reversing the lower cour~ the Court 
distinguished Shapiro properly on the ground that in' that case 
"the Court found state interference with the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of interstate travel.'' Id., at 484 n. 16. 
. 
o .... +) 1 S 
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volv.es the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
uman beings," 'provided no basis for departing from 
e settled mode 01 constitutional analysis of legislative 
assifications involving questions of economic and social 
policy. As in the case of housing, the central importance 
of welfare benefits to the poor was not an adequate 
foundation for requiring the State to justify its law by 
showing some compelling state interest. See also Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. 
Belcher, 404 U. S. 78 (1971). 
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court .is plain. It is not the province 
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights 
ill the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence 
or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether 
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, 
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly gua~teed by the Con-· 
stitution. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1072); 7 " 
72 The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny test de~pite its 
contemporaneous recognition in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 
264 (1970)"'& that "welfare provides the means to obtain essential 
food, clothing, housin~and medical care." .... 1 ... +- L> ~ 0 I, 1 b 1 l-ed 73 In Eisenstad~the 'Court struck down a Massachusetts statute .-n... r 
f!Fe8ibitit1& the distribution of contraceptive devices, finding that 
the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection 
standard." I d., at 447 n. 7. Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court, 
recited the arm o equal protectiOn ana ysis: "if we were 
to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon funda-
mental freedoms under Griswold [v. ConnPcticut, 381 U. S. 479 
(1965)~the statutory classification would have to be not merely 
rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the 
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); 7 ~  
Police Department o the City of Chicago 408 U. S. 92 
('1972); 75 tnner v. Oklahoma, 316 . 535 (1942) .. 7(j 
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. 
- J!.S we have said, the undisputed importance of education 
will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual 
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legis-
lation. It is appellees' contention, however, that educa-
tion is distinguishable from other services and benefits 
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly closE' 
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded pro-
tection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist 
71 Dunn fully canvasses this Cour1's voting right~ ca~:;cs and ex-
plains that "this Court has madt• clear that a citizen lut~ a con-
stitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal 
basis with other citizens in the jurisdictwn." !d., at 336 (rmphasi~:; 
supplied) . The constitutional underpinnings of the right to equal 
treatment in the voting proce~s can no longer be doubted even 
though, as the Court noted in Ilarper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 
383 U. S. 663, 665 (1966), "the right to vote in ::;tate election~; i::; 
IJ.Sl , nowhere expressly mentioned." Ser Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 E· S. 
/
112,h38-144 (Mn. JUi:>TICE DouGLAS) ,1241-242 (~fit. .foSILCE n: r 
~ Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 140-144 (1972); Kramer 
v. llnion Free School District, 395 U. S. 621, 625-630 (1969); 
Rey?Wlds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 554-562 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 
372 U.S. 36 , 379-381 (1963). 1\/, - 'T!rfn Mosleyhthe Court struck down a Chicago antipickrting 
J ~ 1" ... ordinanc~ exempted labor picketing from it s prohibitions. 
+ ~ ~nee was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause 
after subjecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance 
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of rrview was appro-
priately applied since the ordinanct> was one "affecting First Amend-
ment interests." I d., at 101. 
76 Skinner applied the standard of close scrutiny to a ::;tate law 
permitting forced sterilizat ion of "habitual criminals." Impliclt in 
the Court's opinion is the recognition that the right of procreation 
is among the rights of personal privacy protected unclrr the Consti-
tution. See Roe v. Wade,- U. S. -,- (1973) . 
nor Jo w-t. 
f,.,.J Q.n 1 bo.r.is 
tov H~Y')1j it ~~ 
p/;,;1/~ so 
Jo ro tec.kd. 
(of1>1111"1 "f 
(JH F..N,._. ~"IJ Wtitr~ 
~ f1'l ,. •. I ;-- ,_{. ) 
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that education is itself a fundamental personal right be- , 
cause it is essential to the effective exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and 
education, appellees urge that the rjght to speak is mean-
ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his 
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "market-
place of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic 
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the ( 
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little 
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not 
been taught to read, assimilat)\ and utilize available 
knowledge. ' 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to the right to vote. 78 Exercise of the franchise, it is con-
tended, cannot be divorced from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
to conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-~ 
formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelli-
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded ~ection agamst ui1-
justifiable governmental interference with the individ-
ual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never I 
presumed to possess either the abjlity or the authority 
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or 
77 See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
"3 ~T-390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (196()) ; Lamont 
v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301~.,:?&> b ·JO 7 
78 Since the right to vote, per se, is not a const1tutionally pro-
tected right, we assume that appcllers' rcfrrences to that right arc 
~
:simply shorthand references to the 89Aiitiktti!!n8ll::t protected right, 
~ f'A- t- e,.. to participate1on an equal basis with othrr qualifiPd votpr~ whrnrvrr I 
. the Stat r has adoptPd an e!Prt i\·r prorP~s for clrtrrmining who will 
/~c.. t t Yl'l t:.;re~Pnt any sPgmPnt of the State's population. Sec n. 74, supra. 
I ....., p/1c,1t- ll'l 011~ 
> 
"(/11" ,.,+v+tfll1 "'I 
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the most informed electoral choice. That these may be 
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and 
of a representative form of government is not to be 
doubted.70 These are indeed goals to be pursued by a 
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from govern-
mental interference. But they are not values to be 
implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legiti-
mate state activities. 
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan- / 
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequi-
site to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no 
indication that the present levels of educational expendi-
ture in Texas provide an education that falls short. 
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a/ 
State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of 
educational opportunities to any of its children, that 
argument provides no basis for finding an interference 
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in 
spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the 
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity 
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and of full participation in 
the political process. 
79 The States have often pursued their entirely legitimatE' interest 
in assuring "intelli e t exerciRe of the franchise," Katz('nbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 655 (1966), through such devices ~] 
literacy tests and age restrictions on i he right to vote. See ibid.; 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970). And, where those rest no-
tions have been found to promote intelligent use of the ballot without 
discriminating against those racial and ethnic minorities previoui>ly 
do rived of an equal educational opportunity, this Court has uphPld 
their use. Compare Lassiter v. N orthamptonrEkB6i~H Et\-:360 U. S. 
45 (1959), with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. , at 133 (Mr .. Just ice 
Black), 144-147 (MR. JusTICE DouGM.s), L216-217 (Mr. .Tu~t ice 
Harlan , 231-236 , 282-284 MR .. J f<TTCg 
Coc.~n~ t &J. Cl f 
El ~c..t1 to..,&J 
I S 21 
TEWAR'l' , and Gaston County v. nited States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) , 
---------ot "Ju.rlc.ES /31't ilENN~NJ 
f..th-l tr-E ~ /'1~11~HJ4LL )) 
--
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Furthermore, the logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficult to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendment. 80 If so).\ MB Ehn; ap- . 
pe ees t es1s Bandridge v_. Williams, supra, !lnd Lindsey 
Y_· N ormet, sujmiA. would UQ lo.g~QF Q9 ~~od cgngtjty t._ 
.ti€Hl~ • I •' ' 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right or liberty and have found / 
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect 
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which 
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The 
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly dif- / 
ferent from any of the cases in which the Court has 
applied strict scrutiny to state or federal legislation 
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of I 
our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived,',..-
"infringed," or "interferied" with the fr·ee exercise of 
some such fundamental'personal right or liberty. See 
~vp 1-" J J .... Skinner v. Oklahoma, ~H~ U. :!; . 62§> 536; ( HH9)fl Shap1-ro 
v. Thorn:pson, 634,;-f~ Dunn v. Blum-
~ . . , 338- 343,(1972:t A critical distinc-
J>~fl H~::, ~~be ween those cases and the one now before us lies 
./ i~~•~hat Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to edu-




80 See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Educa-
____ t..,..io-n-, -:-7fl.,., Col. L. Rev. 1355, 1389- 1390 (1971) ; Vieira, supra, n. 68, 
at 622- 623 ; Comment , Tenant Intere;;t RPpresentation: Propo~al for 
a National Tenants' A~sociation , 47 Tex. L. Rev. 1160, 1172-1173 
n. 61 (1969) . 
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in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), expresses 
well the salient point: 81 ,__ __ 
"This is not a complaint that Congress ... has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situated] . ... 
"[The federal law in question] does not restrict or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. . . . We need decide only whether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected .. . was 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reforir]..../' 
measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not invalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther than 
it did,' ... that a legislature need not 'strike at all Q .; 
evils at the same time,' and that 'reformti may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
81 Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a challenge by registered voters 
in New York City to a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
that prohibited enforcement of a state law calling for English 
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least six years of educa-
tion at an "American-flag" school in that country even though 
the language of instruction was other than English. TI11S Court 
'ltpheld the questioned provision\'Over the claim that it d1scrimmated 
against those with a sixth grade education obtained in non-English-
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\ 
tive mind(_ ... '" Id., at 656-657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federal legislation involved in Katzenbach in this regard. 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aid- was implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality.82 Of course, every reform that benefits some 
more than others may be criticized for what it fails 
to accomplish. But we think it plain that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
~ormatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's 
efforts and to the rights reserved to the States under the { 
Constitution.83 
c 
/ It should be clear, for the reasons stated above and in 
U ccord with the prior decisions of this Court, :r-1'.~ar-+-J.L..; 
this is not a case in which the challenged state action 
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny re-
served for laws that create suspect classifications or 
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. 
We need not rest our decision, however, solely on the 
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century 
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Pro-
tection Qlause affirmatively supports the application of 
the traditional standard of review, which requires only 
that the Stat~ system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This case 
~2 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Hargrave v. Ki'0. , 31:3 F . Supp. 
944 (MD Fla. 1970) , vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) . 
83 See Schilb v. Kuebel
1 
404 U. S. 357 (1971) ; McDonald v, 
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represents far more than a challenge to the manner in 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothing less than a direct attack on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse 
state and local tax revenues. We are asked to condemn 
the State's judgment in conferring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. In so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures.8 ' This Court has 
often admonished against such interferences with the 
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause: 
"The broad discretion as to .classification possessed 
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long 
been recognized. . . . [T]he passage of time has 
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recogni-
tion of the large area of discretion which is needed 
by a legislature in formulating sound tax poli-
cies. . . . It has ... been pointed out that in 
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since 
the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a 
familiarity with local conditions which this Court 
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality 
can be overcome only by the most explicit demon-
stration that a classification is ostile an oppres-
sive discrimination against particular persons and 
classes .... " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 
87-88 (1940). 
See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,-
U. S. - (1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 
U. S. 435, 445 (1940). 
84 See, e. g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890) ;. 
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Thus we stand on familiar ground when we continue to I 
·acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the 
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are 
urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the 
present system or to throwlthe property tax&@altogether 
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme o£ 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.85 
85 Those who urge that the present system be invalidated offer 
): 
little guidance as to what type of school financing should replace 
h k e /v it. The al~ iBevita,hle result of rejection of the existing s}•s1e~ 
I ~ would be statewide financing of all public education with e C 
funds derived from taxation of property or from the ado )iion or S 1 m rJ r1 jJ:'.f .!:.!!:-" /1 · b 2 • , 
be c.a.<~le of +-
h 'J he~-- f ropev-t; 
v"'-luesJ 
expansion of sales and income taxes. T e authors of Private Wealth 
and Public Education, supra, n. 13, at 201-242, suggest an alterna~ 
tive scheme, known as "district power equalizing." In simplest 
terms, the State would guarantee that at any particulnr ra e of 
property taxation the district would receive a stated number oV 
dollars regardless of the district's tax base. To finance the subsidies 
1 o "poorer" districts, funds would be taken away from the "wealthier" 
... districts tha0collect more than the stated amount at any given 
rate. This IS not the place to weigh the arguments for and against 
"district power equalizing," beyond noting that commentators are 
in disagreement as to whether it is feasible, how it would work, and 
indeed whether it would violate the equal protection theory un-
derlying appellees' case. President's Comm'n on School Finance _ 3 :J-
Schools, People & Money(33 (1972); Bateman & Brown, Some 
' 
Reflections on Serrano v. Priest, 49 ,J. Urban L. 701, 706-708 1 ~J n . J~. 
(1972); Brest, Book Review, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 594-596 (Hl71); ..tl o I vi $ tc:.l 11 1 
Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative oJt- ~ 1/ ;J -S Jf 3 • 
Response, 2 Yale Rev. of L. & Soc. Action 123, 125 (1971) ; J 
Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of· 
educational policy, another area in which this Court'~ 
-, indeed a10:y CQWPt's .flack of specialized knowledge and ( 
/fS experience coun-;Fs against premature interference with 
the informed judgments made at the state and local 
levels. Education, perhaps even more than -w-e~- . +--"'---
fare ass1stancel.\~~~• presents a myraid of "intract-
able economic~ socia~and even philosophical problems." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487. The very. 
complexity of the problems of financing and manag- . 
ing a statewide public school system suggest that "there 
will be more than one constitutionally permissible 
method of solving them," and that, within the limits 
of rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the 
problems'r should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even 
the most basic questions in this area the scholars 
and educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of 
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between----
educational expenditures and the quality of education 86- 1 J n assumed correlation tae ¥a.1ieity Elf waiBa tn1:EleF~iEis v 1'\ cA e ~-' Y I Y1 j tually every legal conclusion drawn by the District urt in this case. Related to the questioned relation-
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 
Wis. L. Rev. 7, 29-30. 
1---'!!rl'"lle quality-cost controversy has received cono;iderablP atten-
tion. Among the notable authorities on both sides are the follow-
ing: C. Jencks, Inequality (1972); C. Silberman, Crisi~ in the 
Classroom (1970); Office of Education, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1966) (The Coleman Report); On Equality of Eduea-
tional Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & Mosteller ed~:;.); J . Guthrie, 
C. G. KleindorJer, H. Levin, & ~· Stout, Schools and Inequality R, 
J - (19'ij) ; fusident's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85; Swan- • 
~~The Cost-Quality R'E~lationsfu in lOth Nnt'l fi onf. on 'srh'Oo1l 
~ FinancZrThe Challenge of Change in School Finance 151 (1967) . , 
FJ<Jc.,dlmal ;Js/)1 
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ship between cost and quality, Is the equally unsettled 
controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public 
education.87 And the question re ation-
ship between state boards of education and local school 
boards, in terms of their respective responsibilityf"and 
degree of control, is now undergoing searching re-exami- -r ~~ 
natiOn. The ultimate wisdom as to these and l~+~il~~e........,a--
-pi=Oblems of education is not likely to be devined for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States in-
flexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keeping abreast of ever changing 
conditions. 
It must be remembered also that every claim arising 
under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for~ 
the relationship between national and state power under 
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of J 
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigor-
ous judicial scrutiny. While "[tlhe maintenance of 
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration 
in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under I 
which this Court examines state action~88 it would be J) 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
impact on our federal system than the one now before 
87 See the results of the Texas Governor's Commit tee 's statewide 
r:;urvey on the goals of education in that State. I Governor 's 
.Committee Report , at 59-68. See also Goldstein , supra, n. 3 , 
at 519- 522 ; Schoettle, supra, n. 80; author it ier:; citrd in n. 86, surra. 
88 Allied Stores of Ohio1 v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 1532 (1959) 
(MR. JusTICE BHENNAN, concurring) ; Katzenbach v. M organ, 384 
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. ~ 
us, in which we are urged to abrogate ~of 
financing public education presently in existence in 
virtually every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap-
propriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny. These 
same considerations are relevant to the determination 
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, 
nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legiti-, 
mate state purpose. It is to this question that we next 
turn our attention. 
III 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands J 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparabl~ 
amount of funds is derived from each source.89 The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students. 00 Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 'Bb- teachers; n one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; oz 
89 ln 1970 Texas expended approximately 2.1 billwn dollars for 
educat ion and a little over one billion came from the Minimum 
Foundation Program. Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 2. 
J. 9o Tex. Educ. Code § 16.13'-(... ( I ~ 7 2) . 
L·~ TelL Bdt1e. Oode § 16.18. 
92 Tex Edt CeQe § 16.15. 
:rJ .. } 
1/ 
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s u~~ I" In +t ""J otYrt-.s1 l1 vocational instructors, counselors, and educators for ex-
ceptional children are also provided.03 Additional funds 
are earmarked for current operating expenses ... ~
' ~· student transportatio~·l ~free textbooks.95 o. "~"~ J 
The program is administered by the State Board of 
Education and by the ~ Education Agency, which ( ~..., H a.. I 
also have responsibility for school accreditation ou and 
\ 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification' stand-
ards.97 As reflected by the 62ro increase in funds allotted 
to the Edgewood School District over the last three 
years,98 the State's financial contribution to education is 
steadily increasing. None of Texas' school districts, how,;..--
ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
a~sure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.99 Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
insubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part.Jocal differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the r'ates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
l]!..1-G8 ':Pt-x. Ectdc . Code §§ 16.16, 16.17, 16.19. J 94 Tex~tc. Code §§ 16.45, 16.511~ ~ 
[.. ·>- 9"5Ten. EEltte. Getle..§J1,Ql._____ -:
7J, . ~ 96 T8!$. Eebe, Ceae § 11.26 (5~ § 
- J...__ 97 'J'ex.:J Ed11e. G6a6 §~6.301 et. seq. J. 
98 See ante, at ~· S 
" Gilino<-Aik<m 
1 
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its assessed value.100 The greatest interdistrict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have ~ greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher salaries to more 
teachers. Therefore, the primary distinguishing attri-
butes of schools ~e ~tHttsat districts are lower pupil-
teacher ratios and higher salary schedules.101 
100 There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texas. 
Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of 
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's 
Committee Report, at 25-26; Berke, Carnt:vale, Morgan & White, 
supr_a, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16. ~ 
101 Texas Research League, supra, n. 20, at 18. s previously 
noted, teA"t accompanying n. 86, supra, the exi ent to w 1ich t e 
quality of education varies with expenditure per pupil is debated 
inconclusively by the most thoughtful students of public education. 
While all would agree that there is a correlation up to the point 
of providing the recognized essentials in facilities and academic op-
portunities, the issues of greatest disagreement include the effect on 
. of pupil-teacher ratios and of higher teacher salary schedules. 
l')oo,i---~ 
1e state funding in Texas is designed to assure, on the av<>rage, one 
teacher for every 25 students, which is considered to be a favorable 
ratio by most standards. Whether the minimum salary of $6 ,000 per 
year is sufficient in Texas to attract qualified teachers may be more 
debatable, depending in major part upon the location of the school 
district. But there appears to be little empirical data that supports 
the advantage of any particular pupil-teacher ratio or that documents 
the existence of a dependable correlation between the levE'l of public 
school teachers' salaries and the quality of their classroom instruc-
tion. An intractable problem in dealing with teachers' salaries is the 
absence, up to this time, of s:.ttisfactory techniques for judging 
their ability or performance. Relatively few school system~ have I 
merit plans of any kind, with the result that teachers' salaries are 
usually increased across the board in a way which tends to reward the 
least deserving on the same basis as the most deserving. Salaries arc 
usually raised automatically on the basis of length of service and 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees claim that children in less affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to t j, +-
establish a reasonable basis" for a system ~ lA 
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. We disagree. 
l~~?t:;::~~~~:a~~ "fp it~ _reliance on state aS-Jvall no 
f commercial and When the growth o 
industrial centers 
shifts in population 
and ~ accompanying 
H> 2 President's Comm'n on School Finance, supra, n. 85, at 9. Until 
recently Hawaii was the only State that maintained a purely state-
fvnded 1ducational program. In 1968, however, that State amended 
its educat.ional fiw;mce statute to permit counties to collect addi-
tional funds locally and spend those amounts on its schools. The 
rationale for that recent legislative choice is instructive on the 
question before the Court today: 
"Under existing law, counties are precluded from doing anything 
in this area, even to spend their own funds if they so desire. This 
corrective legislation is urgently needed in order to allow counties 
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educa-
tional facilities as good as the people of the counties want and 
are willing to pay for. Allowing local communities to go above 
and beyond established minimums provided for their people encour-
ages the best features of democratic government." Haw. Sess. Laws, 
Art. 38, § 1 ( 1968). 
1 'o3 See text accompanying n. 7, supra. 
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of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a. 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of locay 
participation. The Straycr-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
artic11lated by Professor Coleman: 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 




The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these 
two forces. While assuring a basic education for every 
child in the State, it permits and encourages a large 
measure of participation in and control of each distnc s 
schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a 
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of 
government, local sharing of responsibility for public edu-
cation has survived. The merit of local control was recog-
nized last Term in both the majority and di~].g_9pin­
IOns in Wright v. Council offCity of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 
(1972). MR. JusTICE STEWART stated there that "fd]i-
rect control over decisions vitally affecting the education 
. the. 
of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our 
--~ society." !d., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dis-
ihe :_1 104 G. Strayer & R. Haig,fFinancing of Education in the State of 
New York ( 1923). For a thorough analysis of the contribution 
of these reformers and of the prior and subsequent history of e -
cational finance, see J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at 39-95. 
105 J. Coons, W. Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by 
James S. Coleman, at vii. 
-
. 
J I Yl 
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sent, agreed that "[l] ocal control is not only vital to con-
tinued public support of the schools, but it is of over~ 
riding importance from an educational standpoint as 
well." !d., at 478. 
The persistence of attachment to government at 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part, 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
~ Equally important, however, is the opportunity ( 
it offers for participation in the decision1making proc- -
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Pluralism also affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment each State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." 106 No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches 
than does public education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, 
they fljrpgrt ~ attack the school finance system precisely 
because it does not provide the same level of local 
control and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted under other financing systems that resulted in 
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is 
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-
' 06 New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932), 
~; 
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spect to expenditures for some districts than for others,107 
the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system, 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interest:s.; while occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenciitures, might be conceived. Only 
where state action impinges on the exercise of funda-
mental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found I 
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 ( 1972); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is also well to 
remember that even those districts that have reduced 
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much 
they spend on educati~ still retain under the present syr-+-
~-tem g}iij J?PeFegahv;l£0 ~~how available funds will be 
allocated. They fufTiiBr enjoy the power to make numer- · 
107 MR. JusTICE WHITE suggests in his dissent that the Texas 
system violates the Equal Protection Clause because the means it has 
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee 
complete freedom of choice to ever:•h~:;ic~. b!Hh places sprcial 
emphasis on the statutory provision · es a IS es a maximum 
rate of $1.50 per $100 valuation at which a local srhool district may 
tax for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d) The 
maintenance rate in Edgewood when this case was litigated in the 
District Court was $.55 per $100, barely one-third of the allowable 
rate. (Thr tax rate of $1.05 per $100, see p. 7, · is the equalized 
rate for maintenance and for the retirement of bonds.) Appellee;, do . 
not claim that the ceiling presently bars desired tax increases in Edge-
wood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality 
of that statubry provi;,ion is not before us and must await litigation 
in a case in "which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk; 
313 F . Supp. 944 (MD FLa. 1970), vacated, 401 U. S. 476 (1971). 
. . 
1081 states 
Mr. JUSTICE MARSHALL ld~~ijij in his dissenting 
opinion that the State's asserted interest in local 
control is a "mere sham," post, p. &0 , and that it has 
been offered not as a legitimate justifi~ation but "as 
an excuse •.• for interdistrict inequality." !.d·, at 
fb . In addition to asserting that local control 
/"""" 
would be preserved and possibly betlter served under 
'--" 
other systems--a consideration that we find irrelevant 
for purposes of deciding whether the system may be said 
to be supported by a legitimate and reasonable basis--
the dissent suggests that Texas' lack of good faith 
may be demonstrated by examining the extent to which 
the State already maintains considerable control.. The 
State, we are told, regulates "the most ~minute details of 
local public education," id., including textbook 
selection, teacher qualifications, and the length of the 
~ 
school day. This ·s~sgestion/ that genuine local control 
r 
~~A~.9r 
does not exist in Texas 'A is abundantly refuted by the 
elaborate statutory division of responsibilities set 
~= cu.~~~'-- · . ~~ ~  1-t.d-~k~r 1, ~ 
out 1n the Texas Educat1on Code. ~he ultimate 
/\ 
~ £-Lf- 1-o -~ 
A authority over the "management and control" of all 
public elementary and secondary schools is squarely 
placed on the local school boards. Tex. Educ. Code ~~ 
(!fl..<) . 





powers of the/school authorities are the following: 
GXQFeiee ~ the power of eminent domain to acquire 
land for the construction of school facilities, id. 
~~ 17.26, 23.26; the power to hire and terminate 
H~ 
teachers and other personnel, i-id···}3 .101-.103; 
the power to designate conditions of teacher employ-
~~ 
ment and to establish standards of educational policy, 
" 
id. ~ 13.901; the power to maintain order and discipline, 
id. § 21.305, including the prerogative to suspend 
~ 
s tude o.t:.s--£o= ,:L:...-- ~ - -- ' "d s, L• § 21.301; 
:fer a kindergarten 
vocational training 
of special education 
the power to control 
bus program, id. § 16.52. See also Pervis v. LaNargue 
D. 
Ind. School Dist,, 328 F.Supp. 638 (d. Tex. 1971); 
~ichols v. Aldine Ind. School Dist., 356 S.W.2d 182 
(Tex. Civ. App. 196:21) WQ ele nat believe that J t can~ 
be seriously doubted that in Texas education remains 
largely a local function, and that the preponderating 
affect in& 
bulk of all decisions lil~lii~~ the schools are made 
and executed at the local level, guaranteeing the 
greatest participation by those most directly concerned. 
p,v:~ ·~ 




Professor Simon, in his thoughtful afinalysis of the 
political ramifications of this case, states that one 
of the most likely consequences of the District Court's 
decision would be an increase in the centralization of 
school finance and an increase in the extent of collective 
bargaining by teacher unions at the state level. He 
suggests that the subjects for bargaining may include 
many "non-salary" 
such as teaching loads, class 
item~#ldl#iii~ffiti#~~gl~iiiitd~ 
) 
size, curricular and program choices, questions of student 
discipline, and selection of administrative personnel--
matters traditionally decided hereltofore at the local 
level. 
L~~ 
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ous other decisions with respect to the operation of the (!) f 
\ 0 school&rhe people .ifi Texas may be JUStified in be~ 
lieving that other systems of school finance, which place 
more of the financial responsibility in the hands of the 
State, will result in a comparable lessening of desired 
local autonomy. That is, they may believe that along 
with increased control of the purse strings at the state 
level will go increased control over local policies.~ J ~ J 
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
/
- stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They see no justification for a system that allows, as 
they contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
local taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary. ___ 
It is equally inevitable that some localities are going 
~~ 
y ·. \"\ ~ t. ~ ~ /~This theme-that greater state control over funding will lead 
p tC. Jd 0 .../to greater state power with respect to local educational programs 
-nO IO 1 and policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing pu:;:.:b:::!l~ic'-t-...,. 
- edumttioTr.l See, e. g., Coleman, The Struggle for Control of Educa-
tion, in Education and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64, 
77-78 (Bowers ed. 1970); J. Conant, The Child, The Parent, and 
fr . ~ The State (1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school 
~ ., 
1 
oard, as some control over the purse, there can be little real feel-
J_/ ing in the community that schools are in fact local schools .... ") ; 
Howe, Anatomy of a Revolution, in Sat. Rev. 4, 88 (Nov. 20, 1971) 
------t-~ ("It is an axiom of American politics that control and power o ow 
money .... "); Hutchinson, State-Administered Locally-Shared Taxes 
21 (1931) (" [S]tate administration of taxation is the first step to-
wa~ state control of the functions supported by these taxes ... . ") . 
6 Irrespective of whether one regards such prospects as detrimental" 
or whether he agrees that the consequence is inevitable, it certainly 
cannot be doubted that there is a rational basis for this concern on 
the part of parents, educators, and legislators. 
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to be blessed with more taxable assets than others.-' Not 
is local wealth a static quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable wealth within any district may result from 
any number of events, some of which local residents 
can and do influence. For instance, commercial and 
Jl 0 
ind~st~ial enterp~ises rna! be encou~aged to l.ocate~Q 
~by vanous actwn&-pubhc and pnvate:-""'~ 
~oreo~er, if local taxation for local expenditure is an [-·-1-o__,...F--~----
;10 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then 
1t ~ be equally impermissible i o er nec-
essary services financed f.F local property 
taxes, including local police and fire protection, public 
health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of vari-
ous kinds. We perceive no justification for such a tetal H ~ 
• 
of local property taxation and control as 
would follow from appellees' contentions. It has simply 
never been within the constitutional prerogative of this 
Court to nullify statewide sehemes for financing public 
services merely because the burdens or benefits thereof _ _,_ ___ 
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subdivisions in which citizens live. 
In sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures between children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that. 
is so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. .ftot.. ' 
shortcomings hal!P hfi'fi'R &ek~sdged -hy T~ an4 i 
ha'i pQrsi:st8R:tl' cndeavm?f-not without some success-
~This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining 
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the 
Equal Protection ClauRe any per se rule of "territorial uniformity." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961). See also Griffin 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 
230-231 (1964); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954). Cf. 
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahoma, 409 F. 2d 665, 66S: 
(CAlO 1969). . 
, , 
T <2. Y.fN~ h ~s 
o.c.l.< no«PI eJ 'Iq,J t+ .S 
Sh o~i'~'"~S ~ 
h ().' p e..r~1s. 'lcmtl y 
1/(l,e.J.... 
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to ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditure with-
~ 0..(.. r c~ £.,'(..~, q f.h out benefits of local partici~ 
J pation. The Texas plan is not the result of~ hurried, 
ill-conceived legislation. It certainly is not the product 
of purposeful discrimination against any gr6up or class. 
On the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
exas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69-70 ( 1913). One also must remember that the system I 
here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other 
State. In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for 
financing public education reflects what many educators 
for a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 1/ wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholar~and edu-
cational authorities in 49 States, especially ~here the 
b alternative proposed is only recently conceive and no-
+.c.s-1-eq , where yet~ a.ael"tet The constitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state 
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or 
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U.S. - , - (1973). 
<2 ... 
2/ We hold that the Texas pl~ abundantly this 
'f(). r::i::t~ ....---- I _..___ 
- In light of the unpreced nted attention focused on 
the District Court opinion · this case and on its Cali-
fornia predecessor, Serrano . Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 
P . 2d 1241 (1971), a cauti 1ary postscript seems appro-
IV. 
In light of the considerable attention that has focused 
on the District Court opinion in this case and on its California 
1/:; Co-/. f?pi-Y. t,0/1 
(1971), a cautionary postscript seems appropriate. It cannot 
be questioned that the constitutional judgment reached by the 
District Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today 
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented upheaval 
~ 
in public education. ARG maay commentators have concluded 
that, whatever the contours of the alternative financing programs 
that might be devised and approved, the result could ~y not 
avoid being a beneficial one. But, just as there is ~ nothing 
simple about the constitutional issues involved in these cases, 
,..,v~ 
there is nothing simple about predicting the consequences of 
" & ~~ ctrn-~ of:_~~· 
massive cliange in ediiea:tiofttl:l fifl8:BeS... Those who have devoted 
A 
the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramifications of 
~~ 
these cases have found no dependable XliXIfXX answers and 
their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence in the 
The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by 
the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be said 
with any assurance that the poor, the racial minorities, or the 
~ 
children in overburdened core-city school districts wm be 
...... 
, 
benefitted by abrogation of traditional modes of financ~ education. 
Unless there is to be a substantial increase in state expenditures 
on education across the board J an event the likelihood of which 
is open to considerable question 
111 }i these groups stand to 
realize gains in terms of increased per pupil expenditures 
only if they reside in districts that presently spend at relatively 
low levels, i.e. , in those districts that would benefit from the 
redistribution of existing resources. Yet recent studies have 
indicated that the poorest families are not invariably clustered 
in the most impecunious school districts . 112 · Nor does it now 
appear that there is any more than a random chance that racial 
. ·t· t t d . t d" t . t 113 Add" mmori Ies are concen rae m proper y-poor IS ric s. I-
tionally, several research projects have concluded that any 
financing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of 
expenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower educa-
tional expenditures in the major urban centers, 114 a result 
that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate existing condi-
tions in those areas. 
These practical considerations, of course, play no 
role in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented 
here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of the traditional 
limitations on this Court's function. The consideration and 
initiation of fundamental reforms with respect to state taxation 
and education are matters reserved for the legislative processes 
of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of 
federalism and separation of powers by staying our hand. We 
hardly need add that this Court's action today is not b be viewed 
as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need 
is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied 
too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly 
innovative new thinking as to public education, its methods and its 
funding, is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and 
greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters merit the con-
tinued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much 
by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come 
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of 
those who elect them . 
111/ 
Any alternative that calls for significant increases 
in *d~itiid~ expenditures for education, whether 
financed through increases in property taxation or 
through other sourjces of tax dollars such as income 
and sales taxes, is certain to encounter political 
barriers. At a time when nearly every State and locality 
is suffering from fiscal undernourishment, and with demands 
for services of all kinds burgeoning and with weary tax-
payers already resisting tax increases, there is consider• 
able reason to question whether a decision of this Court 
nullifying present state taxing systems would result 
in a marked increase in the financial commitment to 
education. See Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational 
(J 
Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., TijWard Equal Educational 
Opportunity 339-345 (Comm. Print 1972); Berke & Callahan, 
Serrano v. Priests Milestone or Millstone for School! 
('Cf 7l) 
Finance, 21 J. Pub. L. 23, 1125-21; Simon, supra, nd. 62, 
at 420-21. In Texas it has been calculated that $2.4 
billion of additional school funds would be required to 
bring all schools in that State up to the present level 
of expenditure of all but the wealthies distriats--an 
amount more than double that currently being spent on 
education_..,n Texas. Research League, supra, n. 20, at 16-18. 
' __...,., amzcus curzaeorief fiJea b ---
i:itates, focusing on these pr f l e on ehalf of almost 30 I 
' justification that "each of thac JCad consequences, claims with some 
fi . e un er:::Jgned states l severe nancwl stringency " B . f f A . . . .. wou d suffer 








See Note, supra, n. 53. See also authorities cited 
n. 114 infra. 
1 
113/ 
See Goldstein, supra, n. 38, at 526; C. Jencks, 
supra, n. 86, at 27; U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, 
Inequality in School Financing: The Role of the Law 
3 7 ( 19 7 2 ) • ~ J. Coons, W. une & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, 
at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in California, for example, 
''59% of minority students live in districts above the median 
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the 
largest district-the San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict-is above the local average in both the amount of taxable 
wealth per pupil and in median family income. Yet 72% qf its 
students are Mexican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only 
a very few dollars less per pupil than the North East and North 
Side Independent School Districts, which have only 7% and 18% 
Mexican-American enrollment respectively. Berke, Carn~vale,. 
Morgan & White, supra, n. 29, at 673. '- e_ 
11~/ 
See Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess., Issues in School Finance 129 (Comm. 
Print 1972) (monograph entitled "Inequities in School 
Finance" prepared by Professors Berke and Callahan); 
U.S. Office of Education, Finances of Large-City School 
6_ 
Systems: A Comparative Analysis (19720(HE\v publicationfb); 
U.S. Comm'n ob Civil Rights, supra, n. 113, at 33-36; 
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"adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript. 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226 (1971); Gardner' 
v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. Washing~ 
ton, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Erskine v. Washington Prison 
Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
( 1963), the decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
rights to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay 
for counsel from their own resources and who had no 
other way of gaining representation. Douglas provides 
no relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for 
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not 
insurmountable. Nor does it deal with relative dif-
ferences in the quality of counsel acquired by the , less 
wealthy. 
Williams v, Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal-
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be-
cause of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the dis-
advantaged class was composed only of persons who 
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those 
cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively less money on 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and i 
often do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but in 
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial dis-
cretion rather than by constitutional mandate. 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for 
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying fact() ff>r. 
found in the previous cases were )resent there. U \ 
o t e 
-------
I 
The size of the f f 
ee~ o ten running into the thousands of 
dollars and, in at least one case, 
as high as $8,900, 
7.) /~ I J.J ll; If, 
lf3/ '17-S'f ~ 
~~ 2.2 1 l.l/'1 2 6:, 1o; .JIJ 3.J~ I), 'tZ/ 
~~~ 
~· To: The Chief Justice Mr . Jus~ice Douglas 
M1~ . au::..-~ l80 Brennan 
Er . Ju~,-LJ co Stewart 
5th DRAFT Mr. ,T "" ~ co \'fhi te 
Ur . ' c L· CG ~~ol.~'Chall '-'' 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Ur . lt u.f' \J (;,_; , -'-~'.cluaun blir . ;J L:s ci co r:obnc._tuist 
No. 71- 1332 From: Pc';;oJJ, J. 
San Alltouio Independent School On Appeal from c:the::u1ate:l : ---------
District rt al. , Appellants, United States Dis- • / .... J -
trict Court for ~reirculat od : __1_pJ~ 
a . 
Western District of 
Demetrio P . Rodriguez et al. Texas, 
[March - _. 1973] 
MR. JusTJCE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This suit attacking the Texas system of financing 
public education was initiated by Mexican-American 
parents whose children attend the elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the Edgewood Independent School 
District, an urban school district in San Antonio, Texas.1 
They brought a class action on behalf of school children 
throughout the State who are members of minority 
groups or who are poor and reside in school districts 
having a low property tax base. Named as defendants~ 
were the State Board of Education, the Commissioner 
1 Not all of the children of these complainants 'attend pubhc sC'hool. 
One family's children are enrolled in private school "because of the 
condition of the schools in the Edgewood Independent School Dis-
trict." Third Amended Complaint, App., at 14. 
2 The San Antonio Independent School Distnct, who~e name this 
case still bears, was one of seven school districts in the San Antonio 
mf'tropo!Jtan area that werr originnll:> namrd aH part~· defendant" 
After a pretrial conference, the District Court iHsued an order dis-
missing the school districts from the case Subsequently, the San 
Antonio Independent School District has jomed in the plaintiffs' 
challenge to the State's school finance system and has filed an 
amir11.<1 curiae brief in support. of that pos1t10n in th1s Court. 
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Hf Educatwn . th<> t-ltate Attorney GPneral, and the Bexar 
( 'ou ll ty ( :--lan Antonio) Board of Trustee's. The com-
_plaint. was filed in the summer of 1968 and a three-judgE:' 
court was impaneled in January 1969." ill December 
1971 ' the panel rendered its JUdgment ill a per curiam 
upinwn holding the Texas school finance system unconsti -
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.'' The State appealed, and we noted 
probable jurisdiction to consider the far-reaching constitu-
twnal questions presented . 406 U. S. 9.66 (1972). For 
the reasons stated in this opinion we reverse the deCJsion 
of the District Court 
T 
The first Texas Coustitutwn, promulgated upon Texas' 
Ptltry into the Union in 1845, provided for the establish -
ment of a system of free schools.6 Early in its history , 
Texas adopted a dual approach to the finaucing of its 
" A thrt'e-Judge court wa ::; properly conv<'IWd and thPre are no 
(jUestion;,; a ;; to the District Court 's juri~;diction or thr direct appral -
abiltty of It s .Judgmrnt. 28 0. S C . §§ 22~1 , 1253 
1 ThP tnal was delayed for two years to permit extensive prPtrial 
fli :scovf'ry and to allow completion of a pending Tex,a;; lrgi;;lative 
investigation eonccrning the nerd for reform of Jt~> public school 
finance· ~y;,; t em . 3;~7 F. Supp. 280 , :2R5 n. 11 (WD T r x. 1971) . 
" 337 F . Supp 280. The Distnct Court ~t ayed ItH mandai<• for 
two year;; to provJck Texas an opi)ortunity to remrdy the meqmtw;; 
found m its financm!!: program. Thr court , howrvrr, retained juri~­
diction to fashion 1t :s own remedml orclt-r .if thr State failed to offrr 
an acceptable plan ld ., at 286. 
" TPx. Con;; t. , Art. X . § 1 ( 11{-!5) . 
''A genPI'al dilluswn of knowledgr l•r111g e~~> <'llti:II to the pn'servatioli 
of the right ;,; and lii.Jrrtie::< of thr people. 1t ::;hall be the duty of th<• 
Legislature of this State to makr ~mtable provi;;IOn for the support 
and maintrnam·e of publie ;;chooiR " 
I d .. § :2 
"The LPp;IslaturC' :shall m; Party as pracucablr establish frr r sehool,-
1 hroughou t t he St at(•, and ~(1 a ll furni ;,;h men nH for t hrir ;,; upport , b)' 
1 axa ti Oil on prop<•rty . 
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~chools, relying on mutual participation by the local 
~chool districts and the State. As early as 1883 the state 
ponstitution was amended to provide for the creation of 
local school districts empowered to levy ad valorem 
tax~s with the consent of local taxpayers for the "erec-
tion of school buildings" and for the "further mainte-
nance of public free schools." 7 Such local funds as were 
raised were supplemented by funds distributed to each 
district from the State's Permanent and Available School 
Funds.8 The Permanent School Fund, established in 
1854,9 was endoweq with millions of acres of public land 
set aside to assure a continued source of income for 
schoo,l support.10 The Available School Fund, which 
received income from the Permanent School Fund 
as well as from a state ad valorem property tax and 
other designated taxes,'' served as the disbursing arm 
for most s'tate educational funds throughout the late 
1800's and first half of this century. Additionally, in 
1918 an increase in state property taxes was used to 
finance a progmm providing free textbooks throughout 
the State,J2 
Until recent times Texas was a predominantly rural 
State and its population and property wealth were spread 
relatively evenly across the State.1 a Sizable differences 
1 Tex, Com;t 187ti, Art. 7, § 3, as amendrd, Aug 14, 1KR3 
~ Trx. Con1lt., Art. 7, §§ 3, 4, 5, 
u Gammel's Laws of Texas, p. 117~. SE'r Tex. Con~t . , Art. 7, §§ 1. 2 
(mterprctiw commentaries); I Report of Governor'1l Commttter on 
Public School Education, The Challenge and the Chance 27 (1969) 
(hereinafter Governor's Committee Report) . 
HI Tex. Const., Art . 7, § 5 (1lee also the intrrprettvt' commPntary) ; 
\ Governor'~; Committee Report, at 11-12. 
11 The various sources of revenue for the AvailablE' School Fund 
nre catalogt>d in Texas State Bd. of Educ , TexaH Statewidr School 
Adequacy Survey 7-15 (19:~8) . 
12 Tex ConHt ., Art 7, § 3, a:; amended , Nov 5, HJlH (see int<'r-
prettVE' commentary) 
t:l r Governor's Committee Report , at 35, Texa:; State Bd. of 
}<.;due , supra. n. II. M 5-7 . . ) Coon~ . W Clune, S Sugarman, 
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]n the value of assessable property between local school 
districts became increasingly evident as the State became 
more industrialized and as rural-to-urban population 
shifts became more pronounced.'• The location of com-
mercial and industrial property began to play a significant 
role in determining the amount of tax resources avail-
able to each school district. These growing disparities 
i,n population and taxable property between districts 
were responsible in part for increasingly notable dif-
ferences in levels of local expenditure for education.'" 
In due time 1t became apparent to those concerned 
with financing public education that contributions from 
the Available School Fund were not sufficient to ame-
liorate these disparities. H< Prior to 1939 the Available 
School Fund contributed money to every school district 
at a rate of $17.50 per school-age child.17 Although the 
amount was increased several times in the early 1940's/8 
the Fund was providing only $46 per student by 1945.'" 
Private Wealth and Pubhc Educatwn 48--l\:1 (1970), E. CnbbcrlPy. 
School Fund~ and Their Apportwnmcnt 21-27 (1905) . 
11 By 1940 one-half of the Stat<>'s population was clustered in its 
metropolitan c0nters. I Governor's Commtttre Report, at 35. 
'" Gihmr-Aikru Committre, To Hav0 What We Must 13 (1948). 
'"H. Still, The Gilmer-Aiken Billli 11-12 (1950): Texa~ Stat.r Bd 
of Educ ., supra, 11 11. 
17 R. Still, supra, n. 16, at 12. lt should br noted that during thi;;; 
penod the median per pupil expenditure for all schools with an 
Otlrollment of more than 200 was approximately $50 per year. 
Durmg this same pertod a survey conducted by the State Board 
of EducatiOn concluded that ' ·m Trxm; the best educational advan-
tages offered by i he State at present may be had for the med1an 
cost of $52.67 per year per pupil in average da1ly attendance" · 
Texas State Bd. of Educ., supra, n. 11, at 56. 
tH 1 General Laws of Texas, 46th Legis., Reg. Scss. 1939, at 274 
($22.50 per student); General & Spec. Law~ of Texa;:;, 48th Legis , 
Reg. Se;;s. 1943, c. 161, at 262 ($25.00 per :student) 
!9 General & Sp<.'C. Law~ of. T<.'XU~ , 49th LegiS., neg. se~s 1945 .. 
{;. 53, at 7fi , 
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Recognizing the need for mcreased state funding to 
lfelp offset disparities in local spending and to meet 
Texas' changing educational requirements, the state legis-
lature in the late 1940's undertook a thorough evalua-
tion of public education with an eye toward major 
reform. In 1947 an 18-member committee, composed 
of educators and legislators, was appointed to explore 
alternative systems in other States and to propose a 
funding scheme that would guarantee a minimum or 
basic educational offering to each child and that would 
help overcome interdistrict disparities in taxable re-
sources. The Committee's efforts led to the passage of 
the Gilmer-Aiken bills, named for the Committee's 
'Co-chairmen, establishiug the Texas Minimum Founda-
tion School Program."" Today this Program accounts 
for approximately half of the total E>ducational expendi -
tures in Texas." ' 
The Program calls for state and local contributions 
to a fund earmarked specifically for teacher salaries, 
operating expenses. and transportation costs. The State, 
supplying funds from its general revenues, finances ap-
proximately 80% of the Program, and the school districts 
are responsible-as a unit-for providing the remaining 
20%,. The districts' share. known as the Local Fund 
Assignment. is apportioned among the school districts 
under a formula designed to reflect each district's 
relative taxpaying ability. The Assignment is first 
divided amon~~: Texas' 254 counties pursuant to a com-
~° For a completl' hi;;tory of thr adoption in Trxa;; of a founda-
tion program, ~rc R. Stills, supra, n. 16. Sec also V Governor'~> 
Committee Report, at 14; Texas Research League, Public School 
Finance Problems in Texas 9 (lntenm Report 1972) . 
2 l For the 1970-1971 school year tlu::, state a1cl program accounted 
for 4~.0% of all public school funds . Local taxation contributed 
41.1 % and 10.9% was prov1dcd 111 federal fund s. Texa:; HPsParch 
Leagu(' , NIJprn, n. :W., at ~. 
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plicated economic index that takes into account the 
relative value of each county's contribution to the State's 
total income from manufacturing, mining, and agricul-
tural activities. It also considers each county's relative 
share of all payrolls paid within the State and, to a 
lesser extent, considers each county's share of all property 
in the State.22 Each county's assignment is then divided 
among its school districts on the basis of each district's 
share of assessable property within the county. 23 The 
district, in turn, finances its share of the Assignment out 
of revenues from local property taxation. 
The design of this complex system was two-fold. First. 
it was an attempt to assure that the Foundation Pro-
~ram would have a\l eq!Jalizing influence on expendi-
ture levels between school districts by placing the heaviest 
burden on the school d.istricts most capable of paying. 
Second, the Program's architects sought to establish a 
Local Fund Assignment that would force every school 
~istrict to contribute to the education of its children 24 
but that would not by itself exhaust any district's re-
sources.25 Today every school district does impose a 
property tax from which it derives locally expendable 
funds in excess of the amount necessary to satisfy its 
Local Fund Assignment under the Foundation Program. 
In the years since this program went into operation 
in 1949, expenditures for education-from State as well 
as local sources-have increased steadily. Between 1949' 
22 V Governor'~ Comm1ttee Report , at 44-4!5 . 
23 At pre::;ent there arc 1,161 school districts 111 TPxas. Texas Re-
search League , supra, n . 20, at 12. 
24 In 1948 the Gilmer-Aiken Comm1ttee found that some ::;chool 
di::;tricts were not levymg any local tax to support education. 
Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supm, n. 15, at 16. The Texas State 
Board of Education Survey found that over 400 common and 
independent school district::; wPre levying no lora! property tax ill' 
, 1935-1936. Texa::; State Bel . of Educ., supra n . 11 , at 39-42 
~" G\lmet-Aikel) Committee , supra, n. 15 , at 15. 
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and 1967 expenditures increased by approximately 
500%.26 In the last decade alone the total public school 
pudget rose from $750 million to $2.1 billion 27 and these 
increases have been reflected in consistently rising per 
pupil expenditures throughout the State.~~ Teacher sal- ~ 
aries, by far the largest item in any school's budget, have 
increased dramatically-the state-supported minimum 
teacher salary has risen from $2,400 to $6,000 over tht' 
last 20 years."' 
The school district in which appellees reside, the Edge-
wood Independent School District, has been compared 
throughout this litigation with the Alamo Heights I nde-
pendent School District. This comparison between tht~ 
least and most affluent districts in the San Antonio area 
serves to illustrate the manner in which the dual system 
of finance operates and to indicate the extent to which 
substantial disparities exist despite the State's impressivE' 
progress in recent years. Edgewood is one of seven pub-
lic school districts in the metropolitan area. Approxi~ 
mately 22,000 students are enrolled in its 25 elementary 
and secondary schools. The district is situated in thP 
core-city sector of San Antonio in a residential neighbor~ 
hood that has little commercial or industrial property 
Tht' residents are predominantly of Mexican-American 
descent: approximately 90'?{ of the student population 
is Mexican-American and over 6;7( is Negro. The aver-
age assessed property value per pupil is $5,960-the low-
f'St in the metropolitan area-and the merl.ian family 
~o I Governor's Committee Report, at 51- 5a 
·n Texas Research League, supra, n. 20. at 2 
2 ~ In the years between 1949 and 1967 the average per pupti 
expenditure for all cmrent operating expem:iel:i mcreased from $206 
to $493 In that same period C'apital expenditures increa;,;ed from 
$44 to $102 per pupil. I Governor's Committee flpport, at 53-54. 
>MJ III Governor'~; Committee Heport, at 113-146; Berk<:>, Carol'·· 
vale, Morgan & Whtte, The Trxas School Fmance Case: A Wrong 
\n Srarch of a Remedy, 1 J . of L. & Ednc. 659, ll8H182 (1972) 
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.inconw ($4,686) is also the lowest.·' 0 At an equalized 
tax ratt> of $1.05 per $100 of assessed property-the 
highest in the metropolitan area-the district contrib-
uted $26 to the education of each child for the 1967-
1!168 school year above its Local Fund Assignment for 
the Minimum Foundation Program. The Foundation 
Program contributed $222 per pupil for a state-local 
total of $248.~ 1 Federal funds added another $108 for a 
total of $356 per pupil :'" 
Alamo Heights is the most affluent school district in San 
Antonio. Its six schools, housing approximately 5,000 
students, are situated in a residential community quitE> 
u ulike the Edgewood District. The school population is 
predominantly Anglo, having only 187< Mexican-Ameri-
cans and less than 1 7c Negroes. The assessed property 
value per pupil exceeds $49,000 "" and the median family 
30 The family income figun·s are ba~rtl on HHiO cen~us statistic::,. 
~ 1 ThE> AvailablE> School Fund, techmcally, provides a second 
source of ~tate money. That Fund hm; continued as m year~:; paHt 
(:sec• text accompanying nn. W-19, supta) to du;tnbute uniform 
per pupil grant;; to every di~trict. in the Stat('. In 1968 thiH Fund 
tlllottrd $98 per pupil. How('ver, b('C'itu~:>P the Available 8f'hool 
Fund contributiOn is always subtractrd from a district's entitlP-
ment under the FoundatiOn Program, it play;; no i>Ignifirant rolr 
ln educational finance today. 
"~ While federal a;;;.m;tanee ha:; au amelwrat ing effect on the differ-
ence in :school budget:; between wealthy and poor du;t rict~, tbP 
District Court reJrcted an argnmrnt mad<' by th(' 8tate in that 
court that it should con1>ider the rfTec1 of the frderal gmn1 111 
a::;:;es~:>illg the di:scrimination clrum. 3:~7 F Supp., at 284 The Staw 
ha;; not renewed that content1on here. 
d:l A map of Bexar County mcluded w the record ~>hows that 
Edgewood and Alamo Hrights ar(' among the :;malle~>t distnct~:; m 
the county and are of approximately equal SJZ<' . Yet, as the figureK 
above indicate, Edgewood's studrnt populat 1011 I::i morP than four 
times that of Alamo Height;,;. TillS factor obvwuHiy account,; for 
a 1>igmficant percentage of the diffc·n'IlCC'::; brtwPPn thr two districtK 
in per pupil property values and expenditurr::. . If Alamo H('Ight:s 
had a,-; man.v Htndent~ to Pducate a~ Edgrwood doP~:> ll2,000) I1Sp('t' 
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income is $8,001. In 1967-1968 the local tax rate of $.85 
per $100 of valuation yielded $333 per pupil over and 
above its contribution to the Foundation Program. 
Coupled with the $225 provided from that Program, the 
district was able to supply $558 per student. Supple-
mented by a $36 per pupil grant from federal sources. 
Alamo Heights spent $594 per pupil. 
Although the 1967-1968 school year figures provide 
the only complete statistical breakdown for each cate-
gory of aid/' more recent partial statistics indicate that 
the previously noted trend of increasing state aid has been 
significant. For the 1970-1971 school year. the FoulJ-
dation School Program allotment for Edgewood was 
$356 per pupil. a 62o/r increase over the 1967-1968 school 
year Indeed, state aid alone in 1970---1971 equaled 
Edgewood's entire 1967-1968 school budget from local. 
state. and federal sources. Alamo Heights enjoyed a 
similar increase under the Foundation Program, netting 
$491 per pupil in 1970---197V"' These recent figures 
pupil asse:;sed propPrty value would be flpproximately $11,100 rather 
than $49,000, and its per pupil C'Xpenditures would therefore have 
been considerably lower. 
a4 The figures quoted abovE' vary slightly from thosr lltihzrd in 
the District Court opimon 337 F. Supp., at :Zi\2. Thr,;e tnvwl 
differrnces are apparently a product of that court's reliancr on 
slightly different statistical data than we have r<'lied upon. 
a6 Although the Foundation Program has made significantly greater 
contributionH to both school districts over the last several years, 1t 
1s apparent that Alamo Heights has enjoyed a larger gain. The 
sizable difference between the Alamo Heights and Edgewood grants 
i::; due to the Pmphasis 111 the State's allocation formula on the 
guaranteed minimum ~ala ries for teacher~. Higher salar.ies are 
guaranteed to teachrrs having morr years of expenenee and pos~ 
sessmg more advanced de!!:rees. Therefore, Alamo Heights , which 
ha.s a greater percentage of experienced personnel w1th advanced 
degrees, rece1vrs more State support. In this regard the Texas 
Program IH not unlike that presently m existC'nce .in a number of 
f}ther ShltPS C Coono~ , W C'lunr, S Sn~J;arman, supra, n. 1:{, at 
' 
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also reveal the exteu t to which these two tlistrictsJ 
allotments were funded from their own required con-
tributions to the Local Fund Assignment. Alamo 
Heights, because of its relative property wealth, was 
required to contribute out of its local property tax col-
lections approximately $100 per pupil, or about 209{ of 
its Foundation grant. Edgewood, on the other hand, 
paid only $8.46 per pupil, which is about 2.4% of its 
grant. 3n It does appear then that, at least as to these 
two districts, the Local Fund Assignment does reflect 
a rough approximation of the relative taxpaying potential 
of each.37 
Despite these recent Increases, substantial interdistrict 
disparities in school expenditures found by the Dis-
trict Court to prevaif in San Antonio and in varying 
degrees throughout the State"" still exist. And it was 
63-125. Because more cfollars have been given to districts that 
already spend more per pupil, t>uch Foundation formulas have been 
described as "anti-equalizing." Ibid. The formula, however, is 
anti-equalizing only if viewed in absolute terms. The percentage 
disparity between the two Texas districts is diminished substantially 
by State aid. Alamo Heights derivrd in 1967-1968 almost 13 times 
as much money to ,;pend per pupil from 1ts cornbim•d State and local 
grants to each district in 1970-1971 lowered the ratio to approxi-
mately two to onl.', i. e., Alamo Heights had a little more than twice 
us much money to spend JWr pupil from 1ts combird State and local 
resource;;. 
BG Texas RC8earch League, supra, n. ~0. at 13. 
B7 The Economic Index, which deterrnmes each county's share of 
tlw total Local Fund Assignmrnt, IS based on a complex formula 
conceived in 1949 when the Foundation Program was in;;tituted. 
See text, <lt pp. 5-6 S'Upm. It lws fre(]uently been suggested by 
Texas researchers that the formula br altrred in srveral respects 
to provide a more .accurate reflection of local taxpaymg ability, 
rspecially of urban school d1stncts. V Govrrnor's Commit tre Re-
port , at 4~; Texas H.esca reb Lragu<>, Texas Public School Finane<>. 
A Majonty of Excrptwm; 31-32 (2d Interim Rrport 1972) ; Berkr, 
Carnevale, Morgan t\: White , s'Upra, n . 29, at 680-(i/-:1. 
aB Thr District Court rel1ed on the findingH presented 111 an 
affidav11 submitted by Professor Berke of Syracuse. His sampling 
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these disparities, largely attributable to differences in the 
amounts of money collected through local property taxa-
tion, that led the District Court to conclude that Texas' 
dual system of public school finance violated the Equa.l 
Protection Clause. The District Court held that the 
Texas system discrimmates on the basis of wealth .in 
the manner in which education is provided for its people. 
337 F . Supp., at 282. Finding that wealth is a 
"suspect" classificatiOn and that education is a "fun-
damental" interest, the District Court held that the 
Texas system could be sustained only if the State 
could show that it was premised upon some compelling 
of 110 Texas :>chool di"tricts demon"trateu a direct correlation 
between the amount of a dit>trict 's taxable property and Its level of I 
per pupil exprnditurr. But hit> study found only a partial corrrlation 
between a distnct's median family income and per pupil expendi-
ture~ . The "tudy abo show~. in the relatively few distnct;; at the 
extremes, a11 mvrr~e correlation betwePn percPnta~r of rninoritiP:< 
and expc>nditurPK 
Categorized by Equalized Property Values, 
MPdian Family Income, and State-Local Revenue 
Ma1'ket Vahie Medwu 
of TaxablP Family 
Property Income 
Per Pu71il From 196U 
Above $100,000 $5,900 
( 10 Districts) 





( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 





















Although the correlations w1th respect to family income and race 
uppear only to ex1st at the ext remes, and although the affiant's 
methodology has been que~tioned (see Goldstein, Interdistrict 
lnequaliti!:'" m School Financmg: A Critical Analy~is of Serrano v, 
Priest and 1t ~ ProgPny . 120 TT Pa. L. Rev . 504. 5~2-525 nn. 67 
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state interest. I d., at 282-284. On this issue the court 
concluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate compelling state interests ... they fail even 
to establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.'1 
!d., at 284. 
Texas virtually concedes that its historically rooted 
' dual system of financing education could not withstand 
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found 
appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that inter~ 
fere with fundamental constitutional rights :l!J or that f 
involve suspect classifications.+() If, as previous decisions 
have indicated, strict scrutiny means that the State's sys-
tem is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, 
that the State rather than the complainants must carry 
a "heavy burden o{ justification," that the State must 
demonstrate that its educational system has been struc-
tured with "precisionN and is "tailored" narrowly to serve 
legitimate objectives and that it has selected the "least 
drastic means" for effectuating its objectives,•1 the Texas 
financing system and its counterpart in virtually every 
other State will not pass muster. The State candidly 
admits that "[n]o one familiar with the Texas system 
would contend that it has yet achieved perfection." '12 
Apart from its concession that educational finance in 
& 71 ( 1972)), m~ofar a;; any of t hr;;e correla tiou~ i;; rPlrvant 
to the constitutional thesis presented in this cnse we mny accrpt 
it~; ba:sic thru~t . But see pp. 21-23 infra. For a drfem;e of the 
rehab1lity of thr affidnv1t, ~ee Berke, Carnevale, Morgan & White, 
supra, n. 29 . 
39 E . g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S, 
92 (1972) ; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. 
'Fhompson, 394 U. S. 61~ {1969) . 
10 E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971) ; Loving v. 
Vtrginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); ' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 
(1964) . 
41 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 (] . S. 330, 343 ( 1972) , and th<' 
cases collected therem. 
·12 Appellant;;' Br\ef, at ll, 
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Texas has "defects" 43 and "imperfections," 44 the State 
defends the system's rationality with vigor and disputes 
the District Court's finding that it lacks a "reasonable 
basis" 
This, then, establishes the framework for our analysis. 
We must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financ-
ing public education operates to the disadvantage o( 
some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental 
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Consti-
tution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. If so, 
the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to 
determine whether it rationally furthers some legiti-
mate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not 
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protectiou Clause of the Fourteenth Amenrlment. 
Jl 
The District Court's opinion does not refiect the novelty 
and complexity of the constitutional questions posed by 
appellees' challenge to Texas' system of school finance. 
In concluding that strict judicial scrutiny was required, 
that court relied on decisions dealing with the rights 
of indigents to equal treatment in the criminal trial and' 
appellate processes,45 and on cases disapproving wealth 
restrictions on the right to vote."' Those cases, the 
District Court concluded, established wealth as a sus-
pect classification. Finding that the local property 
tax system discriminated on the basis of wealth, it 
regarded those precedents as controlling. It then rea-
13 lbtd 
11 Tr of Oral Arg. , al .~. Appellant;; ' Hc>ply Bnef, ai 2 
"15 E. (] ., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U S. 12 (1956) ; Douglas v. CoLt· 
fornia, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) . 
•u HarrJer v. Bd. of Electwns , ;3~a U. 1:3 . 66:3 (1966) ; McDonald' · 
Bd. of Electiou Comm'rs, 394 {! . S. K02 ( 1969) ; B·ullock v. ('art!' F •• 
4D5 U. S 1;34 (1972); Ooosb11 , .. Osser , -- {1 S -- 1197:3) 
• jj 
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soned, based on decisions of this Court affirming the 
undeniable importance of education,' 7 that there is a 
fundamental right to education and that, absent some 
compelling state justification, the Texas system: could 
not stand. 
We are unable to agree that this case, which in sig-
nificant aspects is sui generis, may be so neatly fitted 
into the conventional mosaic of constitutional analysis 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, for the 
several reasons that follow, we find neither the suspect 
classification nor the fundamental interest analysis 
persuasive. 
A 
The wealth discrimination discovered by the District 
Court in this case, and by several other courts that have 
recently struck down school financing laws in other 
States, IH IS quite unlike any of the forms of wealth dis-
crimination heretofore reviewed by this Court. Rather 
than focusing on the umque features of the alleged dis-
crimination, the courts in these cases have virtually as-
sumed their findings of a suspect classification through 
a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the tra-
ditional systems of financillg public schools, some poorer 
people receive less expensive educations than other more 
affluent people, these systems discriminate ou the basis 
of wealth. This approach largely ignores the hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a dif-
ference for purposes of consideration under the Consti-
tution that the class of disadvantaged "poor" cannot be 
identified or defined in customary equal protection terms, 
" S<'E' ra;;p~;; citrd in trxt, at 2(i- 27 , mfra. 
4 8 Serrano "· Priest, 9ti Cal Rptr. 601 , 487 P 2d 1241, 5 Cal. 
:3d 584 (1971) ; Van Dusartz v. lfatjield , ;3:)4 F . Supp. R70 (Minn . 
1971) ; Robw.son v. C'ahul , 118 N J. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 
(1972) , Milliken v. Green. No 54,809 (Mich. S. C ., .Jan -, 1973). 
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~nd whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature 
of the asserted deprivation is of significant consequence. 
Before a State's laws and the justifications for the classi-
fications they create are subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny, we think these threshold considerations must 
be analyzed more closely than they were in the court 
below. 
The case comes to us with no defimtive descnption of 
the classifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class. 
Examination of the District Court's opinion and of ap-
pellees' complaint, briefs, and contentions at oral argu-
ment suggests, however, at least three ways in which 
the discrimination claimed here might be described. 
The Texas system of school finance might be regarded as 
discriminating ( 1) against "poor" persons whose incomes 
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who 
might be characterized as functionally "indigent," 4 u or 
(2) against those who are relatively poorer than others. 5" 
or (3) against all those who, Irrespective of their per-
) 
sonal incomes. happen to reside in relatively poorer 
~v In their complaint, app~>llees purported to represeut a cia::;::; 
rompo;;ed of person;, who are "poor" and who reside m ;;chool di;;-
tricts having a "low value of . property ." Tlmd AmendPd Com-
plaint, App., at 15. Yl·t appellees have not dPfined the term ''poor" 
with reference to any absolute Of functional levrl of Impecumty. 8~ 
text, at. lH-1!:!, infra See abo Appellee.·:;' Bmf. at 1. :3 ; Tr. of Oral 
Arg, <t.t. 2(}-~ I. 
~<• Appellee::;' proof at trial focn::;cd on comparativP differences in 
family mcomes between re;;Idt>nts of WPalthy and poor distnct;; . They 
endeavorPd, apparently, to ;;how that there exi;;t1:1 a direct correlation 
between JWr1:1onal family income and educational PxpendJturrs . See 
text , at 20-22, m/m. The District Court may havP bPen rPiymg on 
this notion of relativo d!scnmination ba1:1ed on fam1ly wealth . Citin~ 
a.ppeJlpp::; ' stat1~tieal proof, thP court Pmpha~nwd that "those dis-· 
net~ mo::;t nch in proprrty al::;o havP the highest mPdian family lll · 
eomE:' while thP poor propPrt~ · d1~tnrtt< arC' poor m Inrom<· ..•• " 
;):~7 F. ~llflp , nt '2H~ . 
;: 
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school districts."' Our task must be to ascertain whether') 
in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate 
on any of these possible bases and, if so, whether the 
resulting classification may be regarded as suspect. "( 
The precedents of this Court provide the proper start-
iug point. The individuals or groups of individuals 
who constituted the class discrimi11ated against in our 
prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit. and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to eujoy that benefit. In Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S. 12 ( 1956), and its progeny,5 ~ the Court in-
validated state laws that prevented an indigent criminal 
defendant frow acquiring a transcript, or au adequate 
substitute for a transcript, for use at several stages of the 
trial and appeal process. The payment requirements 
in each case were found to occasion de facto discrimina-
tion against those who, because of their indigency, were 
totally unable to pay for transcripts. And, the Court in 
each case emphasized that no constitutional violation 
would have been shown if the State had provided some 
51 At oral argument and m their bnef, appellef'~ ~ugge~>t that 
descnption of the personal status of the residents m districts that 
spend less on education IS not critiCal to their case. In their view, 
the Texas system is Jmpermiss1bly d1scnminatory even If relatively 
poor districts do not contain poor people. Appellees' Bnef, at 43-44 ; 
Tr. of Oral Arg ., at 20--21. Then' are mdicatwm; m the D1stnet 
Court opmion that 1t adopted thi:,; throry of district discrimination . 
The opimon repeatrdly emphmnzes the comparative financ1al ~:;tatu~:; 
of districb and early m the opimon It describes appellees' class as 
being composed of "all . rhildren throughout Texa:s who live 111 
school di:strict:; w1th low prOJWrty valuation~." :3:37 F. Supp., at 2~J . 
5 " Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U S. 189 (1971); Willwms v. 
Oklahoma City, 395 U. S, 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 
U. S. 367 (1969) ; Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v 
Distrrct Court of Iowa, 385 U S. 192 (1966); Draper v. Washmgton, 
372 U. S. 487 (1963); ErskinP v Washington Pnson Board, 357 
U. S 214. {195H) . 
. . 
~
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~'adequate substitute" for a full stenographic transcript, 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. 8. 226, 228 (1 971) : 
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U. S. 487 ( 1963) ; Erskine v. Washing~ 
ton Prison Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958). 
Likewise, in Douglas v. California, 372 U. 8. 353 
(1963). a decision establishing an indigent defendant's 
right to court-appointed counsel on direct appeal, the 
Court dealt only with defendants who could not pay 
for counsel from their own resources and who had no 
pther way of gaining representation. Douglas provides 
110 relief for those on whom the burdens of paying for 
a criminal defense are, relatively speaking, great but not 
insurmountable, Nor does it deal with relative dif-
ferences in the quality of counsel acquired by the less 
wealthy. 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. 8. 235 (1970), and Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), struck down criminal penal· 
ties that subjected indigents to incarceration simply be-
~ause of their inability to pay a fine. Again, the dis-
advantaged class was composed only of persons who 
were totally unable to pay the demanded sum. Those 
.cases do not touch on the question whether equal protec-
tion is denied to persons with relatively less money or). 
whom designated fines impose heavier burdens. The 
Court has not held that fines must be structured to 
reflect each person's ability to pay in order to avoid 
disproportionate burdens. Sentencing judges may, and 
pften do, consider the defendant's ability to pay, but iu 
such circumstances they are guided by sound judicial dis-
cretion rather than by constitutional mandate. 
Finally, in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), the 
Court invalidated the Texas filing fee requirement for 
primary elections. Both of the relevant classifying facts 
found in the previous eases were present there. The size 
of the fee. often running into thE' thousands of dollars 
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and, In at least one case, as high as $8,900, effectively 
barred all potential candidates who were unable to pay 
thP required fee . As the system provided "no reason ... 
ablE> alteruative rneans of access to the ballot" (ld., at 
149). inability to pay occasioned an absolute denial of' 
a position on the primary ballot . 
Only appellees' first possible basis for describmg the 
class disadvantaged by the Texas school finance system-
discrimination against a class of definably "poor" per• 
sons- might arguably meet the criteria established in 
these prior cases. Even a cursory examination, however, 
,demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing char~ 
acteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. 
First, in support of their charge that the system dis-
criminates against the "poor," appellees have made no 
P-ffort to demonstrate that 1t operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or 
as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any 
designated poverty level. Indeed, there is reason to 
believe that the poorest families are not necessarily clus-
tered in the poorest property districts. A recent and 
exhaustive study of school districts in Connecticut con-
cluded that "[i]t is clearly incorrect ... to contend that 
the 'poor' live in 'poor' districts . . . . Thus, the major 
factual assumption of Serrano- that the educational 
finance system discriminates against the 'poor'-is sim-
ply false in Connecticut." ,,;j Defining "poor" families as 
those below the Bureau of the Census "poverty level," "1 
·the Conuecticut study found, not surprisingly, that the 
poor were clustered around commercial and industrial 
areas- those same areas that provide the most attractive 
sources of property tax income for school districts. 5 ~ 
n Note, A Sta tt::;ttcal Analy::;ts of tlw School Finance Dectt:nom; : On 
Winmng Battle;; and Lo::;ing Wa rs, 81 Yale L .1 1:303, 1328-1321~· 
,(1972) 
' 1 /d ., at ] ;~24 nud n 102 
~" frl HI I :32i'. 
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Whether a similar pattern would be discovered in Texas 
is not known, but there is no basis on the record in this 
case for assuming that the poorest people-defined by 
reference to any level of absolute impecunity-are con-
centrated in the poorest districts. 
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court ad-
dressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, 
lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit. The argument here 
is not that the children in districts having relatively low 
assessable property values are receiving no public edu-
cation; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer 
quality education than that available to children in dis-
tricts having more assessable wealth. Apart from the 
unsettled and disputed question whether the quality of 
education may be determined by the amount of money 
expended for it,•n a sufficient answer to appellees' argu-
<tnent is that at least where wealth is involved the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or 
precisely equal advantages.''' Nor, indeed, in view of the 
infinite variables affecting the educational process, can 
any system assure equal quality of educatiou except 
in the most relative sense. Texas asserts that the 
Minimum Foundation Program provides an "adequate" 
.education for all children iu the State. By providing I 
12 years of free public school education , aud by assur-
ing teachers. books. transportation and operatiug funds, 
56 Each of appellee,;' poHtnble theorw::; of wealth dt,;crnnmatwn 1 ~ 
founded on the a,;sumption that the quality of education vnrieH 
directly with the amount of funds expend0d on it and that , there-
fore, the difference Ill quahty between two schools can b0 deter-
mined simplistically by looking at the diffc·rellce in per puptl C'xpendt-· 
tllrC's . Tht::; is a matter of com;idernble disputP nmong edue;ttor~ nnrl 
c·ommentators . Sc'e nn . H6 and 101 , mjra . 
57 E . g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S 1:34, 1:37, 149 (1!:172) ; Mayer v. 
Ctty of C'hicago, 404 U. S. 189, 194 (1971) ; Draper v. Washmgtou , 
372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (196:3) , Douolas v. California, :372 U S. 
as3, :~57 (I9tt~). 
• f 
71- 1332-0PINION 
~0 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 
the Texas Legislature has endeavored to "guarantee, 
for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all 
people shall have at least an adequate program of edu~ 
cation. This is what is meant by 'A Minimum Founda-
tion Program of Education.' " 5s The State repeatedly 
asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled 
this desire and that it now assures "every child in every 
school district an adequate education.'' su No proof was 
offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the 
State's assertion. 
For these two reasons-the absence of any evidence 
that the financing system discriminates against any de-
finable category of "poor" people or that it results in the 
absolute deprivation of education-the disadvantaged 
class is not susceptiblP to ident.ificat.ion in traditionaJ 
~erms . "" 
' As suggested above, appellees and the District Court 
may have embraced a second or third approach, the 
5" G1lmer-A1ken Comnnttr•e, supra. n. 15 , at 1:3 . Indeed, eve11 
though · local funding ha::; long been a ::;ignificant al:lpect of educa-. 
tiona[ funding, the State ha~ always viewed prov1ding an acceptable· 
education a::; one of ib primary function~. Sre TPxas State Bd. of" 
Educ., supra, n. 11 , at 1, 7. 
5e Appellants' Brief, at 35; Reply Brief, at l. 
;;o An Pducational finance system might be hypothesized, how-
Pver, in which the analogy to the wealth di::;crimination ca~es would 
be considerably clol:lf'f If elementary and ::;econdary Pducation were 
madfl available by the State only to thoHe able to pay a tuitiOn 
;tsses~ed aga\n::;t each pupll , there would br a clearly defined clal:l::; 
of " poor '' peoplp--definablr 111 terms of the1r inabilit)' to pay 
the prescribed sum- who would be absolutely precluded from re-
eeiving 1111 education. That ca::;e would prc~ent a far more com-
pelling i:iet of circum~tances for judicial a~sistance than the case 
b0fore us today. After all, Texas has undertaken to do a good 
deal more than provide an education to tho~e who can afford 1t. 
lt has provided what it con::;iders to be an adequate base educai ion 
for all children and has attempted, though imperfectly, to amdJOratfr 
by stat(' funding and by thr local asses;;ment program the disparit1e~ : 
in local tax re~oureP~ . 
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~econd of which might be characterized as a theory of 
relative or comparative discrimination based on family 
.income. Appellees sought to prove that a direct correla~ 
tion exists between the wealth of families within each 
district and the expenditures therein for education. That 
is. along a continuum, the poorer the family the lower 
the dollar amount of education received by the family's 
children. 
The prinCipal evidence adduced in support of this 
comparative discrimination claim is an affidavit sub-
mitted by Professor Joele S. Berke of Syracuse Univer-
~ity's Educational Finance Policy Institute. The Dis-
trict Court, relying in major part upon this affidavit and 
apparently accepting thE' substance of appellees' theory. 
noted, first. a positive correlation between the wealth of 1 
school districts, measured in terms of assessable prop-
erty per pupil, and their levels of per-pupil expenditures. 
Second. the court found a similar correlation between dis- ' 
trict wealth and the personal wealth of its residents, 
measured in terms of median family income. 337 F. 
:::lupp., at 282. n. 3. 
If, in fact, these correlations could be sustamed, then 
it might be argued that expenditures 011 education-
equated by appellees to the quality of education-are-
dependent on personal wealth. Appellees' comparative 
discrimination theory would still face serious unanswered 
.questions, including whether a bare positive correlation or ( 
some higher degree of correlation 61 is necessary to pro •. 
vide a basis for co11cluding that the financing system is de-
"'· Al:so, 1t ::;hould lw reeoglllzed that rnedJ<UJ income ::;ta u::;tic::; 
may not define with any prccJSJOn the ;status of individual familie::; 
within a11y given di::;tnet. A morf' dPpmdable ::;bowing of compara -
t IVP wealth di::;cnmina1IOII would a!Ho Pxamme factor~ ~ueh a:,; the 
average mromP, thf' mode , and thf' conrPntrntion of poor famJ!ies m 
.<Ill\' rlistrH't, 
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signed to operate to the peculiar disadvantage of the 
comparatively poor,u" and whether a class of this size 
and diversity could ever claim the special protection 
accorded "suspect" classes. These questions need not 
be addressed in this case, however. since appellees' proof 
fails to support their allegations or the District Court's 
conclusions 
Professor Berke's affidavit is based on a survey of 
approximately 1076 of the school districts in Texas. His 
findings, set out in the margin,6 '1 show only that the 
wealthiest few districts in the sample have the highest 
median family incomes and spend the most on educa-
tion, and that the several poorest districts have the lowest 
family incomes and devote the least amount of money 
to education. Fot the remainder of the districts-96 
districts comprising almost 90% of the sample-the cor-
relation is inverted, i. e., the districts that spend next 
to the most moner on education are populated by families 
having next to the lowest median family incomes while 
the districts spending the least have the highest median 
fli cr. Jejfet80YI v. flackney, 40!) U. :::3. 535, 547-54!:1 (197:2); Ely , I 
Lrg;n;lative and Admm1strative Mot1vat JOn m Con~t itutionai Law, 
7!:1 Yair L. J. 1205, 1258-1259 (1970); Snnon, The School Finance 
"Decision~: Collrct1vr Barg;aming; and Future Finance Systemi'i, H2· 
Yair L . . J. 409, 4:39-440 (197:3) . 
uR Market Value of 
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family incomes. It IS evident that, even if the con .. 
'ceptual questions were answered favorably to appellees, 
no factual basis exists upon which to found a claim of 
comparative wealth discrimination.64 
This brings us, then, to the third way in which the 
classification scheme might be defined~district wealth 
'discriminatiou. Since the only correlation indicated by 
the evidence 1s between district property wealth and ex-
penditures, it may be argued that discrimination might 
be found without regard to the individual income char-
acteristics of district residents. Assuming a perfect corre-
lation between district property wealth and expenditures 
from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be 
viewed as encompassing every child in every district 
'except the diStrict that has the most assessable wealth 
and spends the most on education."'' Alternatively, as 
{'4 Studws in oth<·r 8tate::; havP abo quest10nrd the exi;;tence ol 
any dependable correlation between a di~trict'::; wealth mrasured 
in terms· of assessable property and the collect iw wealth of families 
re;nding m the district mrasured in trrms of median family 
income. Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. P1'iest: Wealth and 
Kansas School Finance, 20 Kan. L. 213, 225 (1972) (''It can be 
argued that there exists in Kansas almost an inverse correlation: 
districts with highest income per pupil have low assessed value per 
pupil, and districts with high m;::;es::;ed valtic per pupil haw• low 
income per pupil"), Davit>, Taxpnymg Ability: A Study of thP He-
. lationship Betwren Wealth and Incomr 111 California Countieti, nr 
The Challenge of Changr in School Finance, lOth Nat'l Educationaf 
A:ssn. Conf on School Firwnce 199 (1967). Notr, ill Yale L. .J . 
supra, n. 53. ::lre abo Gold~tem , supra, n. :~1'. at 522-527 . 
" 5 lndred, this Is precise!~· how the plaintiff~ Ill Serrano v. l-"1ie~l 
defined the cla~::; tht•y purportrd to repre~ent. "PiamtiiT children· 
, clann to reprr;;rnt n clati~ con~i,.;t ing of all public ;;chool pupil;; Jll 
Califorma, ' rxcrpt children m that ~chool di;;tnct wlllCh .•. 
affords the grratest educational opportunity of all school di::;tnct;.c 
w1thm Cahfonna .' '' 96 Cal. Hptr ., at H04, 4H7 P. 2d, at 1244 .. 
5 Cal. :~d. HI 51\9,. SeP aJ;;o Van D·usartz v Hatfirld , :3;34 F' Supfl ,, 
,~t . x7:t.. 
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suggested in MR. Jusnc~<.: MARSHALL's d1ssenting opinion, ( 
post, at -. the class might be defined more restrictively 
to include children in districts with assessable property 
which falls below the statewide average, or median, or' 
below some other artificially defined level. 
. However described, it is clear that appellees' suit asks 
this Court to extend 1ts most exacting scrutiny to review 
a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, 
d1verse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happen to have 
less taxable wealth than other districts.<"' The system 
of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have 
noue of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class 
is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-· 
rnand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process. 
We thus conclude that the Texas system does not 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. 
But in recognition of the fact that this Court has never ) 
heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides 
an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees 
have not relied solely on this contention."' They also 
assert that the State's system impermissibly interferes 
with the exercise of a "fundamental" right and that ac-
cordingly the prior decisions of this Court require the 
, " 6 Appellee;;, however, havr avmded de;;cnbmg the Texa,; s~·;;tcm 
as one resultmg merely m discrimination between distnct;; per se 
~ince this Court has never que;;tioncd the State',; power to draw 
r0asonable distinct10n:> between political subdivisions within its 
borders. Grij]in Y. eounty SchooL Board of Prince Edward County, 
377 U. S. 218, 2.'~0-231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U S 
420, 427 ( 1961) , i'\alsburg v !II aryland, ;34,() U. S. 545, 552 (1954) 
r; 7 E. g., Harper v. Vtrgww Bd . of Electwn.s. :38:3 U.S. 6();3 (1966) : 
Urnted State~ v Kras. - l1 S. -- (1972). i-lPP Mit. .JliH'I' ICI!} 
l'vfARHHALL'H diHiil'lltU\g opimon, fJOSt. [l]l -
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application of the strict standard of judicial review, 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375-376 (1971); 
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U. S. 621 
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 ( 1969). It 
is this question-whether education is a fundamental 
right, in the sense that it is among the rights and liberties 
protected by the Constitution-which has so consumed 
the attention of courts and commentators in recent years_n~ 
B 
ln Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
a unanimous Court recognized that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local 
governments.'' Id., a.t 493. What was said there in the 
context of racial discrimination has lost nolle of its 
vitality with the passage of time : 
"Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the performJ 
ance of our most basic responsibilities, even service 
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instru-
ment in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
•;, Srr Serrano v. Pnest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601,487 P. 2d 1241.5 Cal. 3d 
5~4 (1971); Van D"Usartz v. Hatfield, :344 F. Supp. (Minn. 1971) . 
.Robmson v. Cahill, 118 N ,) Suprr. 22::3, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972), .f. 
Coons, W. Clunr, ami S. Sugarman, sup·ra, n. 13, at 8:39-394; Go!d-
::;tein. supra, n. 38, at 534-541; Vieira, Unequal Educational Ex-
Jlenditurcs: Some Minority Viewti on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo . L. 
Rrv. 617, 618-624 (1972): Comment, Educational Financmg, Equal 
ProtectiOn of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICh. L. Rev . 
1324, 1335-1342 (1972); Note, The Public School Financmg Ca~es : 
lnterdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Di~cnmma1wn, 14 Anz. L. 
R(•v . 88. l 20- 124 ( L972) . 
QR SAN ANTONIO 8CBOOL DISTRICT v RODHIGUEZ 
ment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he 
is denied the opportunity of an education. :::luch an 
opportunity, where , thB state has undertaken to pro-
vide it, 1s a right which must be made available to 
all on equal terms.' ' Ibid 
This theme, expressing an abiding respect for the vital 
role of education in a free society, may be found m 
numerous opinions of Justices of this Court writing' 
both before and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (THE CHIEF JusTICE), 237, 
238-239 (MR. JusTICE WHITE) ( 1972); Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. ::-5. 203, 230 (1963) (MR. JusTICE 
BHENNAN); McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 333 U. S 
203.212 (1948) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter); Pierce v 
Society of Sisters, ··z68 U. S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 F . S. 390 ( 1923); Interstate Consolidated 
8treet Ry. v. Massachuset?s, 207 lT. S. 79 ( 1907) . 
Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts 
from our historic dedication to public education. We 
are in complete agreement with the conclusion of the· 
three-judge panel below that "the grave significance 
of education both to the individual and to our society". 
cannot be doubted.'w But the importance of a service· 
performed by the titate does not determine whether it 
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of exami-
nation under the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice· 
Harlan , dissenting from the Court's application of strict 
scrutiny to a law impinging upon the right of interstate· 
travel, admonished that " [ v] irtually every state statute 
a,ffects important rights. " Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 
lJ . S. 618, 655, 661 .(1969) . In his view , if the degrcp· 
qf :judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated de~ 
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pending on a majority's view of the importance of the 
interest affected, we would have gone "far toward 
making this Court a 'super-legislature.'" Ibid. We 
would indeed then be assuming a legislative role and 
<;me for which the Court lacks both authority and com-
petence. But MR. JusTICE STEWART's response in 
Shapiro to Mr. Justice Harlan's concern correctly articu-
lates the limits of the fundamental rights rationale em~ 
ployed in the Court's equal protection decisions : 
"The Court today does not 'pick out particular 
human activities, characterize them as "funda-
mental," and give them added protection . .. .' To 
the contrary, the Court simply recognizes, as it 
must, an established constitutional right, and gives 
to that right no less protection than the Consti-
tution itself demands." 394 U. S .. at 642. (Em-
phasis from original .) 
MR. JusTICE STEWART's statement serves to underline 
what the opinion of the Court in Shapiro makes clear. 
In subjecting to strict judicial scrutiny state welfare 
eligibility statutes that imposed a one-year durational 
t·esidency requirement as a precondition to receiving 
AFDC benefits, the Court explained . 
"in moving from State to State . . . appellees were 
exercising a constitutional right, and any classifica-
tion which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitu-
tional." l d., at 634. (Emphasis from original.) 
The right to interstate travel had long been recognized 
as a right of constitutional significance,7 0 and the Court '~ 
7" E. g .. United ::Jtates 1' . G·uest, :38;{ U. 8. 745 , 757- 759 (l9fio) : 
Oregon v. Mitrh ell. 400 U. S. 112, 229, 2:37- 2:38 (1970) (opmion of 
,Tl ' H'I' TCEI-i BHlCN NAN , WHITE . and :V1ARtHl ALJ, J , 
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decision therefore did not require an ad hoc detenninatio1i I 
as to the social or economic importance of that right. 71 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56 (1972), decided only 
last Term, firmly reiterates that social importance is 
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legisla-
tion to strict scrutiny. The complainants in that casej 
involving a challenge to the procedural limitations im-
posed on tenants in suits brought by landlords under 
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Law, 
urged the Court to examine the operation of the statute 
under "a more stringent standard than mere rationality." 
!d., at 73. The tenants argued that the statutory limita-
tions implicated "fundamental interests which are par-
ticularly important to the poor,'' such as the "'need for 
decent shelter' " and the " 'right to retain peaceful pos-
session of one's home' " Ibid. MR. JusTICE WHITE's ( 
analysis. in his opinion for the Court, is instructive: 
"We do not denigrate the importance of decent, 
safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution 
does not provide judicial remedies for every social 
and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in 
that document any constitutional guarantee of access 
to dwellings of a particular quality or any recogni-
tion of the right of a tenant to occupy the real 
property of his landlord beyond the term of his 
lease, without the payment of rent . . . . Absent 
constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate 
71 After Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970), there could 
be no lingering question about the constitutional foundation for 
the Court's holding in Shapir-o. In Dandridge the Court applied 
the rational basis test in reviewing Maryland's maximum family 
grant provision under its AFDC program. A frderal di~trict court 
held the provision unconstitutional, applying a stricter standard 
of review. In tlw c:<ourse of rever~iug the lower court, the Court 
distinguished , Shapiro properly on the ground that in that rase 
"the Court found state interference with the con~titutionally pro-
tected freedom of interstate travel." Id., at 484 n. 16. 
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housing and the definition of landlord-tenant rela-' 
tionships are legislative, not judicial, functions." 
ld., at 74. (Emphasis supplied.) 
~imilarly, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970), the Court's explicit recognition of the fact that 
the "administration of public welfare assistance ... in-
volves the most basic economic needs of impoverished 
human bei11gs." id., at 485.'~ provided no basis for depart-
ing from the settled mode of constitutional analysis of 
legislative classifications involving questions of economic 
and social policy. As in the case of housing, the central 
importance of welfare benefits to the poor was not an 
adequate foundation for requiring the State to justify its 
law by showing some compelling state interest. See also 
Jefferson v. Hackney! 406 U. S. 535 ( 1972); Richardson 
v. Belcher, 404 0. S. 78 ( 1971) 
The lesson of these cases in addressing the question 
now before the Court is plain. It is not the province 
of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights 
in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. 
Thus the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental'' is not to be found in comparisons of the relatiw 
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence 
c'r housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether 
education is as important as the right to travel. Rather. 
the answer lies in assessing whether there 1s a right to 
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Con-
~titution Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972): '' 
n The Court reftt8rd to apply the stri<'t scrutiny tcl:lt desptte it:> 
eontemporaneou:s recognition m Goldberg v Kelly, 897 U. S. 254, 
:Ui4 (1970), that "welfare provtdr:,; thr mran.~ to obtain rH::;entmf 
food, clothing, housing, and rnrdical carP.'' 
7" In Eisenstadt , the Court Htrurk down a Ma:s::;aelntHt'tl :-; ~tatut<• 
that prohtbtt rd thr di~tributwn of contrareptiv<• devicr::;, findmg that 
rhe law fatled "to satisfy rven the more lenirnt equal protect10n 
;;tandarrl '' ld . at 447 n 7.. NrV<'rthrlr~~. in dictum, thr Court 
... 
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Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972);" Police De.:. 
partment of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 
(1972); · ~ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)."' 
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded 
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor ( 
do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. 
r<>cit(•d the correct form of Pqual protretton analy~1~: "tf wr wer1~ 
to concludr that the Ma;,;;,;achu;;ptt::; statute Impinge;,; upon funda-
mental freedoms under Griswold r v. ConiU'Ctirut, :381 u. S. 479 
(19(i5)], thP ~tntutory chts::;Ificntlon would have to b!' not mrrei~· 
rationally related to a valid public purpo::;e but necessary to the 
<tchiPvement of a r·ompPiling ~tatE' intPrr~r.·· Ibid. (rmphasi:-< from 
original) 
71 Dunn fully canvassPs thi;; Court '~ votmg nghts ca:;p,; and ('X· 
plain~ that ''tht;; Court has madP clear that a ctt1zen ha::; a co 'lt~ 
stitutionaily protPcted right to parttctpatP 111 elections on an Pqual 
bmas wJth otlwr cltizPns in the jurisdictiOn." !d ., at :3:3() (emphal-II~ 
supplied). The eonstltutwnal underpmmng~ of thr right to rqual 
treatment in the voting proce~~ can no longer be doubtrd c•ven 
though, a~ thr Court noted 1n Ilarper '. Virgmw Bd. of Electwns, 
383 U. S. 663, 665 (196()), "thr right to vo1(• Ill state elrctwns I:> 
now her!' expre~sly mentwned." SPC' Oregou \'. iYhtchell, 400 U. S. 
112, 1:35, 1:38-144 (l\lR .. lutmcg DouGLAti), 229 241-242 (Optnton 
of BngNNAN, WH!'m, aud :VlAHtiHALL) (1970); Bullock v. Carter. 
405 U.S. l:H , 140-144 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School District. 
395 U.S. f\21, 625-(1:30 (19(i9); Williams Y. Rhodes, 393 U.S. :2:3, :29. ( 
30-:31 ( 1961-;) ; Reynolds v. Sims, :377 lJ. S. 5:{;), 554-5()2 ( 1964); 
Gray v. Sanders , :372 U.S. :368, :379-:381 (19(1:3). 
7 " In Moslf'.IJ. thr Court ~truck Jown a Chtcago ;uttlptckPttng 
ordinancr that rxPmptPd labor picketing from it:; prohibition~ . Tho 
ordinancl' was hPld mvalid under the Equal Protection Clauti(' 
aftrr subjecting it Lo careful scrutiny and finding that thr ordinancE' 
was not narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of rrviPw was appro-
pnatrly applied :;inc(' the ordinanC(' wa;; onr "affrct ing Fir~t Amrnd-
ment intert'Ht:;." Jd., at 101 , 
7 " Skinner appli('cj tlw staudard of clo::;P ~crutmy to <t statr law 
permitting forced ~tPrillzation of "habitual criminals." lmplictt m 
the Court's opiniou is the n'cognition that the right of procrration 
l::; among the rig\11:; of per;,;onal privacy protected nndN the Cou~tt­
tutiou . Rr<-' Roe v. Wade, ·- lJ S - - ( 197:{) 
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As we have said, the undisputed importance of education 
will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual 
standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legis-
lation. lt is appellees' contention, however, that educa-
tion is distinguishable from other services and benefits 
provided by the State because it bears a peculiarly close 
relationship to other rights and liberties accorded pro-
tection under the Constitution. Specifically, they insist 
that education is itself a fundamental personal right be-
cause it is essential to the effective exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 
right to vote. In asserting a nexus between speech and 
education, appellees urge that the right to speak is mean-
ingless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his 
thoughts intelligently and persuasively. The "market-
place of ideas" is an empty forum for those lacking basic 
communicative tools. Likewise, they argue that the 
corollary right to receive information 77 becomes little 
more than a hollow privilege when the recipient has not 
been taught to read, assimilate. and utilize available 
knowledge. 
A similar line of reasoning is pursued with respect 
to the right to vote. 78 Exercise of the franchise, it is con-
tended, cannot be divorced from the educational foun-
dation of the voter. The electoral process, if reality is 
tp conform to the democratic ideal, depends on an in-
77 See, e. g., Red Lion Broadcastmg Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 
:3159-390 (1969) ; ::itanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969) ; 
Lamont v. Postmaster Ge11R1'al, :{81 lJ. S. :301, 30f:\-:307 (1965) . 
78 Since the right to vote, per se, i;; not a constitutional!~· pro-
tected right, we assume that nppellrrs' rcferencr:; to that right arc 
~Imply shorthand reference:; to the protrcted right, implicit 111 our I 
constitutioual sy;;tem, to participate in ::;tate elert10ns on an equal 
has1::; with other qualified voters whrnrver the State ha::; adopted 
an elective proce::;::; for determining who will reprrsent any segment 
of t.he State's populatiOn . ~('<' n. 74. supro 
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formed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelli~ 
gently unless his reading skills and thought processes 
have been adequately developed. 
We need not dispute any of these propositions. The 
Court has long afforded zealous protection against U t i-
justifiable governmental interference with the individ-
ual's rights to speak and to vote. Yet we have never 
presumed to possess either the ability or the authority 
to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or 
the most informed electoral choice. That these may be 
desirable goals of a system of freedom of expression and 
of a representative form of government is not to be 
doubted."' These are indeed goals to be pursued by a 
people whose thoughts and beliefs are freed from govern-
mental interference. But they are not values to be 
lmplemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legiti-
mate state activities. 
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan-
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequi~ 
site to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no 
indication that the present levels of educational expendi~ 
ture in Texas provide an education that falls short. 
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a 
7u The State~ haY<' often pursued their entirely lcgitimatr intere~t 
in m;suring "intelligent rxrrci~e of the franchise," Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, :3S4 U. S. 041, fi5.5 ( 196!1), through ~urh dev1rr:-; as lit-
erac:v tests and age restrictions on t hr right to vote. SPe tbid., 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (]970). And, whrre those restric-
tions have brrn found to promote intPiligent nsc of tlw ballot without, 
discriminating againHt thosP racial and Pthnic minoritie::; previonsly 
deprived of an equal Pducational opportunity, this Court has upheld 
their u~P. Com parr Lass ita v. N ortharnpton County Bd. of Elec-· 
tions, :360 U.S. 45 (1959), with Oreoon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 1:3:~ 
(Mr . .Tusticr Black), 1:35, l.t4--147 (:Vln .. Ju::mc~~ Dou<;LAK), 15:2. 
'2 16-217 (Mr . .lu~tice Harlan) , 229, 231-2:~6 (Opinion of .TutmCE:> 
BHENNAN, WHrm, and :'viAWHIALL). 281, 282-2S4 (Mn .. Ju::;Tice 
STEWAin), and Ga~ion Cou.nt!l v. United States, 395 0 . S. 2S5 (19()9), 
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State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial o£ 
educational opportunities to any of its children, that 
argument provides no basis for finding an interference 
with fundamental rights where only relative differences in 
~pending levels are involved and where-as is true in the 
present case-no charge fairly could be made that the 
system fails to provide each child with an opportunity 
to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the right~ of speech and of full participation in 
the political proc~ss . 
Furthermore, th logical limitations on appellees' nexus 
theory are difficul to perceive. How, for instance, is 
education to be distinguished from the significant per-
sonal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assump-
tion that the ill-fed, ill·clothed, and ill-housed are among 
the most ineffective participants in the political process 
and that they derive the least enjoyment from the 
benefits of the First Amendmrmt.H" If so appellees ' I 
thesis would cast serious doubt on the authority of Dan-
dridge v. Williams, supra, and Lindsey v. Normet, supra. 
We have carefully considered each of the arguments 
supportive of the District Court's finding that educa-
tion is a fundamental right or liberty and have found 
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect 
we find this a particularly inappropriate case in which 
to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. The 
present case, in another basic sense, is significantly dif-
ferent from any of the cases in which the Court has 
applied strict scrutiny to state or fed eral legislation 
touching upon constitutionally protected rights. Each of 
s-o See Schoettle, The Eqval Protection Clause in Pubhc Educa-
tion. 71 Col. L. Hev . 1355, 1389- 1390 (1971) ; Viem1 , supra, 11. fiH , 
at 622-623 ; Comment , Trnant Interest RcprE\Sentation : Proposal for 
a National Tenants' A:ssociation, 47 Trx. L. Rrv. 1160, 1172- 1173 
n. 61 (1969) . 
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pur prior cases involved legislation which "deprived ,' ~ 
·''infringed," or "interfered" with the free exercise of 
some such fundamental personal right or liberty . 8ee 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 536; Shapiro v. Thompso·n, 
supra, at 634; Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, at 338-343. 
A critical distinction between those cases and the onf' 
now before us lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with 
respect to education. MR. JusTICE BHENNAN, writing 
for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 P B. f:i41 
( 1966), expresses well the salient point · '' 
"This is not a complaint that Congress . .. has un-
constitutionally denied or diluted anyone's right to 
vote but rather that Congress violated the Consti-
tution by not extending the relief effected [to others 
similarly situatedl .... 
"[The federal law in question] does not restnct or 
deny the franchise but in effect extends the franchise 
to persons who otherwise would be denied it by 
state law. , . . We need decide only whether the 
challenged limitation on the relief effected ... was 
permissible. In deciding that question, the prin-· 
ciple that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinc-
tions in laws denying fundamental rights . . is 
inapplicable; for the distinction challenged by ap-
pellees is presented only as a limitation on a reform 
~~ Katzenbach v. Morgan involved a chaJienge by regJ~:;tcred voter:; 
in New York City to a provisiOn of thr Voting Ri!!;hts Act of 1965 
that prohibited enforcement of a state law railing for Engli:;h 
literacy tests for voting. The law was suspended as to residents 
from Puerto Rico who had completed at least :;ix year:; of educa-
tion at an "American-flag" school in that country evm though 
the language of instruction was other than English. Thi::; Court 
upheld the que:;tionrd provi~ion of the 19G5 Act over thl' claim that 
Jt discnmmatrd agaiu~:;t tho::;e with a :;Ixth grade Pducation obtauwd 
in non-English-;;peakml!: ~cbool~:; ot bc>r than t hl' onr~< dPl:>ill;natrd by t llf' 
f(•drral lrgiHia t ton . 
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measure aimed at eliminating an existing barriet 
to the exercise of the franchise. Rather, in deciding 
the constitutional propriety of the limitations in 
such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar 
principles that a 'statute is not iuvalid under the 
Constitution because it might have gone farther tha11 
it did.' . . . that a legislature need not 'strike at all 
Pvils at the same time,' and that 'reform may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legisla-
tive mind : '' !d ., at 656-657. (Emphasis from 
original.) 
The Texas system of school finance is not unlike the 
federallegislatiou involved in Katzenbach in this regard . 
Every step leading to the establishment of the system 
Texas utilizes today-including the decisions permitting 
localities to tax and expend locally, and creating and 
continuously expanding state aiel-was implemented in 
an effort to extend public education and to improve its 
quality.R 2 Of course, every reform that benefits some 
more than others may be criticized for what it fails 
to accomplish. But we think it plaiu that, in substance, 
the thrust of the Texas system is affirmative and re-
formatory and, therefore, should be scrutinized under 
judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's 
efforts and to the rights reserVf•d to the ~tates under thP" 
e ~onsti tu tion . -~ 
It should be clear. for the reasons stated above all(l 
in accord with the prior decisions of this Court, that 
H2 Cf Meye1· ' Nebraska, 2(i2 U 8. :mo (1923) , Pierce, .. Soaety 
of Sisters. :26,1, 0 S. 510 (1925) ; llaryrove v K~1·k. ;~];{ F t-lupp 
\;144 (MD Fla 1970) , vacatf'd, 401 U S. 47fi (1971) 
M3 8rf' Schilb v Kuebel, 404 lJ S :~57 (1971); McDouald "" 
Hrl. of Rlel'hrm ('umm'rs, :{94 l l, 8 ..-m ( 1~)()9). 
I 
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this is not a case in which the challenged stat<• action 
must be subjected to the searching judicial scrutiny n·~ 
served for laws that create suspect classifications or 
impinge upon constitutionally protected rights. 
We ueed not rest our decision, however, solely on the 
inappropriateness of the strict scrutiny test. A century 
of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause affirmatively supports the application of 
the traditional standanl of review. which requires only 
that the State's system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes. This cas<' 
represents far more than a challenge to ·the manner iri 
which Texas provides for the education of its children. 
We have here nothing less thau a direct attack · on the 
way in which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse ·· 
state and local tax revenues. We are askf'd to condemn 
the State's j udgmeut in conferring on political sub.: 
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests. Iu so doing, appellees would 
have the Court intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures.'' ' This Court has 
often admonished against such interferences with the 
State's fiscal policies under the Equal Protection Clause : 
"The broad discretion as to classification possessed 
by a legislature in the field of taxation has long 
been recognized. . . . ITlhe passage of time has 
only served to underscore the wisdom of that recogni-
tion of the large area of discretion which is needed 
by a legislature in formulating sound tax poli-
cies. . . . It has . . . been pointed out that in 
taxation, even more than in other ficlcls. legislatures 
possess the greatest freedom in classification. :.;;ince 
"S(•e , 1'. g., B ell's Gap R Co v. Pmtrli.lJlvania, 1:34 U.S. 232 (1i'90) : 
C'annichae/ v. South em ('val ,t· CokP Co .. :~01 ll. S. -HJ5 . 501'-50~ 
(l9:37) . Allin / 8tore~ of Ohio . Inc . \'. Rowrrs , :l.'i,-: 11 H. 52:.! (IH59) . 
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the members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a 
familiarity with local conditions which this Court 
cannot have, the presumption of constitutionality 
can be overcome only by the most explicit demon-
stration that a classification is a hostile and oppres-
sivP discrimination against particular persons and 
classes . ... " Madden v. Kentucky, 309 tT. S. 831 
87-88 ( 1940) . 
pee also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,-
U. B. - ( 1973); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co ., 311 
U. S. 435, 445 ( 1940) . 
Thus we stand on familiar ground when we coutwue to 
acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both th€' 
~xpertise and the familiarity with local problems so neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to th€' 
raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet we are 
urged to ctirect the States either to alter drastically thr 
prese11t system or to throw out the property tax altogether 
in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of 
taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, in-
come, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been 
devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In 
such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives 
exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a. 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become 
.subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause.'r. 
85 Tho~e who urge that the pre::;ent ;;y~tem be mvahdatrd offer 
httle guidance a:; to what type of school finanei11g ~hould replace 
it. The mo;,;t likely result of rejection of thr rxtstiug sy~trm wou ld I 
be 8tatewid(• financi11g of all public rdueation with funds drrived from 
taxation of proprrty or from the adoption or rxpansion of ~ale~:> and 
income taxe:; . SP<' Simon. supra. n. (i:2 . Thr author~ of Privatr 
Wealth and Publk Educatton, supm. n. n. at :201-242 , suggest aq 
aJternatlV<' :<elwml', known a:-; "dt~tnrt power equalizmg " ln ~tmpl<>~1 
trrms, the State would guarantee that at any part1rular rate ul 
)lropertl' taxatiOn the rh~tnr1 would n 'rrtvf' H Htated numher of 
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In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also 
involves the most persistent and difficult questions of 
educational policy, another area in which this Court's 
lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels 
against premature interference with the informed j udg-
ments made at the state and local levels. Education. 
perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a 
myriad of "intractable economic, social. and even philo-
sophical problems.'' Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S .. 
at 487. The very complexity of the problems of financing· 
and managing a statewide public school system suggest 
that "there will be more than one constitutionally per-
missible method of solving them," and that. within the 
limits of rationality. "the legislature's efforts to tackle 
the problems" should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. 
Hackney, 40~ U. S. 535, 546-547 (1972). On even 
the most basic questiqns in this area the scholars 
t:tnd educational experts are divided. Indeed, one of" 
the hottest sources of controversy concerns the extent 
to which there is a demonstrable correlation between 
P.ollars regardle~s of the du;tnrt's tax ba~e. To finance the ~llbHicllcs 
to "poorer" districts, funds would be takrn away from the .. wealthier" 
districts that, bccauHe of their higher property Hilue~. co llect moro 
than the ~tated <tmotmt at any gJVcn ratP. Thit; i~ not the place to 
weigh the arguments for and ag;tin~t "dbtrict power equalizing," b('-
yond noting that commentator~ arc 111 dbagreement a~ to whcthev 
it is feasible, how it would work, and inclerd whether it would violatP 
the equal protection theory undet•lying appellee~,;' caHc. President '~ 
Comm'n on School Fluancc, Schoob. Peoplr & Moury :3:2-:33 (197:2); 
Bateman & Brown. Somp RefiPction~ on 8errano v. Prirst. 49 .I 
Urban L. 701, 70G-708 (1972); Brc·~t. Book HeviPw. 23 Stan. L. Hev. 
591 , 594-596 (197 i) ; Goldstein, supra, n. :31\, at 542-54:3; Wi~r, 
School Finance Equalization Lawsuit~: A Model LPgi~lativC' He-
~ponsr, 2 Yale Rev . of L. & Soc. Ac1ion 12:3, 125 (1971); Silnrd 
& White, Intra~tate Inequalities 111 Public Education: ThC' Cmw 
for Judicial Relief Under thr Equal Protrrtim1 Clau::;c , 1970 Wi::;. 
L. RPv. 7, 29-30. 
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tJducational expenditures and the quality of education "''-
an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal 
conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case, 
Relaterl to the questioned relationship between cost and 
quality is the equally unsettled controversy as to the 
proper goals of a system of public education.'7 And 
the question regarding the most effective relationship 
heween state boards of education and local school boards . 
.in terms of their respective responsibilities and degrees 
of control, is now undergoing searching re-examma-
tion. The ultimate wisdom as to these and related 
problems of education is not likely to be devined for 
all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debatE' 
the issues. In such circumstances the judiciary is well 
advised to refrain from interposing on the States m-
flexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe· 
or handicap the continued research and experimentation 
so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational 
problems and to keepin~ abreast of Pver changing 
ponditions. 
It must be remembered also that every claim arisi11g 
under the Equal Protection Clause bas unplications for 
~"The qualJt y-coHt cont rovt:>r~y has rec(•ived con~1derable att(•Jl-
lion . Among the notable authontJes on both ~Ide;; are the follow-
iHg . l' .Jencks, Inequality (1972) ; C Silberman. Cris1;; m tlw 
('Jassroom (1970) ; Office of Education, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (196(1) (The Coleman He port); On Equaltty of Educa-
twnal Opportunity (1972) (Moynihan & 1\fo::;teller rds.); .f . Guthm, 
C. Klrindorf('r, II. Levin , & R. Stout. School~ and lnequahtr 
(1969) ; Pre;;idrnt ';; Comm'n on School Finance, supra, 11 H5: Swan-. 
~on , Tlw Co::;t-Quality RrlatJon~>hip, 111 Thr Challrnge of Change in 
School Finance, 10th Nat'! Edncational A,;~n C'onf. on Sebool Finanr<• 
151 (19(ii) 
' ' Ser the n•:sult,; of the Tl•xa" Govemor'~ Commit tee ';; c>tatl•WH1l• 
~ttrvpy on thr goal« of Pducatwn m that State. I Governor'~­
('ommn tee Report, at 59- (il- Sl·P also Gold;;trm , supra, n. 3g, 
:.t( .5Hl- li22 : Rehorttle. supra. 11. XO , authont1es rJt<'d Ill n. Hfi. su.pm,. 
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Lhe relationship between national and state power under 
our federal system. Questions of federalism are always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State's 
laws are to be accorded the traditional presumption of 
constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigor" 
ous judicial scrutiny. While "[tjhe maintenance of 
the principles of federalism is a foremost consideration 
.in interpreting any of the pertinent provisions under 
which this Court examines state action.''"' it would be' 
difficult to imagine a case having a greater potential 
, impact on our federal system than the one now before 
us. in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financ-
ing public education presently in existence in virtually 
every State. 
The foregoing considerations buttress our conclusion 
that Texas' system of public school finance is an inap-
propriate candidate for strict .i udicial scrutiny. Thesf" 
same considerations are rclevan t to the determination 
whether that system, with its conceded imperfections, 
nevertheless bears some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose. It is to this question that we next 
turn our attention . 
lii 
The basic contours of the Texas school finance system 
have been traced at the outset of this opinion. We will 
now describe in more detail that system and how it 
operates, as these facts bear directly upon the demands 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Apart from federal assistance, each Texas school re-
ceives its funds from the State and from its local school 
district. On a statewide average, a roughly comparablf" 
"'ALlied Stores uf Ohiu, Inc " Bowers, a5H ll . 8 . 5:Z2, 5;30 , 5;{2 
(1!:159) (MR . • Jut>T IGE BHEN N AN, concurring) ; Katzenbach v . Morgrrn , 
~ ~1-14 P S, fi41 . 659 . f)61 (1966) ( l\lr .Justirr Harlan. dissrntlllg) 
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·amount of funds is uerived from each source.'w The 
State's contribution, under the Minimum Foundation 
Program, was designed to provide an adequate minimum 
educational offering in every school in the State. Funds 
are distributed to assure that there will be one teacher-
compenstated at the state-supported minimum salary-
for every 25 students.00 Each school district's other 
supportive personnel are provided for: one principal for 
every 30 teachers; '" one "special service" teacher-
librarian, nurse, doctor, etc.-for every 20 teachers; 1)2 
superintendents, vocational instructors. counselors, and 
educators for exceptional children are also provided."" 
Additional funds an' earmarked for current operating· 
expenses, for student transportation."' and for freP 
textbooks."'' 
The program is adrmnistered by the t::ltate Board of 
Education and by the Central Education Agency, which 
also have responsibility for school accreditation 9 r. and 
for monitoring the statutory teacher qualification stand-· 
11rds.97 As reflected by the 62% increase in funds allotted 
to the Edgewood School District over the last threfJ 
,Years,r1' the State's financial contribution to education 1s 
:Steadily increasinp;. None of Texas' school districts, how-
hw In 1!:170 Texa::; expended approxnnately 2.1 b1llion dollars for 
pducatwn and a little over onr billion came from thP Minimum 
Foundation Program Texas Research L<•agur . suwa. n 20, at :2 . 
"" Tf'X Edur ('o(k ~ If) 1:~ (I 97:2). 
" 1 !d., § 1() li-o . 
''" I d .. § Hi.l5 
'"'!d ., §§ Hi.W . W,17, W.HJ 
!H !d ., §§ Hi.45 , 16 .5 1 -W .It~. 
"~ ld ' §§ 1:2.01- 1:2.0-t. 
''" 7 d .. § IJ.:W ( 5 l 
'•7 ld .. § Hi.:301 et Sl'lf, 
'"SP(' aute af 9-lll, 
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ever, has been content to rely alone on funds from the 
Foundation Program. 
By virtue of the obligation to fulfill its local Fund 
Assignment, every district must impose an ad valorem 
tax on property located within its borders. The Fund 
Assignment was designed to remain sufficiently low to 
assure that each district would have some ability to 
provide a more enriched educational program.0u Every 
district supplements its foundation grant in this manner. 
In some districts the local property tax contribution is 
~nsubstantial, as in Edgewood where the supplement 
was only $26 per pupil in 1967. In other districts the 
local share may far exceed even the total Foundation 
grant. In part. local differences are attributable to dif-
ferences in the rates of taxation or in the degree to which 
the market value for any category of property varies from 
its assessed value.100 The greatest interdistrict disparities, 
however, are attributable to differences in the amount of 
assessable property available within any district. Those 
districts that have more property, or more valuable prop-
erty, have a greater capability for supplementing state 
funds. In large measure, these additional local revenues 
are devoted to paying higher salaries to more teachers. 
Therefore, the primary distinguishing attributes of schools 
in property-affluent districts are lower pupil-teacher ratios 
and higher salary schedules."" 
99 Gilmer-Aiken Committee, supra, n. 15, at 15. 
100 There is no uniform statewide assessment practice in Texa~ . 
. Commercial property, for example, might be taxed at 30% of 
market value in one county and at 50% in another. V Governor's 
Committee Heport, at 25-26; Berh, Carnevale. Morgan & Wh1tr, 
supra, n. 29, at 666-667 n. 16. 
"" Texa~ Hesearch League. supra. n. 20, at 18. Texas, in thiH I 
regard, i~ not unlike most other States. One commentator has ob-
served that "di:sparitirs in cxprnditure~ appear to br largely ex· 
..• 
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This, then, is the basic outline of the Texas finance 
structure. Because of differences in expenditure levels 
occasioned by disparities in property tax income, ap-
pellees claim that children in less affluent districts have 
been made the subject of invidious discrimination. The 
District Court found that the State had failed even "to 
establish a reasonable basis'' for a system that results 
in different levels of per pupil expenditure. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. We disagree. 
plained by variatiOn~ in tearhN salaner;." Stmon. supra, n. o2. at 
41:~. 
A~ prevwwsly not('d, text acrompanymg n. !:lf:i. 8Upra, the extent to 
which t lw quality of education varie~ wtth expenditure per pupil 1s 
debated inconclu~\vely by th(' most thoughtful studrnt;; of pubhc edu-
catwn. While all would flgr('r that therE' is a corrrlatwn up to tlw 
·pomt of JH'OVIdmg the rPeognized E'H~ential:s in far1htiE'~ and arnclrmtc 
opportunities, the issues of greatest disagrrempnt mrlude thP dl'l'ct on 
thr quality of education of pupil-tmclwr rattos and of higher tPachE'r 
~alary ,;chedulrs. E. g., Oflicr of Ecluratwn, supra. n. R6, at :no-al9 
The statE' funding 111 Texas is dPSJgned to assure, on the avrrage, uno 
teacher for every '25 ::;tuclent:s , which ~ ~ considrred to be a favorable 
ratio by most standard::;. Whrther thr minimum sa lary of $6,000 per 
year IS :sufficient in Texas to aH ract qualified teacher::; may be mort'~ 
debatable, dependmg Ill maJor Jlart upon the locatwn of lhr school 
distnct. But there appears to br littlE' empincal data that support~:­
the advantagE' of any partiCular pup1l-teaclH'r rat1o or that document~ 
the ex1stencr of a depPndable correlation bctwern the levPl of pub he 
~chool teachers' salaries and the quality of their cla~sroom instruc-
tion. An intractable problrm m dealmg wtth teachers' salan(':,: is the 
absence, up to this time, of satisfactory technique:; for judging 
their ability or performance. l1elat1vely frw ~rhool :systPm:s have 
ment. plan::; of any kmd, w1th the rr::mlt that teachers' salaries arc• 
usually mcrra::;ed acros:s the board in a way wh1rh trnds to rrward tho 
lea::;t dPServmg on the sa me ba::n:s aR thr most desc•rvmg. Salane:s are 
usually raised automatically on the ba:s1s of length of service and 
according to prrdrtE'l'mmerl "Rtep::;," ('Xtrncling ovPr 10-to-12 year 
penocl" • 
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Iu its reliance on state as well as local resources, the 
frexas system is comparable to the systems employed 
in virtually every other State.' 0 " The power to tax local 
property for educational purposes has been recognized 
ln Texas at least since 1883.'"" When the growth of 
commercial and industrial centers anu accompanying 
shifts in population began to create disparities in local 
resources, Texas undertook a program calling for a con-
siderable investment of state funds. 
The "foundation grant" theory upon which Texas 
t;)ducators based the Gilmer-Aiken bills, was a product 
of the pioneering work of two New York educational re-
formers in the 1920's, George D. Strayer and Robert M. 
Haig.104 Their efforts were devoted to establishing a 
means of guaranteeing a minimum statewide educational 
program without sacrificing the vital element of local 
'"2 Pre~Ident':; Comm'n on School Fmance, supra, 11 85, at 9. Until 
recently, Hawaii was the only Stat<' that maintamrd a pur0ly ~tatC'­
funded educational program. In 1968, however, that State amrnded 
its educational finance statut0 to permit countirs to collect addi-
twnal fund:; locally and ::;pend tho:;e amount:; on it::; school::;. Thr 
rationale for that recent legi::;lative choice is im;tructlvP on thr 
question before thr Court today 
''Undrr exi:;ting law, countws are prrduded from domg anythmg 
ln this area, ev0n to spPnd thrir own fund::; if they so desire. Th1s 
corrective lrgi::;lat10n is urgently needed in order to allow counties 
to go above and beyond the State's standards and provide educa-
twnal facilities a::; good as the prople of the countir::; want and 
are willing to pay for . Allowing local communitie:; to go above 
and beyond rstablished mmimums prov1ded for their people pncour-
ages the brst fratures of democratic government." Haw. SC'::;::L Laws, 
Art. 38, § 1 (1968). 
w~ See text accompanying n. 7, supra. 
'"' U. Strayer & R. Ha\g , Tlw Fimmcmg of Education m thr StatP 
of NPw York (192;3). For a thorough analytii::; of the contribution 
of these rrformrrs and of the prior and subsequent hi::;tory of edu-
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participation. The Strayer-Haig thesis represented an 
accommodation between these two competing forces. As 
~rticulated by Professor Coleman · 
"The history of education since the industrial revolu-
tion shows a continual struggle between two forces: 
the desire by members of society to have educational 
opportunity for all children, and the desire of each 
family to provide the best education it can afford for 
its own children.··""' 
The Texas system of school finance is responsive to 
these two forces. While assuring a basic education for 
every child in the 8tate, it permits and encourages a large 
measure of participation in and control of each district's 
schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a 
consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of 
government, local sharing of responsibility for public edu-
cation has survived. The merit of local control was recog-
nized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Wright v. Council of the C'ity of Emporia, 407 U.S. 
451 (1972). MH. JusTICE STEWART stated there that 
" [ d] irect control over decisions vitally affecting the educa-
tion of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our 
society." ld., at 469. THE CHIEF JusTICE, in his dis-
sent, agreed that "[l]ocal control is not only vital to con-
tinued public support of the schools, but it is of over-
riding importance from an educational standpoint as 
well.'' !d., at 478. 
The persistence of attachment to government at 
the lowest level where education is concerned reflects 
the depth of commitment of its supporters. In part. 
local control means, as Professor Coleman suggests, the 
freedom to devote more money to the education of one's 
children. Equally important. however. is the opportunity 
10" J . CoonH, W Clune & S. Sugarman, supra, n. 13, Foreword by 
.• lames S. Coleman , at v1i. 
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·it offers for participation in the decision-making proc"' 
ess that determines how those local tax dollars will be 
spent. Each locality is free to tailor local programs to 
local needs. Plur~lism als9 affords some opportunity 
for experimentation, mnovation, and a healthy competi-
tion for educational excellence. An analogy to the 
Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems 
uniquely appropriate. Mr. .Justice Brandeis identified 
as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of govern-
ment eaph State's freedom to "serve as a laboratory ... 
and try novel social and economic experiments." lOG No 
area of social concern stands to profit more from a multi-
plicity of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches 
than does public education. 
Appellees do not question the propriety of Texas' 
dedication to local control of education. To the contrary, 
they attack the school finance system precisely because, 
in their view, it does not provide the same level of locaf 
control' and fiscal flexibility in all districts. Appellees 
suggest that local control could be preserved and pro-
moted· under other financing- systems that resulted' in 
more equality in educational expenditures. While it is 
no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation 
for school revenues provides less freedom of choice with re-
spect to expenditures for some districts than for others,"" 
106 New State Ice Co. v. Leibrnann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1932). 
107 MR. Jm:;'l'ICE WHITE ~uggests in his dissent that the Texas 
l:!ystem violates the Equal Protection Clause becau~e the means it ha~ 
selected to effectuate its interest in local autonomy fail to guarantee 
complete freedom of choice to every district. He . places special 
empha~is on the ~tatutory provision that establi~hes a maximum rate 
of $1.50 per $100 valwttion at whi ch a local school district may tax 
for school maintenance. Tex. Educ. Code § 20.04 (d) ( 1972). The 
maintenance rate in Edgewoo.d when this ca~e was litigated in the 
District Court was $.S5 per .UOO, barely one-third of the a!Jowable 
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the existence of "some inequality" in the manner in 
which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a 
sufficient basis for striking down the entire system. 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961). 
It may not be condemned simply because it imperfectly 
effectuates the State's goals. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U. S., at 485. Nor must the financing system fail be-
cause, as appellees suggest, another method of satisfying 
the State's interests, while occasioning "less drastic" 
disparities in expenditures, might be conceived. Only 
where state action impinges on the exercise of funda~ 
mental constitutional rights or liberties must it be found 
to have chosen the least restrictive alternative. Cf. Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 343 ( 1972); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). It is also well to 
remember that even those districts that have reduced 
ability to make free decisions with respect to how much 
they spend on education still retain under the present sys-
tem a large measure of authority as to how available 1 
funds will be allocated. They further enjoy the power 
to make numerous other decisions with respect to the 
operation of the schools.'"' The people of Texas may be 
ratP for maintenance and for thP retirempnt of bonds.) Appellees do 
not cla1m that the ceiling presently bar;; desired tax increases in Edge-
wood or in any other Texas district. Therefore, the constitutionality 
of th~:~,t statutory provision is not before us and must await litigation 
in a case in which it is properly presented. Cf. Hargrave v. Kirk, 
313 F. Supp. 944 (MD Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). 
111 8 MR. JusTICE MARSHALL statE'S in hi;; dis;;enting opinion that 
the State's a~serted interest in local control is a "mere sham," post , 
p. 60, and that it has bePn oft'pred not as a legitimate justification 
but "as an excusE' ... for interdi;; trict inE-quality." !d. , at 56. In 
additwn to a~serting that local control would be pre;;erved and po~­
sibly brtter served under other systems-a consideration that we 
find irre!Pvant for purpose of deciding whPther the system may be 
said to bP supported by a legitimate and reasonablE' basis-the dis-
<Pent suggests th<tt Texas' lack of good faith may be demon~trated 
' ' ' . 
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_justified in believing that other systems of school finance; 
which place more of the financial responsibility in the 
hands of the State, Wlill result in a comparable lessening 
of desired local autonomy. That is, they may believe 
that along with increased control of the purse strings 
hy exarmmng thr extent to which the Stat(• aln•ady mamtain~ eon-
~iderable rontrol. The State, we arr told, rrgulatr::; "the mo:-;1 mtnutt• 
details of local public rducation," ibid .. including textbook ~rlrrt ion, 
tracher 4uallfication~. and thr lrngth of the ~chou! clay. Thi~ as~Pr­
tion, that genumr local control does not exi~t lll Trxa:;, ~imply 
cannot. br ~upportecl. It 1:; abundantly rrfutrd by thr elaboratP 
:;tatutory divi:;ion of re:;ponsibJiitJe::; :;et out 111 the Texa:; Education 
Code. Although policy decbion-making and :;upNvi~ion in eertam 
~Lrea:; art> re:srrvecl to the Statr, the clay-to-day authority over thr 
··management and control" of all public Plementary and :;eronclar~· 
,;chool:; tl:i squarely placrd ou the local school board:;. Tex. Educ 
Codr §§ 17.01, 2:3.26 (1972) Among the mnumrrable SJ)('Ctfic power~ 
of the local school authoritie:; are the followmg: thr power of rminrnt 
domain to acquirr land for thr con;;truction of school facilitirs, id .. 
§§ 17 .26, 23.26; the powrr to hirr and terminate trachrrs and otlwr 
per~:>onnel, id., §§ 1:3.101-1:3.103; the powrr to drsignatr condit tons of 
teachrr rmploymrnt and to establi~h certmn ;;tandard:; of educational 
policy, id., § 13.901; the pow<'f to maintain order and disCipline, 
id., § 21.:305, includmg thr prerogattve to :;m;pend ~tudrnt;; for dt~­
ciplinary rea;;ons, id., § 21.:~01; the power to dPcidr whether to offer 
a kindergarten program, id., §§ 21.l:H-21.1:~5. or a vocational tram-
ing program, ul., § 21.111, or a program of ~pecial rducation for 
the hand1eapped, id., § ll.Hi ; thl' powrr to control thr a~~Ignment 
and tran~:>frr of ~tudent;;, id., §§ 21.074--21.0~0; and tlw power to 
operate and mamtam a ~:>chool bu~ program, ul., § Hi.52. See also 
Perms v. LaMarque Ind. 8chuo/ Dist., ;~2R F. Supp. 6:3H (Tex. 
1971); NichoLs v. Aldine lnd. SchooL Dist., :356 S . W. 2d 1~2 (Tex . 
Civ. App. 1962). Local :;chool board~ also determme attt•ndance 
zone~:>, location of new school,;, clo~ing of old onr~, ;;cbool a ttenda ncr 
hour~:> (within limit~:>), gradmg and promotiOn policte::; subject to grn-
Pral guideline~. n'creational and athletic pohcie:;, and a mynad of 
other matter:; m the rout 111(' of ::;chool administration. It cannot lw 
~eriously doubted that Ill Texa:;, ('duration remams largPI~· a local 
funct1011, and that the prrpond<'fatmg bulk of all decisio11~:> affectlll!-!' 
the schoob are madr and executed at the locullPvel. guaranteeing tlw 
_greatest participation by tho~P mo~t din•ctly c•oncernPd 
. : 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ , 4\l 
at the state level will go increased control over local 
policies.100 
Appellees further urge that the Texas system is uncon-
stitutionally arbitrary because it allows the availability 
of local taxable resources to turn on "happenstance." 
They see no j usti:fication for a system that allows, as 
tpey contend, the quality of education to fluctuate on the 
basis of the fortuitous positioning of the boundary lines 
of political subdivisions and the location of valuable com-
mercial and industrial property. But any scheme of 
l9cal taxation-indeed the very existence of identifiable 
local governmental units-requires the establishment of 
10" This themr-that greater ~tate control over funding will lead 
to greater state power with respect to local educational program~ 
a.I)d policies-is a recurrent one in the literature on financing public 
ec(ucat1on. Professor Simon, in his thoughtful analysis of the po-
litical ramifications of this case, states that on<> of the most likely 
consequences of the District Court's decision would be an increase 
in the centralization of school finance and an increase in the <·x'-
tent of collect1ve bargaming by teacher unions at the Htate 
level. He suggests that the wbjects for bargaining may include 
many ''non-salary" item,;, such a~ teaching loads, clnss size, curricula,r 
;1nd program choices, questions of student di~cipline, and selection 
of administrative personnel-matters traditionally decided heretoforr 
at the local level. Simon, supra, n. n2, at 434-436. See, e. q., 
Coleman, Th<> Struggle for Control of Education, in Education 
and Social Policy: Local Control of Education 64, 77-78 (BowE>rs 
ed. 1970); ,}. Conant, The Child, The Parent, ::wd The StHte 27 
(1959) ("Unless a local community, through its school board, ba~ 
some control over the pursE', there can br little real feE>Iing 1t1 
the community that schools arc in fact local schools. .'') ; HowE', 
Anatomy of a Revolution, in Sat. Rev. 84, H8 (Nov. 20, 1971) 
("It is au axiom of American politics that control and powE'r follow 
money . , . . "); Hutchinson, StatE>-AdministE>red Locally-Sharf'd Taxe;; 
21 (1931) (' ' I S]tate administratiOn of taxation i~ the fi~t ~tcp to~ 
ward ,.;tatE' control of the functions supportf'd by thE'SE' taxe~. . ."). 
Irrespective of whether one regards such prospE>cts as dE'trimcntal , 
or whether he agrres that the con::;NJncncf' i8 inevitable, it. certainly 
cannot be doubtf'd that there is a rational basi<> for this concrm on 
the part of parrnt~ , educators, <lild IE>gislator~ . 
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jurisdictional boundaries that are inevitably arbitrary, 
It is 'equally inevitable that some localities are going· 
to be blessed with more taxable assets than others."" Nor 
is local wealth ·'a stadc. quantity. Changes in the level 
of taxable wealth within any district may result from 
any number of events, some of which locai residents 
can and do influence. For instance, . commercial and 
industrial enterprises may be encouraged to locate within 
a district by various actions-public and private. 
Moreover, if local taxation for local expenditure is an 
unconstitutional method of providing for education then 
it may be equally impermissible to provide other nee- \ 
essary services customarily financed largely from local 
property taxes, including local police and fire protection, 
public health and hospitals, and public utility facilities of 
various kinds. We perceive no justification for such a 
severe denegration of local property taxation and control { 
as would follow from appellees' contentions, It has sim-
ply never 'been within the constitutional prerogative of 
this Court to nullify statewide measures for financing pub-
lic services merely because the l;lUrdens or benefits thereof 
fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the 
political subd.ivisions in which citizens live. 
ln sum, to the extent that the Texas system of school 
finance results in unequal expenditures between children 
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say 
that such disparities are the product of a system that 
ts so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory. 
Texas has acknowledged tts · shortcomings and has per~ 
'"'This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining 
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in tho 
Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of " territorial uniformity ." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 427 (1961) . See also Griffin 
v. County School Board of Prince Edward County , 377 U. S. 218, 
. 230--231 (1964) ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954) . Cf. 
Board of Education of Muskogee v. Oklahorna, 409 F. 2d 6fi5 , (i68 
,(CAIO 1969) . 
. ., 
71- 1332-0PINION 
SAN ANTONlO SCHOOL DISTHICT v. RODHIGUEZ 51 
sistently endeavored-not without some success-t<J 
ameliorate the differences in levels of expenditures with-
but sacrificing the benefits of local participation. The 
Texas plan is not the result of hurried, ill-conceived 
legislation . It certainly is not the product of pur~ 
poseful discrimination against any group or class. On 
the contrary, it is rooted in decades of experience in 
Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product 
of responsible studies by qualified people. In giving 
substance to the presumption of validity to which the 
Texas system is entitled, Lindsey v. National Carbonic 
Gas Co ., 220 U. S. 61, 78 (1911), it is important to 
remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a "rough accommodation" of interests in an 
effort to arrive at practical and workable solutions. 
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U. S. 
69- 70 ( 1913). One also must remember that the system 
here challenged is not peculiar to Texas or to any other 
~tate . In its essential characteristics the Texas plan for 
financing public education reflects what many educators 
for a half century have thought was an enlightened ap-
proach to a problem for which there is no perfect solution. 
We are unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of 
wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars, and edu-
cational authorities in 49 States, especially where the 
alternative proposed is only recently conceived and no-
where yet tested. The constitutional standard under the 
Equal Protection Clause is whether the challenged state 
action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or 
interest. McGinnis v. Royster,- U. S. ·-. - (1973) 
We hold that the Texas plan abundantly satisfies this 
stanclarcl . 
IV 
ln light of the considerable attention that has focused 1 
on the District Court opmiOll in this case and on its 
California predecessor, Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 
132 SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. HODRIGUEZ' 
601, 487 P. 2d 1241, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971), a cautionary 
postscript seems appropriate. It cannot be questioned 
that the constitutional judgment reached by the District 
Court and approved by our dissenting brothers today 
would occasion in Texas and elsewhere an unprecedented 
upheaval in public education. Some commentators have 
concluded that, whatever the contours of the alternative 
financing programs that might be devised and approved. 
the result could not avoid being a beneficial one. But, 
Just as there is nothing simple about the constitutional 
fssues involved in these cases, there is nothing simple or 
certain about predicting the consequences of massive 
change in the financing and control of public education, 
Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention 
to the practical ramifications of these cases have found 
uo clear or dependable answers and their scholarship 
reflects ~ ..\ucn unqualified confidence in the desirability 
of completely uprooting the existing system. 
The complexity of these problems is demonstrated by 
the lack of consensus with respect to whether it may be 
said with any assurance that the poor, the racial minori~ 
ties, or th-e children in overburdened · core::city school dis-
tricts would .. be benefitted by abrogation of traditional 
modes of financing education. Unless there is to be a 
substantial increase in state expenditures on education 
across the board-an event the likelihood of which IS 
!')pen to considerable question 111-these groups stand to 
111 Any alternative that calls for ~ignificant increa:se~ in expendi -
tures for edueation, whether financed through increa~es in property 
taxation or through other ~ource:s of tax do.llars such as income and 
"ales taxe:s , b certgin to encounter political barrier::>. At a time 
when nearly ever~· State and loc1tlity is suffenng from fiscal under-
nounshment, and with demands for service~ of all kinds burgeolling· 
and with weary taxpayer::> already resisting tax increases, there i~ 
considerable reason to question whet her a decis iOn of thi::; Court 
nullifying present state taxing ~y~tl'ms would result i11 a marked 
'incrra~(· in thC' financial commitment to education . See Senatr Selrct 
'i '· .... 
' .. 
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realize gains in terms of increased per pupil expenditures 
only if they reside in districts that presently spend at 
relatively low levels, i. e., in those districts that would 
benefit from tre redistribution of existing resources. 
Yet recent studies have indicated that the poorest fam-' 
ilies are not invariably clustered in the most impecunious 
school districts.m Nor does it now appear that there is 
any more than a random chance that racial minorities are 
concentrated in property-poor districts."" Additionally. 
several research projects have concluded tha.t any financ- . 
ing alternative designed to achieve a greater equality of 
Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 
Toward Equal Educational Opportunity 339-345 (Comm. Print 
l!:i72); Berh & C:.dlahal!, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or MillstonP. 
for School Finance, ?l .J. Pub. L. 23, 25-26 ( 1972); Simon, supra, 
n. 62, at 420-421. lri Texas It has been calculated that $2.4 billion 
of additional school funds would be required to bring all ::;chools 
in that State up to the pr<:>sent level of expenditure of all but the. 
wealthiest district::;-an amount more than double that currently bc~­
mg spent on education. Texas Rr::;earch League, supm, n. 20, at 
1,6-18. An amicus c·uriae brief filed on behalf of almost 30 States, 
focusing on these practical consequence::;, claims with some justifica-
qon that '·each of the understgned states . .. would suffer severe·· 
financial stringency ." Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Ap-· 
pellants, at 2 (filed by Att.y. Gen. of Md. et al.) . 
u 2 See Note, supra, n. 53. S<>e also authorities cited n. 114, infm. 
11
:1 S<:><:> Goldstem, s·upra, n. 38, at 526 ; C . .Jeuch, wpra, n. 116. 
<l.t 27 ; U. S. Cornm'n on Civil Rights, Inequality in School Finane-· 
ing : The Role of th<:> Law 37 ( 197Z). J. Coons, W. ClunE' & S. Sugar-
man, supra, n. 1:3 , at 356-357 n. 47, have noted that in Callfornia, for · 
example, "59% of minority students livE' in districts above tlw median 
average valuation per pupil." In Bexar County by far the 
largest district- t,hc San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict-is above the local average in both the amount of taxabln 
wealth prr pupil anql jri mej}ian family income. Yet 72% of its 
students are M<>xican-Americans. And, in 1967-1968 it spent only 
a very few dollars less j'ier pupil than the North East and North 
Side Independent School DistrictH, which have only 7% and 18% 
JV!exiean-Americnn enrollment respectively. BNk<' , CHrnPvnlr, 
Morgan & White, supm, n. 29, at 67iL 
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~xpenditures is likely to lead to higher taxation and lower 
educational expenditures in the major urban centers,"" a 
result that would exacerbate rather than ameliorate exist-
ing conditions in those areas. 
These practical considerations, of course, play no role 
in the adjudication of the constitutional issues presented 
here. But they serve to highlight the wisdom of thE' 
traditional limitations on this Court's function. The 
consideration and initiation of fundamental reforms with 
respect to state taxation and education are matters re-
served for the legislative processes of the various States. 
and we do no violence to the values of federalism and 
separation of powers by staying our hand. We hardly 
need add that this Court's action today is not to b(-' 
viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status 
quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems 
which may well have relied too loug and too heavily 
on the local property tax. And certainly innovative new 
thinking as to public education, its methods and its fund-
]ng, is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality 
and greater uniformity of opportunity. These matters 
merit the continued attention of the scholars who already 
have contributed much by their challenges. But the 
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and 
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them . 
Reversed. 
11 '1 See Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity , 
92d Gong., 2rl Ses:>., I~sues in School Finanre 129 (Corrun. Print 1972) 
(monograph entlt Jed "Inequities m School Finance" preparf'd by 
Proff'ssors BC'rke and Callahan); ll. S. Office of Education, Finance::: 
of Large-City School Sy:,;tems: A Comparative Analysis (1972) 
(HEW publication); U. 8. Comm'n on Civil Rip:ht~. supra., n. Wl,. 
ai. :33-:36 ; Simon, s'Upra , n . 62, at 410-411 , 418. 
t.1 Jl. 
To: The Cnief Jus t i ce 
v. 
Demetrio P. Rodriguez et al. Texas. 
rFebruary -, 19731 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court today decides, in effect, that a State may 
constitutionally vary the quality of education which it 
offers its children in accordance with the amount of tax-
able wealth located in the district within which they 
reside. The majority's decision represents an abrupt 
departure from the mainstream of recent state and 
federal court decisions conceruing the unconstitutionality 
of state educational financing schemes dependent upon 
taxable local wealth.1 More unfortunately, though, the 
majority's holding can only be seen as a retreat from our 
historic commitment to equality of educational oppor-
tunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system 
which deprives children in their earliest years of the 
chance to reach their full potential as citizens. The 
Court does this despite the absence of any substantial 
justification for a scheme which arbitrarily channels edu-
1 Sec Van Dusartz v. Ilatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (l\Jinn. 1971); 
Milliken v. Green,- Mich.-,-- 1 . W. 2d- (1972); Serrano 
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rp1.r. 601 (1971); 
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. Y. Super. 223, 287 A. 2d 187 (1972); 
Hollins v. Sofstall, Civil No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cy., 
Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972) _ See al::;o Sweetwater County PLanning Cornm . 
for the Organization of School Districts v. Hinlcte, 491 P. 2d 1234 
(Wyo. 1971), 493 P. 2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972). 
1-._:r:. Justice Douglas 
}!r. J•_;,stice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
Mr . Justlc~ Powel l 
Mr . J tcStice Rehnquist 
-
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cational resources in accordance with the fortuity of 
the amount of taxable wealth within each district. 
Jn my judgment, the right of every American to an 
equal start in life, so far as the provision of a state serv-
ice as important as education is concerned, is far too 
vital to permit state discrimination on grounds as tenuous 
as tho~e presented by this record. Nor can I accept the 
notion that it is sufficient to remit these appellees to the 
vagaries of the political process which, contrary to the 
majority's suggestion, has proven singularly unsuited to 
the task of providing a remedy for this discrimination. 2 
I, for one, am unsatisfied with the hope of an ultimate 
"political" solution sometime in the indefinite future 
while, in the meantime, countless children unjustifiably 
receive inferior educations which "may affect their hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954). I must 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
I 
The Court acknowledges that "substantial interdis-
trict disparities in school expenditures exist in Texas," 
ante, at -, and that these disparities are "largely at-
tributable to differences in the amounts of money col-
lected through local property taxation," ante, at -. 
But instead of closely ·examining the seriousness of these 
"The Distriet Court in this ca8e posl]1oned decisions for some 
two year:-; in the hope that the Texas Legi~lat urc would remedy 
the gro~s disparitirs in treatment inherent. in the TexaH finnncing 
scheme. It W<li> onJ~· nftrr thr lrgi~l:ttmr failrcl to art in it~ 1971 
H.egulnr Sesl"ion that thr District Court, nppnrcntl~· recogni~ing the 
lack of hopr for ~rlf-initialrd lrgi~lati,·e rdorm, rrndered it:-; drei~ion. 
Sec Texas Rc"carch Lrngur, Public School Finance Problems in 
Trx:1s 13 (Intrrirn Rrporl 1972). The sl rong vested intcrrstR of 
proprrty rich di~trict,: in the existing propcrt~· tnx >:rhcmc pose a 
sub~tantial baricr to self-initiatrd legislative reform i11 cclucation:ll 
financing. Sec N. Y. Time", Drr. 19, 1973, nt 1, col. 1. 
....., -
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disparities and the invidiousness of the Texas financing 
scheme, the Court undertakes an elaborate exploration 
of the efforts Texas has purportedly made to close the 
gaps between its districts in terms of levels of district 
wealth and resulting educational funding. Yet, how-
ever praiseworthy Texas' equalizing efforts, the issue in 
this case is not whether Texas is doing its best to amelio-
rate the worst features of a discriminatory scheme, but 
rather whether the scheme itself is in fact unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory in the face of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 
When the Texas financing scheme is taken as a whole, I 
do not think it can be doubted that it produces a dis-
criminatory impact on substantial numbers of the school-
age children of the State of Texas. 
A 
Funds to support public education in Texas are de-
rived from three sources: local ad valorem property taxes; 
the Federal Government; and the state government.3 
It is enlightening to consider these in order. 
Under Texas law the only mechanism provided the 
local school district for raising new, unencumbered reve-
nues is the power to tax property located within its 
:• Texas provides its school districts with cxtensiw bonding au-
thority to obtain capital both for the acqui;:ition of school siteR and 
''the construction and equipmrnt of school building,," Trx. Educ. 
Code Ann. § 20.01 (1972), and for the acquisition, construction, and 
maintrnancc of "gymnasia, Stadia, and other recreational facilities," 
id., §§ 20.21-20.22. While such printt r capital pro1·idcs a fourth 
somcc of rcvrnuc, it is, of coursr, only temporar~' in nature since 
the principal and interest of all bonds must ultimately be paid 
out. of thr receipts of the local ad valorem property tax, sec id., 
§§ 22.01, 22.04, except to the extent that outside revenues derived 
from the operation of certain facilities, such as gymnasium, are 
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boundaries.~ At the same tirne, the Texas financing 
schom.e effectively restricts the use of monies raised by 
local property taxation to the support of public -educa-
tion within the boundaries of the district in which they 
are raised, since any such taxes must be approved by a 
majority of the property-taxpaying voters of the district. 5 
The significance of the local property tax element of 
tho Texas financing scheme is apparent from the fact that 
it provides the funds to meet some 40% of the cost of 
public education for Texas as a whole.n Yet tho amount 
of revenue that any particular Texas district can raise 
is dependent on two factors-its tax rate and its amount 
of taxable property. The first factor is determined by 
the property-taxpaying voters of the disttict. 7 But re-
gardless of tho enthusiasm of the local voters for public 
education, the second factor-the taxable property wealth 
of the district-necessarily restricts the district's ability 
to raise funds to support public education.8 Thus, even 
'Sec Texat-~ Const., Art. 7, §§ :3, 3n; Tcxa:; Ednc. CodC' Ann. 
§ 20.010.02. AR a part of the proprrt~· tax scheme, bonding authority 
is confc·rrcd upon the locnl srhool dist riets, "cr 11. :3. supra. 
3 SPc Texas Educ. Code. 1\ nn § 20.04. 
n For the 1970-Hl71 school year, the prrci~e figure wn~ -H.1%. 
Sec Tcxa~ Hc~E'arch Lcn~uc, supm, n. 2. at 9. 
7 Sec Texa~ Ednr. Codt• Ann. § 20.04. 
Theoretically, Tcxns law limit:; the tux rnte for public ~t·hcJOl 
m:tintcnancc, sec 'id., § 20.02 (1971) , to 81..50 per :);100 ,·aluation, 
sec irl. § 20.04 (d). HO\n'vcr, it docs not appear that nn~· Texas 
district. prcsrntl~· taxc:> it~rlf at the highest rate allowable, although 
Home poor distric-ts arc npproaching it. SE'C App., at 174. 
8 Under Texas law local dit-itrict::; nrc allowed to cmplo~· difTrring 
ha~cs of aR~c~"mcltt-a fact tlwt introduce:,; a third varinblc iilto the 
lor:1l funding. Sec Texas Educ. Code Ann. § 22.03. But Jtcit her 
party has suggested that this factor is rcsponc~iblr for the di::~p:1riiic~ 
in n·,-cmw~ available to the nriom,; di:-;trirt~. Con:<<'qucntJ_,., T be-
lie' c we mu;•t deal with the ca~e on the a~~tunpt ion thnt ditl'crencc~ 
in lorn! met hod;; of n"R<'~"mcnt do not mc:min!!;fully afl'cct the rp,·cnuc 
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though the voters of two Texas districts may be willing 
to make the same tax effort, the results for the districts 
will be substantially different if 011e is property rich while 
the other is property poor. The necessary effect of the 
Texas local property tax is, in short, to favor property 
rich districts and to disfavor property poor ones. 
The seriously disparate consequences of the Texas 
local property tax, when that tax is considered alone, 
arc amply illustrated by data presented to the District 
Court by appellees. This data included a detailed study 
of a sample of 110 Texas school districts" for the 1967-
1968 school year conducted by Professor Joel S. Berke of 
Syracuse University's Educational Finance Policy Insti-
tute. Among other things, this study revealed that the 
10 richest districts examined, each of which had more 
than $100,000 in taxable property per pupil, raised 
through local effort an average of $610 per pupil, whereas 
the four poorest districts studied, each of which had less 
than $10,000 in taxable property per pupil, were able 
to raise only an average of $63 per pupil."' And, as the 
Court, in effect recognir.es, ante, at -, this correlation 
between the amount of taxable property per pupil and 
the amount of local revenues per pupil holds true for the 
96 districts in between the richest and poorest districts. 11 
mi~ing powrr of lorn] districts rebti1·c to one another. The Court 
appnrcntl~· nclmits ns much. Src ante, at -. It should be noted, 
morrovrr, that the main set of data introdnrccl brforr thr District 
Court. to establi::;h the cli::=:paritirs at issur here was ba~rd upon 
"cf1ualizrcl taxablr property" values which had bern adjustrd to 
correct for clifferin~r method~ of assessment. See App. C to Affidavit 
of Profr~sor Joel S. Berke. 
'1 Texas lws approximatrly 1,200 srhool district::;. 
"'Sec App. I, infm. 
11 Sre id. Indeed, appellants acknowlrdge that i he rrle1·n nt data 
from Profe88or Berke's affidnYit showR "a very positive correlation, 
0.9n, bct"·ern market value of taxable property per pnpil and 
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It is clear, moreover, that the disparity of per pupil 
revenues cannot be dismissed as the result of lack of local 
effort-that is, lower tax rates-by property poor dis-
tricts. To the contrary, the data presented below in-
dicates that the poorest districts tend to have the highest 
tax rates and the richest districts tend to have the lowest 
tax rates. 12 Yet, despite the apparent extra effort being 
made by the poorest districts, they are unable even to 
begin to match the richest districts in terms of the pro-
duction of local revenues. For example, the 10 richest 
districts studied by Professor Berke were able to pro-
duce $585 per pupil with an equalized tax rate of 31¢ 
on $100 of equalized valuation, but the four poorest dis-
tricts studied, with an equalized rate of 70¢ on $100 of 
equalized valuation, were able to produce only $60 per 
pupiPa Without more, this state imposed system of 
educational funding presents a serious picture of widely 
varying treatment of Texas school districts, and thereby 
~tate and local revenurH per pupil." Reply Brirf for Appellants 6, 
n. 9. 
While the Court takes issue with much of Professor Bcrkc'o; data 
;mel conclusions, ante, at -, nn. 38 nnd -, I do not undrr~land 
its criticisms to run to the basic finding of a correlation between 
taxable district property per pupil and local revenues per pupil. 
The critique of Professor Berke's methodology upon which the Court 
rdies, sec Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Finance: A 
Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest, and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 504, 523-525, nn. 67 and 71 (1972), is directed only at the 
suggested correlations between family income and taxable district 
wealth and between race and taxable district wealth. Obviously, 
the appellants do not question the relationship in Texas bet ween 
taxable district wealth and per pupil expenditure; nnd there is no 
basis for the Court to do so, whatever the criticisms which mny be 
leveled at other aspects of Professor Berke's study, buL see infra, 
n. 55. 
12 See App. II, infra. 
1 :J Sec Ibid. 
.. 
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of Texas school children, in terms of the amount of funds 
available for public education. 
Nor are these funding variations corrected by the other 
aspects of the Texas financing scheme. The Federal Gov-
ernment provides funds sufficient to cover only some lO<;'o 
of the total cost of public education in Texas.14 Further-
more, while these . federal funds are not distributed in 
Texas solely on a per pupil basis, appellants do not here 
contend that they are used in such a way as to ameliorate 
significantly the widely varying consequences for Texas 
school districts and school children of the local property 
tax element of the state financing scheme.u; 
State funds provide the remaining some 50<fo of the 
monies spent on public education in Texas.10 Techni-
cally, they are distributed under two programs. The 
first is the Available School Fund, for which provision 
is made in the Texas Constitution.17 The Available 
School Fund is comprised of revenues obtained from a 
number of sources, including receipts from the state ad 
valorem property tax, one-fourth of all monies collected 
by the occupation taxes, annual contributions by the 
legislature from general revenues, and the revenues de-
14 For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 10.9% .. 
Sec Texas Research League, supra, n. 2, at 9. 
15 Appellants made such a contention before the District Court but 
apparently have abandoned it in this Comt. Indeed, data intro-
duced in the District Court simply belies the argument that fcdE'ral 
funds have a signiftcant equalizing effect. Sec App. I, infra. And, 
as the District Court observed, it does not follow that remedial 
action by the Federal Government would excuse any unconstitutional 
discrimination cfiected by the state financing scheme. 337 F. Supp., 
at 284. 
In For the 1970-1971 school year, the precise figure was 48%. Sec 
Texas Research League, supra, n. 2, at 9. 
17 See Texas Canst., Art. 7, § 3. See also Texas Educ. Code Alln. 
§ 15.01 (b) . 
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rived from the Permanent School Fund.'; For the 1970-
1971 school year the Available School Fund contained 
$296,000,000. The Texas Constitution requires that this 
money be distributed annually on a per capita basis 1 ') to 
the local school districts. Obviously such a fiat grant 
could not alone eradicate the funding differentials at-
tributable to the local property tax. Moreover, today 
the Available School Fund is in reality simply one facet 
of the second state financing program, the Minimum 
Foundation School Program,~0 since each district's an-
nual share of the Fund is deducted from the sum to 
which the district is entitled under the Foundation 
Program.21 
The Minimum Foundation School Program provides 
funds for three specific purposes: professional salaries, 
current operating expenses and transportatio11 expenses.2" 
The State pays, on an overall basis, for approximately 
80o/o of the cost of the Program; the remaining 20o/o is 
distributed among the local school districts under the 
Local Fund Assignment."" Each district's share of the 
Local Fund Assignment is determined by a complex 
Ls Sec Texas Edur. Code Ann. § 15.01 (b). 
The Permanent School .Fund is iu c~~cnrc a public tru~t iniiinlly 
endowed with va~t quantities of publie land, the sale of whic-h 
hati provided an cnormou · ropu~ that in turn produces ~ub~tnntia[ 
:mnual revenues which arc dc,·oted exclu:,;ivd.l' to public cdur·ation. 
Set' Texas Const., Art. 7, § 5 (Supp. 1972). SPc also V Report of 
the Governor's Committee on J'ublic Education in Trxa~-Financing 
the Sy~tcm 11 ( 1968) (hrrcinaftcr Trxas Go1unor's Committee 
Report). 
•n Thi~ i~ dcterminrd from the a1·cragr daily attrndanrr within 
rneh district for the Jlrcrcuing yr:tr. Tcxa~ Edm. Codr Ann. 
§ 15.01 (c). 
" 0 Sec Tcx::tR Eclur. Codr Ann. §§ 16.01-16.975. 
"
1 Sec id .. §§ 16.71 (2), 16.79. 
22 See id., §§ 16.:301-16.:316, 16.45, 16.51-16.68. 
"' Src id., §§ 16.72-16.73, ]6.76-16.77. 
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"economic index'' which is designed to allocate a larger 
share of the costs to property rich districts than to prop-
erty poor districts."" Each district pays its share with 
revenues derived from local property taxation. 
The stated purpose of the Minimum Foundation School 
Program is to provide certain basic funding for each 
local Texas school district."" At the same time the Pro-
gram was apparently intended to improve, to some de-
gree, the financial position of property poor districts 
relative to property rich districts, since-through the use 
of the economic index-an effort is made to charge a 
disproportionate share of the costs of the Program to 
rich districts.~" It bears noting, however, that substan-
tial criticism has been leveled at the practical effective-
ness of the economic index system of local cost alloca-
tion.27 In theory, the index is designed to ascertain the 
relative ability of each district to contribute to the Local 
Fund Assignment from local property taxes. Yet the 
index is not developed simply on the basis of each dis-
trict's taxable wealth. It also takes into account the 
district's relative income from manufacturing, mining, 
agriculture, its payrolls, and its scholastic population. 28 
It is difficult to discern precisely how these latter factors 
are predictive of a district's relative ability to raise 
"'See id., § 16.74. The formula for raleulating each district's 
~hare i~ described in V Texas Governor's Committee Report 44-48. 
2 ;; See Texa~ Edur. Code Ann. § 16.01. 
2~; See V Texas GoYernor's Committee Report 40-41. 
"'See id .. at 45-67; IV Texas Research League, Texas Public 
School~ Under the Minimum Foundation Progr:un: An Eniliwtion 
123-124 (1956) . 
"~Technically, the cronomir index involve-< a two ~tep enlrulalion. 
Fir~t. on the ba~i~ of lhe factors mentioned above, each Texas 
<·ount~ · ·~ ~hare of the Lo('al Fund Asi:iignmPnt is dcterminPd. Then 
each count~·'::; ;,hare i;,; divided arnong it~ school dir>!rirts on the 
ha,:i~ of their rrlative shares of the count~··~ asse~sable wealth. See 
V Texas Gowrnor'~ Committee Report. 43-44. 
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revenues through local property taxes. Thus, in 1966, 
one of the consultants who originally participated in the 
development of the Texas economic index adopted in 
1949 told the Governor's Committee on Public Educa-
tion: 29 "The Economic Index approach to evaluating 
local ability offers little better measure than sheer chance 
but not much." 
Moreover, even putting aside these criticisms of the 
economic index as a device for achieving meaningful 
district wealth equalization through cost allocation, poor 
districts still do not necessarily receive more state aid 
than property rich districts. For the standards which 
currently determine the amount received from the Foun-
dation Program by any particular district 30 favor prop-
erty rich districts.31 Thus, focusing on the same Edge-
20 I d., at 48, quoting statement of Dr. Edgar Morphet. 
30 The extraordinmllycomplcx standards are summarized in V Texas 
Governor's Committee Report 41-43. 
:n The key element of the Minimum Foundation School Program 
is the provision of funds for professional salaries-more particularly, 
for teacher salaries. The Program provide.· each district with funds 
to pay its professional payroll as determined by certain state sland-
nrds. Sec Texas Educ. Code Ann. §§ 16.301-16.316. If ihe district 
fails to pay its teachers at the levels determined by the state stand-
ards it rereives nothing from the Program. See id., § 16.301 (c). 
At the same time, districts arc free to pay their teachers salaries in 
excess of the level set by the state standards, uRing local revenues-
that is, property tax revenue-to make up the differeuce, ~rc id., 
§ 16.301 (a). 
The state salary standards focus upon two factor·: the educat ional 
level and the experience of t he district's teachers. Ser id., §§ 16.301-
16.316. The higher these two factors arc, the more fund~ the dis-
trict will receive from the Foundation Program for profeHsional 
salaries. 
It should be apparent that the net effect of 1 hio scheme is to 
provide more aR~istance to rich districts than to poor ones. For 
rich districts arc able to pay their teachers, out of local fundH, ~nlary 
increments above the state minimum levels. Thus, the rich clist ricts 
arc able to attract the teachers with the best education and the most 
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wood Independent and Alamo Heights School Districts 
which the majority uses for purposes of illustration, we 
find that in 1967-1968 property rich Alamo Heights 32 
which raised $333 per pupil on a tax rate of 85¢ per 
$100 valuation received $225 per pupil from the Founda-
tion Program, while property poor Edgewood 33 which 
raised only $26 per pupil with a tax rate of $1.05 per 
$100 valuation received only $222 per pupil from the 
Foundation Program.a4 And, more recent data, which 
indicates that for the 1970-1971 school year Alamo 
Heights received $491 per pupil from the Program while 
Edgewood received only $356 per pupil, hardly suggests 
that the wealth gap between the districts is being nar-
rowed by the state program. To the contrary, whereas 
in 1967-1968 Alamo Heights received only $3 per pupil, 
experience. To complete the circle, this then means, given the state 
standards, that the rich districts receive more from the Foundation 
Program for professional salaries than do poor districts. A portion 
of Professor Berke's study vividly illustrates the impact of the 
State's standards on districts of varying wealth. See App. III, infra. 
Jt In 1968-1969, Alamo Heights School District had $49,478 in 
taxable propert y per pupil. See Berke Affidavit, Table VII, App.,. 
at 216. 
33 In 1968-1969, Edgewood Independent School District had $5,960 
in taxable property per pupil. Ibid. 
34 I fail to understand the relevance for this case of the Court's 
suggestion that if Alamo Heights School District, which is approxi-
mately the same physical size as Edgewood School District but 
which has only one-fourth as many student ,;, had the same number 
of students as Edgewood, the former's per pupil expenditure would 
be considerably closer to the latter's. Ante, at -, n. 33. Obvi-
ously, this is true, but it docs not alter the simple fact that Edge-
wood does lmve four times as many students but not four time~:; as 
much taxable property wealth. From the perspective of Edge-
wood's school children then-the perspective that ultimately counts 
here-Edgewood is clearly a much poorer district than Alamo 
Heights. The question here is not whether districts have equal tax-
able J)ropcrty wealth in absolute terms, but whether districts have 
diiTcring taxable wealth giYen their respective school-age populations. 
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or about 1 <fo, more than Edgewood in state aid, by 1070-
1971 the gap had widened to a difference of $135 per pupil, 
or about 38%.'1" It was data of this character that 
prompted the District Court to observe that "the cur-
rent [state aid] system tends to subsidir.e the rich at 
the expense of the poor rather than the other way 
around." :w 337 F. Supp. 280, 282. And even the ap-
pellants go no further here than to suggest that the 
Minimum Foundation School Program has "a mildly 
equalizing effect." 'l7 
Despite these facts, the majority continually empha-
sizes how much state aid has, in recent years, been given 
to property poor Texas school districts. What the Court 
fails to emphasize is the cruel irony of how much more 
state aid is being given to property rich Texas school 
'1" In the face of t hesc gross dit'paritics in treatment which experi-
ence with the Texn~ financin!!; schrme has rcvcalrd , I cannot arrept 
thr Comt's suggeRtion thnt we nrr draling herr with n rrmrclinl 
~chrmc to whirh 11·r ~boule! accord Rnb~tantinl defrrrnre berau~e of 
its accompli~hmrnt;; rather than criticize it for its fnilurrs. Ante, 
at -. J\Jorronr, Trxas' financing scheme is hard!~· rPmrdinl lrgis-
lation of the 1y]1e for which we have proviou~l~· shown ~ub.,tantinl 
toleranre. Such lrgi~lation ma~· in fact c•xtrnd thr ,·otl' to '·prr~ons 
\\·ho othrrwi~c would be denied iL by stntc law," Katzenbach v . 
Moraan, :3R4 U.S. 641, 6!)() (1966), or it mn~· rliminnte thr r1· il~ of 
tho private bail bondsmnn, Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U. S. 357 (1971). 
But t ho~c nrc in~t11 nrc~ in \\·hich a lrgi~lnt i1·c bod~· ha~ oought to 
remrd.1· problem~ for which it cannot br snid to ha1·c brrn dirrrtly 
rrspom;iblo. B~· rontrnst, public education is the function of the 
Statr in Texas, and the re~pon~ibility for an~· drfert in the ~('IH'mc 
for financing public education mu~t ultimate!~· rc"t with the Stntc. 
It is thr Stair's own schrmr which has rau~rd thr funding ]1roblem, 
<llld thus Yiewed, that schrmr can hardly be deemed remedial. 
"" Comparr App. I, inj1'a. Indeed, rvcn npart from thr dif-
fcrrntial treatment inherent in 1hr local propC'I't.V tnx, thr rnormous 
intrrdi~trirt disparitirs in ~tate aid reccivrd undrr tho Minimum 
Foundation School Program would seem to rni~r ~ub~tantinl crpwl 
prot rrtion que~tionH. 
a7 Brief for Appcllnnts 3. 
71-1332-DIRSENT (A) 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 13 
districts on top of their substantial local property tax 
revenues."R Under any view, it is apparent that thP 
state aid provided by the Foundation School fails to 
compensate for the funding variations attributable to 
the local property tax clement of the Texas financing 
scheme. It is these stark differences in the treatment 
of Texas school districts and school children inherent in 
the Texas financing scheme, not the absolute amount of 
state aid provided to any particular school district, that 
arc the crux of this case. There is, then, no escaping the 
conclusion that the local property tax which is de-
pendent upon taxable district property wealth is an es-
sential feature of the Texas scheme for financing public 
eel ucation. 'H' 
B 
The appellants do not deny the disparities in educa-
tional funding caused by variations in taxable district 
property wealth. They do contend, however, that what-
ever the differences in per pupil spending among Texas 
districts, there are no discriminatory consequences for the 
children of the disadvantaged districts. They recogni:1.e 
that what is at stake in this case is the quality of the 
public education provided Texas children in the districts 
in which they live. But appellants reject the suggestion 
that the quality of education in any particular district 
~8 ThuR, in 1967-1968, Edgewood had a total of $248 per pupil in 
~tate and local funds compared with a total of $558 per pupil for 
Alamo Heights. Sec Berke Affid:wit, Tnblc X, App. , at 219. For 
1970-1971, the respective totnls were S418 and 891:3. Rc<' Tf'xns 
Rcscnrch Lr•ague, supra, n. 2, at 14. 
:w Not Olll~r docs the local property tax provid<' npproximatcly 
-W% of the fund~ <'xpcndcd on public education, but it is the only 
~ourc·c of funds for such c~~ential a~pects of cclucat ionnl financing as 
the payment of school bonds, ~:<cc n. 3, supra, nncl the pa~·mcnt of 
the cliRtrict ';; share of the Local Fund Assignment, ns well ns for 
ncnrlr all expenditures above the minimums e~tabli~hecl by thB 
}'onndntion Program. 
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is determined by money-beyond some minimal level of 
funding which they believe is assured every Texas dis-
trict by the Minimum Foundation School Program.40 
In their view, there is simply no denial of equal educa-
tional opportunity to any Texas school children as a re-
sult of the widely varying per pupil spending power pro-
vided districts under the current financing scheme. 
In my view, though , even an unadorned restatement 
of this contention is sufficient to reveal its absurdity. 
Authorities no doubt disagree as to the significance of 
variations in per pupil spending.·n Indeed, conflicting 
expert testimony was presented to the District Court in 
this case concerning the effect of spending variations on 
educational achievement: ~ We sit, however, not to re-
solve disputes over educational theory but to enforce our 
Constitution. It is an inescapable fact that if one dis-
trict has more funds available per pupil than another 
district, the former will have greater choice in educa-
tional planning than will the latter. In this regard, I 
believe the question of discrimination in educational 
40 Sec Reply Brief for Appcllants 5, 15- 17. 
'
11 Compare, e. g., Coleman, Equality of Educat ional Opportunity 
(1966) , Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, 
in On Equality of Educational Opportunity 69, 91- 104 (F. Mosteller & 
D . Moynihan, ed. 1972), with e. g., J. Gutherie, G. Kleindorf, H . 
Levin, & R. Stout, Schools and Inequality 79-90 (1971) ; Kie~ling, 
Measuring a Local Government Service: A Study of School Di~­
trictR in New York State, 49 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 356 ( 1967). 
42 Compare Berke Deposit ion, at 10 (" [Dlollar expenditures arc 
probably the best way of measuring the quali ty of education afforded 
students . . .. " ) , with Graham Deposition, at 3 (" [I]t i ~ not just 
ncce.:;sarily the money, no. It is how wisely you spend it. "). It 
should be noted that even appellants' witness, Mr. Graham, quali-
fied the importance of money only by the requirement of wise 
expenditure. Quite obviously, a district which is property poor is 
powerless to mat ch the education provided by a property rich dis-
trict assuming each district allocates its fund with equal wisdom. 
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quality must be deemed to be an objective one that looks 
~what the State provides its children, not to what the 
children are able to do with what they receive. That a 
child forced to attend an underfunded school, with poorer 
physical facilities, poorer teachers, larger classes, and 
fewer courses than a school with substantially more 
funds may nevertheless excel is to the credit of the child, 
not the State, cf. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 
U. S. 337, 349 (1938). And who can ever measure for 
such a child the opportunities lost and the talents wasted 
for want of a broader, more enriched education. Dis-
crimination in the opportunity to learn that is afforded 
a child must be our standard. 
Hence, even before this Court recognized its duty to 
tear down the barriers of state enforced racial segrega-
tion in public education, it acknowledged that inequality 
in the educational facilities provided to students may 
make for discriminatory state action as contemplated by 
the Equal Protection Clause. As a basis for striking 
down state enforced segregation of a law school, the 
Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,633-634 (1950), 
stated: 
"[W] e cannot find substantial equality in the edu-
cational opportunities offered white and Negro law 
students by the State. In terms of number of fac-
ulty, variety of courses and opportunity for special-
ization, size of student body, scope of the library, 
availability of law review and similar activities, the 
[white only] Law School is superior. . . . It is 
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice 
between these law schools would consider the ques-
tion close." 
See also McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher 
Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Likewise it is difficult 
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to believe that if the children of Texas had a free choice, 
they would choose to be educated in districts with fewer 
resources, and hence with more antiquated plants, less 
experienced teachers, and a less diversified curriculum. 
Indeed, if financing variations are so insignificant to edu-
cational quality, it is difficult to understand 'vhy a num-
ber of our country's wealthiest school districts, who have 
no legal obligation to argue in support of the constitu-
tionality of the Texas legislation, have nevertheless 
zealously pursued its cause before this Court."' 
The consequences, in terms of objective educational 
inputs, of the variations in district funding caused by the 
Texas financing scheme are apparent from the data in-
troduced before the District Court. For example, in 
1968-1969, 1001f'o of the teachers in the property rich 
Alamo Heights School District had college degrees.44 
By contrast, during the same school year only 80.021f'o of 
the teachers had college degrees in the property poor 
Edgewood Independent School District:'" Also, in 1968-
1969. approximately 47% of the teachers in the Edge-
wood District were on emergency teaching permits, 
whereas only 11% of the teachers in Alamo Heights were 
on such permits.'"' This is undoubtedly a reflectiou of the 
fact that Edgewood's teacher salary scale was approxi-
mately 807o of Alamo Heights'.'" And, not surprisingly, 
.,, See Brief of, inter alia, San Marino Unified School Di~t rirt; 
ne,·crl.'· HillR Unifird School Di~trict a~ amicvs curiae; Brirf of, i11ter 
alia, Bloomfield Hill~, Michigan, School Di~trict: Drnrborn Cit~·, 
Michigan, School Di;;triet: Gro~::;c l'ointc, Michigan, Public- School 
S.1·~tcm a~ amicus curiae . 
. ,J AnHwcr~ to l'laintirl"~ Intcrrogatoric~, App., at 115. 
·'"Ibid. l\Ioreo1·er, dming ihc same prriod, :37.17% of ilw irarhcrs 
in Alamo Heights had advanrrd drgrec~, while onl~· 14.98% of l':dgc-
ll·ood's faculty had Hnrh degrrcs. See id., at 116. 
'1" Answer~ to VlnintilT's Intrrrogntorirs, App., at 117. 
"'Id., at 118. 
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the teacher-student ratio varies significantly between the 
two districts.•R In other words, as might be expected, 
a difference in the funds available to districts results in 
a difference in educational inputs available for a child's 
public education in Texas. For constitutional purposes, 
1 believe this situation. which is directly attributable to 
the Texas financing scheme, raises a grave question of 
state created discrimination in the provision of public 
education. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 
U. S. 285, 293-294 (1969). 
At the very least, in view of the substantial inter-
district disparities in funding and in resulting educational 
inputs shown by appellees to exist under the Texas 
financing scheme, the burden of proving that these dis-
parities do not in fact affect the quality of children's 
education must fall upon the appellants. Cf. Hobson 
v. Hanson, 327 F. Supp. 844, 860- 861 (DC 1971) . Yet 
appellants made no effort in the District Court to dem-
onstrate that educational quality is not affected by vari-
ations in funding and in resulting inputs. And, in this 
Court, they have argued no more than that the relation-
ship is ambiguous. This is hardly sufficient to overcome 
appellees' prima facie showing of state created discrim-
ination between the school children of Texas with respect 
to objective educational opportunity. 
Nevertheless, the Court now seems to suggest that the 
Minimum Foundation School Program effectively eradi-
cates any discriminatory effects otherwise resulting fron1 
the local property tax clement of the Texas financing 
scheme. Ante, at --. The Court does not contend-
as it certainly cannot ·11!-that the Program ensures inter-
4 0 In the 1967-1968 school year, Edp;ewood had 22,R62 ~tucknt~ nnd 
~64 teachers, n ratio of 26.5 to 1. See id., at 110, 114. In .\lamo 
Hcip;ht;;, for thr Hmne school year, there wrre 5,432 ~tudrnt~ nnd 265-
t cnrher~ for a rn t io of 20.5 to 1. Sec ibid. 
"n See supra, p. -. 
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district equality in educational funding. Instead, the 
Court tells us that "the Equal Protection Clause does not 
require absolute or complete equality," and then seem-
ingly accepts the suggestion that the Foundation Pro-
gram "assures 'every child in every school district an 
adequate education' " as sufficient to dispose of any 
claim of unconstitutional discrimination. Ante, at -. 
I must admit that the precise thrust of the Court's 
remarks are not altogether clear to me. It may be that 
the Court is suggesting that the state aid received via 
the Foundation Program sufficiently improves the posi-
tion of property poor districts vis-a-vis property rich dis-
tricts-in terms of educational funds-to eliminate any 
claim of interdistrict discrimination in available educa-
tional resources which might otherwise exist if educa-
tional funding were dependent solely upon local property 
taxation. Certainly the Court has recognized that to 
demand precise equality of treatment is normally un-
realistic, and thus minor differences inherent in any 
practical context will usually not make out a substantial 
equal protection claim. See, e. g., Mayer v. City of Chi-
cago, 404 U. S. 189, 194-195 (1971); Draper v Wash- 1 
ington, 372 U. S. 487, 495-496 (1963); Bain Peanut Co. 
v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). But as has already 
been seen, we are hardly presented here with son::e de 
miniwJ,§ claim of discrimination resulting from the "play" 
necessary in any functioning system; in fact, it is clear 
that the Foundation Program utterly fails to ameliorate 
the seriously discriminatory effects of the local property 
tax. 
Alternatively, the Court may believe that the Equal 
Protection Clause cannot be offended by substantially 
unequal state treatment of persons who are similarly 
situated so long as the State provides everyone with some 
unspecified amount of education which evidently is 
"enough." The basis for such a novel view is far from 
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clear to me. It is, of course, true that the Constitution 
does not require precise equality in the treatment of all 
persons. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained: 
"The equality at which the 'equal protection' clause-
aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth 
Amendment enjoins 'the equal protection of the 
laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. . . . 
The Constitution does not require things which are 
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as 
though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 
u. s. 141, 147 (1940). 
See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963); 
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). 
But this Court has never suggested that because some· 
"adequate" level of benefits is provided to all, discrimina-
tion in the provision of services is therefore constitution-
ally excusable. The Equal Protection Clause is not 
addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the 
unjustifiable inequalities of state action. It mandates 
nothing less than that "all persons similarly circum-
stanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). 
Even if the Equal Protection Clause encompassed the 
Court's apparent theory of constitutional adequacy, dis-
crimination in the provision of educational opportunity 
would certainly seem to be a poor candidate for its ap-
plication. The Court never informs us how judicially 
manageable standards are to be derived for determining 
how much education is "enough" to excuse constitu-
tional discrimination. One would think that the ma- { 
jority would heed its own fervent affirmation of judicial 
self-restraint before undertaking the complex task of 1 
determining at large what level of education is constitu-
tionally sufficient. Indeed, the majority's reliance upon · 
the purported adequacy of the educational opportunity 
assured by the Texas Minimum Foundation School Pro-
i 
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gram would seem fundamentally inconsistent with its own 
recognition that educational authorities are unable to 
agree upon what makes for educational quality, see ante, 
at - , - n. 86 and - n. 101. If, as the Court stresses, 
such authorities are uncertain as to the impact of various 
levels of funding on educational quality, I fail to see 
where the Court finds the e~ertise to devine that the 
particular levels of funding provided by the Program as-
sure an adequate educational opportunity- much Jess an 
education substantially equivalent in quality to that 
which a higher level of funding might provide. It is 
true that appellants have repeatedly asserted before this 
Court the adequacy of the education guaranteed by the 
Minimum Foundation School Program. But given the 
uncertainty of the educational authorities, such mere 
assertions hardly provide a basis for this Court to rely 
upon the adequacy of that education-particularly since 
the appellees offered substantial uncontroverted evidence 
before the District Court impugning the now much 
touted "adequacy" of the education guaranteed by the 
Foundation Program. 50 
In my view, then, it is inequality- not some notion of 
gross inadequacy- of educational opportunity that raises 
a question of denial of equal protection of the laws. I 
find any other approach to the issue unintelligible and 
without directing principle. Here appellees have made 
a substantial showing of wide variations in educational 
funding and the resulting educational opportunity af-
forded to the school children of Texas. This discrim-
ination is, in large measure, attributable to significant 
disparities in the taxable wealth of local Texas school 
"" Sec An~wcr:; to lntcnogntorie;; b~· Dr . .Jod S. Brrke, Ans. 17, 
p. 9: An~ . 48-51, pp. 22-2-l; Ans. 88-89, pp. 41- 42 ; Dcpo~ition of 
Dr. Daniel C. l\'Iorgnn, .Jr., 52-55 ; AffidaYil of Dr. Daniel C. l\1or-
~wn, Jr., App., a t 242-243. 
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districts. This is a sufficient showing to raise a substan-
tial question of discriminatory state action in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause."' 
'' 'It i~ true that in two preYious caf.'e~ thi~ Court hn~ ~ummarily 
aflirmecl cli~t riel court di~mis:;ab of eonst itut ion a! attnd~H upon other 
Htate edurntional finaneing :;cheme~. Sec l.fcfnnis v. Shapiro, 293. 
·F. Supp. :327 (ND Ill. 1967), aff'd mem. sub ?Wm. Mcfnnis v. 
Ooilvie, 394 U. S. 322 (1969); Burress v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Su]1p. 
572 (WD V;t. 1969), aff'd mem. , 397 U. R. 44 (1970). But those 
derisions cannot be consiclerrd clisposili\·e of this action for a numbrr 
of reasons. 
In the firHt place, the thruHt of tho~r suits differrd matcriall~· from 
that of this case. In lllclnnis, the plaintiffs a~~rrted that "only a 
financing ~~·Htem which apportions public funds ncrording to the 
<'clnrntional nerds of the students satisfies the Fomteenth Amend-
mrnt." 323 F. Supp., at 331. The Dist rirt Comt ronrlucled that 
'· (1) the Fourtrenth Amendmrnt docs not rcquirr public school 
expenditure~ to be made onl~' on the bn~is of pupils' edurntionnl 
needs, nnd (2) thr lnrk of .iuclicinlly mnnagrablr stnndurds makes this 
contro\·er,.;y non.iusticiable." !d., at 329. The Burress District, 
Comt dismis~ed that suit. c~scntially in reliance on M clnnis which 
it. found to be 'scarcely dist ingnishablc." 310 F. Supp., at 574. 
This Ruit involves no effort to obtain an allocation of ~chool fund:; 
that considers only educational nred. The District Court ruled only 
that the State must equalize local district wealth which has hereto-
fore JWCwnted many di~t rict s from trul~· exrrrising local fiscal con-
trol. Fmthcrmore, the limited holding of the District Court pre-
srntcd none of the problems of judicial management which wonld 
rxist if thr federal courts wrrc to attempt to ensure thr distribntion 
of rducational funds soldy on the ba~is of cduc:ttional need, Rce 
infra, pp. ---, or, for that matter, on the baRis of some 
stnndard of cdnrntional "adequac~·" now snggc::;ted bv the ma.iority. 
Aside from the ~igniftcnnt legal difference~ between this case and 
Mcinnis and Burress. thr prececlcntial \·alur of the lattrr casrs must 
be temperrcl by the fact that the~' were disposed of by summary 
ord0r. While, in eontrnst to petitions for ccrtiomri, appenls tech-
nicnll~· are always diRposcd of on the merits, the burdens of onr sub-
Htantial dockrt often compel us to denl with appeals on the basis of 
man)' of the same discretiomu~· considerations which inOuenre the 
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Despite the evident discriminatory effect of the Texas 
financing scheme, both the appellants and the majority 
suggest that there is no true disadvantaged class for 
purposes of equal protection analysis. The District Court 
concluded that the Texas financing scheme draws "dis-
tinctiors between groups of citizens depending upon the 
wealth of the district in which they live" and thus cre-
ated a disadvantaged class composed of persons living 
in property poor districts. See 337 F. Supp., at 282. In 
light of the data introduced before the District Court, 
the conclusion that the' ~chool children of property poor 
districts'' constitute a sufficient class for our purposes 
seems indisputable to me. 
Appellants contend, however, that in constitutional 
terms this case involves nothing more than discrimina-
tion against locaJ school districts, not against individuals, 
since on its face the state scheme is concerned only with 
exercise of our certiorari power. Cf. Frankfurter & Landi~, The 
Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 Harv. 
L. ReY. 1, 12-14 (1930). This id true of appeals from federal, as 
well as from state courts, despite technical differences in our mode 
of dispo~it ion, sec R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 
233 (4th ed. 1969). At times summary disposition of an appeal 
may indeed reflect the settled state of the relevant law. nut at 
other times, summary affirmance may be the product of the uncer-
tain and developing nature of a particular field of law into which the 
Court either i~ not yet prepared to step or else sees no need to 
step. Compare Drueding v. Devlin, :380 U. S. 125 ( 1965) , aff'g per 
curiam, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724-725 (Md. 1964), with Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 337 (1972). Hence, we ~hould not be 
quick to give too great precedential effect to our summary affirmance 
of an appeal. Certainly, the precedential value of the summary 
affirmance of M clnnis and Burress for this case is small since the 
unrefined and unclear character of the parties' legal theories in those 
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the provision of funds to local districts. The result 
of the Texas financing scheme, appellants suggest, is 
simply that some local districts have more available 
revenues for education; others have less. And, in that 
respect, the States have broad discretion in drawing rea-
sonable distinction between their subdivisions. See Grif-
fin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 
377 U. S. 218, 231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 
545, 550--554 ( 1952). 
But this Court has consistently recognized that where 
there is in fact discrimination against individual interests, 
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws is not inapplicable simply because the discrimination 
is based upon some group characteristic such as geographic 
location. See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U. S. 1, 4 (1971); 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 565~566 (1964); Gray 
v. Sanders 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963). Texas has chosen 
to provide free public education for all its citizens, and 
has embodied that decision in its constitution. 5 2 Yet, 
having established public education for its citizens, some 
Texas school children, as a direct consequence of the 
varia£lohs in local property wealth endemic to Tex~s' 
financing scheme, have been provided with substantially 
less resources for their education than have others. 
Thus, while on its face the Texas scheme may merely 
discriminate between local districts, the impact of that 
discrimination falls directly upon the children whose 
educational opportunity is dependent upon where they 
happen to live. Consequently, the District Court cor-
rectly concluded that the Texas financing scheme dis-
criminates from a constitutional perspective between 
school age children on the basis of the amount of taxable 
property located within their local districts. 
""Texas Const., Art. 7, § 1. 
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In the majority's view, however, such a description 
of the discrimination inherent in this case is apparently 
not sufficient. For it fails to define the "discrete, iden-
tifiable class" which the Court now evidently perceives 
to be "necessary for equal protection analysis." Ante, 
at -. If by this the Court means that an essential 
predicate to equal protection analysis is the precise 
identification of the particular individuals who comprise 
the disadvantaged class, I fail to find the source from 
which the Court derives such a requirement. Certainly, 
such precision is not analytically necessary. So long as 
the basis of the discrimination is clearly identified, it is 
possible to test it against the State's purpose for Fuch 
discrimination-whatever the standard of equal protec-
tion analysis employed."" This is clear from our decision 
only last Term in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 ( 1972), 
where the Court, in striking down Texas' primary filing 
fees as violative of equal protection, found no impedi-
ment to equal protection analysis in the fact that the 
members of the disadvantaged class could not be readily 
identified. The Court recognized that the filing fee 
system tended "to deny some voters the opportunity to 
vote for the candidate of their choosing; at the same 
time it gives the affluent power to place on the ballot 
their own names or the Hames of persons they favor." 
!d., at 144. The Court also recognized that "rtJhis 
""Problems of remedy ma~· be another matter. If ]JrOI · i~ion of 
the relief sou~rht in a partirul!tr rn~c rP(Juirrd identifiention of carh 
member of the affected cla~~. a~ in the ca~e of monctar~· rrlirf, the 
need for clarity in defining the da~>< i~ :tppnrrnt. But thi~ in-
volves the procedmal problem~ inhrrcnt in ria~~ action litigation, not 
the character of the clemrnt~ e~~cnt ial to equal prot crt ion :1nnl~·~is. 
lYe arc ronr<·rned here on!~· with the !at tcr. Morcowr, it i~ e1·i<knt 
that in r.1~c~ ~urh :ts this provi~ion of appropriate relief. whirh tnkcs 
the in,innrt iw· form, i~ not a Rrrious problem ~inee it i~ enough i o 
direct the nrtion of nppro]Jrintc offirinb. 
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disparity in voting po"·er based on wealth cannot be 
described by reference to discrete and precisely defined 
segments of the community as is typical of inequities 
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause .... " 
Ibid. Nevertheless, it concluded that "we would ignore 
reality were we not to recog11ize that this system falls 
with unequal weight on voters ... according to their 
economic status." Ibid. The nature of the classifica-
tion in Bullock was clear, although the precise member-
ship of the disadvantaged class was not. This was 
enough in Bullock for purposes of equal protection analy-
sis. It is enough here. 
It may be, though, that the Court is not in fact de- \ 
manding precise identification of the membership of the 
disadvantaged class for purposes of equal protection 1 
analysis, but is merely unable to discern with sufficient 
clarity the nature of the discrimination charged in this 
case. Indeed, this may be the explanation for the Court's 
elaborate exploration of the various theories of discrim.i-
nation which have been put forth at various stages of 
this case. See ante, at -. It is, of course, essential 
to equal protection analysis to have a firm grasp upon 
the nature of the discrimination at issue. The absence 
of such a clear, articulatable understa.nding of the nature 
of alleged discrimination in a particular instance may 
well suggest the absence of any real discrimination. 
But such is hardly the case here. 
A number of theories of discrimination have, to be· 
sure, been considered in the course of this litigation. 
Thus, the District Court found that in Texas the poor 
and minority group members tend to live in property 
poor districts, suggesting discrimination on the basis of 
both personal ·wealth and race. The Court goes to great 
lengths to discredit the data upon which the District 
Court relied and thereby its conclusion that poor people 
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live in poor districts. 54 Although I have serious doubts 
as to the correctness of the Court's analysis in rC'jecting 
the data submitted below,"5 I have no need to join issue 
on these factual disputes. 
"'I assume the Court would launch the ~ame critici;.;m againRt the 
validity of the finding of a correlation bet ween poor district~ and 
racial minorities. 
r.r. The Court rejects the District Court's finding of a correlation 
brtween poor people and poor di,;tricts with lhr a~~ert ion thn.t 
"thPrc is • rea::;on to believr that t he poorr~l familieH arc not ll Cces-
~nrily clubtered in the poorest districts" in Texa.-. Ante, at -. 
In support of its conclusion the Court offers absolutrl~' no data-
which it cannot on th is record-concerning the distribution of pnor 
proplr in Texas to refute the dn.ta introducrd below by appPilecs; 
it relics in~tead on a recent law revirw note concerned solely with 
the State of Connecticut, ::\l'ote, A Statistical Analysis of the School 
Finance Decisions: On Winning HattleH and Losing War~, 81 Yale 
L .• T. 1303 (1972). Common scnf3e suggests that the basis for draw-
ing a demographic conclusion with respect to a geographically large, 
urban-rural, industrial-agricultural Stale such as Texas from a 
geographically small, drnscly populated, highly induRtrializrd State 
such as Connecticut is doubtful at best. 
Furthrrmore, thr artirlr upon which thP Court rrlirs to dil:icrrdit 
t hr stat isticnl procedures employed by Professor Brrke to establish 
the corrrlation between poor pPople and poor districts, sec n. 11, 
supra, based its criticism primarily on the fact that only four of the 
110 di~tricts studied were in the lowpst of the five categories, which 
were determined by rclativr taxnblc property per j)Upil, and most 
districts clustered in the middlr thrrc groups. See Goldstein, Inter-
diHtrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical A nnl~'sis of 
Serrano v. Pl'iest and its Progeny, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 504, 524 n. 67 
(1972). But the Court fails to note that tho four poorest districts 
in the Rample had over 50,000 students which constitutrd 10% of 
the students in the entire sample. It apprars, moreover, that even 
when the richest and the poorest categories are enlarged to include 
in e~ch category 20% of the students in the sample, the correlation 
between district and individual wealth hold::; true. See Brief for the 
Governors of Minnesota, Maine, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan as amicus curiae 17 n. 21. 
Finall y, it cannot be ignored that tho data. introduced by apprlleoH 
went unchallenged in the District Court. The majorit~··~ willingness 
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.~.-~ .. / 
1 believe it is sufficient that the 'tv8n ea:elo!i~~ form 
of discrimination in this case is between the school dis-
trict of Texas on the basis of the taxable property wealth 
of the district in which they happen to live. To under-
stand the precise nature of this discrimination-and even 
the precise parameters of the disadvantaged class-it is 
sufficient to consider the constitutional principle which 
appellees contend is controlling in the context of educa-
tional financing. In their complaint appellees asserted 
that the Constitution does not permit local district 
wealth to be determinative of educational opportunity."n 
This is simply another way of saying, as the District 
Court concluded, that consistent with the guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws, "the quality of public e. du- ( 
cation may not be a function of wealth, other than the 
wealth of the state as a whole." 337 F . Supp., at 284. 
Under such a principle, the children of a district are 
excessively advantaged if tiliitchstrict has more taxable 
property per pupii' "than the average amount of taxabie 
property per pupil coi1sidering the tate as a whole. By 
contrast, the ~en_of a district are disadvantaged if 
that district has less taxable proper y per pupil than 
tlie state average. I do not believe that the C'ourt could 
asklor, much less need, a clearer definition of either the 
disadvantaged class of Texas school children or the 
allegedly unconstitutional discrimination suffered by the 
members of that class under the present Texas financing 
scheme."7 Whether this discrimination, against the 
to permit appellants to litigate the rorrectne~s of thnt data for 1 he 
first time before thi~:~ tribunal-where diective response by appellees 
i · irnpo~;,;ible-i~ both unfair and judicially llll~01md. 
" 6 Third Amended Complaint, App., at 24. 
"
7 Thus, I simply fail to under,;tnnd the CourL'o; suggestion that ) 
the disadnmiagcd cla~s as I would define it, would be "ambiguous." 
Ante, at -. And, certainly there is nothing "artificial" nbout the 
line which determine~ whether the children of a particular district 
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school children of property poor districts, inherent in the 
Texas financillg scheme is violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is the question to which we must novv turn. 
II 
In striking down the Texas financing scheme because 
of the interdistrict variations in taxable property wealth, 
the District Court determined that it was insufficient ---------.... -
for appellants to show merely that the State's scheme 
was rationally related to some legitimate state purpose; 
rather, the discrimination inherent iu the scheme had to 
be supported by a "compelling state interest" in order 
to withstand constitutwmi1 scrutiny. The basis for this 
determination was two-fold: first, the financing scheme 
divides citizens on a wealth basis, a classification which. 
the pistrict Court vie~ved as highly suspect; and second, 
the discriminatory scheme directly affects what it con-
sidered to be a "fundamental interest," namely, education. 
This Court has repeatedly held that state discrimina-
tion which either adversely affects a "fundamental in-
terest," sec, e. g., Dunn v. Blumsteh1, 405 F S. 330, 336-
337 (Hl72); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 629-
631 (1969), or is based on a distinction of a suspect char-
acter. see, e. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365. 372 
(1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 191-192 
(1969), must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the 
scheme is necessary to promote a substantial, legitimate 
state interest. Sec, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., 
at 342-343; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 634. 
The majority today concludes, however, that the Texas 
scheme is not subject to such a strict standard of review 
under the Equal Protection Clause, Instead in its view, 
the Texas scheme must be tested by nothing more than 
are mlvantagcd or cli~aclYanta~rd. Ibid. ThnL i~ thr line rlrarl~· 
clir1 a ted h~· the prinripl r of intcrdi~trict oqunlit~· in taxable proprrl y 
wcal1h for whieh apprllccs ha\·o argued. 
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that lenient standard of rationality which we have tra-
ditionally applied to discriminatory state action in the 
context of economic and commercial matters. See, e. g., 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-426 (1961); 
Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 457, 465-466 ( 1957); F. S. 
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (HJ20); 
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-
79 (1911). By so doing tho Court avoids tho telling 
task of searching for a substantlal state interest which 
tl1eTcxas :financii1g scheme, with its variations in taxable 
district property "·ealth. is necessary to further. I can-
not accept such an emasculation of the Equal Protection 
Clause in tho context of this case. 
A 
To begin, I must once more voice my disagreement 
with tho Court's rio·idified approach to equal protection 
analysis. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-
521[1969) (dissenting opinion); Richardson v. Belcher, 
404 U.S. 78. 90 (1971) (dissenting opinion). Tho Court 
apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection 
cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate 
the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or 
mere rationality. But this Court's decisions in the field 
of equal protection defy such easy categorization. A 
principled reading of what this Court has done reveals 
that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing 
discrimination allegedly viOlative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends varia-
tions in the degreeofeare with wh:lch the Court will 
scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, 
or1the constitutional and societal importance of the inter-
est adversely aft'ected and the recognized invidiousness 
of tho basis upon which the particular classification is 
drawn. In short, I find that many of the Court's recent 
decisions embody the very sort of reasoned approach to 
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equal protection analysis for which I previo~sly ~ed­
that is, an approach in which "concentration [is l placed 
upon the character of the classification in question, the 
relative importance to the individuals iu the class dis-
criminated against of the governmental benefits they do 
not receive, and the asserted state interests in support 
of the classification." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., 
at 520-521 (dissenting opinion). 
I therefore cannot accept the majority's labored efforts 
to demonStraTe that fundamental interests, which call -for strict scrutiny of the challenged classification, encom-
pass only established rights which we are bound to .reco~­
nize from the text of the Constitution itself. To be sure, 
some interests w uch the Court has deemed to be funda-
mental for purposes of equal protection analysis are 
themselves constitutionally protected rights. Thus, dis-
crimination against the guaranteed right of freedom of 
speech has called for strict judicial scrutiny. s;;JI;iOsei'y 
Y.' Police Department of the City of Chicago, 408 U. S. 
92 ( 1972). Every citizen's right to travel interstate, 
although nowhere expressly mentioned iii'the Constitu-
tion, has long been recognized as implicit in the premises 
underlying the Document: the right "was conceived from 
the beginning to be a concomitant of the stronger Union 
the Constitution created." United States v. Guest, 383 
U. S. 745, 758 (1966). See also Crandall v. Nevada, 6 
Wall. 35, 48 (1867). Consequently, the Court has re-
quired that a state classification affecting the constitu-
tionally protected right to travel must be "shown to be 
necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969). 
But it will not do to suggest that the Constitution itself 
alwaySdefines what interests are fundamental for pur-
posesof equal protection analysis."8 
t/t.~..r· ~­
ou..lt-r t(tWA tP HJ .. l.A./-~(J~ 
""'V'-1' f <; ' .... • ..... ~ ........ 
'-
"
8 Indeed, the Court's theory would render the Equal Prolcction l 
Clause largely superfluous, except for cases of discrimination on the 
I '/,.. --r-vt) ~ 
t-v--~. 
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I would like to know where the Constitution guaran-
tees the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. 
Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942), or the right to 
vote in state elections, e. g., Reynolds v. SimS, 3'7 U. S. 
533 (1964), or the right to an appeal from a criminal 
conviction, e. g.-,-Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956). 
These are instances in which, due to the importance of 
the interests at stake, the Court has displayed a strong 
concern with the existence of discriminatory state treat-
ment. But the Court has never said or indicated that 
these are interests which independently enjoy full-blown 
constitutional protection. 
Thus, in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the Court 
refused to recognize a substantive constitutional guaran-
tee of the right to procreate. Nevertheless, in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S., at 541, the 
Court, without impugning the continuing validity of Buck 
v. Bell, held that "strict scrutiny" of state discrimina-
tion affecting procreation "is essential," for " [ m] arriage 
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence 
and survival of the race." Today the importance of 
procreation may indeed be explained on the basis of its 
intimate relationship with the constitutional right of 
privacy which we have recognized. See Roe v. Wade, 
- U. S. -, -- (1973). Yet the limited stature ac-
corded any "right" to procreate is evident from the fact 
that at the same time the Court has reaffirmed its initial 
decision in Buck v. Bell. See Roe v. Wade, - U. S., 
at-. 
basi:; of su ·pect criteria such as race, e. g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 
379 U. S. 184, 191-192 (1964), or alienage, e. g., Graham v. Rirhard-
son, 403 U. S. 365, 372 (1971). For the substantive con;,;titutional 
right it;;elf requires that this Court o;trictly scrutinize any :u;;,;crted 
stale intereo;t for restricting or denyiug the right to its citizens. Sec, 
e. g., O'Brien v. United States, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1961:l); Cox v. 
Loui8iana, 379 U. S. 536, 545-551 (1965). 
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Similarly, the right to vote in state elections has been \ 
recognized as a ~ental political right," because I 
the Court concluded very early that it is "preservative { 
of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370 
( 1886); see, e. g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561-
562 (1964). For this reason, "this Court has m.ade clear 
that a citi~:en has a constitutionally protected right to 
participate in elections on an equal basis with other citi-
zens in the jurisdict·ion." Dunn v. Blumstein., 405 U. S. 
330, 336 (1972) (emphasis added). The source of such 
protection from inequality in the provision of the state 
franchise is, of course, the Equal Protection Clause. Yet 
it is clear that whatever degree of importance has been 
attached to the state electoral process, the right to vote 
in state elections has never been accorded the stature of 
an independent constitutional guarantee. See Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
Finally, it is likewise "true that a State is not required 
by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts 
or a right to appellate review at all." Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U. S., at 18. Nevertheless, discrimination adversely 
affecting access to an appellate process which a State 
has chosen to provide has been considered to require 
close judicial scrutiny. See, e. g., Griffin v. Illinois, 
supra; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963).00 
The majority, is, of course, correct when it suggests 
that the job of determini11g which interests are funda-
"" It is trur that Griffin 11nd Douglas abo inYolYrcl di~criminn­
tion ag;ain~t incligmt~, that i~, wrnlth cliscrimin<ltion. But, ;~ . ., thr 
majorit.1· 11oint~ out, aute. at - n. 67, tho Court ha~ nr1 er deemed 
wealth di~criminat ion alonr to be ~nfficient to requirr Rtrict jud ieial 
Hcrutin~·; rather, such review of wralth classification~ ha~ brrn np-
plil:'d on!~· whrrr thr diHcrimination nffrcts an important indi,•idnal 
interr~t, srr, e. g .. Ilwper , .. V£rginia Board of Elections, 3~3 li. S. 
66:3 (1966). Tim~, I believe Griffin and Douglas cnn only be undrr-
~tood as prrmi~C'd on n recognition of thr fundnmental importnncr of 
the criminal appollnte process. 
(Y 
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mental is a difficult one. But I do not think the problem 
is insurmountable, and I do not accept the view that it I 
need necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, sub-
jective "picking-and-choosing" between various inter-
ests. Although not all fundamental interests arc con-
stitutionally guaranteed, the determination of which 
interests are fundamental should be finnly rooted in the 
text of the Constitution. The task in every case should 
be to determine the extent to ,vhich constitutionally guar-
anteed rights arc dependent on interests not mentioned 
in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific 
cons 1tutio11al guarantee and the nonconstitutional inter- 1 <"' 
est draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes 
more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny 
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory 
basis must grow accordingly. Thus, it cannot be denied • 
that interests such as procreation, the exercise of the state 
franchise, and access to criminal appellate processes arc 
not fully guaranteed to the citizen by our Constitution. 
But these interests have nonetheless been afforded spe-
cial judicial consideration in the face of discrimination 
because they are, to son1e extent, interrelated with con-
stitutional guarantees. Procreation is deemed important 
because of its interaction with the established constitu-
tional right of privacy. The exercise of the state fran-
chise is closely tied to basic civil and political rights 
inherent in the First Amendment. And access to crim-
inal appellate proc<'sses enhances the integrity of the 
range of rights Go implicit in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantee of due process of law. Only if we closely 
protect the related interests from state discrimination 
do "·e ultimately ensure the integrity of the constitutional 
'"' Sc<', e. g .. Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 U. R. 14!5 (19f\8) (right io 
jury trial); TVashington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1907) (right to 
compulsor~· proecs~); Pointer v. Texas, 880 U.S. 400 (1965) (right 
to confrout onc'8 nrru~cr::;). 
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guarantee itself. This is the real lesson that must be 
taken from our previous decisions involving interests 
deemed to be fundamental. 
The effect of the interaction of individual interests 
with established constitutional guarantees upon the de-
gree of care exercised by this Court in reviewing state 
discrimination affecting such interests is amply illustrated 
by our decision last Term in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U. S. 438 (1972). In Baird, the Court struck down as 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause a state statute 
which denied unmarried persons access to contraceptive 
devices on the same basis as married persons. The Court 
purported to test the statute under its traditional staml-
ard whether there is some rational basis for the discrimi-
nation effected. !d., at 447. In the context of com-
mercial regulation, the Court has indicated that the 
Equal Protection Clause "is offended only if the classifi-
cation rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the State's objective. See, e. g., McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961); Kotch v. Board 
of R1"ver Port Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, 557 
(1947). And this lenient standard is further weighted in 
the State's favor by the fact that "[a] statutory classifi-
uation will not be set aside if any state of facts rea-
sonably may be conceived [by the Court 1 to justify it." 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 426. But in Baird 
the Court clearly did not adhere to these highly tolerant 
st~ndards of review. For although there were conceiv-
able state interests intended to be advanced by the 
statute-e. g., deterrence of premarital sexual activity; 
regulation of the dissemination of potentially dangerous 
articles-the Court was not prepared to accept these in-
terests on their face, but instead proceeded to test their 
substantiality by independent analysis. See 405 U. S., 
at 449-454. Such close scrutiny of the State's interests 
was hardly characteristic of the deference shown state 
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classifications in the context of economic interests. See, 
e. g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. 
Boar,d of River Port Pilot Commissioners, supra. Y ct 
I think the Court's action was entirely appropriate for 
access to and usc of contraceptives bears a close rela-
tionship to the individual's constitutional right of privacy. 
See 405 U. S., at 453-454; id., at 463-464 (WHITE, J. , 
concurring). See also Roe v. Wade, - U. S., at -. 
A similar process of analysis with respect to the in-
vidiousness of the basis on which a particular classifi-
cation is drawn has also influenced the Court as to the 
appropriate degree of scrutiny to be accorded any par-
ticular case. The highly suspect character of classifi-
cations based on race,u1 nationality,u" or alienage "" is 
well established. The reasons why such classifications 
call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain 
racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recog-
nized as "discrete and insular minorities" who arc rela-
tively powerless to protect their interests in the political 
process. See Grah.am v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 372 
(1971); cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 
U. S. 144, 152 n. 4 ( 1938). Moreover, race, nationality, 
or alienage is " 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to any 
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose, Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100." McLaughlin 
v. Florida, 379 U. S., at 192. Instead, lines drawn on 
such bases arc frequently the reflection of historic prej-
udices rather than legislative rationality. It may be 
that all of these considerations, which make for par-
ticular judicial solicitude in the face of discrimi11ation 
on the basis of race, nationality, or alienage, do not 
01 Sec, e. g., Jl!cLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S., at 191- 192; Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). 
""Sec Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 63:3, 644-646 (1948); 
Kurematsu v. United States. 32:3 U. S. 214, 216 ( 1944). 
na Sec Graham v. Richard8un, 403 U. S. 365, 37:2 (1971) . 
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coalesce-or at least not to the same degree- in other 
forms of discrimination. Nevertheless, these considera-
tions have undoubtedly influeucecl the care with " ·hich 
the Court has scrutillized other forms of discrimination. 
In James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 128 (1972), the Court 
held unconstitutional a state statute which provided for 
recoupment from indigent convicts of legal defense fees 
paid by the State. The Court found that the statute 
impermissibly differentiated between criminals 
in debt to the state and civil judgment debtors, since 
criminal debtors were denied various protective exemp-
tions afforded civil judgment debtors. The Court sug-
gested that in reviewing the statute under the Equal 
Protection Clause, it was merely applying the traditional 
requirement that there be "some rationality in the line 
drawn between the different types of debtors." I d., at 
140. Yet it then proceeded to scrutinize the statute with 
less than traditional deference and restraint. Thus the 
Court recognized "that state recoupment statutes may 
be token legitimate state interests" in recovering expemes 
and discouraging fraud. Nevertheless. MH. Jn=vrrc1~ 
PowELL, speaking for the Court, concluded that 
"these interests are not thwarted by requiring more 
even treatment of indigent criminal defendants 
with other classes of debtors to whom the statute 
itself repeatedly makes reference. State recoupment 
laws, notwithstanding the state interests they may 
serve, need not blight in such discriminatory fashion 
the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-
respect." !d. , at 141-142. 
The Court, in short, clearly did not consider the prob-
lems of fraud and collection that the state legislature 
might have concluded were peculiar to~ criminal 
defendants either to be sufficiently real or Important to 
justify denial of the protective exemptions afforded to 
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all civil judgment debtors, to a class composed exclu-
sively of indigent criminal debtors. 
Similarly, in Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), the 
Court, in striking do\\~1 a state statute "·hich gave men 
preference over women when persons of equal entitlement 
apply for assignment as an administrator of a particular 
estate, resorted to a more stringent standard of equal pro-
tection review than that employed in cases involving 
commercial matters. The Court indicated that it was 
testing the claim of sex discrimination by nothing more 
than whether the line drawn bore "a rational relationship 
to the state objective," \Yhich it recognized as a legitimate 
effort to reduce the work of probate courts in choosing 
between competing applications for letters of adminis-
tration. !d., at 76. Accepting such a purpose, the Idaho 
Supreme Court had thought tho classification to be sus-
tainable on the basis that the legislature might have 
reasonably concluded that, as a rule, men have more 
experience than \\·omen in business matters relevant to 
the administration of estate. 03 Idaho 511, 514; 465 P. 
2cl 635. 638 (1970). This Court, hO\Yever, concluded 
that " [ t] o giYe a mandatory preference to members of 
either sex over members of the other, merely to ac-
complish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is 
to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice for-
bidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and whatever may be said as to the positive 
values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the choice 
in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on 
the basis of sex," id., at 76-77. This Court, in other 
words, was umYilling to consider a theoretical and un-
substantiated basis for distinction-however reasonable 
it might appear-sufficient to sustain a statute discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex. 
James and Reed can only be understood as instances in 
"·hich the particularly invidious character of the classi-
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fication caused the Court to pause and scrutinize with 
more than traditional care the rationality of state dis-
crimination. Discrimination on the basis of past crim-
inality and on the basis of sex posed for the Court the 
spectre of forms of discrimination which it implicitly 
recognized to have deep social and legal roots without 
necessarily having any basis in actual differences. Still, 
the Court's sensitivity to the invidiousness of the basis 
for discrimination is perhaps most apparent in its deci-
sions protecting the interests of children born out of wed-
lock from discriminatory state action. See Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy 
v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968). 
In Weber, the Court struck down a portion of a state 
workmen's compensation statute that relegated unac-
knowledged illegitimate children of the deceased to a 
lesser status with respect to benefits than that occupied 
by legitimate children of the deceased. The Court ac-
knowledged the true nature of its inquiry in cases such 
as these: "What legitimate state interest does the classi-
fication promote? What fundamental personal rights 
might the classification endanger?" !d., at 173. Em-
barking upon a determination of the relative substanti-
ality of the State's justifications for the classification, the 
Court rejected the contention that the classifications re-
flected what might be presumed to have been the de-
ceased's preference of beneficiaries as "not compelling ... 
where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to 
anyone's recovery .... " !d., at 174. Likewise, it 
deemed the relationship between the State's interest in 
encouraging legitimate family relationships and the bur-
den placed on the illegitimates too tenuous to permit the 
classification to stand. I d., at 173. A clear insight 
into the basis of the Court's action is provided by its 
conclusion: 
"[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is 
contrary to the basic concept of our system that 
,. 
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legal burdens should bear some relationship to in-
dividual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously no 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the 
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an 
unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are 
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered 
by these hapless children, but the Equal Protection 
Clause does enable us to strike clown discriminatory 
laws relating to status of birth." 406 U. S., at 175-
176 (footnote omitted). 
Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something 
which the individual cannot control, and should generally 
be irrelevant in legislative considerations. Yet illegit-
imacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence, 
discrimination on the basis of birth-particularly when 
it affects innocent children-warrants special judicial 
consideration. 
In summary, it seems to me inescapably clear that this 
Court has consistently adjusted the care with which it 
willreview state discrimination in light of the constitu-
tional significance• of the interests affected and the in-
vi?iousness of the particular classification. In the con-
text of economic interests, we find that discriminatory 
state action is almost always sustained for such interests 
.... are generally far removed from constitutional guar-
antees. Moreover, "[t]he extremes to which the Court 
has gone in dreaming up rational bases for state regulation 
in that area may in many instances be ascribed to a 
healthy revulsion from the Court's earlier excesses in using 
the Constitution to protect interests that have more than 
enough power to protect themselves in the legislative 
halls." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S., at 520 (dissent-
ing opinon). But the situation differs markedly when 
discrimination against important individual interests ) 
with constitutional implications and against particularly 
disadvalltagecl or powerless classes is involved. The 
. , . 
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majority suggests, however, that a variable standard of 
reviev,· would give this Court tho appearance of a "su11er-
legislature." Ante, at -. I cannot agree. Such an 
approach seems to me a part of the guarantees of our 
Constitution and of the historic experiences with oppres-
sion of and discrimination against discrete, powerless 
minorities "·hich underlie that Document. In truth, 
the Court itself '"ill be open to the criticism raised by ? 
tho majority so long as it continues on its present course 
of effectively selecting in private which cases will be 
afforded special consideration without acknowledging the 
true basis of its action.G' Opinions such as those in 
Reed and James seem dra>vn more as efforts to shield 
rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's de-
CISIOns. Such obfuscated action may be appropriate to 
a political body suCh as a legiSlature, but it is not ap-
propriate to this Court. Open debate of the bases for 
the Court's action is essential to the rationality and 
consistency of our decisio1lnaking process. Only in this 
way can we avoid the label of legislature and ensure the 
integrity of tho judicial process. 
Ne\·ertheless, the majority today attempts to force this 
case into the same category for purposes of equal pro-
tection analysis as decisions involving discrimination 
affecting commercial interests. By so doing, the majority 
singles this case out for analytic treatment at odds with 
what seems to me to be the clear trend of recent decisions 
in this Court, and thereby ignores tho constitutional im-
portance of the interest at stake and the invidiomness of 
the particular classification, factors that call for far more 
than the lenient scrutiny of the Texas financing schon1e 
which the majority pursues. Yet if the discrimination 
inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with the care 
0 '
1 Src grncrall~· Ciunthrr, Thr Supreme Court , 1971 Term: Forr-
\rord, In Sc:trrh of EYoh·ing Doctrine on 3 Clwnging Com1 : A 
l\1odrl for 3 l\C'wcr Equal Prolcrtion, R6 HarT. L. TIP\". 1 (1972) . 
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demanded by the interest and classification present m 
this case, the unconl'titutionality of that scheme IS 
unmistakcab lc. 
B 
Since the Court now suggests that only interests guar-
anteedby the Constitution arc fundamental for pur-
poses of equal protection analysis and since it rejects 
the contention that public education is fundamental, 
it follows that the Court implicitly concludes that pub-
lic~ eaucation is not constitutionally guaranteed. It is 
true that this Court has never deemed the provision of 
free public education to be required by the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, it has on occasion suggested that state 
supported education is a privilege bestowed by a State 
on its citizens. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada., 
305 U. S. 337, 349 (Hl38). Nevertheless. the funda-
mental importance of education is amply indicated by 
the prior decisions of this Court. by the unique status 
accorded public education by our society, and by the 
close relationship between education and some of our 
mo t basic constitutional values. 
The special concern of this Court with the educational 
process of our country is a matter of common knowledge. 
Undoubtedly, this Court's most famous statement on 
the subject is that contained in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954): 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. Com-
pulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for eel ucation both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perform-
ance of our most basic public responsibilities, even 
service in armed forces. It is the very foundation 
of good citizenship. Today it is a principal in-
strument in awakening the child to cultural values, 
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in preparing him for later professional training, and 
in helping to adjust normally to his environment .... " 
Only last Term the Court recognized that "r p] rovid-
ing public schools ranks at the very apex of the functions 
of a State." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 
(1972). This is clearly borne out by the fact that in 48 
of our 50 States the provision of public education is 
mandated by the state constitution.(;" No other state 
function is so uniformly recognized nn as an essential 
element of our society's well-being. In large measure, 
the explanation for the special importance attached to 
education must rest, as the Court recognized in Yoder, 
id., at 221, on the facts that "some degree of education 
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively 
in our open political system ... ," and that "education 
prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient 
participants in society." Both facets of this observation 
are suggestive of the substantial relationship which edu-
cation bears to guarantees of our Constitution. 
Education directly affects the ability of a child to exer-
cise his First Amendment interests both as a source and 
as a reeciver of information and ideas, whatever inter-
ests he may pursue in life. This Court's decision in 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957), 
speaks of the right of students "to inquire, to study, and 
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understand-
05 Sec Brief amicus curiae on behalf of the National Education 
Association et al., App. A. All 48 of the 50 States which mnndntc 
publir education also have compulsory attendance laws which re-
quire school attendance for eight years or more. !d., at 20-21. 
cr. Prior to this Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 
847 U. S. 483 (1954), ever~' State had a constitutional provision 
directing the establishment of a system of publir schools. But a ftcr 
Brown, South Carolina repealed its constitutional provision, and 
Mi~sis~ippi made its constitutional provision discretionary with the 
HU1to legislature. 
71-1332-DISSENT (A) 
SAN ANTONIO SCHOOL DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ 43 
ing .... " Thus, we have not casually described the 
classroom as the "marketplace of ideas." Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The oppor-
tunity for formal education may not necessarily be the 
essential determinant of an individual's ability to enjoy 
throughout his life the rights of free speech and asso-
ciation guaranteed to him by the First Amendment. But 
such an opportunity may enhance the individual's en-
joyment of those rights, not only during but also follow-
ing school attendance. Thus, in the final analysis, "the 
pivotal position of education to success in American so-
ciety and its essential role in opening up to the individual 
the cultural experiences of our culture lend it an im-
portance that is undeniable." 67 
Of particular importance is the relationship between 
education and the political process. "Americans regard 
the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of the democratic system of Government." 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 230 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Education serves 
the essential function of instilling in our young an under-
standing of and appreciation for the principles and opera-
tion of our governmental processes. 68 Education may 
instill the interest and provide the tools necessary for 
67 Devrlopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 
1065, 1129 ( 1969) 0 
68 The President's Commission on School Finance, Schools, Peo-
ple, nnd Money: the Need for Educational Reform 11 (1972), con-
cluded that "[l]iterally we cannot survive as a mature nation or as 
individualR without. [education]." It further observed that 
" in a democratic society, public understanding of public is;:;ues is 
necessary for public support. Schools generally include in their 
coursrs of in.,truction a wide variety of subject;;; related to the history, 
Rt ruct urc and principles of Americnn government at all levels. In so 
doiug, schools proYide students with a background of knowledge 
which is deemed an absolute nrcesHity for responsible eitizen~hip." 
Id., at 1:3-14. 
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political discourse and debate. Indeed, it has frequently 
been suggested that education is the dominant factor 
affecting political consciousness and participation.nr• A 
system of "[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental 
policies is at the core of our electoral process and of First 
Amendment freedoms." Williams v. Rhodes, 303 U. S. 
23. 32 (1968). But of most immediate and direct con-
cern must be the demonstrated effect of education on the 
exercise of the franchise by the electorate. The right to 
vote in federal eJections is conferred by Art. I, § 2, and 
the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution, and 
access to the state franchise has been afforded special 
protection because it is "preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 
561-562 (1964). Data from the Presidential Rlection 
of 1968 clearly demonstrates a direct relationship between 
participation in the electoral process and Jevel of edu-
cational attainment,70 and, as this Court recognized in 
"" Srr J. Guthrie•, G. Klrindorfer, II. Le,·in, & H. Stout. Srhool~ 
nnd Inequalit~· 103-105 (1971): H. He~~ & .1. Tome~·, The Drvclop-
mrnt of Political Attitudes in Children 217-21~ (HHii); Ca!ll]Jhrll, 
The Pa~~iw Citizen, \'I Arta Soriologien, :'fo~. 1-2. 9, 20-21 (10()2) . 
That rduration i~ the dominant factor in influrncing pol it ir:tl p:tr-
tiripation al!Cl nwnrpnr~~ i" RtliTirieni. I brlirw, to cli~po~r of thr 
Court!~ suggr~tion that, in all rvrnt~. thrre is no inclir-nlion that 
Trx:tR i~ not pro,·iding nll of it·H children with :1 ~llffif'irnl rdu<':tlion 
to rn.io~· thr right of frer ~prrrh and to ]Jnrtiripntr full~· in the 
political procr~s. Ant<', at -. Tlwrc is, in ~hort. no limi t on thr 
:tmmmt of frrr ~prrrh or polit irnl part if'ipnl ion t hn t t hr Com:titu-
tion gunrnntee~. :\forro,·cr, il ~hotild hr ob\'iou~ thai thr polilirnl 
prorr~~ . like mo~l ol hrr nRpret;;; of Borin! i ntrrrou r."r. i~ to ~ornr 
dr~!:rer rompetiti,·r. II i~ thu~ of little brnrfit to an indi,·idu:d from 
:1 proprrty ]Joor rli,;lrirl to hrt,-c "rnough" rdurntion if tho~r :trotmd 
him haw morr than "enough.'' Cf. 81c1'att , .. Paiutrr. ::;:)!) lT. S. 029, 
();~:i-034 ( 1950). 
70 Srr Unilrd Stair~ Department of Commcrcr, Bnrr:tll of tlw 
Crn~n~, Voting and Brgi~tration in tbr Elretion of ~owmbrr 190R, 
Currrnl Population Rcporl, , Rrrirs P-20, No. Hl2, Tahir 4, Jl. 17 
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Gaston v. United States, 395 U. S. 285, 296 (1969), the 
quality of education offered may influence a child's 
decision to "enter or remain in school." It is, in sum, 
this very sort of intimate relationship between a par-
ticular personal interest and specific constitutional guar-
antees that has heretofore caused the Court to attach 
special significance, for purposes of equal protection anal-
ysis. to individual interests such as procreation and the 
C'xercise of the state franchise. 7 ' 
While ultimately disputing little of this, the majority 
seeks refuge in the fact that the Court has "never pre-
sumed to possess either the ability or the authority to 
guarantee the citizenry the most effective speech or 
(10fiR). Srr ;d~o Lr,·in, thr Co~tR to thr X:ttion of Inadrquntr Edu-
ention, CommittPP Print of thP SC'n:ltC' SPlret CommittPr on Equal 
Fdurat ion:d Opportunit _,., 92d Cong., 2d SP~~ .• j). -~7 (1972). 
71 I brlirvr that thr dosr llC'XIIS betwPPIJ education aml our rstab-
li~hrd cou~titution:d valur~ with rr~prrt to freedom of spcf'rh and 
Jlartieip:ltion in thP political prorrss makPs this a difTcrcnt cnsc 
t h:m our prior dPri~ion~ rmwcrning di~rriminn tion nffprt ing public 
wp]fnrr. srr, 1' . g., Dandridge'"· Williams. 394 U.S. -t71 (1970). or 
hou~ing. ~rc, c. g .. Lindsey "· N O?'met. 405 U. S. M (1972). Thrrr 
c:tn be no que~tion thnt, n~ thr majority ~nggrsts, eon~titntional 
rights mn:'· br Jp~~ mraningful for Romcone without enough to cat or 
without decent hou~ing . Ante. at -. But t hr rrueial diffrrcncP 
lir>< in tlw rloRenc"·' of tlw rrlntionship. Whatewr thf' >'rvcrit~· of 
t IH' impact of insufficient food or inndcquatr hou~ing ou :1 prrson';-; 
lifr , they ha,·r ncvrr been ron~iderecl to brar the snmr direr( nml 
immcdin tc rel nt ions hip to ronst it ntionnl conrrrns for frcr ~wrrh 
nne! for our pol it ira! processr:; ns Pduca t ion has long hrcn rrcognizcd 
to bear. Pcrhnp~. thr best evidence of thif' fnct i~ the uniqur ,:: tatu~ 
\Yhirh ha" bren ncrordrd puhlir rduration n~ the single public srrvicc 
nrnrl.v unanirnou;;;ly ~unrantcecl in 1!lC' con~titut ions of om Stairs, src 
n. G5, suwa. Edurntion, in trnns of ronstitution:li vnlnrs, i>' much 
more nnnlogon~ in m~· jud~mrnt , to the right to vote in ~tntr clcr-
t ion~ thnn to public welfare or public hou::; i110:. IndPrcl. it i~ not 
without signifir:lll('r that wr hn,·r long rceognizrd education n~ nn 
csscnt in! step in providing the disad nllltng<'ci with i he tool s ncces-
~:n·~· to nchir,·p Pronomic srlf-~uffirirncy. 
71-1332-DISSENT (A) 
4G SAN AKTONIO SCHOOL DISTinCT v. RODniGUEZ 
the most infor·m.ed electoral choice." Ante, at-. This 
serves only to blur w·hat is in fact at stake. \Yith clue 
respect. the issue is ueither provision of the most effec-
tive speech nor of the most informed vote. Appellees 
do not now seek the best education Texas might provide. 
They do seek, however, an end to state imposed dis-
crimination in the distribution of taxable district prop-
erty wealth that directly impairs the ability of some 
districts to provide the same educational opportunity 
that other districts can provide with the same or even 
substantially less tax effort. The issue is, in other words, 
one of discrimination that affects the quality of the edu-
cation which Texas has chosen to provide its children; 
and, the precise question here is what importance should 
attach to education for purposes of equal protection anal-
ysis of that discrimination. As this Court held in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S., at 493: The 
opportunity of education, "where the State has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms." The factors just considered, 
including the relationship between education and the 
social and political interests enshrined within the Con-
stitution, compel us to recognize the fundamentality of 
education and to scrutinize with appropriate care the 
bases for state discrimination affecting equality of edu-
cational opportunity in Texas' school districts 72-a con-
72 The majority's reliance on this Court's traditional deference to 
legislative bodies in matters of taxation falls wide of the mark in 
the context of this particular case. See ante, at -. The de-
risions on which the Court relies were simply taxpa~·cr suits chal-
lenging the constitutimmlity of a tax burden in the fare of exemp-
tions or differential taxation afforded to other::;. See Allird Sto1'rs 
of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowel's, 358 U. S. 522 (1959); Ca1'michacl v. South-
em Coal & CokP Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Bell's Gap B. Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890). There is no question that 
from the perspective of the taxpayer, the Equal Protection Clause 
'·imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and va-
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elusion which is only strengthened when we consider 
the character of the classification in this case. 
c 
The District Court found that in discriminating be-
tween Texas school children on the basis of the amount of 
taxable property wealth located in the district in which 
they live, the Texas financing scheme created a form of 
wealth discrimination. This Court has frequently recog-
nized that discrimination on the basis of wealth may cre-
ate a classification of a suspectcharacter and there& call 
forexact.!!?:_g~ciaiscrutiTIY. See-:e. g., Griffin-v. Illi-
nois, 351 U. S~ I2-cTir5T); Douglas v. California, 372 
U. S. 353 (1963); McDonald v. Board of Election Com-
m·issioners of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802, 807 (1969). The 
majority, however, considers any wealth classification in 
this case to lack certain essential characteristics which 
it contends are common to the instances of wealth dis-
crimination that this Court has heretofore recognized. 
We are told that in every prior case involving a wealth 
ricty that arc appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. 
The Statr may impose different specific taxe:; upon different trades 
and profcssionR and may vary the rate of an excise upon various 
products." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S., at 526-
527. But in this case we are presented with a claim of discrimina-
tion of an e11tircly different nature-a claim that the revenue pro-
during mechanism directly discriminates against the interests of some 
of thr intrnded beneficiaries; and in contrast to the tnxpayer suits, 
the interest adversely affected is of substantial constitutional and 
societal importance. l-Ienee, a different standard of equal protec-
tion review than has been employed in the taxpayer suits is appro-
priate here. It is true that affirmance of the District Court deciRion 
would to some extent intrude upon the State'~ taxing power insofar 
as it would be 11ecessar~' for the State to at lca:;t equalize taxable 
district wealth. But contray to the suggcHtions of the majority, 
nflirmnnrc would not impose a straitjacket upon the revenue raising 
powers of the SLate, and would certainly not spell the end of the 
local property tax. Sec infra, pp. ---
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classification, the members of the disadvantaged class 
"have shared two distinguishing characteristics: (1) be-
cause of their impecunity they were completely unable 
to pay for some desired benefit, and (2) as a. consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful 
opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Ante, at -. I 
cannot agree. The Court's distinctions may be sufficient 
to explain the decisions in ·williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 
235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971); and 
even Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972). But they 
arc not in fact consistent with the decisions in Harper v. 
Virginia Board o Elections-;-3-s3 . K't>63 (1965), or 
Griffin v. Illinois, supra, or Douglas v. California, supra. 
In H m·per, the Court struck down as violative of the 
Equal Vrotection Clause an annual Virginia poll tax of 
$1.50, pa.ymeut of '"hich by persons over the age of 21 
was a prerequisite to voting in Virginia elections. In 
part, the Court relied on the fact that the p~ll tax intef: - --fered with a fundamental interest-the exercise of the 
state ranchise. In addition, though, the Court em-
phasized that "[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or 
property ... are traditionally disfavored." I d., at 668. 
Under the first part of the theory armounced by the 
majority the disadvantaged class in Harper, in trrms of 
a wealth analysis. should have consisted only of those too 
poor to afford the $1.50 necessary to vote. But the 
Harper Court did not see it that way. In its view, the 
Equal Protection Clause "bars a system which excludes 
[from the franchise] those unable to pay or who fail to 
pay." Ib·id. (Emphasis added.) So far as the Court 
\vas concerned, the "degree of discrimination .[was] irrel-
evant ." Ibid. Thus. the Court struck clown the poll 
tax in toto; it did not order merely that those too poor 
to pay the tax be exempted; complete impecunity clearly 
\Yas not determinative of the limits of the disadvantaged 
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class, nor "·as it essential to make an equal protection 
claim. 
Similarly, Griffin and Douglas refute the majority's 
contention that we have in the past required an absolute 
deprivation before subjecting wealth classifications to 
strict scrutiny. The Court characterizes Griffin as a case 
concerned simply with the denial of a transcript or an 
adequate substitute therefor, and Douglas as involving 
the denial of counsel. But in both cases the question 
was in fact whether "a State that r grants] appellate 
review can do so in a way that discriminates against 
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 18 (emphasis added). In 
that regard, the Court concluded that inability to pur-
chase a transcript denies "the poor an adequate appellate 
review accorded to all who have mollCY enough to pa.y 
the costs in advance," id., at 18 (emphasis added), and 
that "the type of an appeal a person is afforded ... 
!_hinges] upon whether or not he can pay for the assist-
ance of counsel," Douglas v. California, 372 U. S., at 
355-356 (emphasis added). The right of appeal i~lf 
was not absolute] denied to those too )OOr lli!Y; but 
because of the cost of a transcript and of counsel. the 
appeal was a substantially less meaningful right for the 
poor than for the rich.7 ~ It was on these terms that the 
Court found a denial of equal protection, and those terms 
70 This clor~ not mean that thr Court has drm:mdrd prrei~r <'quulity 
in thr trratmrnt of the indigent and thr prrRon of mrnnR in the 
criminnl pro<·r~s. \Yr haYr nr,·rr Ru~~rf'trd, for in~t:1nrr, that t hr 
Equal Protection Cbu~e rrquirr,; tlw hrst law~·rr monrv ran bu~· for 
thE> indip;rnt. Wr arr hardly rquipped with thr ohjrrti,·r :-:tandarcls 
which i'llrh a. judp;mrnt would rrquirr. But \\·r ha,·c pur~urd the 
p;oal of Rnbstantial cqualit~· of trratmrnt in thr farr of rlr:tr diR-
paritir~ in tlw naturr of the apprllatc procr~R affordrd rich Yrr,:m: 
poor. Rrr, r. (1., Dra]Jer , .. Tl'ashi1l(fton, :~72 U. 8. 4R7, 4\)fi-49(3. 
(196~). 
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clearly encompassed degrees of discrimination on the 
basis of wealth which do not amount to outright denial 
of the affected right or interest. 74 
This is not to say that the form of "·ealth classifica-
tion in this case does not differ significantly fr~ those 
recoo-uized in tileprevTous dedsion~--;;f this Court. Our 
prior cases have dea t essential y wiTiiCT!SciW1ination on 
the basis of personal wealth. 7 " Here. by contrast. the 
----------------
7-1 Even putting aside its misrrading of Griffin and Douolas. the 
Court fails to offer nn~· rra.·onccl conRtitutional basis for rrstrirting 
cnsrH involving wraith diHcrimination to instances in "·hich thrrr is 
:m abRolutc deprivation of the interest affected. As I havr alreacl~· 
diHeussccl, sec supra, p. -. the Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
rquality of treatmrnt of those persons who arr similnrly situntecl; 
it dors not mere!~· bar Rome form of excessive discriminntion be-
t wren such persons. Out~icle the context of wealth di~crimiuation, 
the Court's renpportionmcnt decision;;: clear!~, indicate thai, rrlntivc 
di~crimination is within thr purview of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Thus, in Reynolds '"· Sims, 872 U. S. 533, 562-563 (1964), the 
Court rceognized: 
"It would appear extraordinar~· to suggest that a State could be 
constitutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of 
the State's voters could Yote two, five, or 10 times for thrir legislative 
representatives, while voters living elsewhere could vote only 
once. . . . Of course, the effect of state legislative districting schemes 
which give the same number of ropresentativrs to unequal numbers 
of constituents is identical. Overweighting and overvaluation of the 
votes of those living here haR the certain effect of dilution and undcr-
Yaluation of the votes to those living there. . . . Their right 1o 
vote is simply not the same right to vote as that of those living 
in n favored part of the State. . . . One must be rwr awarr that 
the Constitution forbids 'sophisticated as well as simplr-miudcd 
modes of discrimination.' " 
See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 380-381 (1963). The 
Court gives no explanation why a case involving wealth ckTrimina-
tion should be treated an~' differently. 
7 " But cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 144 (1972), whrre n 
candidate's inabilit~· to pay a primary filing fee was seen as discrimi-
nation against both the impecunious candidate and thr "los~ affluent 
segment of tho community" who support such a candidate but arc 
al~o too poor as a group to contribute enough for the filing fee. 
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children of the disadvantaged Texas school districts are 
being discriminated against not necessarily because of 
their p;;.sonal wealtll or the wealth of their families, but 
because of the taxable property ~ealtl1 of theresidmits 
of the d1Strici in Which the l1ap..12_en to live. The ap-
propriate question, th~ is whether- the ~~me degree of 
judicial solicitude and scrutiny that has previously been 
afforded wealth classifications is warranted here. 
As the Court points out, ante, at -, no previous 
decision has deemed the presence of just a wealtl;:-classi-
ficatio~to be sufficientbasis to call f~rth "rigorous judi-
ci~ scrutiny" of allegedly discrimin~tory stateactim1. 
Compare, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elect?:ons,. 
supra, with, e. g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
That wealth classifications alone have not necessarily 
been considered to bear the same high degree of sus-
pectness as have classifications based on, for instance, 
race or alienage may be explainable on a number of 
grounds. The "poor" may not be seen as politically 
powerless as certain discrete and insular minority 
groups. 76 Personal poverty may entail much the same 
social stigma as historically attached to certain racial or 
ethnic groups. 77 But personal poverty is not a perma-
nent disability; its shackles may be escaped. Perhaps, 
most importantly, though, personal wealth may not 
necessarily share the general irrelevance as basis for 
legislative action which race or nationality is recognized 
to have. While the "poor" have frequently been a 
legally disadvantaged group/8 it cannot be ignored that 
social legislation must frequently take cognizance of 
76 But rf. l\1. Harrington, The Other America 13-17 (Pcn~uin cd. 
1963). 
77 Sec E. Banfield, The Unhe:wcnly City 63, 75-76 (1970); 
R Lynd & H. Lynd, Middle1own in Tran:sition 450 (1937) . 
7
' Cf. City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 142 (1837) . 
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the economic status of our citizens. Thus, we have gen-
erally gauged the invidiousness of wealth classifications 
with an awareness of the importance of the interests 
being affected and the relevance of personal wealth to 
those interests. See Harper v. Virginia. Board of Elec-
tions, supra.. 
When evaluated with these considerations in mind. it 
seems to me that discrimination on the basis of group 
wealth in this case likc\\·ise cans 10r"bareful judicial 
scrutiny~1 • First, it mustbe recognized that '"hile local 
district wealth may serve other interests.7 " it bears no 
relationship whatsoever to the interest of Texas school 
children in the educational opportunity afforded them 
by the State of Texas. Given the importance of that 
interest, we must be particularly sensitive to the invidious 
characteristics of any form of discrimination that is not 
clearly intended to serve it, as opposed to some other 
distinct state interest. Discrimination on the Lasis of 
group wealth may not. to be sure, reflect the social stigma 
frequently attached to personal poverty. Nevertheless, 
insofar as group wealth discrimination involves wealth 
ov~1~~anta~~c~all~s no ~gnificant 
control/0 it represents in fact a more serious basis of 
cli~crimination than does personal wealth. For such dis-
crii"nination ...... is no reflect1on- oftl1e - individual's charac-
teristics or his abilities. And thus-particularly in the 
context of a disadvantaged class compo~ed of children-
7
" Throrrti <'tt ll~·. at lrn~t. it 111:1~· proYidr n mrrhani~m for implr-
lllPPi ing Trx:1~' n~~Prtrd iut rrr~t in loe:d rclurationnl eont rol, ~l'r 
infra. pp. ---. 
~o Trnr, a fa mil~· mn~· mo1·r to c~rapr n proprrt~· poor ~c·hool 
di~trirt, a~~uming it ha~ t hP means to do c:o. But surh n , ·irw would 
it~rlf rni~r n srriou~ ronstitutionnl qur;:tion rmwcrning an imprrmiR-
siblr burdening of t hr right to tr:wrl, or, morr prrri"rl~ · . i hr ron-
romitant right to rrmain \\'herr 011(' i~. cr. Sha]Jii'O \". 'I'hOIII]JS011. 
~94 F. 8. Gl.S, G29-G31 (19G9). 
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we have previously treated discrimination on a basis 
·\\'hich the individual cannot control as constitutionally 
disfavored. Cf. TV eber v. Aetna CasualLy & Surety Co., 
406 U. S. 164 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 
( 1968). 
The disability of the disadvantaged class in this case 
extends as well into the political processes upon '"hich 
we ordinarily rely as adequate for the protection and 
promotion of a.Il interests. Here legislative reallocation 
of the State's property wealth must be sought in the face 
of inevitable opposition from significantly advantaged 
districts that have a strong vested interest in the preserva-
tion of the sta.tus quo. a problem not completely dis-
similar to that faced by underrepresented districts prior 
to the Court's intervention in the proress of reapportion-
ment.' ' see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191-192 (1962). 
Nor can we ignore the extent to which, in contrast to 
our prim decisions. the State is responsible for the 'vealth 
discrimination in this instance. Griffin, Douglas, Wil-
liams, Tate, and our other prior cases have dealt with 
discrimination on the basis of indigency which \vas at-
tributable to the operation of the private sector. But 
we have no such simple de facto wealth discrimination 
here. The means for financing public education in Texas 
arc selected and specified by the State. It is the Sta.te 
that has created local school districts, and tied educa-
tional funding to the local property tax and thereby to 
local district wealth. At the same time, governmentally 
imposed land usc controls have encouraged and rigidified 
natural trends in the allocation of particular areas for 
'' Inc!C'C'cl, thC' politirn l cl .iillru l liC'~ that HC'riouRh· di~acln1nl:t .g:c•d 
di~trirtH farC' in :;C'rurin!); IC'gi~b I i1·r rrdrC'SR nrc au~mcntrd by the 
f:trl tlwt little support i~ likC'I~· to be SC'rurcd from on l.1· milcH~· 
di-<acl 1·:mta!);Nl di~t rirt~. Cf. Grau v. Sanders, 372 U. R. :3G~ (196~). 
Src al'o n. 2, supm. 
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residential or commercial use,R2 and thus determined 
each district's amount of taxable property wealth. In 
short, this case in contrast to the Court's previous wealth 
discrimination decisions, can only be seen as "unusual 
in the extent to " ·hich govemmental action is the cause 
of the wealth classification." 'a 
In the final analysis, then. the invidious characteristics 
of the group wealth classification present in this case only 
serves to emphasize tfi:e need Tor careful judicial scrutiny 
of the State's justifications for theresu1~distnct 
discrimination in the educational opportunity afforded to 
the school children of Texas. 
D 
The nature of our inquiry into the justifications for 
state dis(;rillllnation Is essentially e same in air equal 
protection cases: we must consider' the substantiality ----of the state interests sought to be served, and we must 
scrutinize the reasonableness of the means by which the 
State has sought to advance its interests. See Police 
Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U. S. 92, 
95 ( 1972). Differences in the application of these tests 
are, in my view, a function of the constitutional im-
portance of the interests at stake and the invidiousness 
of the particular classification. Thus, for instance, the 
Court has required "a compelling governmental interest" 
to justify discrimination affecting the constitutional right 
to travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 
(1969). This is, I believe, essentia.lly an expression of 
b 2 SC'C' Texas Cities, Towns, & Villages Code Ann. §§ JOlla-lOllj. 
See also, e. g., Skinner v. Reed, 265 S. W. 2d 850 (Tex:ls Civ. App. 
1954); City of Corpus Christi v. Joues, 144 8. W. 2d 388 (Texas 
Civ. App. 1940). 
f>a Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, -, 487 P. 2d 1241, -. 96 
Cal. Hptr. 601, 614 (1971). See also Van Dusartz v. Ilatficld, 334 
F. Sllpp. 870, 875-876 (Minn. 1971) . 
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the Court's concern for the legitimacy of the asserted 
state interests. When interests of constitutional im-
portance are at stake, the Court does not stand ready to 
credit the State's classification with any conceivable 
legitimate purpose,R" but demands a clear showing that 
there are in fact sub~antial, legitimate state interests 
which the classification serve-s. BeyondtheState's pur-
pose f~;-the classificatwl1,'the Court traditionally has be-
come increasingly sensitive to the means by which- a 
St~s to act as- its action affects more dir~ctly 
interests0re011Stitutional significan~e.&8;e. g., United 
States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 265 (1967); Shelton v. 
Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1968). Thus, by now, "le~s 
n~strictive alternatives" analysis is firmly established in 
equal prote~tionjurisprudence. See Dunn V.Blumstein, 
---.....;;--- ......_ - . .._ - -~ 
405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School 
District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621, 627 (1969). It seems to 
me that the range of choice we are willing to accord the 
State in selecting the means by which it will act and the 
care with which we scrutinize the effectiveness of the 
means which the State select:(~ust reflect the consti-
tutional importance of the interest affected and the in-
vidiousness of the particular classification. Here both 
the nature of the interest and the classification dictate 
'
1 close judicial scrutiny~£ thepurposes which Texas seeks 
to serve with its present educational financing scheme 
and of the means it has selected to serve that purpose. 
The only justification offered by appellants to sustain l 
the discrTrllinahon in educational opportunity calJ§ed by 
the exas financing scheme i~nal control. --
Presented with this justification, the District Court con-
cluded that "[n]ot only are defendants unable to demon-
' '1 Sec, e. g., Two Guys frorn Ilarrison-Allentown, Inc . v. McGinley, 
:366 U.S. 5S2 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); 
Gocsaert Y. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
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strate compelling state interests for their classification 
based on wealth, they fail even to establish a reasonable 
basis for these classificatious." 337 F. Supp., at -. 
I must agree with this conclusion. 
- At the outs~ I do 110t question that local control of 
public education. as an abstract matter, constitutes a 
very snbstantial state interest. We observed only last 
Term that " [ d] irect control over decisions vitally affect-
ing the education of one's children is a. need strongly felt 
in our society." Wright v. Council of the City of 
Emporium, 407 U. S. 451 ( 1972). See also id., at 469 
(BuRGER, C. J., dissenting). The State's interest in local 
educational control-which certainly includes questions 
of educational funding-has deep roots in the inherent 
benefits of community support for public education. 
Consequently, true state dedication to local control would 
present, I think, a substantial justification to weigh 
against simply interdistrict variations in the treatment 
of a State's school children. But I need not now decide 
how I might ultimately strike the balance ,,;ere \\'e con-
fronted with a situation \Vhere the State's sincere con-
cern for local control inevitably produced educational 
inequality. For on this record, it is apparent that the ) 
State's puq1orted concern \Yith local control is offered 
primarily as an excuse rather than as a justification for 
interclistrict inequa.lfty. 
~·ide laws regula.te in fact the most 
n~ detSt~a~blic ~· For example, 
the State prescribes rcquifCCI courses.8 " All textbooks 
must be submitted for state a.pproval,~n and only ap-
proved textbooks may be used.87 The State has estab-
~ r. Tc•xas Edur. Codr Ann. §§ 21.101-21.117. Criminal p<'n~dl i<':< 
:11'<' pro,·idrd for f:!ilmr to trarh rrrlain n•quirrd rom:<r:<. !d., 
§§ 4.1.')-4.16. 
M: /d., §§ 12.11-12.35. 
'
1 I d., § 12.62. 
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lished the qualifications necessary for teaching in Texas 
public schools and the procedures for obtaining certifica-
tion." The State has even legislated on the length of 
the school day.''' Texas' own courts have said: 
"As a result of the acts of the Legislature our 
school system is not of mere local concern but is 
statewide. While a school district is local in ter-
ritorial limits. it is an integral part of the vast 
school system "·hich is coextensive with the con-
fines of the State of Texas." Treadway v. Whitney 
Independent School District, 205 8. W. 2d 97, 99 
(Tex. Civil App. 1949). 
See also El Dorado Independent School District v. Tis-
dale, 3 S. W. 2d 420, 422 (Tex. Comm. Civ. App. 1928). 
Moreover, even if we accept Texas' general dedication 
to local control in education matters, it is difficult to find 
any evidence of such dedication with respect to fiscal 
matters. It ignores reality to suggest-as the Court 
docs, ante, at --that the local property tax • ele-
ment of the Texas financing scheme reflects a conscious 
legislative effort to provide school districts with local 
fiscal control. If Texas had ~y~ truly d~d~ted 
to local fiscal controTOiie would expect the quality of 
- -- --·------·~ -- -the educational opportumty provided in each district to 
vary "'ith the deciswn7tlwvoters in thatdistrict a; 
to the m sacrifice they-w!sn to mai{e for public 
educatiOn. tl1 _.!act~ti1e1.'cxas scl1CJTI.e produces pre-
cisely the opposite result. Local school districts cannot 
choose tohavethe oest education in the State by impos-
ing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the ) 
educational opportunity offered by any particular dis-
trict is largely determined by the amount of taxable 





--~~ ;:fo - ~· 
' . 
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property located in the district-a factor over \Yhich local 
voters can exercise no control. ·----The study introduced in the District Court sho\Yecl a 
direct inverse relationship behveen equalized taxable 
district property "·ealth and district tax effort with the 
result that the property poor districts making the highest 
tax effort obtained the lowest per pupil yield.no The 
implications of this situation for local choice is illus-
trated by again comparing the Edgewood and Alamo 
Heights School Districts. In 1967-1968, Edgewood, after 
contributing its share to the Local Fund Afl-signment, 
raised only $26 per pupil through its local property tax, 
whereas Alamo Heights was able to raise $333 per pupil. 
Since the funds received through the Minimum Founda-
tion School Program are to be used only for minimum 
professional salaries, transportation costs, and operating 
expenses, it is not hard to see the lack of local choice 
with respect to higher teacher salaries to attract more 
and better teachers, physical facilities, library books, and 
facilities, special courses, or participation in special state 
and federal matching funds programs under \-vhich a 
property poor district such as Edgewood is forced to 
labor.n In fact, because of the differences in taxable 
local property wealth, Edgewood would have to tax 
itself almost nine times as heavily to obtain the same 
yield as Alamo Heights.n2 At present, then, local control 
is a myth for many of the local school districts in Texas. 
As one district court has observed, "rather than reposing 
in each school district the economic power to fix its own 
level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so arranged 
the structure as to guarantee that some districts will spend 
00 See App. II, infra. 
!Jt See Affid:wit of Dr . .Jose CardenaR, Superiutenclcnt of Sc-hools, 
Edgewood Independent School District, App., at 234-238. 
v~ See App. IV, infra. 
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low [with high taxes] while others will spend high [with 
low taxes]." Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 
876 (Minn. 1971). 
In my judgment, any substantial scrutiny of the op-
eration of the Texas financing scheme reveals that the 
State has selected means wholly inappropriate to secure 
its purported interest in assuring its school districts local 
fiscal control. At the same time, appellees have pointed 
out a variety of alternative financing schemes ·which may 
serve the State's purported interest in local control as 
well, if not better, than the present scheme without the 
current impairment of the educational opportunity of 
vast numbers of Texas school children.93 I see no need, 
however, to explore the practical or constitutional merits 
of those suggested alternatives at this time, for whatever 
their positive or negative features, experience with the 
present financing schem.e impugns any suggestion that 
it constitutes a serious effort to provide local fiscal con-
trol. If, for the sake of local educational control, this 
Court is to sustain interdistrict discrimination in the 
educational opportunity afforded Texas school children, 
it should require that the State present something more 
than the mere sham now before us. -------
III 
In conclusion it is essential to recognize that an end to 
the wide variations in taxable district property wealth 
inherent in the Texas financing scheme would entail 
none of the untoward consequences suggested by the 
Court or by the appellants. 
First, affirmance of the District Court's decisions would 
hardly sound the death knell for local control of educa-
tion. It would mean neither centralized decisionmaking 
nor federal court intervention in the operation of public 
""See n. 94, supra. 
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schools. Clearly, this suit has nothing to do with local 
decisionmaking with respect to educational policy or even 
educational spending. It involves only a narrow aspect 
of local control-namely, local control over educational 
funding. In fact, in striking down interdistrict dis-
parities in taxable local wealth, the District Court took 
the course which is most likely to make true local con-
trol over educational decisionmaking a reality for all 
Texas school districts. 
Nor does the District Court's decision even necessarily 
eliminate local control of educational funding. The Dis-
trict Comt struck down nothing more than the continued 
interclistrict wealth discrimination inherent in the present 
property tax. Both centralized and decentralized plans 
for educational funding not involving such interdistrict 
discrimination have been put forward.n·• The choice 
'"' Crntrnlizrd rdurational financin!!: iH, lo hr ~urr, onr :iltrrnntiYr. 
On :mnl~·;: i,.;, though. it i::; rlrnr that Pl·rn c<>ntralir.rd finnnrinl-': would 
not drprin:• lorn! ~rhool di"trict~ of whnt hn~ bern ron~idrrrd to hr 
thr r;:,;rncr of !oral rducnt ional control. Scr Jl'rioht "· Cowu:il of 
thr City of Em]Joriwn. 407 U. S. 451, 469 (1972) (Bunc:~:n. C . .T. , 
di""rn ting). C'rntral finnncing would lrnw in local hand~ thr <·ntirr 
gamut of lora! rducational polirYmnking-trnrhN", c·tnTirulum, "rhnol 
. I . fld~At~t• I . I . I ;: ttr~. t 1r rnt 1rr prorr~~ o A_l'l'fiomrr;: among a tcrnn t n·e ec urn t wna 
oh,irrt i1·rs. 
A ~rrond JlO"" ihilit~ · is thr much disru""rd thror~· of di;:trict poll'rr 
t•qualir.ation put forth by Profrs"or Coons, Cl une. nnd Snu:nrm:lll 
in t hrir srminal work , Pri1·nt r Wrnlt h and Puhlie Erlnr:t t ion 201-242 
(1!)70). Su ch n schrmc would trul~· rrfirct :1 dedieation to local fi scnl 
eon trol. Under smh a ~~·strm, r:l('h school d i~t rirt would rrrri 1·r a 
fixrd amount of rrwnnr prr pupil for an~· part iculn r lr1·rl of t:n 
r!Tort rrgnrcllrR,.: of thr lrl'r! of local proprrt~· tax hnsr. A11prllants 
critirizr this srhrmr on thr rathrr rxtr:wrdinnr~· ground th;lt it would 
c•nc·ouragr poorrr di~triet~ to o1·rrtax thrmsrll'r~ in ordrr to oht:tin 
suhst nntinl rrYcmtr,.; for rdurat ion. Bnt undrr t hr ptwrnt di~rrimi­
nator~· srhrmr, it i ~ thr poor dist riet s who nrr clrnrl~· t:txing thrm-
srh ·e,, :tt t hr highrst rate~. yet :trr recri 1·ing t hr lowr"t rrt urns. 
Distrirt wrnlt h rrapportionmt>nt is yrt nnot hrr nlt Nn:rt i1·r which 
would accompl i ~ h clirrrtl~· r~~rn tially what dist riet powrr equ:tl izn-
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among these or other alternatives remains with the State, 
not with the federal courts. In thil regard, it should be 
evident that the degree of federal intervention in matters 
of local concern would be substantially less in this con-
text than in previous decisions in which we have been 
asked effectively to impose a particular scheme upon the 
States under the guise of the Equal Protection Clause. 
SeE', e. g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); 
cf. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). 
Still, we are told that this case requires us "to condemn 
the State's judgment in conferring on political sub-
divisions the power to tax local property to supply reve-
nues for local interests." Ante, at --. Yet no one in 
the course of this entire litigation has ever questioned the 
constitutionality of the local property tax as a device 
for raising educational funds. The District Court's de-
cision, at most, restricts the power of the State to make 
educational funaing dependent exclusively upon local 
~ty taxa.tio_g so long as thC're exists interdistrict 
disparities in taxable property wealth. But it hardly 
eliminates tne locilproperty tax as a source of educa-
1io11 "·oulcl srck to do artificially. Apprllant" rhim th:1t tlw enl-
rulat ions concerning ~t atr property rcqnirrd by such :1 sr·hrme would 
br im]1o~:,;ible as a prarticfll mflttrr. Yet Trxa:,; is alrrad~· mt1king 
far more romplrx annual calculntiom;-invol\'ing not only local 
proprrt~· Yalues but also lorn] income nnd other economic fact or~­
in conjunction with the Lorn! Fund A8signmrnt portion of thr Mini-
mum Founclat ion School Program. Srr V Texas Go,·ernor's Com-
mittrr Report 43-44. 
A fourth possibility would br to remoYe commrrrinl, inclust rinl, 
and mineral proper!~' from local tnx rolls, to tax this property on a 
stat r-wiclr bnsi~, and to rrturn the resulting reYrnues to thr local 
di~t rirts in a fashion that \Yould compen~ate for remnining n11"in-
t ions in the locnl tax bases. 
Konc of these pnrtirnlar alternntive~ are nrrr~~~ril~· ron~titu­
tionflll~· romprllrd: rnther, they indicate thr breadth of rhoice which 
rrmnins to the State if the pre.-ent wraith discrimination wrrc-
('] iminatrd. 
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tional funding or a means of providing local fiscal 
controP5 
The Court seeks solace for its action today in the pos-
sibility of legislative reform. The Court's suggestions 
of legislative redress and experimentation will doubtless 
be of great comfort to the school children of Texas' dis-
advantage<IdistrictS;-but considering the vested interests 
of wealthy school districts in the preservation of the 
status quo, they are worth little more. The possibility 
of legislative action is, in all events, no answer to this 
Court's duty under the Constitution to eliminate un-
justified state discrimination. In this case we have been 
presented with an instance of such discrimination, in a 
particularly invidious form, against an individual inter-
est of large constitutional and practical importance. To 
support the demonstrated discrimination in the provision 
of educational opportunity the State has offered a justifi-
cation which, on analysis, takes on at best an ephemeral 
character. Thus, I believe that the wide disparities in 
taxable district property wealth inherent in the local 
property tax element of the Texas financing scheme render 
that scheme violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 9a 
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
!Jc. See n. 94, supra. 
!Jn Of course, nothing in the Court's decision today should inhibit 
further review of state educational funding schemes under state con-
stitutional provisions. See Milliken v. Green, - Mich. -, -
N. W. 2d - -(1972); cf. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cnl. 3d 584, 487 P. 2d 
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APPENDIX II TO OPINIO~ OF MARSHALL, J., 
DISSENTING 
TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS CATEGORIZED BY 
EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUES, EQUAL-
IZED TAX RATES, AND YIELD OF RATES* 
CATEGORIERl EQUALIZED YIELD PElt PUPIL 
i\Tnrkrt VnlttP of TAX (Eqttalizrd Rate 
Taxnble Property HATES Applied to District 
Prr Pupil ON 8100 Market V~tluc) 
Above $100,000 $ .31 $585 
( 10 Districts) 
$100,000-$50,000 .38 262 
( 26 Districts) 
$50,000-$30,000 .55 213 
(30 Districts) 
$30,000-$10,000 .72 162 
( 40 Districts) 
Below $10,000 .70 60 
( 4 Districts) 
·>:·Sonrce: Policy Institute, Syrnrusc UniYcrsity Rcscnrrh Corpora-
tion, 8~-rn-rusc, N. Y. 
t Prrpared on the b::tf'is of n, ~arnplr of 110 selected TPxns School 
Districts from data for thr 1967-196S school yrn,r. Ba.<cd on Table 
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APPENDIX IV TO OPINION OF MARSHALL, J., 
DISSENTING 
BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS, SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
RANKED BY EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUE 
AND TAX RATE REQUIRED TO GENERATE 
HIGHEST YIELD IN ALL DISTRICTS* 
Di~trirts Ranked from 
High to Low l\larket 











SOUTH SAN ANTONIO 
EDGEWOOD 
Tax Rate Per $100 














-r.·Policy Institute, Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syra-
cuse, New York. 
t Prepared on the basis of the 12 school districts located in Bexar 
County, Texas, from data from the 1967-1968 school ymr. 
Based on Table IX to Affidavit of Joel S. Berke, App., at 218. 
' . I 
. ... 
REPORT OF THE SUB- CO MMITTEE TO 
THE SCHOOL DIVISION CRITERIA STUDY COMMISSION 
Thi s re port i s submitted by the School Division Criteria Study Commi ssion, 
established by the 1972 General Assembly, in complianc e with the General 
Ass embly's request "to study and dete rmine reasonable conditions and criteria 
which should be set by the General Assembly for use by the Board of Education 
in dividing the State into school divisions, to the end that the size and com-
position of such school divisions will, in compliance with the Constitution, 
promote the reali zation of quality education for the school children of the 
Commonwealth." It is not yet possible to evaluate the impact of the Se rrano 
vs. Pri e st and Rodriquez vs. San Antonio class action suits and of the Richmond 
consolidation case on the organizational patterns of public education, nor is 
it yet possible to evaluate progress toward achievement of the "Standards of 
Quality and Objectives for Public Schools in Virginia, 1972-7 4" because these 
new requirements became effective July 1, 197 2, and implementation is just 
beginning. Therefore, this report deals with four factors considered by educa-
tors to be important considerations in determining the minimum size at which a 
local school administrative unit is capable of providing a quality educational 
program. Implications for Virginia conclude this report. 
The strengthening of Virginia's public education program through the consoli-
dation of small schools was begun in 1918 as one of s everal reform measures 
of State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Harris H. Hart. During World 
War II and the postwar years, school consolidation was accelerated because of 
• > 
-2 -
mat e ri a l a nd manpower shortages. By 19 57, the number of Virgini a high schools 
wit h fewer tha n s even t eache rs had been reduced from 340 i n 1940 and 173 in 1950 
to 39. 1 
The tre nd toward fewer schools and larger enrollme nt pe r s c hool has been 
accompa nied by a national movement toward the consolidation or reorganization 
of loca l school administrative units for the purpose of forming units which can 
provide comprehe nsive educational programs, efficient administration, and 
adequate supervision. In 1947-48, there were 94,926 local school divisions
2 
and during the period of 1966 to 1970, the national total of local school admin-
istrative units was reduced from 23,464 to 17,995 (23%). In 1970, the number 
of divisions per state ranged from 1 (Hawaii) to 1, 665 (Nebraska). 3 There is 
strong evidence to indicate that the number of individual admi~i.strative school 
units in the United States are continuing to decrease. Some educators indicate 
that the number will drop to 10,000 and a few go so far as to predict a figure 
as low as 5,000. 
As a result of the large number of consolidations, an extensive background 
of literature concerning guidelines for establishing optimally-sized local school 
administrative units has been created. The following sections discuss consensus 
opinions in four critical areas: (1) the desired educational program and its 
1EDUCATION IN THE STATES: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND OUTLOOK, National 
EducationAssociation, 1969, p. 1296. 
2Local school administrative units are referred to generally as divisions in Virginia 
whereas generally throughout the country the word district is used. 
3STATISTICS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, National Center for Educational Statistics, 
U.S. Office of Education, 1971, pp. 12-13. 
'· 
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relationship to the number of pupils in a school district, (2) ava.ilable financial 
resources, (3) the geography of the area unde r consideration in relation to trans-
portation and population de nsity, and (4) a subjective decision regarding the 
feasibility of reorganization in terms of the climate of opinion and general 
attitudes of the people involved. 
(l) Educational Program 
The literature shows that a small school division is unable to provide a com-
prehensive articulated educational program, K-12, with adequate opportunities 
for special, vocational, and continuing education. 4 There is no uniform agree-
ment among even so-called experts concerning the accepted optimum size of a 
school or school division. However, there are general ranges within which most 
4
Charles F. Faber summarizes individual reports in his article, "The Size of a 
School District" (PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 1966, pp. 33-35), including the following 
items. The Forty-Fourth Year Book (Part II, "Structural Reorganization," 1945, 
p. 304) of the National Society for the Study of Education states that "The sig-
nificance of the inadequate local school unit as a retarding factor in limiting 
educational progress has probably never been fully appreciated." The Committee 
for the White House Conference on Education (1956, pp. 14-22) reported that the 
shortage of well-qualified teachers is most keenly felt by small districts where 
teaching loads tend to be heavier and equipment is less satisfactory than in 
larger, better-organized districts. A study reported by the National Conference 
of Professors of Educational Administration (Problems and Issues in School Finance, 
Columbia University, 1952, p. 73) revealed that very small districts frequently 
lack adequate lay and professional leadership and that an inverse relationship 
exists between enrollment and cost per pupil. C. F. Faber ("Measuring School 
District Quality," American School Board Journal, October 1964, pp. 12-13) 
assessed 35 school districts on the basis of 15 measures of quality and found 
a high relationship between quality and enrollment. 
-4-
educators tend to agree. A summary of the present thinking is given in 
Public School Administration by Griede,r, Pierce and Jordan . 
Thirty or forty years ago a total enrollment of two thou sand 
pupils in Grades 1-12 was quite acceptable; tens of thousands 
of districts did not have that many. Since , 19 3 4, however , 
when Howard Dawson published his pioneer study, Satisfactory 
Local School Units, the acceptable minimum has risen con-
tinuously. In 1950, five thousand was widely used as a 
standard; by 1960 the figures had changed to 10,000 to 
15,000; in the mid-1960's the Illinois Task Force cited 
earlier recommended 25,000 to 30, 000; and Benson suggested 
6 0 1 0 0 0 to 7 0 I 0 0 0 o 
In the judgment of the authors, when school district enrollment 
passes the 50,000 mark, administrative and instructional prob-
lems become unwieldy and their complexity increases faster 
than enrollment. 5 · 
In determining the size of the local school division, it is important to look at 
,-
the distribution of the pupil population in determining the size of individual schools. 
For example, at the elementary school level, the minimum figure that most educators 
agree on is 150 to 175 pupils in grades one through six with about 25 to 30 pupils 
per grade. Most educators would prefer to have at least two sections of each grade 
and three or four would be considered better. Maximum enrollment of some 600 to 
700 pupils is considered ideal for an elementary school. Applying this formula at 
the primary level, grades one through 4, the enrollment would be approximately 400 
pupils. At the junior high and middle school level, the suggested range extends 
5 
Calvin Grieder, Truman M. Pierce and K. Forbis Jordan, Public School Administration, 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1969), pp. 19-22. 
-5-
from 500 to a maximum of l, 200, and for the senior high schools the suggested 
range is from about 600 to 2, 000. 
While even the smallest of high schools provides instruction in English, 
mathematics, science, and social studies, the program is quite limited in many 
schools. The programs in most small schools are not substantially expanded 
beyond the minimum requirements established by the State Board of Education 
for graduation. Courses in art, music, industrial arts, vocational education, 
etc. , are seldom offered in schools which enroll fewer than 500 pupils. The 
offerings in many areas do not increase significantly until enrollment reaches 
6 
1,000. 
Conant has suggested that a minimum of no fewer than 100 students in the 
graduating class is needed in order to offer an adequate program, implying an 
administrative unit of from 1, 500 to 2, 000 pupils. 7 Faber states that "although 
an enrollment of about 2, 000 might be sufficient for the offering of a good 
instructional program, most authorities regard it as being much too small to 
8 
enable a district to provide the full range of needed educational services. " A 
6The Division of Education Research and Statistics, Virginia Department of 
Education, surveyed school size and the relationship between size and course 
offerings in Virginia and the South in 1967-68. 
7 James B. Conant, THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL TODAY, 1959, p. 77. 
8 Faber (1966), op cit. 
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study of administrative and supervisory services and cost per pupil l ed Dawson 
to suggest an optimum size of 9, 800 to 12,000 pupils and 280 t eaching units. 9 
Although Cook said that 46 teachers is an absolute minimum, she implied that 
this would be an inefficient, undesirable arrangement, preferring a district of 
10,000 to 12,000 pupils, which would enable more efficient us e of supervisory 
personnel, librarians, nurses, et cetera. 10 
The literature does not deal as extensively with a maximum size desirable 
for school divisions. Swanson finds a strong positive relationship between 
population and quality up to 20,000, a leveling off and a gradual decline in 
quality as population went above SO, 000. ll Because very large school admin-
istrative units--those containing a total pupil population in excess of 100,000--
are often beset by lack of public support, Mort and Reusser suggest that natural 
communities be identified within the large city and that these areas be estab-
lished as independent districts in order to decentralize the system and increase 
citizen interest, participation, and control. 12 Bell and Green describe 
9Howard A. Dawson, SATISFACTORY LOCAL SCHOOL UNITS, Field Study No. 7, 
George Peabody College for Teachers, 1934. 
10Katherine M. Cook (ed.), REORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL UNITS, U.S. Office 
of Education, Bulletin No. 15, 1936. 
llArthur D. Swanson, "Relations Between Community Size and School Quality," 
Institute of Administrative Research, RESEARCH BULLETIN, October, 1961, pp. 1-3. 
12Paul R. Mort and Walter C. Reusser, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, Second Edition, 
1951, pp. 92-93. 
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the division of Chicago into 16 sub-districts, each serving about 20, 000 pupils, 
in an effort to bring the democratic and personal advantages of the smaller 
school system to the teachers and pupils of a large city. 13 Michael E. Hickey 
has reduced the sizable literature concerning enrollm~nt recommendations to a 
table presented as Exhibit 1 in the addendum at the end of this report. 
(2) Financial Resources 
It is difficult to establish a minimum expenditure necessary to provide the - ---
d~sired quality educational program. The outcome of class action suits presently 
under appeal (Serrano vs. Priest, Rodriquez vs. San Antonio) may require extensive 
changes in the funding patterns for public education. Any functional discussion of 
this aspect of school district organization should be based on the results of these 
important cases. We will have more to say on the subject of finances under the 
Implications for Virginia. Exhibit 2 shows the pattern of state support among the 
different states. Exhibit 3 gives some indications of the wide range of state support 
for schools. Both of these exhibits can be found in the addendum of this report. 
(3) Geography 
The transportation of students for long distances in rural areas or for long 
periods of time through metropolitan areas or mountainous terrain is an important 
limitation in the reorganization of school divisions. Travel for supervisory 1 admin-
istrative, and maintenance personnel should also be considered. 
l3 John W. Bell and ArthurS. Green, "Why Not Vertical Administration?" 1 
AMERICAN SCHOOL BOARD JOURNAL, December, 1957 1 pp. 25-26. 
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School faciliti es should be centrally located with respect to unit population. 
Pre s e nt re commenda tions of the Virgini a De partment of Educ a tion's Divi s ion of 
Pupil Tra nsporta tion i ndica t e that 29 mile s per one way pupil trip is a max imum 
dista nce feasibl e . At a sta ndard rate of 3 minute s per mile , a trip of 29 mile s 
is roughly one and one-half hours long. In areas where popula tion is quite scattere d, 
or where a natural geographical barrier makes centralization difficult, some states 
are using intermediate administrative units within adivision which permit economies 
while limiting long or dangerous travel. 
The generally accepted standards related to pupil transportation suggest that the 
maximum walking distance for elementary school children is generally s e t at l/ 2 
to 3/4 of a mile one way; for junior high school students, 1 1/2 miles; and for 
senior high school students, 2 miles. These figures, of course, could be greatly 
affected by road and traffic conditions in terms of safety and feasibility. Where 
transportation is furnished, the maximum time for travel for elementary pupils one 
way is generally considered to be 45 minutes and for secondary pupils one hour. 
Local conditions have to be given consideration in applying these criteria. 
(4) Feasibility 
A subjective judgment concerning the feasibility of the consolidation or re-
organization plan must be made by administrative and planning personne l in order 
to ensure effective implementation. There is often a considerable amount of 
opposition to change in administrative units. There are a number of reasons for 
opposition, including the following listed by M. E. Hickey: 
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l. General antipathy toward change. 
2. Misunderstanding, or lack of understanding of 
the purpose of the reogranization. 
3. Fear that reorganization will result in centralization 
of government control. 
4. Feelings that the organization of school districts is 
a matter of local concern--despite the fact that a 
large portion of funds are provided by the State. 14 
In surveying Wisconsin superintendents regarding redistricting, T. J. Jensen 
found the major problems to be (a) educating the general public, (b) transporting 
students, (c) fear of losing local representation, (d) changing taxes, and (e) 
concerns over new building needs. 15 
IMPLICATIONS FOR VIRGINIA 
Available data pertaining to the foregoing discussion of factors influencing the 
determination of school division size are presented summarily in the following 
sections. 
(l) Educational Program 
Virginia is in the initial stages of implementing the 11 Standards of Quality and 
Objectives for Public Schools, 1972-74," passed into law by the 1972 General 
Assembly. These standards and objectives are expected to have great influence 
in shaping the development of Virginia's educational program. The scope of the 
proposed programs would seem to suggest that some reorganization should be 
considered. 
14Hickey, op cit~~ pp. 12-13. 
15T. J. Jensen, "Public Opinion Factors in School District Reorganization, 11 
unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1952. 
... 
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Table 1, located in the Addendum, shows the ranking of school divisions in 
Virginia by size. It will be noted that only one school system extends an enroll-
ment beyond the usual SO, 000 to 7 S, 000 pupil range that is suggested by most 
authorities. This school division is Fairfax County with over 140,000 pupils. 
Some educators would agree that a school system with this many pupils would 
need to be divided into sub-administrative units, which Fairfax County has done. 
Other school divisions that exceed SO, 000 pupils, depending to some extent on 
geography, might wish to consider the advantages of a sub-district plan. 
The major problem that still exists in Virginia is the number of ve1y small 
divisions (54) with a pupil population of less than 3, 000, and another 57 school 
divisions in the range of 3, 001 to 10,000 pupils. These figures suggest the 
magnitude of the consolidation problem that faces Virginia if ea..Gh school divi-
sion · in the State is to have enough pupils to provide a reasonably effective and 
comprehensive program at a reasonable cost. If the most generally accepted 
figure of 10,000 pupils were accepted as a desirable goal, this would mean that 
111 local school divisions would be affected. And even if we accept a figure of 
3, 000 as an intermediate goal, the magnitude of the problem is still very great. 
Exhibit 4 in the Addendum shows the number of public secondary, elementary, 
and combined schools in 1970-71 according to average daily membership (ADM) 
and number of teaching positions. 
Table 2 shows the number of school divisions with respect to student enrollment 
and number of teaching positions referred to in the first section of this report. 
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(2) Financial Resources · 
A total of $7 47 1473 1338 was spent for the operation of public schools in 
Virginia during the 1970-71 school year. The sources of these funds were as 
follows: 
Local $40619891400 (54%) 
State 25212511071 (34%) 
Federal 88,232,867 (12%) 
$74714731338 
The average cost per pupil in average daily attendance (ADA) for the State 
during 1970-71 was $784 1 compared with a national average of $868. In 1970 
Virginia ranked 29th among the states in the average cost per pupil in ADA. 
Exhibit 5 shows a ranking of states by cost per pupil. 
Exhibit 6 shows shows the comparable figures for the individual school divisions 
in Virginia. Careful consideration should be given to this exhibit for it dramatically 
emphasizes one of the problems facing Virginia in providing anywhere near equal 
educational opportunities for all of its pupils. For example 1 the total cost per 
pupil in average daily attendance for 1970-71 ranges from a low of $516 to a 
high of $1318. Just as dramatic is the range of local expenditures per pupil in 
average daily attendance which ranges from a low of $153 to a high of $1001. 
(3) Geography 
Geography 1 population density 1 and natural barriers are an important con-
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sideration in determining boundary lines for specific school divisions. It is 
difficult to suggest specific distances that are acceptable and which would 
apply with equal validity throughout the State. For example, extraordinary 
conditions exist in Highland and Bath counties where the combined total 
school enrollment in 1970-71 was I, 777 and the total land area was 1, 743 
square miles. 
Exhibit 6 shows pupil transportation figures for Virginia by division for 1970-
'll. 
Exhibit 7 gives the ranking of Virginia among the states by percent of 
expenditure spent for transportation and the average cost of transportation per 
pupil. 
Improved road conditions have removed one of the barriers to effective 
consolidation. 
(4) Feasibility 
The real job of the Committee will be to review the criteria dealing with 
division size as it relates to the number of pupils, the financial resources, 
and geography with proper consideration to population density 1 distances 1 
and natural barriers. The factors that were reviewed under this heading 
earlier in this report need to be applied specifically to each area that is 
proposed as an independent administrative unit. Virginia has not had the 
great proliferation of administrative units that reached into the thousands 
as was true of some states. However 1 as the figures indicate 1 we have a 
serious problem of local division size that must be approached with both 
-13-
boldness and discretion. 
The sub-commiteee of the School Division Criteria Study Commission 
has reviewed the literature and practices that relate to our assignment. On 
the basis of these findings 1 the sub-committee has identified four broad areas 
generally recognized as being worthy of consideration out of which specific 
criteria will have to be developed. These four broad areas include: 
1. Educational Program which has a direct relationship to 
the number of pupils in a given school division 
2. Financial Resources 
3. Geography 
4. Feasibility 
Attention is called to additional supporting data that appears in the 
Addendum to this report. 
October 3 1 19 72 
' . 
Respectfully submitted 1 
Hillary H. Jones 1 Jr. 
Ray E. Reid 
(Mrs.) Katherine L. Goolsby 
Staff Attorney 
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FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF EDUCATION 
Percentage of School Support from Local ,and County, State, 
and Federal Sources, 1929-30 to 1967-68 














Source: Various statistical reports published by the U.S. Office of Education. 
The NEA Research publishes useful "Estimates of School Statistics" annually. 
Copied in full from Public School Administration by Grieder, Pierce and Jordan 
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Table 1 
Ranking of School Divisions by Size Within Four Cate gories 1 




















Small ( 1-3 1 0 0 0 students) 
Medium (3 1001-10 1000 students) 
Optimum (1 0 1 001-25 1 000 students) 
Large (25 1 001 or more students) 



































Small Systems continued 
Small Systems Enrollment No. of High Schools No. of Graduates 
Floyd 2,183 1 135 
Fluvanna 2,056 1 87 
Falls Church 2,090 1 148 
Franklin City 2,271 1 118 
Fredericksburg 2,795 1 171 
Fries 570 1 55 
Galax 1,591 1 126 
Goochland 2,573 1 98 
Grayson 2,603 3 159 
Greene 1,324 1 55 
Harrisonburg 2,713 1 140 
Highland 564 1 42 
King George 2,188 1 99 
King and Queen 1,108 1 51 
King William 1,367 2 118 
Lancaster 2,103 1 111 
Lexington 1,200 1 136 
Lunenburg 2,846 1 147 
Madison 2,103 1 87 
Mathews 1,394 1 69 
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Small Syst ems continued 
Sma ll Sy ste ms ]::nrollme nt No. of High Sc hools No. of Graduates 
Middlesex 1,410 l 80 
Nelson 2,961 l 14 4 
New Kent 1,402 l 77 
Northumberland 21117 l 133 
Norton 1,334 l 78 
Poquoson 1,489 NA NA 
Powhata n 1,573 l 65 
Prince Edward 1,888 l 77 
Radford 2,250 l 130 
,-
Rappahannock 1,234 l 40 
Richmond County 1,613 l 82 
Saltville 931 NA NA 
South Boston 1,638 NA NA 
Suffolk 2,126 l 139 
Surry 1,325 l 53 
Westmoreland 2,586 2 153 
West Point 754 NA NA 
Winchester 2,903 1 197 
Total small districts: 54 
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Medium Systems 
Medium Systems Enrollment No. of High Schools No. of Graduates 
Accomack 6,462 6 353 
Albemarle 8,833 1 435 
Alleghany 3,269 1 176 
Amherst 5,375 1 248 
Bedford 8,282 2 457 
Botetourt 4,610 2 241 
Bristol 3,523 1 200 
Brunswick 3,666 1 192 
Buchanan 9,891 5 343 
Caroline 3,689 2 175 
Carroll 5,334 1 270 
Charlotte 3,045 1 167 
Charlottesville 7,475 1 349 
Colonial Heights 3,902 1 245 
Culpeper 4,657 1 201 
Dickinson 4, 684 3 226 
Dinwiddie 5,731 1 243 
Fauquier 7,076 1 292 
Franklin 6,951 1 352 
Frederick 7,609 1 365 
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Medium Systems continued 
Medium Systems Enrollment No. of High Schools No. of Graduates 
Giles 4,063 2 266 
Gloucester 3,233 1 149 
Greensville 3,807 1 199 
Halifax 7,790 1 495 
Hanover 9,676 2 483 
Hopewell 5,726 1 281 
Isle of Wight 4,817 2 213 
Lee 5,224 6 248 
Louisa 3,858 1 154 
-~ 
Martinsville 4,715 1 270 
Mecklenburg 7,017 2 374 
Montgomery 8,600 4 473 
Nansemond 9,591 3 520 
Northampton 3,296 2 207 
Nottoway 3,242 1 154 
Orange 3,582 1 153 
Page 3,807 2 149 
Petersburg 8,857 1 423 
Patrick 3,537 1 176 
Prince George 6,367 1 261 
Pulaski 7,271 2 389 
-22-
Medium Sys; t e ms continued 
Me dium Sys t ems . Enrollme nt No. of High Schools No. of Graduates 
Rockbridge 4,142 2 170 
Russ e ll 6,72 4 4 297 
Scott 5,739 3 328 
She nandoah 5,260 3 290 
Smyth 6,532 4 390 
Southampton 4,524 1 173 
Spotsylvania 4,663 1 192 
Stafford 6,589 1 296 
Sussex 3,143 1 134 
Staunton 4,721 l 287 
Warren 3,680 l 213 
Washington 9,354 4 530 
Waynesboro 4,289 1 225 
Williamsburg 4,716 1 242 
Wythe 5,284 3 308 
York 8,953 2 537 
Total medium districts: 57 




Alexandria 18,892 i 
Augusta 10,773 
Campbell 10,8 40 





Roanoke City 20,046 
Roanoke County 22,625 
Rockingham 11, 12 4 
Tazewell 11, 247 
Wise 9,870 
Total optimally-sized districts: 13 















Large Syste ms 
Large Systems Enrollment No. of High Schools No. of Graduates 
Arlington 26,444 3 1,664 
Chesapeake 26,492 6 1,463 
Chesterfield 25,493 6 1,242 
Fairfax 141,270 19 8,560 
Hampton 34,306 4 1,667 
Henrico 35,654 6 2,114 
Newport News 33,900 6 1,713 
Norfolk 58,610 5 2,415 
Portsmouth 27,847 4 1,249 
Prince William 33,019 5 ,- 1,229 
Richmond City 50,339 7 2,027 
Virginia Beach 48,779 6 2,252 
Total Large Districts: 12 
Source: Annual Report of the Superintendent, Virginia Department of Education, 
1970-71, pp. 63-86,294-299. 
Exhibit 4 
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TABLE 57A-NU!\IBER OF IIIGFI SCIIOOLS ACCORDING TO 
AVERAGE DAILY ME!\1BEllSHIP AND NUMBER OF 
TEACHING POSITIO:-..'S-1\170-1971 
.An:tuoz ! Oil or 
D.mT 1-9 10-19 20-29 31}-39 40-19 51}-59 60 -GO 71}-70 81}-Sg 90- 99 ~!ore Totll 
M EIIBE!\3111P Tchrs. Tchro. Tchrn. Tchrn. Tchr3. Tcbrn . Tcl.n Tcbrs. Tchrn. Tc!l.r.1. Tchr•. 
1-99....... 2 1 . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . .. . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
100-190 ....•. .•... ...• .... .... ...•. .... . ...•... •. ···• • · .. .•. .•..•••. •. ...• •... . •. . . . ... • .. . · •...•.• 
200-2~J. . . . . . . . . . . . . G 2 . . . • . • . . . • • . • • . • • • • • . . • . • • • • . • . . • . . , • • • • • . . • . • • . . . . • • . . . 8 
30()-539...... . . . . . . . 9 4G 17 3 . • . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . • • . • . • . . . . • . • . 75 
60()-809...... . . . • . . . . . . • . . . 1 35 29 10 . . • • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . • . . 76 
G00-1199 . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. .. .• . . . .• .• . ... . .. 10 24 4 1 1 .•..... 1 41 
120()-1409 . . .. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . •. . . . . • . . . • . . • . . • • 3 12 s 1l 4 . . . . • . . 33 
15oo-17oo ..... . • . .. . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . 1 2 11 7 s 2a 
ISOG-2090... . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . • . • . • . . • . . . . . . • . . . •• . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . 1 6 10 17 
2100-2399.. ... . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . • • . . . • . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 11 11 
2-100 or more.. . . . . • . . • . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • • . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . 4 4 
Tot.nl ••••. 2 1G 54 42 37 17 11 24 17 31 300 
TABLE 57B-NUMBER OF COMBINED SCHOOLS ACCORDING 
TO AVERAGE DAILY MEMBERSHIP AND NUW3ER OF 
TEACHING POSITIONS-1970-1971 
-




100-149 .•• ••• .•••• 
150-199 ••..•••..•. 
200-299 ••....•.••• 
300 -399 .. .••• •••.• 
•oo-599 .•••.•••••• 
£0()-799 •••••••...• 
800-999 . ••.•....•. 
1000-1999 .• •••.••.• 
1200 or more . •• •.••• 
Total .•...•.•.. 
50 or 
One Two 'l'hree Four 5-9 IG-19 2()-29 3()-39 41}-49 More Tot:~!__ , 
Tchr. Tchrs. Tchrs. Tchrs. Tchrn. Tclus. Tchrn. Tcb..-s. 'l'c~. Tchrs. 
1 
. 3 ..... i. ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: 2 4 
.... T ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: .... T .... T ::::::: ::::::: :: ::: :: :: ::::: ...... 3 
. ..•..• . ..•... ··· · · ·· ... .... 3 3 .............. · ···· · · ···•··· 6 
· ·•···· ·· ······· ··.······ ···· · ···• ·· 7 8 1 .•............ Uf 
. . . • . . . . . • . • • . . . . • . . . . .• . . . . . .. • . . . 1 18 13 2 34 
. • • . • . • . • • • • •• . . • • . .• . •. • • .• . • • • . • • . • • .• • . 2 13 8 2 28 
. • . • . • • . • . • . •• . . . . • . . . . • • • • . • • • . . . . . •• • . . • . • • • • . • 1 13 12 31 
. . . . . . • . . • . . • • . • . . • • • . . . . . •• . • • • . • . . . • . • . • . . • • • . . . . • . . • . 3 25 23 
.• ••.•• ••••••• . .. .... .•.•••• . •••••• ••. • •• • .•••••• .••• .• • . • ••••• 3G 36 
1 .•....... •. .. . 8 13 28 33 75 ISS 
TABLE 570-NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY SCIIOOLS ACCORDING 
TO AVERAGE DAILY ME<VII3ERSHIP AND NUMBER 
An:RAOE D~ILT 
Mt>IDEMUIP 
1-24 .••• ··•·••·• 








800-99~ . .•••.•••.• 
100(H199.; ••••• .-•• 
)2()()-1399 .• •••••••• 
. 1400 or more •••• • ••• 
Tol>l.. •••.• 
OF TEACHING POSITIONS-1970-1971 
50 or 
One Two Three Four 6-9 10- 19 2()-29 30- 39 40--19 More 
Tcbr. Tchr3. Tcbr3. Tchrs. Tchrs. Tcbr.J. Tchrs. Tchn. Tchrs. Tchrs. 
..... f I 1 . .... 
3 
............... .............. ..... . . 
3 .... i9" .. .. ii;" 12 ·· ···;· ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: ::::::: 
. . . • • • • • • . . . . • 2 1t :lo -!. • •• •••• ••• ••••• • • • ••• • • •• ••• 
••••··• .•.••••.••.•.• ·•••••• 59 12 .••••.•.•••.••.••••.•.••.••• 
. • • • . • . . . . •. .• . • . • . . • . . • • . . . 57 123 3 ...•.•..•..•...••...• 
. • • • • • • . • . . • . • . • . • . • . . • . . . . • 1 IS3 8 .•.••...•.••.• . ..•..• 
. . . • . • • . • . • • • . . . • . • • • . • . • . . • . • • . • • • 127 227 7 .•..•.• . • . ••.. 
. • . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • • . . . • . • • • . . . . . • . . . • . . . . • 193 53 ...•..•.•••... 
. • • • . •• . • • • • •• . •• • . . • . . . . . • • . • . • • . • . •• • • • . 9 7G 4 I 
. . • • • . • . • • . • . • . . . • • . • . • . • . • • . • ••• . • . • . • . . • . • . . . . • 12 12 1 
.••.•.• . •.•... ....••• ....••. .•••••. .•••••. .•...•• ....... • 3 















7 22 31 16S 455 410 l -IS 20 7 1300 
Source: 11 Annual Report of the Superintendent, 11 Virginia Department of 




Summary of Virginia School Districts with Respect to 
Student Enrollment and Teacher Positions 
Districts not having 11 600 enrollment 
Districts employing less than 46 teachers 
Districts enrolling between 1 1 600-3 1 000 
Districts employing between 47-100 teachers 
Districts enrolling between 1 1 600-9 1 799 
Districts employing between 47-200 teachers 
Districts enrolling between 9 1 800-12 1 000 
Districts employing 201-300 teachers 
Districts enrolling more than 12 1 000 












Source: "Facing Up: 19 70-71 1 " Virginia Department of Education 1 197 2 1 pp. 31-35. 
-271 
I 
Exhibit ~ I I 
i 
I 
121 - AVEilAGJ.:: COST OF TitANS- I 
l'ORT:\TION PER PUPIL 'fi{,\NS-
PORH: D, 1%9-70 
~ 
·.· l. l\lontana s l•1-7 
'"2. Alaslv1 132 
3. North Dakota 129 
4. Nebraska 117 
5. Rhode Island lU•l 
6. South Dakota 102 
' 
7. Wyoming 101 
i 8. ·.Hawaii 90 
' 
' 9. Kansas 87 ,. 10. Wisconsin 83 
IL Iowa 80 
12. New Jersey 75 
l3l New MexiCo 70 
New York 70 
15[ Colorado 66 Dr.! aware 66 
Vermont 66 
Washington 66 
] 9. ;\ laryland 64 
20T 
lllinois 61 
1\la~; sachusctts 61 
Oklahoma 61 
23.[ Maine 60 
Nevada 60 
_, 
25"[ Louisiana 59 
West Virginia 59 
' 27"[ 
Indiana 56 
.. New llamp, ltirc 56 
_29. [ Idaho 55 
• I l\lir;ncsota 55 
31. Pcnosylvania 53 ,. 
32. Missouri !i2 
-r;: 
1 UNITED STATES 52 ! 
.. 33. Oregon 51 
34. Connecticut -19 
35. Michigan 45 I 
36. Utah 42 
~7l Florida 41 Georgia 41 
Kentucky -1-1 
40. l\1ississi ppi 40 
1-L Arkansas 38 
42.[ Ohio 37 
T{'llllt'SSCe 37 
44. Texas 35 
45. Alabama 3·t 
'16. Vir[.,>inia :32 
-1-7. South Carolina 25 
11l. North Carolina 2:3 
-1-9. California 22 
50. Arizona 17 I 
Sclwol /Ius Flct•t, December 1971/Janu-
I ary 1 !.172, p. •W. 
·=<· Hcducc 30'/e to makt· purch :t ~ ing powcr I I 
l:otllpa~ahlc , to fi;;m1' S for otlwr an·a, of I 
tit.: lhuted ::itatt'.' . 
I 
I 
Source: National Educati on As sociation ~ 
120--I'UI'IL TlL\NSI'OitTATION EX-
PE;-.;DlTLIRE AS PEH.CENT OF CUR· 
!tENT EXPENDITURES FOlt PUill.IC 
ELt::'\IE:'ITARY AND St::COND,\I{Y 
SCI! 00 LS, 1 %.:.:'9'--"'-', 0'----- ----
l. North Dakota U.2 
2. Wt·sl Virginia 6.'1. 
3. Rhode h:land 6.3 
4. Louisiana 5.9 
5. '\Iaine ~.7 
6. :\lontana 5.6 
7. Wi; consin 5.4 
8. New llarnp~hirc 4.9 
9. Idaho 4.8 
10. :\lissouri 4.7 
11. [ New 1\lcxico 4.6 
South Dakota ·t6 
13. ;\ li~:; is~i ppi 4-.5 
11. Kenturky ·1.4 
IS'[ Dela\\~lre 4.3 
Kansas .u 




22. Vermo nt .t_o 
'"[ Arkansas 3.9 Georgia 3.9 Oklahoma 3.9 
1\'yorning 3.9 
27. Ala Lama 3.8 






33'[ i'\cvacla 3.2 
Oregon 3.2 
35. Nrw Jersey 3.1 
UNITED STATES 3.0 
36. Colorado 2.9 
37. Virginia 2.3 
38T 
Conncl'licut 2.7 
New York 2.7 
Ohio 2.7 
- ~1. South Carolina 2.5 
42. Illinois 2.3 
43'[ i'\orth Carolina 2.2 
Utah 2.2 
·15. :\lichi~an 2.1 
tJ6. llawaii 1.9 
'H. Florida 1.8 
48. Texas 1.4 
·1·9. Ari zona 0.3 
;,o. C:difornia 0.7 
-·-- --- ----·--
1\t. r\ ' f.'.- timutcs nf Sclu.~ol Statistic.<, 
II) ~'(). 71. I' · :\(•. 
Sc/1u" / Hu .,· Fi r.(' /, D c r~mhcr J 971/.J aril:-
an J ;)': :! . P- l U. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































126 ANNUAL REPORT OF TEE 
TABLE 12-TRANSPORTA.TION BY Pli"3 LIC CARRIER 
COU~TIES 
Franklin ........................................ . 
Rockingham .................................... . 
Total Coun tie3 ................•.......... 
CITIES 
Alexandria. ..................................•.... 
Buena Vista ..................................... . 
Charlottes vi I! e .................................. . 
Colonial Heights ...•...........................•. 
Harrisonburg ..........................•.•....... 




Roanoke .• · ...........•...............•........... 
Staunton .........•......•....•.................. 
\Y nynesboro .................................... . 
\Vinchester .••.........•..........•.............. 
Totcl Citie3 ••......•.........•.......... 
Total State .......•.••.................•. 
~ i.!:UO ~i 
PL~pi !.:; 




'5 900 co 
13,£Sl 75 
----------- 1·-----------
71 ) 14,971 75 













3,1~5 ) 365,074 32 









SUl'IO:Iti!'iTE~DENT OF PUBI,IC INST!tUCTION 127 
TABLE 13- PAY.MENTS TO P,\nENTS IN LI EU OF PRO\'lDING BUS 
TRANSPOltTATION SERVICE 
COUNTIES 
Accomack .... . ................................. . 
Bedford ................................... , ...... . 
Botetour t ..................................•..... 
Buchn.nan ...•.•....•..•...•.....•............•••. 
Cn.mpbcll. ................. . .............. : ..... . 
Cn.roli r..e ........... ... .. ... ... .......... . ....... . 
Carroll. ........................................ . 
Crai~~ - ... . · .... . ..... .... ... . ...... . ............. . 
Dinwiddie ... . .... . . . ..... . . . ... . .. . ....... . .... . 
Franklin ........................................ . 
Giles ........................................... . 
Grayson .................................•....... 
Greene . ............. .... .. ... .................. . 
Henrico .. ....................................... . 
Henry ...... . ................................... . 
Lee ... .. . ......... . ............................. . 
Loudoun ......•................••....•........... 
?-!::tdison .............. ..... ............. ... . .. .. . 
i\Ieeklcnburg ..... . ............................•.. 
i\Iontgomery ..•...•.............................. 
N' ansernond ..................................... . 
Northampton ......... ~ ......................... . 
Pngc ... ........................................ . 
Pul:tski. ........................................ . 
Happabnnnoek . ..••........................•..... 
Smyth ........•...............•........•...•...•. 
\Yn.rrcn . .......•...•...•.......•.......•..•...... 
\Vi tie ...................................•...•..•.. 
Total Counties ...•.•.•............•...... 
TOWNS 
Poquoson ...•...••..•.•.••...•..........•...•..•. 
Total To"'"Ils ....•.....•.•.•.•........•... 
CITIES 
Charlottcsvillo ...............•..............•.... 
Chesapeake ...... . . . .... .. .................... .. . 
:\orfolk ............ · ..........................•... 
:-;_t :\ll!lt.on . ..•.. ... ........•.. •.... ........ ... ..•. 
\ 1rgm1a Beach .................................. . 
Total Cities ............•.........•..•.... 
































































:) 40,566 28 
s 375 00 
s 375 00 





s 34,516 85 
s 75,458 13 
• 
-42-
128 ANN UAL ItEPOnT Or.' TirE 
TABLE H-PAYMENT OF MONEY TO OTITER SCTIOOL 





Campbell t o Appomattox Coun ty ................ . 16 
I sle of Wigh t t o Che3s.penkc City ...... . .. . . . ..... 4 
Total Counties ...•..•.. ••..•.....•.•.••.. 20 
TOWNS 
Cape Charles to North!unpton County .•..••..•• .. ... 
Total Towns ............................. .. . 
CITIES 
Waynesboro to Augusta County . .............. . ... ... 
Total Cities .••.••.••••••••.••....•.•..•. ... 
Total State .............................. 20 
TABLE 15-SPECIAL TRIPS 
COUNTIES 
Accomack •••••..•••••...•••••••.•.••....•••.•..• 
Albemarle ............... ~ ............. . ........ . 
Alleghany •••..•••••••••••.•.••..•••.•..••••.•.•. 
Amelia .. . .••.•.••.••..........•...•.... •.•..••.. 
Appomattox .•••••••••••••.•..•••.....•••.....••. 




Bland .. •. •.••• • ...•..•.•..•••••.••.••••...•.•••. . 
Botetourt . ••.••.••••••••••••..•••.••••••.••••.... 
Brunswick •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•••..•. 
Buchanan ................................ . ...... . 
JBuckinghaDl .•••••••••••.•••..•••.••••..•..•••... 
Ca.Dlpbell .••••••••••.•••.•••••..••.••.••••••...•. 
Carroll .••••••••••.•.•.•.•.....•• ••••••. ••.•...•. 
Charlotte . ...................................... . 
Chesterfield ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•.•. 
Clarke ......................................... . . 
C~;~lpeper ........................................ . 
D1ckenson ...................................... . 
Dinwiddie ••••••••••.••.••••.•••••••••.••.•..•••. 
Fairfa.~ ......................................... . 
FauqWer . ...........•......•..................... 
Floyd .......................................... .. 
Fluvanna ....................................... . 
FrAllklin .. ..••••..•.....•••...•.................. 
Number 




























:) 6S3 GS 
576 00 
s 1,25!) 68 
s 658 50 
:5 653 50 
s 3,766 00 
s 3,766 00 
s 5,68-:!: 18 
Cost 
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The U. s. Supreme Court Case 
which challenges 
public school financing in Texas 
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History of the Texas School Finance System 
History of the Rodriguez Case 
The Position of the Texas State Board of Education 
Alternative Ways of Financing Public Schools 
Oral Arguments on Rogriguez given before 
the U. s. Supreme Court 
January 1973 
Published and distributed by: The National 
Council for the Advancement of Education Writing 




The laws in Texas governing the collection and 
distribution of public funds for public schools result 
in widespread inequalities. All children living in 
Texas do not have an equal opportunity to have a fiscally 
comparable education through the public schools of the 
state because of the immense differences in the funds 
available to each school district. That fact is the basis 
for Rodriguez vs. San Antonio Independent School District. 
What is true of the laws in Texas is true of the 
laws in all states except Hawaii. And Hawaii is exempted 
only because that state is one large school district. 
(While it is possible, of course, for schools within one 
district to have more resources than others, this type 
of intra-district discrimination is not involved in 
Rodriguez, which deals solely with different funding 
levels among school districts within a specific state.) 
-2-
On December 23, 1971, three Texas judges, (the Chief 
U. S. District Judge, a U. s. District Judge, and a U. S. 
Circuit Judge} unanimously found "merit in plaintiff's 
claim that the current method of State financing for 
public elementary and secondary education deprives their 
class of equal protection of the laws under the 14th 
amendment to the u. s. Constitution." 
And as further reason to rule in favor of the plain-
tiffs, the judges stated: "Within [the] ad valorem 
[property tax] system lies the defect which plaintiffs 
challenge. This system assumes that the value of property 
within the various districts will be sufficiently equal 
to sustain comparable expenditures from one district to 
another. It makes education a function of the local 
property tax base •.• 
"For poor school districts, educational financing 
in Texas is, thus, a tax-more, spend-less system. The 
constitutional and statutory framework employed by the 
state in providing education draws distinctions between 
groups of citizens depending upon the wealth of the dis-
trict in which they live." 
In its conclusion, the court charged, "Now it is 
incumbent upon the defendants and the Texas Legislature 
to determine what new forms of financing should be utilized 
to support public education making it a function of wealth 




The court ordered the defendants, the Commissioner 
of Education and the members of the State Board of Educa-
tion, to draft new laws for the legislature of Texas so 
that the taxing and financing system would provide for 
each child equally throughout the state. A time limit of 
two years was given with the court concluding: 
"In the event the Legislature fails to act within the 
time stated, the Court is authorized to and will take such 
further steps as may be necP.ssary to implement both the 
purpose and the spirit of this order." 
The defendants immediately appealed the ruling and 
on October 12, 1972, the oral arguments were heard by the 
u.s. Supreme Court. A ruling is expected by this spring. 
Should the Supreme Court rule in favor of Rodriguez, 
the Texas Legislature would have to draft new laws in its 
next session to be in compliance with the U. s. District 
Court order of December 23, 1971. Regardless of the U. s. 
Supreme Court decision, the Commissioner of Education in 
Texas has stated his intent to improve the present system 
of financing the public schools. 
If Rodriguez is upheld, the implications for all the 
other 48 states are enormous. 
Some reporters have written that it is the property 
tax which is being challenged. This is not the case. It 
is the way the tax money is . being distributed which is at 
issue. 
-4-
Texas may have a more complicated taxing system than 
most of the other states, but the conditions which produce 
the incompatible results are so similar, that reporters 
in the other 48 states will find much background material 
here which is applicable to their own localitites. As in 
most states, each school district in Texas (some cities 
include several independent school districts) has to raise 
its own public school monies -- mostly by taxing property 
with only a minimal amount of additional help from the 
state. 
This use of the wealth of the property in a school 
district as a main source of funds has resulted nationwide 
in dramatically different abilities of a school system to 
pay for building, maintaining an0 operating their schools. 
A school district fortunate enough to have a few industries 
which pay high property taxes and families with only a 
few children, is able to keep the personal property tax 
rate very low at the san1e time that it has a lot of money 
to use picking and choosing among well-qualified teachers. 
Such school districts can build and maintain modern school 
plants, offer a wide variety of courses, provide special 
counselling, and give extensive remedial help. 
Such privileges usually cost a school system between 
$1,500 and $2,000 per/pupil, per/year. 
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Some school districts, without the good fortune to 
have businesses and light industries helping to pay the 
school bills, still are able to spend at the $1,500+ 
per/pupil level by attracting to the community only those 
who can assist them attract "outside" funds to pay for 
high-quality programs. Such "outside" help comes from 
Federal programs, foundation, and even from the state. 
But there are many school districts where there are 
no industries or businesses to help pay school bills, 
where family incomes are low, where property value is also 
low, where there is no one to help attract foundation or 
Federal "outside" funds, and where the per/pupil, per/year 
expenditure is considerably less than $1,000. 
Many states have tinkered with such inequalities and 
have tried to find some way for the state to compensate 
those school districts which don't have enough resources 
to do the job themselves. But the effort to equalize 
fiscal opportunity in the public schools has been fragmented 
and stymied by the tangled web of state laws governing 
property tax rates, property assessment, state funding 
patterns, and qualifications for "outside" support. 
There is no question that some school districts within 
a state have more money than others to run the public 
schools. And there are few left in the United States who 
do not know that some families pay a higher percent of 
their incomes toward public schooling than do other families. 
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Yet those who often have the biggest bite taken out 
of their paychecks are those who live in school districts 
which have the least to spend. 
This is true in the Rodriguez case. The tax rate is 
higher and produces less for the effort in the district 
where the Rodriguezes live than in the neighboring San 
Antonio Independent School District. The Rodriguez family 
lives in Edgewood. And while Edgewood is totally within 
the city of S.an Antonio, by law it is a separate and inde-
pendent school district. Edgewood is horne to most of the 
Mexican-Americans living in San Antonio. Ethnic break-
down is approximately 95% Chicano and 5% black. 
In Edgewood there are no large businesses or industries 
to help pay the taxes, there is almost no property of any 
significant value, and only a few families with incomes ,, 
above the poverty line. Hence, according to the Texas 
Research League, Edgewood raised only $418 per/pupil in 
1970/71 after combining local funds with state funds. In 
the same school year, the San Antonio Independent School 
District raised $599 per pupil from the same resources. 
The difference between the two neighboring school 
districts is $181, or more than 40% of Edgewood's total. 
If that was the widest discrepancy in the stat~ one might 
have cause to wonder why the Rodriguez case has caused 
so much turmoil in Texas and such interest nationally. 
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But the same year that Edgewood had $418 per pupil 
to spend, and Antonio I.S.D. had $599, Deer Park I.S.D. 
had $1,277 and Lipscomb C.S.D. had an incredible $7,332. 
Property market value statistics (from the year 
1967/1968) show that Edgewood had $5,429 per/student, but 
that Alamo Heights, another school district in the city 
of San Antonio, had a market value per/student of $45,095. 
This means that taxes as a percent of the property's 
market value were high in Edgewood and low in Alamo Heights. 
And yet, in spite of its high rate, Edgewood was able to 
produce only _$21 per pupil from local ad valorem taxes. 
Alamo Heights, on the other hand, with a lower rate, pro-
duced $307 per pupil. 
In most states, the poorer school districts -- that 
is, those school districts with the least to spend for 
education-- includs not only families with low incomes, 
a heavy percent of families on welfare, but also blacks 
and other minorities. 
A Texas study showed, for example, that the rich 
districts, like Alamo Heights, had only 8% minority pupils, 
while the poor districts were 79% minority. 
Clearly, there is no argument as to whether some 
children are discriminated against because they happen to 
live in "poor" school districts. Yet no one really knows 
how much should rightfully be spent per/pupil, per/year. 
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There is no significant data available in Texas --
or in any other state-- to tell legislators just how much 
money it is necessary for an Edgewood or any school . 
district to spend each year on each pupil to guarantee 
an adequate education. 
If such information were available then we would 
know exactly how far below this "necessary•· or "adequate" 
level each child was. We could work out formulas for 
local taxing efforts, compensate with state funds, and be 
sure that this "adequate" amount was available to all 
school districts equally throughout the state. 
A few studies are being conducted which may provide 
some significant and reliable data about what it costs to 
provide certain types of schooling for specific types of 
children. At the mo~ent, however, no one really knows. 
Unfortunately, since the property tax is so often 
the base source of funds for local school districts, 
some reporters have informed the public that what is 
being challenged in Rodriguez and Serrano is the constitu-
tionality of the property tax. This is not the case. 
The challenge is to the right of a state to consciously 
write laws which result in unequal funding for public 
school children based solely on the school district in 
which they live. 
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The issue is wealth discrimination. The child 
born within a wealthy school district (whether to a 
poor or rich family), has an advantage over the child 
born within a poor school district. And that advantage 
is tied directly to the amount of money the school 
system has to spend for maintaining and operating the 
public schools. 
The school district which does not have enough money 
to offer sound vocational/technical programs to its stu-
dents, is making the children victims of wealth discrimin-
ation. The school district which does not have enough 
money to hire teachers qualified to prepare students for 
four-year colleges, is suffering from wealth discrimina-
tion. The school district which does not have good refer-
ence books in the library, up-to-date science equipment 
in the physics labs, ~ in-service staff training programs, 
remedial reading teachers, and adequate playing fields, 
can't offer its children schooling which is equal to 
that of a district which has well-stocked libraries, 
modern equipment, expertly-trained teachers, and a top-
notch sports program. 
Should Rodriguez be upheld, what then? Certainly, 
the level of spending in Edgewood -- and other poor dis-
tricts around the United States -- appears insufficient. 
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While one may argue that the funds, even though small, 
might be better spent, no one is going to argue that the 
"ideal" or "adequate" amount is what Edgewood now spends. 
Conversely, almost everyone would argue that those 
districts spending more than $1,500 per/pupil, per/year 
are probably too rich; that is, they are overspending. 
They are, for example, probably locked into a salary 
schedule with insufficient quality control; they are 
probably over-equipped; and undoubtedly they are carrying 
an unnecessary administrative load. 
Most school systems grew in the past 25 years a bit 
like Topsy, and it has only been in the past five years 
that any thought has been given to cost efficiency and 
to differentiated staffing which lowers the teacher/pupil 
ratio without raising the per/teacher costs. 
It would, of course, cost almost no more money to 
bring every school district in the state of Texas to the 
average spending level. That could be done by giving to 
the poor districts the surplus from the rich districts. 
For example, Alamo Heights !.S.D. would still tax at its 
present level, but it would give the surplus back to the 
state which would give as much to Edgewood as it needed 
to reach the average. 
This rather simplistic approach to a solution caused 
one Texas wag to argue that Texas could become, were Rodriguez 
upheld by the Supreme Court, just one large Sherwood Forest, 
robbing the rich to give to the poor. 
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Yet something of this nature must take place if 
the Supreme Court does uphold Rodriguez and does state 
that wealth discrimination is unconstitutional. This 
will mean that within a given state, all children must 
have an equal share of the public school resources regard-
less of the school district in which they live. And the 
job of providing this equality, in Texas, is left up to 
the Texas Legislature. 
In the pages which follow, we present FYI several 
documents or discussions pertaining to the school financing 
question as it affects Texas and the Rodriguez case. These 
include: (a) an explanation of the present financing 
system by Glen Ivy of the Texas Research League; (b) a 
historical review of Rodriguez v. San Antonio by Mark Yudof, 
who assisted Arthur Gotchman, lawyer for the plaintiffs; 
(c) the position of ~he State Board of Education by its 
Deputy Commissioner, Marlin Brockette; (d) a discussion 
by Dan Morgan, economist, regarding possible funding schemes 
to eliminate wealth discrimination; (e) a summary of the 
oral arguments made before the U. s. Supreme Court. 
The NCAEW wishes to thank the following people who 
have worked long and hard (and fast) to bring this booklet 
to the working press and interested public: Janet Edson, 
Dorothea Kahn Jaffee, Jane Lampmann, Cecily Lee, 
Cynthia Parsons, and Linda Pyle. 
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PART TWO 
HISTORY OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM* 
There is little disagreement that the public school 
financing system in Texas is extremely complex. The pro-
blem of equalization -- even at a defined minimum level 
has plagued legislative policy makers in Texas for more 
than two decades. Some understanding of past equalization 
problems may throw light on future prospects. 
In 1949, a committee of the legislature presented a 
study called "To Have What We Must." The Gilmer-Aikin 
Committee, as it was known, found some of the following 
problems existing in its education system at that time: 
(a) Too many school districts were not levying any tax 
to support education. Others were contributing little 
because of low assessed valuations or low tax rates. 
(b) Because of wide differences in local assessed rates, 
amounts raised locally for education differed widely. 
* Dr. Glen Ivy, Executive Director of the Texas Research 
League, presented this history of Texas public school 
finance at the NCAEW Seminar on School Finance October 3, 
1972, at the University of Texas at Austin. 
.. 
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(c) At that time, the only state aid (Rural Aid Program) 
was so limited that many districts lacked means for good 
schools. 
(d) Distributing aid on a per/pupil basis caused the 
Gilmer-Aikin Committee to conclude that "such distribution 
tends to unequalize rather than equalize educational 
opportunities." 
To remedy these conditions the committee proposed 
the Minimum Foundation Program. This new proposal's 
main premise was that, 
" ••• every school-age child should be given an 
equal minimum educational opportunity, financed by 
an equalized local tax effort supplemented by state 
aid sufficient to compensate for variations in local 
taxpaying ability." 
The study had disclosed that in 1947 more than half 
of the state's 5,000 school districts, did not even operate 
a school. The new committee proposal attempted to 
eliminate such districts which served only as "tax havens," 
and recommended a modest 750 student minimum and while the 
legislature agreed to eliminate districts that had no 
school, it set a minimum of only 15 student (rather than 
750) requisite for a district to participate in the Found-
ation Program. 
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The new formulas for appropriating state aid and 
district taxes had to be altered to include the very small 
districts. The expansion of these formulas added to the 
system's complexities. 
To reduce them, the new Minimum Foundation Program 
proposed a scheme to determine the amount each district 
contributes. Theoretically, the plan seemed simple. But 
major complications resulted from the differing methods 
among districts in assessing and collecting taxes. The 
variation was so great that it defied a legislative solu-
tion and the legislature did not require statewide equal-
ization. 
As a substitute for equalized property value estimates 
the Committee designed an indirect measurement of local 
ability. Despite the relative simplicity of the program, 
,, 
the formulas covered such a range of factors and inputs 
that in practice there soon was little relationship 
between the taxpaying ability of a district and the money 
it was alloted for education purposes. 
Included in the Gilmer-Aikin package was a "credit" 
system designed to reduce the local tax load on the smaller 
districts. In other words, those districts having such 
items as national forests, armed service bases, state 
prisons, university lands, and orphanages, had a certain 




However, there was one credit which proved 
beneficial for the wealthy districts, called the "maximum 
tax rate limitation." 
In its origianl form, the clause apparently was 
designed to require local school boards to keep their 
values at least as high as those of the county in which 
they were located, (and use their maximum legal property 
tax levy for maintenance purposes), before they would get 
any extra help from the state. When the clause was incor-
porated into the Foundation Program, its purpose apparently 
was changed to protect "common" school districts which 
used the county tax office and county tax roll for assess-
ing and collecting local district taxes. If the county 
assessments were so low that they would not produce the 
district's local fund assignment, the difference would 
not be subtracted from the district's state aid. 
Some years after the Foundation Program was adopted, 
a few independent districts began claiming the maximum 
tax rate credit to which they would have been entitled 
if they had been common districts •••. But by pretend-
ing that their taxable property resources were limited to 
the level fixed by the county, 158 independent districts 
were able to reduce their local fund assignments by a 
total of more then $21 million in 1971-72 -- and to 
increase their state aid by a like amount. 
,. 
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Another discrepancy in the financing system, in 
addition to the "credit" plan, is the per/capita appor-
tionment, a state constitutional law. This Act guarantees 
every child in the state a specific amount, without regard 
to the Foundation Program's objective of an equalized 
local effort. This fund, along with the Program, often 
results in a "budget-balance complication." That is, 
some districts receive more per/pupil than the total state 
program specifies. Any sum over that fixed amount is 
poured back into the state budget. The practice has no 
rational relationship to the needs or ability of the 
individual districts. 
Despite its many complex idiosyncracies, the Minimum 
Foundation Program, per se, was not challenged in the 
Rodgriguez suit.* Presumably it might meet the test of 
a system based on the wealth of the State as a whole. ,, 
However, the federal district court overturned the whole 
public school finance system of Texas, including both the 
Foundation Program and the local supplements, because only 
about half of the total expenditures are equalized. 
Within the Foundation Component Program itself, in 
1970-71, there was a 100 percent spread of per/student 
expenditures from high to low. 
* The suit states, "Any mild equalizing effeqts state 
aid may have do not benefit the poorest districts." 
; 
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These variations can be attributed to the built-in 
formula advantages for the smaller districts. Even among 
the larger districts however there were some discrepancies 
between outlay of resources. 
Because Edgewood and Alamo Heights figure prominently, 
in the Rodriguez case, we might compare the Foundation Pro-
gram costs for those two districts as an example. The 
cost per student was $491 in Alamo Heights and only $356 
per pupil in Edgewood -- a difference of $135, or the 
equivalent of nearly $2,755,000 in additional State aid 
that Edgewood would have received at the Alamo Heights 
level. 
There are, according to Dr. Ivy, only two ways to 
equalize districts like Alamo Heights and Edgewood --
split the advantage which the affluent district enjoys, 
or raise the poor district up to the level of the rich 
system. The Texas Research League has estimated the cost 
of averaging up as follows: 
Just to bring the below average districts to 
the State average of $704 per student would 
cost an additional $130 million a year. 
To equalize up to reach the 99th percentile 
($1,277 per student) would cost $1.4 billion. 
In summary, Texas is facing a tough period if the state 
has to devise a new system of financing education. It's 
going to require every effort to find new sources and new 
ways of allocating. 
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PART THREE 
HISTORY OF THE RODRIGUEZ CASE* 
To put the Rodriguez case into perspective we'll 
start with the proposition that concern for unequal expendi-
tures in public schools is not really a new concern. It's 
something that dates back at least to the 1890's and the 
infamous case of Plessy v. Ferguson. In this decision the 
United States Supreme Court declared that separate but 
equal facilites were unconstitutional. 
Since Plessy there has been a gradual erosion of 
the separate but equal doctrine. During the first half 
of the 20th Century courts began finding inherent inequal-
ities in it and started to use the inequalities they found 
as a way to integrate segregated schools and universities. 
* Summary of remarks made at the NCAEW Seminar on School 
Finance October 3, 1972, by~ Yudof, co-counsel for 
the plaintiffs in the Rodri~uez case. Mr. Yudof 
requests that nothing in th1s statement· be construed 
or interpreted as indicating the plaintiff's position, 
but should be regarded as his own views. 
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For example, by the middle of the 20th century the 
• 
University of Texas at Austin Law School was integrated 
pursuant to a court order on the theory that a law school 
which the state had given to the blacks was not equal to 
Austin. The court in that decision considered not only 
the physical facilities but also the intangibles, such 
as school prestige. These were the only decisions during 
the first half of the century up to the 1954 Supreme 
Court case, Brown v. the Board of Education. In this case, 
the Supreme Court repudiated the "seperate but equal" 
doctrine saying that schools separated by race are inher-
ently unequal. Even if you could count the last piece of 
chalk in school buildings and they're equal in some phys-
ical sense, the court says no, that will not suffice: 
You've got to integrate these schools. 
This, I think, had a profound effect on civil rights 
litigation for the next fifteen years. Civil rights 
lawyers and activists organizations like the NAACP essen-
tially addressed themselves to the integration problem. 
By the mid 1960's all this began to change. And it began ., 
to change for a variety of reasons. One, quite under-
standably, was that there was a good deal of dissatis-
faction with the progress of desegregation in the South. 
The second was that even in those areas where inte-




It seemed that what ultimately happened was that the 
poor blacks went to school with poor whites in poor schools. 
Both poor black and poor white children simply were not 
getting their share of the pie. 
Another factor I suppose is that some people eaw 
better school financing as a politically feasible alter-
native to the controversial integration. They hoped that 
somehow one could achieve equality in education through 
the manipulation of the financial structure rather than 
through integration. 
Contributing also to the demand for improved financing 
was an increased emphasis on local control of the school 
structure on the part of particular racial and ethnic groups. 
So, with all these ideas in the air, we saw a change 
in the mid '60's among civil rights groups from emphasis 
on integration alone for removing inequalities to an empha-
sis on school financing. 
It was at this point that Congress entered the scene 
with Title I of the Elementary and Secondary School Act 
of 1965. It provided for special educational services 
for indigent children. 
.. 
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There was a ·twofold recognition: (1) that the poor 
children might not be getting their fair share of local 
and/or state resources and therefore federal resources 
were required; {2) that poor children might actually 
require not simply equality of resources, but additional 
resources -- resources that more affluent children did 
no·t need because they came from homes in which food was 
plentiful, and there were books, summer camp opportunities, 
and the like. 
The first challenge to school financing occurred in 
the District of Columbia in the famous case of Hobson v • 
Hansen in 1967. In that case, Julius Hobson brought suit 
against the District of Columbia Board of Education for 
failing to distribute funds between black and white 
schools equitably. Sometimes the disparities were actu-
ally gargantuan. Some white schools were spending two 
and three times as much money per/pupil as some black 
schools in the same district. 
This resulted in a number of things. One was that 
the expensive teachers -- that is the teachers with 
degrees and more pay -- generally taught in the white 
schools. 
A second factor was the age of the buildings and 
the conditions of the physical facilities in the area. 
' ... .~ 
..... ·~· 
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When it came to counting cafeterias, gymnasiums, 
broken windows and so forth, the black students were 
always on the adverse end of that count. That was also 
true of honors courses, library books and, in general, 
congestion in the schools. 
Justice Skelly Wright, in the Hobson v. Hansen 
decision, ultimately ruled that he would permit only 5% 
deviations between schools in the District of Columbia. 
He said, "I realize there are some administrative hassels, 
but you'd better work it out to within 5%." 
There are several tltings to be noted about Hobson in 
order to put this in perspective. One is that it is an 
intradistrict case. What is being alleged is that there 
are disparities between schools within the same district. 
That is a very different case from one that involves dis-
parities between districts and that's what we're talking 
about in Rodriguez. 
The second point which is absolutely crucial is that 
Hobson involves a racial classification. In Serrano and 
Rodriguez we're talking about all the poor -- white, black, 
and Chicano. 
And the third thing which is important is that no one 
paid any attention to Hobson. Judge Wright was always 
viewed as something of a deviant judge and his decisions 
were simply not followed in other jurisdictions at that 
time. 
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So then we move on in this rapid history, and after 
Hobson v. Hansen there comes down in 1967 the first inter-
district suit, Mcinnis v. Olgilvie in Illinois. I think 
it's fair to say that the suit was a calamity. The plain-
tiffs petitioned the court to distribute the state's funds 
according to the educational needs of the children. This 
was asking for a sort of child by child, district by dis-
trict survey. The court said that that was preposterous 
and most people would agree. The court rejected the suit, 
saying it was nonjudiciable and was largely a political 
and legislative question. 
By this time school financing was thought to be dead 
as a lawyer's type of issue. Then Coons, Clune, and 
Sugarman came on the scene. Coons was a law professor at 
Berkeley who had been working diligently on these problems. 
He and his colleagues wrote a brilliant article which has 
largely formed the basis of all the attacks we see today 
-- the Rodriguez suit, the Serrano suit, the suits in 
Arizona, New York, New Jersey and others. 
Their legal argument went somewhat as follows: 
The first thing to decide is whether education is of funda-
mental interest. They put together all the documents they 
could find to support the proposition that education was 
important to the success of a student, to his socio-
economic mobility, to his job security, to the amount of 
income he would get. They also argued that it was absolutely 
crucial to participation in the democratic process. 
-24-
The second prong of their argument, and this is still 
hotly disputed, was that poor people live in poor dis-
tricts and that therefore any system which treats poor 
people distinctly as a class must be scrutinized by the 
court. This comes from a long line of cases which say 
that when a certain group of people are politically power-
less and legislation treats them differently from other 
people in the state, the court will be peculiarly aware 
of this and will scrutinize the classification with a. 
great deal of care. 
And the third prong is that g·iven these two things --
discrimination on the one hand and the importance of educa-
tion on the other -- the state must come up with a compell-
ing reason for classification. 
"Compelling reason" is the legal jargon. What it 
means is that there q,re ways to finance education without 
discriminating against the poor. Coonsi Clune, and 
Sugarman argued that there certainly are alternatives. 
The plan that they proposed, which ! 1 m tola had arisen 
earlier, was something they called district power equal-
ization. 
What they were .saying in effect was, if you're really 
worried about local control and you want each district to 
determine its own tax rate and if each district. is to 
choose between hospitals and highways and fire departments, 
then the way to do that is to make each district equally 
capable of raising funds for all these purposes. 
·~ . . ~. 
.~· 
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Poor districts do not choose to spend less for educa-
tion. It's like telling a man who makes $50 a week that 
he has the same right as a millionaire to send his son to 
Exeter. It just isn't so. He can't spend his $50 in any 
fashion which will allow for the Exeter education. 
They're saying in effect, let's equalize the ability 
of the poor and rich districts to spend for education, and 
once we've equalized the ability, then if the poor districts 
turn out to not value education very much, well, that's 
their choice and they have to live with it. But let's 
equalize their ability. 
Essentially what we're talking about is subsidies 
from the state to the local districts in order to do this. 
At any level of taxation, at 1%, 2%, whatever, Edgewood, 
the poor district in San Antonio, should be able to raise 
as much money as Ala~o Heights, the rich. If it cannot, the 
state will make up the difference. 
There are a couple of things to think about in 
relation to the Coons' approach. One thing is that 
Coons' standard is much simpler than the educational 
needs standard of Mcinnis. The other is that it really 
moves one away from the educational suit and takes on 
the overtones of a taxation suit. 
A third thing which is very important is that Coons' 
proposal is a negative standard. Coons is telling you what 
is unconstitutional, he isn't telling you what you have 
to do. 
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In the Coons' rational the court simply declares that 
the present method of financing education is unconstitu-
tional because it discriminates according to wealth. It 
is up to the legislature to figure out any other scheme 
it wishes so long as it doesn't have this constitutional 
imperfection in it. 
So this is the standard which is employed in Serrano 
v. Priest in California and in Rodriguez v. San Antonio ISD. 
It holds that the state may not allocate its resources 
according to wealth of the individual or the school dis-
trict but must allocate them according to the wealth of 
the state as a whole. 
Now, with something of the basic framework, let's go 
into the specific history of Rodriguez. The suit began 
in the spring of 1968. Bexar County commissioner Albert 
Penia brought a number of parents of children attending 
school in Edgewood, a San Antonio district, to speak with 
Arthur Gochman, who has a private practice in San Antonio, 
and has handled a number of civil rights lawsuits. 
The parents were very unhappy with the Edgewood schools, 
saying there was a shortage of classroom teachers, poor 
facilities, vast overcrowding, lack of basic education 
materials. The conversation began with an effort to fix 
blame for discrimination on persons, but ended with placing 
the onus on the syst.em itself. Mr Gochman became chief 





In September 1969,the case came before the court. 
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and 
that was really the crucial decision. The court thus was 
saying to the plaintiffs, I agree with you as a matter of 
law. If you can prove the facts to us, we're going to 
' rule in your favor.
At that time the court was rather optimistic. It 
said to the legislature, we'll give you two years to do 
something about this problem, to act on the govenor's 
report. The legislature convened in January 1971, and 
adjourned in June but, quite predictably did nothing about 
it. 
After the legislative session, Mr. Gotchman began to 
make preparations for the trial and it was at this point 
that I began to assist him. We began by outlining our 
strategy. We felt that the inequities of the system were 
so great that our job was to convince the court of the 
magnitude of the discrimination against the poor and min-
ority children. We thought that if we could make our case 
to the court that this is really the way the system is, 
that it really is discriminatory, the court would rule in 
our favor. 
The state's case at this point was even simpler. Its 
tactics were, 1) to expose what it termed the "frivolous 
nature" of the law suit (which ultimately was not too sue-
cessful) and 2) to uncover what it alleged were unsavory 
motives of the plaintiffs' lawyers and their expert witnesses. 
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Prior to the trial, the testimony of the witnesses 
was taken and the court made the decision on the written 
record. 
The trial, I think it is fair to say, followed the 
prel~ skirmishes. The defendants reported on their 
, 
brie~ which I think in a number of points supports our 
factual if not our legal contention. 
Concluding its oral argument, the state argued that 
it was guided by a sense of honesty, that the plaintiffs 
were seeking socialized education, and that if the case 
ended with the invalidation of the Texas financing system, 
it would lead to forty years of seeking another solution, 
"like Moses wandering in the desert." 
The plaintiffs relied, obviously, on the recent 
Serrano decision, emphasizing the flexibility the legisla-
ture would have if in fact this decree were entered. They 
said they simply fought for the standard for which Professor 
Coons had fought. That is, that the legislature should 
have wide discretion in choosing a financing scheme, but 
it must pick one which doesn't discriminate systematically 
against the poor and minority groups. 
On December 23, 1971, the Texas Supreme Court unan-
imously upheld the charge that the present Texas school 
financing scheme is unconstitutional, and directed the 
state to remedy the situation within two years. 
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You can see the restraint the court has exercised. 
The directive allows the legislature two more years after 
December 1971, for completion of the new program. So, 
we're really talking about a remedy which will not go 
into effect until early 1974. The suit started in 1968, 
and six years can elapse before the state gets its house 
in order, with two or three warnings along the way. I 
suppose that at the end of that time nothing will have 
happened, and the court will have to implement its injunc-
tion if it is affirmed. 
At the end of the opinion, the court disposed of the 
defendant's argument that the plaintiffs were calling for 
socialized education. Education, like the postal service, 
has been socialized and publicly financed and operated by 
the government almost from its inception. The court held 
that the type of socialized education, not the question 
of its existence, is the only matter currently in dispute. 
And that, of course, was the point we had been trying to 
make -- that education had been socialized since the 1850's. 
If they had a bone to pick in that regard, they should 
have taken it up with Horace Mann and certainly not with 
the plaintiffs in this suit. 
Rodriguez is now pending before the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The hearing took place October 12. Professor 
Charles Alan Wriqht argued for the state, Arthur Gotchman 
for the plaintiffs. 
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There appeared to be four main issues before the 
court at the time of the u.s. Supreme Court hearing. One 
is whether or not this case is manageable. What happens 
when the court issues its decrees? Is anyone going to 
pay attention? What shall the court do if no one responds? 
A second issue is whether or not the court treats 
poverty as a suspect classification, and whether or not 
it affirms the finding of the lower court that by and 
large poor people do live in poor districts. 
The third element is whether in a constitutional 
sense education is deemed to be of fundamental interest. 
And the final thing, I think, is whether or not the 
court believes that the case can be limited to its own 
facts. And I think that's crucially important. The argu-
ment has been made that if tax income is equalized among 
school districts today, why not hospitals tomorrow, and 
roads and sewers and so forth. I think the court is going 
to have to be convinced that it can put stops on this 
suit at some particular point. That it's going to be able 
to deal with the education issue in isolation, that by 
committing itself to the Serrano and Rodriguez principle 
it is not committing itself to an endless series of liti-
gations involving every conceivable public service. 
We're going to have to clear up exactly what we're 
talking about in Rodriquez. 
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One point that needs clarification is: Are we talking 
about a taxpayers' suit? What offends us about the present 
financing system? Is it the fact that some taxpayers must 
bear a heavier burden than others to raise the same amount 
or less for the same education for their youngsters? Are 
we really talking about an inequitable taxation scheme? 
The second thing the court will have to decide is 
whether or not this discrimination extends only to discrim-
ination against the poor. And that is really problematic. 
Suppose the state comes in and says we've got a perfectly 
rational financing scheme. Lots of kids get more than 
other kids, but when you round them up, the kids who get 
less are not consistently poor or members of minority 
groups. Some get more than others, and we think that's 
a good idea. The question is whether or not that is consti-
tutional. If the suit does extend only to prohibiting dis-
crimination against the poor, there's no reason to think 
that that would be unconstitutional. 
And the third point which I think that the court will 
ultimately take a position on, and which I would certainly 
take, is simply the proposition that the state has got to 
inject some rationality into this financing process. We 
have an essentially irrational scheme at this time. We're 
talking about discrimination based upon the accident of 
whether or not a child lives in a district with a Dupont 
plant, whether or not the school which he attends has oil 
underneath it. 
-32-
We're talking about things which bear no relation to 
children's education. So I would hope that what we get 
out of Rodriguez is a requirement of rationality. 
It's pretty simple. When the state distributes it's 
resources and gives some children more than others, it 
has to give reasons, and those reasons simply have to be 
rational. If the state says we want to give handicapped 
children more money, fine, and if the state says we want 
to give gifted children more money, fine, and so on. But 
don't give one child more money than another child, simply 
because of fortuity. Give reasons for your discrepancies. 
And I'm hop~ng that that's ultimately where the 
Rodriguez case will take us, although I don't think that 
in this round of litigation it will take us there. This 
~ 
means that even if Rodriguez is affirmed, I think we can 





THE POSITION OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION* 
Two weeks after the Texas Supreme Court ordered state 
education authorities to restructure the entire system of 
financing the public school system, the State Board of 
Education adopted a formal resolution on the matter. 
First, the resolution requested the Attorney General 
to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of the United States. 
If the result of such action were a reversal of the Rodriguez 
,, 
decision, the State Board of Education could continue to 
follow its present course. 
Second, facing the possibility that the u.s. Supreme Court 
might uphold the Texas Court's order, the resolution stated: 
* 
"The State Board of Education ••• assumes full 
responsibility for developing a proposal to be sub-
mitted to the Govenor, the Legislature, and to the 
gener.,.l public which will provide for financing public 
school education in Texas in accordance with st~ndards 
of high quality commensurate · ~'1ith the financial ability 
of Texas." 
A summary of remarks made by Dr. Marlin B~ockette, 
deputy commissioner, Texas Education Agency (TEA), 
at the NCAEW Seminar on School Finance, held October 3, 
1971, at the University of Texas at Austin. 
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Several officially appointed study groups have been 
working on the problem of Texas school finance for many 
years. So that the final proposal presented for legisla-
tive action would represent the "broadest participation by 
citizens," the State Board has invited these groups to 
coordinate their findings with its own. 
Each of these groups is working independently but 
all are using the same data base. This includes TEA's 
estimates of future school needs and its study of market 
value of taxed property in Texas school districts, as well 
as a compendium of school statistics prepared by the Texas 
Research League. 
To help these study groups, the State Board has pre-
pared a chart for procedure -- a visual guide. This is 
shown on the last page in this section. 
To guide its own staff in planning, the State Board 
drew up a statement of principles of school finance. The 
dominant note in this statement is support for local con-
trol of school financing. This appears to move in a direc-
tion opposite to that implied in Rodriguez. However, the 
State Board affirmed that in drawing u~ the guidelines it 
was considering not only the general problem of improving 
school financing but also the specific concerns of Rodriguez. 
"Local taxes should continue to be used in the district 
collected," is one principle laid down. Added to this is 
the caution that districts should not be restricted in their 
efforts to add to their funds by their own efforts. 
.. 
-35-
Less controversial is the point that control of the 
district's funds should be vested in the citizens residing 
in the district. An evident allusion to the existence of 
"tax-havens" districts gerrymandered to minimize or 
avoid the taxation of wealthy property-owners -- is made 
in this section. 
It is observed that emphasis on local control will 
require "responsible district organization and financial 
structure." 
Regarding state financing to equalize district income, 
the principles are stated in very broad terms. For example: 
(a) "The allocation of state funds shall give consideration 
to the ability of the local school district to provide local 
tax and other revenues; and (b) "Guaranteed funding of 
the state's share of basic educational opportunity for all 
children must continue to be a key element." 
This contrasts with the court order which called for 
an entirely new plan by which public education is made a 
function of the state as a whole and not of the district. 
While recognizing the need for improving the state's 
method of financing its schools, the Board of Education 
holds that the demands of Rodriguez are impracticable. 
The Board's position is made clear in papers by 
Ben R. Howell, Board Chairman. In these Mr. Howell dis-
cusses the Board's reasons for requesting appeal of the 
case. The gist of the argument is as follows. 
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The State Board of Education agrees that Texas should 
improve its method of financing education. Mr. Howell 
calls the disparity among districts in evaluation of prop-
erty and return from tax effort "a horrible example of 
inequity." He deplores the existence of "tax havens with 
a tiny number of children and a huge tax base." The Board, 
he says, has asked for authority to reorganize districts 
and should be given it. 
But, Mr. Howell contends, to accept the court's demand 
that variations in wealth among governmentally chosen units 
may not affect spending for the education of any child 
presents problems seemingly unsoluble. 
The Board's reasons for this stand are stated in the 
brief filed by the Board's attorney, Charles Alan Wright, 
in a request for a u.s. Supreme Court hearing. The brief 
holds in effect: (a) that the court's demands are unreason-
,, 
able; (b) that to bring all districts up to the present 
district average of spending per/student would more than 
double the amount the state now spends upon education; (c) 
that it is very "unlikely" that the state could produce 
that amount of money; and (d) that such spending would 
not be wise public policy. Other social needs are still 
unmet in Texas because of underfunding, it notes. Further, 
it argues that it cannot be proved that greatly increased 
spending for education would improve quality • 
. . 
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A management task force of the Texas Education Agency 
and consultants are now developing alternate plans for the 
State Board of Education. Regardless of the outcome of 
Rodriguez, the Board states as its goal, "improv1ng the 
below-average standard schools without pulling down the 
best schools.• 
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PROPOSED STEPS FOR DETERMINING A METHOD OF 
FINANCING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Scope of Public School Education Determined: 
A. Populations 
What age groups will be financed 
by the state? 
B. Programs and Services 
What kind will be financed to 
meet the objectives of the goals 
adopted? 
C. Elements of Quality 
What criteria will be used to 
determine the quality of services 
as far as money is concerned? 
Organization - Structure of Governmental 
Units Determined 
What structure should be used to 
better -q.se of resources? 
l 
Level of Funding Determined 
How much money needed to carry out 
these plans? 
Method of Financing Determined 





ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF FINANCING PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
OR 
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE SUPRE~ill COURT UPHOLDS RODRIQUEZ?* 
Introduction 
The appropriate men to address my topic, "What 
Happens if Rodriguez Is Upheld?" are the other men on our 
program, Dr. Marlin Brockette, Deputy Commissioner of 
Education, and Mark Yudof, of the UT Law faculty and coun-
sel for the plaintiffs in the case and Dr. Glenn Ivy, 
Director of the recent Governor's Committee on Public School 
Reform. What I shall do is discuss the possibilities, most 
of which are not political probabilities. At the end of 
my presentation I shall go into what I consider to be 
politically relevant forecasts. 
* Address by Daniel c. Morgan, Jr., to the National 
Council for the Advancement of Education Writing, 
J. Thompson Conference Center, University of Texas 
at Austin, October 3, 1972. 
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The Assumptions 
First, I shall assume that the court rules that wealth 
discrimination is what the Rodriguez case is about, and 
that wealth discrimination between districts is out hence-
forth, i.e., that it must be eliminated very, very quickly. 
Obviously the court need rule no such things, and my per-
sonal guess is that they will not. But I want to operate 
initially with strong case assumptions and leave to the 
lawyers and the politicians the realistic compromise fore-
casts. So I shall assume that the high court says, "No 
more wealth discrimination among the school districts of 
Texas." Under such a ruling practically anything in the 
way of system or solution is legal, the only prescription 
being that the state of Texas is not to discriminate on 
the basis of wealth among its many school districts. To 
keep things simple I~shall assume that the only alternative 
systems open to the state are these& 
1. Full State Funding 
2. Minimum Foundation Program approach--fixed unit 
variety 
3. Minimum Foundation Program approach-- variable 
unit variety 
4. Power or percentage equalizing of some sort: or 
5. Some combination of these four. 
To make the illustrations as simple as possible, I'll 
manufacture a mythical state with • 
1. Four districts--A, B, C, D 
2. Each district with 25 pupils 
3. Wealth per pupil as follows: 
District Wealth/5upil 






This mythical state differs quite a bit from Texas 
reality, with its 1149 districts (not 4); with fantastic 
differences in wealth per pupil, (not just 4 to 1 ratio). 
[In the latest study, published by the Texas Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the range of 
market value per/pupil goes all the way from $5,147 per 
pupil in Edgewood to $10.9 million per pupil in Provident 
City, or over 2,000 to 1!] And of course the actual range 
of students among Texas districts is immense. 
Let me assume a system somewhat like Texas where the 
state provieds a foundation guaranteeing so much per/pupil, 
say $400, with the state paying 80% of the cost of the State 
program and the local districts collectively paying 20% 
(with each district paying in accordance with its respec-
tive capacity; let's say that this is measured by its 
,, 
wealth per/pupil). But in addition to the State program 
the local districts can provide whatever they wish -- or 
"local enrichment" is completely up to the local district. 
Let us assume that each district decides to make the same 
tax effort -- highly unlikely • 




State Corcpulsory State Local vol- Total 
Foundation local aid untary taxes revenue: 
Dist. Wealth Guarantee taxes (1)- (2) at 2% local = (2) + 
rate (3) + (4) 
A $10,000 $ 400 $ 32 $ 368 $ 200 $ 600 
B 20,000 400 64 336 400 800 
c 30,000 400 96 304 600 1000 
D 40,000 400 128 272 800 1200 
$1600 $320 $1280 $2000 $3600 
(20% of (80% of 
$1600> $1600) 
So pre-Rodriguez we commence with immense disparities 
in total revenue per pupil, as Column (5) shows, going 
from $600 in A to $1200 in D. The source of the differ-
ences is the local districts' wealth bases: they range 
from $10,000 per pupil to $40,000 per pupil, so that equal 
tax rates of 2% (or 20 mills) give a range from $200 to 
$800 per pupil in local districts revenues. [This is 
nothing like actual differences which ranged from $300 
or so to thousands in the years pertinent to the Roqriguez 
case.] 
We wish to end the discrimination. [Notice that the 
total cost of the program, State + local, is $3600. Notice 
also that cost to the State government is only $1280.] So 
suppose that we wish to keep costs (State plus local, 
combined) constant, at $3600. We equalize to the middle 
at $900 per pupil. 
.. 
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Equalizing to the Middle Under 
A State Flat Grant 
Say that we take the route of 100% State Funding, 
using State flat grants of $900 per pupil, ending all 
local district taxation (compulsory as well as voluntary 
local enrichment). Now only the State bears the taxes. 
So we get: 
Wealth State Carpulsory 
per flat local State local Total 
Dist. Eupil 9:rant taxes aid enrichrrent revenue 
A $10,000 $ 900 $0 $ 900 $0 $ 900 
B 20,000 900 0 900 0 900 
c 30,000 900 0 900 0 900 
D 40,000 900 0 900 0 900 
$100,000 $3600 $0 $3600 $0 $3600 
Half the districts gain (A and B) but half the districts 
lose (C and D) : 
A= +$300; B = +$100; C = -$100; D = -$300. 
Total cost (and average revenue per pupil) is the same. 
But then notice how costs to the State government rise: 
They were $1280 earlier; now they are $3600 -- nearly a 
300% increase in costs! Not too popular with state legis-
lators. 
But even with this we see C and D's children hurt. 
Some would say, surely we don't want to let them be hurt. 
If we equalized everybody to the level of D's children 
($1200), costs would go to $4800. 
,. ~) .~. 
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Now total costs (State and local) have risen ~rom 
$3600 to $4800, or 33 1/3%. But costs to the State govern-
ment have risen from $1280 to $4800~ nearly fourfold. 
Full State Funding 
One alternative, then, is for the State government 
to take over the entire funding of the education program, 
thereby relieving the local school districts of all their 
property tax obligations. The State could do this either 
through centralization or by flat grant payments to the 
school districts. Probably implicit in centralization 
and State operation of the schools is the idea that the 
State government will make all of what we think of as the 
big education decisions, decisions such as the level of 
program and such as the allocation of our education resources. 
~ 
Centralization is not about to happen as the result of 
Rodriguez, so for the sake of brevity I'll pass it by as 
an alternative. But the State government could make grants 
to the districts and continue to make the decisions it 
presently makes and have the local districts make most of 
the decisions they presently make. State flat grants could 
be equal perjpupil or per/task unit (whatever the unit may 
be) or it could be weighted, so that certain pupils or 
units receive more than others. (In Texas we presently 
have much of the latter and there would be heavy pressure 
to keep it so.) 
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(So, saying "flat grants" does not necessarily imply 
equal amount per/pupil. If we wish more money for needier 
pupils, ttis is perfectly legitimate under Rodriguez, so 
long as the differences are not invidious distinctions or 
classifications.) 
Seeing how this works out with an over-simple myth-
ical state example, it should come as no surprise to us 
then that actual empirical costs to the State in Texas 
jump irnroensely unC.er 1.00% State funding. Even if we keep 
total costs of education constant in Texas and equalize 
to the middle it would cost the State government abcut 
$1 billion today. And say that we equalized up to the 
level of Texas City (just under $1000 per pupil in 1970-71 
or the 95th percentile in Texas), it would cost nearly 
$2 billion! (This is so even though it would cost state + 
local together only between $600 and $700 million.) 
The State government is not apt to foot this entire 
bill, npedless to say! They will at the very least turn 
to a Minimum Foundation Program approach (as we used to 
call it; in Texas we now call it a Foundation School 
Program) . Under this approach even though the State 
guarantees money or services it compels the local dis-
tricts to put up some portion of the cost: the State does 
not bear it all alone. 
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Foundation Progr~rn Approaches 
Under a Foundation Program the State lays down a 
compulsory uniform rate tax on the local school districts. 
It makes the portion it wishes the districts to put up 
a~ything the State wishes. Texas has used 20%, roughly, 
but it could be more than this. The portion that each 
district pays of this total percent depends on its 
relative capacity to pay taxes, the given district's 
ability relative to the ability of the others. This can 
be measured all kinds of ways: Texas uses an Economic 
Index to measure it. There is plenty of pressure nowadays 
to measure it in a.ccordance with full market value of 
property. 
One big question after Rodriguez, if the court rules 
for the plaintiffs, is: if we use a foundation program, 
can there be any local enrichment atop this even as 
little as 5%, 10%, or 15% -- that continues to use the 
fantastic differences in wealth vJi tbout. using power ~qual­
ization (which I'll talk about in a minute). Certainly 
and logically the answer is NO! l~ny amount continues to 
give wealth discrimination: districts with dozens of 
times the wealth per/pupil hold the big advantage still; 
you would simply be reducing the dollar amount of it if 
you allow any local enrich~ent at.op the State foundation 
progra~ ~ithout power equalizing for the local portion. 
: 
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So let ~e assume for a moment that there is only a 
State foundation system and no local enrichment atop it, 
as we think of the term local enrichment today. 
There are tv-10 basic types of foundat.ion programs: 
1. the fixed unit approach 
2. the variable unit approach 
Some of each of these is found in Texas' Foundation 
School Program to~ay. But the dominant part is the vari-
able unit approach. This is very unusual among the· states. 
It comes about because of how our Salary Schedule dominates 
our foundation program 80% to 90% of its total costs. 
But the fixed unit approach is easier to understand; so 
I'll start with that and play as if the entire system is 
fixed unit, for a moment. 
Fixed Urli t Approach to Foundation Program 
To go back to my original example, if we want equal 
spending per/ pupil but no increase in State + local district 


















Total= $100,000 Total= $3600 
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If we want to keep the State-local division at 80-20, 
then local districts must pay $720 or 20% of $3600. It 
would be divided so that A would pay 10% of this because 
it has 10% of the ability, ($10,000 is 10% of $100,000); 
B would pay 20%; C would pay 30%; D would pay 40%. 
Notice that the original cost being paid by the State 
government pre-Rodriguez was $1280. Now it is [$3600 -$720] 
or $2880. More than double. And the children of C and D 
are receiving less money than pre-Rodriguez. So, there 
would almost surely be equalizing up; so the increase to 
the State government would be greater than this. 
It is easy to see that if the State goes to an all-out 
Foundation program approach it will almost surely be 
changing the State-local ratio; so the local districts 
~ill be paying more than 20% of the program's costs. 
As we work on these things it comes clear pretty fast 
that Rodriguez is not going to mean the end of property 
taxes for schools if it means the end of \'Tec3_l th disc rim-







Costs to State Government of Alternative 
Splittlng Arrangements, 1970-71 
80-20 60-40 
Keep average costs/ 
pupil constant ($704) $ 691 mil. $ 518 mil. $ 
Equalize up to Odessa 
[86th%]: $804 1,006 " 745.3" 
Equalize to Texas City 
[95th%]: $959 1,321 " 984 " 
Equalize to Deer Park 
[99.1%]: $1277 1,943 II 1,463 II 
Equalize to Andrews 








Local districts will not be relieved of property 
taxes. 
We'd have to equalize everybody down to Edgewood's 
level. That would lower total (State-local) spending 
$700 willian, and the State government would just break 
even! 
But Andrews would lose about $3 million, i.e., over 
$1,000/pupil; Alamo Heights would lose about $500/pupil; 
Houston and Dallas would lose between $55 and $65 million 
each, between $300 and $400/pupil. 
(When people say money doesn't matter, just suggest 
to them that we solve our equalization problem by cutting 
everyone down to Edgewood's level!) 
Variable Unit Approach to Foundation Program 
Some foundation programs, though rare nowadays, are 
not per/pupil based, ~r per/classroom, or per;task unit. 
They are not fixed unit approaches, they are variable unit 
appioaches. The common variable unit approach is the State 
minimum salary schedule approach. The State sets up a 
minimum salary that each teacher of designated character-
istics or qualifications must receive no matter what dis-
trict she or he teaches in. Usually the teachers with more 
schooling and more experience are deemed to provide the 
better teaching services and the districts with these 
teachers receive the greater State aid. This is the major 
part of the Texas Foundation School Program. 
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The Foundation Prograro has some other aspects that 
are 100 % State funding, and some that are fixed unit 
foundation approach, like the $660 per classroom teacher 
unit for maintenance and operation. But $660 for, say, 
25 pupils per classroom unit, comes to about $26 per/pupil. 
(It really goes a little higher than this, to abut $30 
for the average CTU.) But all this is peanuts compared 
to the salary schedules. 
The State Board of Ec.ucation and most people concerned 
seem to want to retain this unusual salary schedule approach 
as a basic for aid to the school districts. As thinge 
stand now, wi t.h local enrichment based on the immense 
differences in wealth, not only do we have great differ-
ences in local enrichroent money per/pupil among the dis-
tricts, v_re even often have the State Foundation's program 
giving more rooney to the rich districts than to the poor, 
contrary to what we would expect. This is because the 
richer districts are more able to hire the teachers with 
the more degrees and experience, and to hire more aides, 
etc., that the program pays them for having. 
So one question that faces us if we retain any kind 
of local enrichment at all and at the same time retain 
the salary schedule as a major part of our foundation pro-




If the richest districts have the best chance of 
attracting the teachers with the qualities that give the 
biggest State money -- because a given tax effort by 
richer districts gives them more money -- are we not wealth 
discriminating? In other words, is not the Salary Schedule 
approach unconstitutional? Almost certainly it would not 
be if we have power equalization among the school districts, 
so that each district has an artificial equal economic 
potential per/student, thus an equal ability to attract 
a given characteristic of teacher. 
With all this talk about "power equalization," it is 
time to talk about it! 
The Power Equalization or Percentage 
Equalization Approach 
So far we have talked only about reforms that turn 
the big education decisions over to the State government 
-- at least decisions as to the level of outlay and how 
that outlay is to be distributed among· the various school 
districts. 
But suppose we want the local school districts to 
make practically all the big decisions? In other words, 
suppose we really favor the principle of local control, 
practically all the way? 
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If the plaintiffs win Rodriguez, clearly we can't just 
say "Local enrichment all the way," leaving the wealth 
disparities per/pupil remaining immense, as they are in 
Texas today. With our immense disparities, with equal 
tax effort the revenues per/pupil differences would be 
immense. But does this mean that local control is out 
completely? This is one of the decisions the court must 
deal with. But my guess is that it will say no. Local 
control is perfectly okay, the Supreme Court will say, so 
long as there is power equalization among the school dis-
tricts. Many people fail to understand this point because 
they don't understand power equalization or equalization 
of fiscal potential per/pupil. 
Many people assume tha·t with Rodriguez (if affirmed} 
we must choose between two alternatives, both of which they 
consider bad: 
1. Local control (good) but with wealth discrimina-
tion (bad) 
2. State uniformity and/or no local control (bad) but 
with no wealth discrimination (good). 
But, theoretically at least, we can indeed have both 
local control and diversity of levels of education among 
the various school districts if we do it under conditions 
of "fiscal neutrality" or equal resources per/pupil. 
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The idea is for the end of wealth discrimination but 
to continue to allow the local districts to decide the 
le~els of program they want throug~ the tax rates they 
are willing to pay, except not like toeay, where Edgewood 
can tax itself out of existence and raise very little 
~oney while Andrews can make very little effort and raise 
a barrelfull. The State government plays a subsidizing 
role in setting up a situation so that equal tax effort 
gets districts the same revenue per/J?upil no matter their 
real wealth per/pupil. But higher effort gets you more 
money and you, the district, make the decision about how 
much effort yo~ wish to make. 
~his is dcne with formulas but the basic idea cf one 
kind of power equalization where the State keys on the 
richest district can be displayed easily. First assume, 
unrealistically, that each district puts fort.h the same 
true tax effort: 
Actual Total Tax Paid 
~7ealth State Local revenue by local 
l-:ler gUc-rran teec tax r--er district State 
Cist. EUEil ~\'eal th Base rate EUEil (2% x act. wealth) aid 
A $10,000 $40,000 2% $800 $200 $600 
B 20,000 40,000 2% 800 400 400 
c 30,000 40,000 2% 800 600 200 
D 40,000 40,000 2% 800 800 0 
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In this case every district pays an equal percentage 
of its true wealth in tax, and with equal effort all dis-
tricts receive equal total revenue per/pupil. 
But of course districts will not all have the same 
"appetite for education and taxes, II and will not make the 
same effort. Suppose IA makes 1 % and D makes 1%, while B 
makes 3% a.nd C makes 2 %. Then we have the following: 
P..ctual Total Tax paid 
Wealth State IDeal revenue by 
per guaranteed tax per local State 
Dist. EUEil Wealth Base rate pupil district aid 
A $10,000 $40,000 1% $ 400 $ 100 $ 300 
B 20,000 40,000 3% 1,200 600 600 
c 30,000 40,000 2% 800 600 200 
D 40,000 40,000 1% 400 400 0 
$1,700 $1,100 
Equal effort of A and D gives equal revenue per pupil 
(total): $400 per pupil. Higher effort gives higher taxes 
and higher revenue per/pupil. The local districts make 
the crucial decisions --"local control." But, unlike to-
day, every district has an equal chance: equal effort 
yields equal revenue per/pupil. 
Of course if it wishes the State can say: you must 
make at least so much effort; or you can't make above so 
much effort. 
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Co~binations of Approaches 
Now the [previous examplel assvmes complete local 
control -- no more foundation system. But of course the 
State can create a foundation system -- fixed unit approach 
and/or variable unit approach -- and put some power equal-
ization above it. 
In other words, it can make up any combination of 
the above approaches it likes. For example: the total 
system might be: E[(l) + (2) + (3)]: 
( 1) • 
+ ( 2) • 
+ ( 3) • 
Some things -- full State funding 
Foundation program: 
more fixed amount per/pupil or per/class-
room district than the present system has; 
plus 
contintuation of the present Salary Schedule 
approach 
Power equlaization (with some limits) above these 
State programs. Clearly this ends wealth 
discrimination and is constitutional. (So 
long as the local is power equalized and not 
just local enrichment based on the present 
power bases.) 
Forecasting What the State Will Do 
What will the State do? What will come from the 
Texas Education Agency, Texas Research League, "Mauzy 
Con!IT1ittee," Texas State Teachers Association, et al, 
studies, plus politics? 
I believe the lines are emerging and that Dr. Brockette 
can answer the question for us. I think that the Texas 
Education Agency plan, or something related to it, is what 
will emerge. Let us not worry for a moment about whether 
the plan is wealth discriminatory. 
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I am fully certain that what the Legislature passes 
will continue to be a highly wealth discriminatory plan. 
The plans that end it are either too expensive or hurt too 
much those who've "got it" now, while those who are being 
hurt don't have the power to assert their rights. 
What will emerge will be a plan that improves the 
Foundation School Program considerably; it will be phased 
in over several years; it will continue local enrichment 
(which is clearly wealth discriminatory); it will continue 
capital outlay and dept service with districts, giving no 
aid from the State, (which is also wealth discriminatory); 
it will put a lot of emphasis on creating new staff positions 
[Out of the Govenor's Committee Report the main result was 
increases in teachers salaries; now there are a couple of 
teachers looking for work for every job opening, and TSTA 
is anxious for more openings]; it will increase the State 
program and money per/pupil which will help the poorest 
districts. In other words, the emphasis will be on making 
the foundation program more adequate, more than today's, 
and this will help the poorest districts. 
But it will leave heavy wealth discrimination, and we 
will be back in court ~mmediately trying to show how wealth 
discriminatory the plan remains and trying to get the 
court to force a nondiscriminatory plan on the State. 
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PART SIX 
THE ORAL ARGUMENTS 
On October 12, 1972, the Supreme Court of the United 
States heard the oral arguments in case number 71-1332 --
San Antonio Independent School District, et al, Appellants, 
v. Demetrio P. Rodriguez, et al., Appellees. Eight justices 
were in attendance: 
Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice 
William 0. Douglas, Associate Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice 
Potter Stewart, Associate Justice 
Byron R. White, Associate Justice 
Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice 
William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice 
Charles A. Wright, of Austin, Texas, was the lawyer 
for the Appellants. Arthur Gochman, San Antonio, Texas, 
was the lawyer for the Apellees. 
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First, excerpts (and some summary) from arguments 
put forth by Charles A. Wright: 
"I would like to take as the text for my argument 
this morning a sentence from an article that Professor 
Coons and his collaborators, Sugarman and Clune, wrote 
last year. It is cited at page 44 of my initial brief. 
They said: ' of all public functions, education in its 
goals and methods is least understood and most in need 
of local variety, experimentation, and independence.' 
"That, I think, is wise counsel. I believe that is 
the argument for reversal in this case. In our view, the 
Texas system of school finance, imperfect as it is •.. 
does allow for local variety, experimentation and inde-
pendence; not as much as I would like it to, but that is 
its goal, that is its rationale, and for that reason there , 
is a rational basis to it, and I will undertake to develop 
our view that the ·rational basis test is the.appropriate 
test. 
"The view adopted by the district court that there is 
a rigid constitutional mandate that the quality of educa-
tion may not be a function of wealth, except the wealth of 
the state as a whole, in my submission, is based on educa-
tional assumptions about matters that are today not under-





"[It] would seriously inhibit, if it would not destroy 
altogether, the possibilities for local variety, experi-
mentation and independence, of which Messrs. Coons, et al., 
quite properly speak so warmly. 
"Proposition One, the proposition adopted by the 
district court in this case, would i~pose a constitutional 
strait jacket on the public schools of 50 states. It 
would mean that hereafter and permanently, or at least 
until a new book is written and the Constitution changes 
again, that all measurements in terms of the public schools, 
must be in terms of per/capita or per/pupil student expend-
itures, even though there may be many other things that 
we ought to be worrying about in an effort to cure the 
problems of public education." 
Then followed a discussion of district ppwer equal-
ization by Mr. Wright with question from the court. 
Justice White asked Mr. Wright if it was not necessary 
for the court to assure a minimum level of spending through-
out the State of Texas, to which Mr. Wright responded in 
part: "I do not think you have to decide that. I am pre-
pared for purposes of the present a.rgument, Justice ~Jhi te, 
without foreclosing what I may say the next time I am up 
before you on a different case, to concede that there is 
a constitutional minimum that could be required. 
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"I think that there were certainly overtones of that 
in Yoder last term when the court talked about a basic 
education and quoted what Thomas Jefferson had to say 
about it and things of that sort, so that I can understand 
what to me is a viable constitutional argument, that a 
minimum education is required. But I do not think there 
is any issue between the parties in this case on whether 
or not Texas is providing a minimum education. 
"I certainly would not want to put words into the 
mouths of my friends. But their pleading is not drawn 
on the theory that the foundation program does not give 
Edgewood enough. Their theory is that it does not give 
Edgewood as much as Alamo Heights and that there is the 
constitutional violation. And that is certainly the consti-
"' 
tutional violation found by the district court. The 
district court made no finding that we fall below what-
ever the constitutional minimum may be ••• " 
Then followed an exchange by Justice Rehnquist and 
Mr. Wright. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: "Do you know of any case in this 
court which has ever held that it would be unconstitu-
tional for a state simply to get out of the business of 
public education bag and baggage?" 
MR. WRIGHT: "I know of no such case, and I would say 
there were certainly strong implications in the Prince 
Edward county case that a state could do exactly that •.• " 
c 
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST: "Then why do you say that a 
minimum education may be a constitutional requirement if 
a state could get out of it entirely?" 
MR. WRIGHT: "I, of course, you recall, sir, made my 
concession entirely in terms of this case. I think I can .. 
safely ooncede it here, but I do not have to take on that 
argument in order to win this case; even if a minimum is 
constitutionally required, Texas wins here. I must say 
I am attracted, Justice Rehnquist, as a scholar to the 
argument that it might be, despite the intimations of your 
previous cases, that today the failure of state to provide 
an education altogether would inhibit the First Amendment 
rights, that a state has an obligation to teach children 
to read and to write. I do not know that I would accept 
that argument, but I can see the possibilities of sketching 
out an argument of that kind." 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: "In the past two or three years, 
-
did not Mr. Justice Black in one opinion, whether part of 
the holding or not, did he not say pretty flatly a state 
could close all its schools if it wanted to?" .. 
MR. WRIGHT: "I think he said something of the sort in 
Palmer v. Thompson, the swimming pool case--" 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST: "Is there a question, however, 
that once the state undertakes to furnish education, then 
it must furnish a certain minimal adequate education for 
everybody? Once they start to go down that row, they must 
follow through." 
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MR WRIGHT: "We certainly must do it for everybody, 
yes. If we are going to do it for any, then we must do 
it for every young person in the state." 
Justice Brennan next asked a question about district 
power equalizations. 
"On district power equalizations, what about the 
percentage of ratings? Do they not differ in Texas? 
They seem to everywhere else. Some places assess at 30 
percent and some at eighty and some at a hundred." 
MR. WRIGHT: "They differ very widely in Texas as 
they do in most states, Justice Brennan, and I think 
that if a state were to adopt district power equalizing, 
it as a practical matter would have to adopt statewide 
as~essing, I do not see any other way in which the scheme 
would be feasible. Otherwise you simply use a favorable 
rate, and you get more than you are entitled to. And I 
think that demonstrates the further incursion on local 
government that the ideas presented here by the Appellees 
[lawyers for Rodriguez] represent, that very little is 
to be left of local government if the decision below is 
to be affirmed. 
"We contend, of course, that if we are subject only to 
the rational basis test, that this is not one of those 
cases in which we must demonstrate a compelling state 
interest in order to justify the results for which we 




"And we think that there are quite a number of very 
recent cases in this court, some of them ignored by the 
lower court and some of them still more recent, that show 
exactly that and show that this court is not going to 
impose a constitutional strait jacket on the states in 
difficult, intractable questions of social reform, wel-
fare, economics, Dandridge, Lindsey, Jefferson v. Hackney, 
cases of that kind, and we think this is clearly in the 
area with which we are concerned. The appellees undertake 
to distinguish these and to suggest that in some way the 
educational needs of the poor are fundamental, while their 
needs for food, for housing, are not. And, with respect, 
this is a distinction that I think simply is not a tenable 
one, that it is hard to say that a higher salaried school 
teacher is more fundamental to a poor child than food or 
a sound roof over head." 
Mr. Wright then took up several issues regarding the 
relationship of money to quality and education. He 
challenged the district court's findings "that there is a 
correlation between poor people and poor school districts," 
arguing that the information which the district court had 
had was not truly representative. He cited a study in 
Connecticut which tended to shav the opposite "that it is 
the poor poeple who live in the area where the most is 
being spent on education and the rich people live in the 
areas where the least is being spent on education." 
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This discussion was interrupted by Justice Douglas 
who asked, "As I read this record, Mr. Wright, it seemed 
to me that the testimony -- I am not sure about the 
findings -- pretty clearly demonstrate there is unequal 
treatment of these respondents who are Americans of 
Spanish ancestry at educational levels. Is that any part 
of this litigation?" 
MR. WRIGHT: "The racial issue is in this litigation, 
yes, Justice Douglas. It is a major portion of the plain-
tiffs' complaint. The trial court did not rely on it in 
its opinion. It put its holding squarely on the dollar 
ineq~ality without regard to whether the particular plain-
tiffs were of Spanish ancestry of Anglo or what. But the 
issue is certainly there. 
~ 
"We think that the issue is one that is fairly read-
ily answered, that although it is of course quite true 
that in the Edgewood School District . in Bexar County, Texas, 
the great majority of the students are of Spanish origin 
and not as much money is spent there as in other school 
districts. But we doubt that this would be found to be 
true as a general matter. But the poor school districts 
are not that congruent with racial distributions, that it 
is, in other words, a happenstance. We have a case in 
which we have particular plaintiffs who are Mexican-




"l.gain, on these factual statistical problems, we 
think that the state of the literature simply does not 
perroit the conclusions that are essePtial to the position 
of my fri e nd; and that even if their conclusions were 
sound, we still think that our legal argument would have 
great merit. But if their conclusions are not de~onstrable 
at the present time because they are the esse~tial premises 
of the results for which they argue, we think that the 
inability to demonstrate the accuracy of these assumptions 
is fatal to tr:cir case." 
Chief Justice Bruger interrupted: "I assume you use 
the term 'state of the literature' in the broader sense 
of state of the human knowledge on this?" 
ME. vJRIGHT: "Yes, yes. That is exactly the sense 
in which I use it, Mr. Chief Justice. I would like ... 
to quote from the book by Messrs. Coons, Sugarman, and 
Clune. They say -- the quotation appears on page 24 of 
our initial brief-- 'It is not surprising that even the 
present litigation is understood by many of its close 
supporters as a racial struggle. The fact is otherwise. 
There is no reason to suppose that the system of district-
based school finance embodies racial bias ... No doubt there 
are poor districts which are basically Negro, but it is 
clear alMost Ly definition that the vast preponderance of 
such districts is white.' 
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"Professor Coons and his associates have supported 
that statement, by figures showing thaL in California, for 
example, 59% of minority students live in districts in 
which the assessed values are above the nedian and there-
fore, if we would have strict equalization, they would 
get less than even novl. '' 
Mr. Wright concluded his testimony thus: 
"I am not here to apologize for the Texas school 
finance system, and I have said repeatedly that it seems 
to me far from perfect. I think that the Texas system 
does assure, as evidence in the record shows, more than 
merely a minimumi it insures a basic education to every 
school child in the state, and it then lets districts, 
if they have r,·,oney and vlant to spend money, go beyond 
that. As I uncerstand the argument of my friend, Mr. 
Gochman, it would not matter if Texas were giving each 
school district in the state $2,000 per student. If Alamo 
Heights were still free to tax, with its heavy resouces, 
and spend more than Edgevmod was, he v10ul.d still find this 
to be impermissible, although, for reasons that are not 
persuasive to me, he regards the same result as quite 
different if it stems from district power equalizing 




"I have said several times in my brief -- and I want 
to say here and say with the utmost sincerity -- how much 
I admire the creative scholarship of Professor Coons and 
his associates, my colleague Professor Udall, and others 
who have written in the field, and I admire also the devo-
tion and the ability with which Mr. Gochman has perser-
vered in this case. These people have opened the eyes of 
the whole country to a very serious problem. I think 
that every one in this courtroom would agree that what 
we want is better education for all children and especially 
for p9or children, that the real differences between us 
are whether a new system should be adopted because this 
court finds that the Constitution requires it or whether 
we look to legislatures to provide remedies and the 
difference about whether the proposals they make would 
indeed lead to better education or only more expensive 
education, whether they would relieve poor children or 
only children who happen to live in poor school districts, 
and indeed if district power equalizing is to be taken 
seriously, whether the remedy that has been offered here 
is not one that is of no benefit to children but only of 
benefit to taxpayers." 
Arthur Gochman presented the case for Rodgriguez, 
et al, substantially as follows. 
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"The court below held the Texas system unconstitu-
tional because it distributes educational benefits on 
the basis of district wealth. The court said, as might 
be expected, those districts most rich in property also 
have the highest median family income and the lowest per-
centage of minority pupils, while the poorer districts are 
poorer in income and predominantly minority in composition ... 
"The court further found that there was no rational 
or compelling reason that could be offered for this invid-
ious discrimination. This court is to decide whether or 
not to reverse the lower court and approve District 12 as 
a proper basis for distributing public school education. 
"The defendants admit that there is a perfect corr~Ja-
tion between the property tax base per/student and the 
~ 
amount of dollars each child gets for his education. Yes, 
Mr. Justice Brennan, tax rates do vary in Texas. But the 
district taxing at the highest rates in Texas get the low-
est dollars per/pupil, and the districts taxing at the 
lowest rate get the highest dollars per/pupil; and we 
showed it in exhibits in Bexar County where my clients 
live, a metropolitan area, and we showed it statewide." 
Mr. Gochman was interrupted by two justices who chal-
lenged whether or not there weren't some school districts 
where the per/capita income is low, but the schools 
have a lot of money to spend. 
'· . 
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While Mr. Gochman agreed this could and did happen, 
he emphasized that this was not the case in Bexar County, 
where Edgewood I. S. D and San Antonio I. S. D are located. 
Mr. Gochman was asked about other social services 
such as police and fire protection and public health 
facilities. He replied, "I think what is important is 
the constitutional importance of education. And that is, 
education affects matters guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
It is preservative of other rights, unlike some of these 
othEr services. It is related to every important right 
we have. It is related to the right to vote, [to] speech, 
[and to] jury service. You cannot serve on a federal 
jury if you cannot read, write, understand, and speak the 
English language. It 'is education this co~rt has used as 
the high water mark for measuring the importance of other 
rights ..• 
"Public health, food, lodging, these things are of 
great economic importance. But they are not matters that 
are related to those things guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights. And in importance, education lies at the apex 
up and down the ladder. It is important to the free enter-
prise system, to the individual not to the poor. It is 
important to fulfill individual potential. It is univer-
sally relevant. And it is the only thing the state pro-
vides that it compels you to utilize for this period of 
time. 
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"But a child has to go to school for ten years. That 
is the importance that the state puts on it. It molds the 
character and the personality of the individual. And it is 
vital for the United States to compete in the world. 
"But they seek to rationalize this and say it is all 
right on the basis of local control, on the basis of 
diversity, variety, independence. [Local control is the] 
one thing the Texas system does not have, because those 
that tax at the highest rates, as I said a moment ago, 
have the lowest expenditures per/pupil. And those that 
tax at the lowest rate have the highest expenditures per 
pupil. This is just the reverse of local control. 
"In San Antonio, Edgewood taxes at a rate 20% 
~igher than Alamo Heights. But they raise thirty some-
odd dollars a pupil. Alamo Heights raises over $400 a 
pupil. It is the property tax base that determines how 
much you have for a child's education. And who set that 
base and who set that standard? The state. And they 
agree that this is a state system of public school educa-
tion. And these school districts were set up by the state 
for the convenience of the state in affording public 
school education. 
"They also agree that these district boundaries serve 
no educational function, and they have no rational basis." 
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Next Mr. Gochman was asked if he agreed with Mr. Wright 
that the state foundation contribution is sufficient to 
provide an adequate education. He said he did not and 
followed with a question of his own. 
"What is a minimum? viThat kind of morass is Mr. Wright 
asking you to get into? What is a minimum? .•• Are we going 
to have two classes of citizens, minimum opportunity 
citizens and first-class citizens? I think in Sweatt we 
took care of that, and I think in McLaurin we took care 
of that." 
Mr. Gochman then got into the issue of power equal-
ization when he was asked the following question: "In 
power equalization, if after providing a minimum education, 
if a district decided that they wanted to spend more money 
on education, they could decide to spend it; is that right?" 
Mr. Gochman agreed. 
Another justice asked if there was any system which 
would satisfy Mr. Gochman's objections to the present 
Texas. system. To which Mr. Gochman replied in substance: 
"One thing they are looking at in Texas for example 
is, you take all the nonresidential wealth and you tax 
it statewide and you tax the residential wealth on a 
county-wide basis. In taxing the residential wealth on 
a county-wide basis each district, by improving its own 
tax rate, will get itself reore money. 
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"But there is a basis, because pretty well, on a 
county-wide basis throughout the state, the residential 
tax basis will be equal or the variance will relate to 
the higher cost of living." 
A justice then summarized, "As I get your position, 
it is not that just unequal inputs per se violate the 
equal protection clause. So far it sounds like you are 
syaing that the fact that there are some districts that 
are locked in is what violates the equal protection clause. 
There is nothing they can do about having a better educa-
tion either from the state foundation program or from 
taxing at higher rates." 
Again Mr. Gochman agreed. 
A long discussion on power equalization followed. 
Then ~1r. Gochman concluded his oral arguments by stating: 
"One thing [the Appellants] are asking you to do in 
this case is to declare constitutional a system that is 
based on money making a difference and giving incentive 
matching grants to those schools that have the most money 
and put up the most money for education, and ask you to 
declare that system to be constitutional on the ground 
that money makes no difference. Actually at the trial of 
this case thay all agreed that money made some difference. 
Now they say that a minimum program is enough, which is 
admission that money must make a difference, that there 






"But again I want to go into the fact that Sweatt, 
J think, did away with minimuros. And I want to point 
the court to McLaurin, because this is what the state 
did. And it is not what will happen as a result that 
counts. In McLaurin the State of Oklahoma s&id this 
child shall sit in the back of the room. This law stu-
dent shall sit in the back of the room, 'Well, nobody 
else would have sat with him anyway; so, the statute 
ought to be upheld because it wouldn't be any different 
if we didn't have it.' And the court said, 'Khat the 
state did is what is important.' 
"I want to say, in concluding, that the San Antonio 
Independent School District, the central city district, 
is a main defendant in this case. And they fought us 
hard at the trial level, got out on a motion to dismiss; 
but on appeal of this case, after seeing the decision of 
the trial court, and the equity involved and the vast 
discrimination, filed a brief in support of the decision 
of the trial court." 
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